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I N T R O D U C T I O N
T h i s  report presents the findings, conclusions, a n d  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  of the National C o m m i s s i o n  
o n  Fraudulent Financial R e p o r t i n g  (the C o m m i s s i o n ) .  F r o m  O c t o b e r  1 9 8 5  to S e p t e m b e r  1987, the 
C o m m i s s i o n  studied the financial reporting s y s t e m  in the U n i t e d  States. O u r  m i s s i o n  w a s  to 
identify causal factors that c a n  lead to fraudulent financial reporting a n d  steps to r e d u c e  its 
incidence.
Fr aud ule nt financial reporting is i n d e e d  a serious p r o b l e m .  Infrequent t h o u g h  its occurrence 
a r gua bly m a y  be, its c o n s e q u e n c e s  c a n  b e  w i d e s p r e a d  a n d  significant. A l t h o u g h  fraud in a n y  f o r m  
c a n  b e  difficult to deter, fraudulent financial reporting c a n  b e  reduced, p e r h a p s  substantially, if 
e a c h  party for w h o m  w e  m a d e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  takes the steps w e  r e c o m m e n d .  T h e  
C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  e m b r a c e  the top m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  b o a r d s  of directors o f  all public 
c o m p a n i e s ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants a n d  the public ac cou nti ng profession, the S E C  a n d  
other regulatory a n d  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  bodies, a n d  the a c a d e m i c  world.
A s  b a c k g r o u n d  to the C o m m i s s i o n  a n d  its w o r k ,  this introduction discusses the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
sponsors, m e m b e r s ,  a n d  advisors, the definition of fraudulent financial reporting that the C o m ­
m i s s i o n  used, the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  objectives, the s c o p e  o f  the study, a n d  the research p r o g r a m .
F o l l o w i n g  this b a c k g r o u n d  information is a discussion of the m a j o r  conclusions that g u i d e d  the 
C o m m i s s i o n  in de v e l o p i n g  the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  presented in this report.
I. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n
S p o n s o r s ,  M e m b e r s ,  a n d  A d v i s o r s
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  w a s  a private-sector initiative, jointly s p o n s o r e d  a n d  f u n d e d  b y  the A m e r i c a n  
Institute o f  Certified Public A c c o u n t a n t s  ( A I C P A ) ,  the A m e r i c a n  A c c o u n t i n g  Association ( A A A ) ,  
the Financial Ex ecu tiv es Institute (FEI), the Institute o f  Internal A uditors (IIA), a n d  the National 
Association o f  A c c o u n t a n t s  ( N A A ) .
T h e  s i x - m e m b e r  C o m m i s s i o n  w a s  i n d e p e n d e n t  of the sp ons ori ng organizations. T h e  c h a i r m a n  of 
the C o m m i s s i o n  w a s  J a m e s  C .  T r e a d w a y ,  Jr., formerly a C o m m i s s i o n e r  of the Securities a n d  
E x c h a n g e  C o m m i s s i o n  ( S E C ) ,  a n d  presently E x e c u t i v e  V i c e  President, G e n e r a l  C o u n s e l ,  m e m b e r  
o f  the E x e c u t i v e  G r o u p ,  a n d  a Director o f  P a i n e  W e b b e r  Incorporated. W i l l i a m  M .  Batten is the 
i m m e d i a t e  past C h a i r m a n  o f  the N e w  Y o r k  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e  a n d  the f o r m e r  C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e  Officer 
( C E O )  o f  J.C. P e n n e y  C o .  W i l l i a m  S. K a n a g a  is C h a i r m a n  o f  the A d v i s o r y  B o a r d  o f  A r t h u r  Y o u n g  
&  C o m p a n y ,  a n d  served as C h a i r m a n  o f  that firm a n d  o f  the A I C P A .  H u g h  L. M a r s h  is the 
Director-Internal A u d i t  for A L C O A ,  responsible for its w o r l d w i d e  audit activities. H e  also is a past 
C h a i r m a n  o f  the IIA. T h o m a s  I. Storrs is the i m m e d i a t e  past C h a i r m a n  a n d  C E O  o f  N C N B  
Corporation, a b a n k  holding c o m p a n y ,  a n d  continues to serve as a Director o f  N C N B .  D o n a l d  H .  
Trautlein recently retired as C h a i r m a n  a n d  C E O  o f  B e t h l e h e m  Steel a n d  w a s  f ormerly a partner 
w i th the ac cou nti ng firm of Price W a t e r h o u s e .  A p p e n d i x  A  includes biographies o f  the C o m m i s ­
sioners a n d  the E x e c u t i v e  Staff.
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A n  A d v i s o r y  B o a r d ,  representing a b r o a d  s p e c t r u m  o f  ex perience a n d  points o f  v i ew, assisted the 
C o m m i s s i o n .
Definition o f  F r a u d u l e n t  Fi n a n c ia l R e p o r t i n g
F o r  p u r p o s e s  of this study a n d  report, the C o m m i s s i o n  defined fraudulent financial reporting as 
intentional or reckless conduct, w h e t h e r  act or om ission, that results in materially mi sle adi ng 
financial statements. Fr audulent financial reporting c a n  involve m a n y  factors a n d  take m a n y  forms. 
It m a y  entail gross a n d  deliberate distortion of corporate records, s u c h  as inventory c o u n t  tags, or 
falsified transactions, s u c h  as fictitious sales or orders. It m a y  entail the misapplication of a c ­
c o unt ing principles. C o m p a n y  e m p l o y e e s  at a n y  level m a y  b e  involved, f r o m  top to m i d d l e  
m a n a g e m e n t  to lower-level personnel. If the c o n d u c t  is intentional, or so reckless that it is the legal 
equivalent of  intentional conduct, a n d  results in fraudulent financial statements, it c o m e s  within 
the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  operating definition of  the t e r m  frau d u l e n t  financial reporting.
Fraudulent financial reporting differs f r o m  other causes of materially misl e a d i n g  financial state­
m e n t s ,  s u c h  as unintentional errors. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  also distinguished fraudulent financial 
reporting f r o m  other corporate improprieties, s u c h  as e m p l o y e e  e m b e z z l e m e n t s ,  violations of 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  or p roduct safety regulations, a n d  tax fraud, w h i c h  d o  not necessarily c a u s e  the 
financial statements to b e  materially inaccurate.
O b j e c t i v e s
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  h a d  three m a j o r  objectives:
1. C o n s i d e r  the extent to w h i c h  acts of fraudulent financial reporting u n d e r m i n e  the integrity of 
financial reporting; the forces a n d  the opportunities, environmental, institutional, or individ­
ual, that m a y  contribute to these acts; the extent to w h i c h  fraudulent financial reporting c a n  
b e  pre v e n t e d  or deterred a n d  to w h i c h  it c a n  b e  detected s o o n e r  after occurrence; the extent, 
if any, to w h i c h  incidents of this type of fraud m a y  b e  the p roduct o f  a decline in profes­
sionalism o f  corporate financial officers a n d  internal auditors; a n d  the extent, if any, to w h i c h  
the regulatory a n d  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  e n v i r o n m e n t  unwittingly m a y  h a v e  tolerated or contrib­
uted to the oc cur ren ce o f  this type o f  fraud.
2. E x a m i n e  the role o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant in detecting fraud, focusing particu­
larly o n  w h e t h e r  the detection o f  fraudulent financial reporting has b e e n  neglected or insuf­
ficiently f o c u s e d  o n  a n d  w h e t h e r  the ability of the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant to detect s u c h  
fraud c a n  b e  e n h a n c e d ,  a n d  consider w h e t h e r  c h a n g e s  in auditing standards or proc e d u r e s —  
internal a n d  external— w o u l d  r e d u c e  the extent o f  fraudulent financial reporting.
3. Identify attributes of corporate structure that m a y  contribute to acts o f  fraudulent financial 
reporting or to the failure to detect s u c h  acts promptly.
S c o p e :  P u b l i c  C o m p a n i e s
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  study f o c u s e d  o n  public c o m p a n i e s .  T h e  t e r m  public c o m p a n y  generally 
includes c o m p a n i e s  o w n e d  b y  public investors. Several types o f  c o m p a n i e s  fall within the 
C o m m i s s i o n ' s  definition of public c o m p a n y :  (1) public c o m p a n i e s  that report to the S E C ;  (2) 
certain publicly o w n e d  banks, savings a n d  loan associations, a n d  other financial institutions that 
are subject to the disclosure provisions o f  the federal securities l a w s  but report to o n e  o f  the 
financial institution regulatory agencies; a n d  (3) certain m u t u a l  thrift institutions.
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T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  included public c o m p a n i e s  o f  this third type for several reasons. T h e  s a m e  federal 
agencies that regulate the publicly o w n e d  financial institutions regulate these m u t u a l  thrift insti­
tutions. T h e i r  o w n e r s h i p  b y  depositors r e s e m b l e s  public o w n e r s h i p  since these c o m p a n i e s  accept 
public f u nds as capital a n d  give depositors equity-like interests. A  n u m b e r  o f  cases o f  fraudulent 
financial reporting h a v e  occurred in these institutions, w i th far-reaching impact.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  focus sh o u l d  not i m p l y  that fraudulent financial reporting occurs only in public 
c o m p a n i e s  or that o n l y  in these c o m p a n i e s  is its i m p a c t  noteworthy. O n  the contrary, fraudulent 
financial reporting has occurred, often w i t h  serious c o n s e q u e n c e s ,  in entities that are outside the 
express s c o p e  o f  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  study a n d  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
A m o n g  the " n o n - p u b l i c  c o m p a n y "  entities that are at risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting are 
s o m e  entities, s u c h  as m u t u a l  insurance c o m p a n i e s ,  that m a y  in fact accept public funds as capital. 
Ot h e r s  at risk include state-regulated ba n k s ,  private de fense contractors a n d  private c o m p a n i e s  in 
general, as well as various g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  q u a s i - g o v e r n m e n t  entities. In the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
estimation, the overall thrust o f  the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s — especially the e m p h a s i s  o n  top m a n a g e ­
m e n t ' s  responsibility— is relevant a n d  applies to all these " n o n - p u b l i c  c o m p a n y "  entities.
A p p l i e d  w i th pr o p e r  reflection, foresight, a n d  ingenuity, m a n y  of the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n ­
dations sh o u l d  p r o v e  practicable, cost-effective, a n d  suitable for these other entities to i m p l e m e n t .  
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  urges " n o n - p u b l i c  c o m p a n y "  entities to us e  the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
in f o r m i n g  individual or collective responses to the p r o b l e m  o f  fraudulent financial reporting.
R e s e a r c h  P r o g r a m  a n d  I n t e r v i e w s
A  t h o r o u g h  u n derstanding of  the e n v i r o n m e n t  in w h i c h  fraudulent financial reporting occurs is a 
prerequisite to identifying appropriate responses. T o o  often, the subject ha s  b e e n  considered f r o m  
a n a r r o w  perspective. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  p laced a hi gh priority o n  g o i n g  d e e p e r  than the o b v i o u s  
in identifying the m a n y  forces a n d  opportunities that m a y  contribute to financial reporting fraud.
T o  this end, the C o m m i s s i o n  directed a n  extensive research p r o g r a m .  O u t s i d e  experts w h o  
c o n d u c t e d  research projects for the C o m m i s s i o n  co nsidered professionalism a n d  c o d e s  of corporate 
conduct, corporate pressures, surprise writeoffs, internal control, internal auditing, the role of the 
S E C ,  litigation against public accountants, the i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  the public accountant, c o m p u t e r  
fraud, a n d  business a n d  accounting education. In addition, the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  staff c o m p l e t e d  m o r e  
than 2 0  research projects a n d  briefing papers, including analyses of S E C  e n f o r c e m e n t  actions, 
pressures within public a c cou nti ng firms, A I C P A  self-regulatory p r o g r a m s ,  a n d  the legal a n d  
regulatory e n v i r o n m e n t .  Significant findings o f  the research efforts are incorporated into the text 
o f  the report, a n d  A p p e n d i c e s  B  a n d  C  s u m m a r i z e  the research.
T o  s u p p l e m e n t  this research p r o g r a m ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  r e v i e w e d  previous a n d  current related 
studies a n d  interviewed n u m e r o u s  experts. T h e  related studies the C o m m i s s i o n  r e v i e w e d  are listed 
in A p p e n d i x  C .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  interviewed the C h a i r m a n  o f  the S E C ,  the C h a i r m a n  of the 
Federal D e p o s i t  Insurance Corporation, the C o m p t r o l l e r  of the C u r r e n c y ,  the C o m p t r o l l e r  G e n e r a l  
o f  the U n i t e d  States, the C h a i r m a n  of the A I C P A ,  the C h a i r m a n  of the A u d i t i n g  Standards B o a r d ,  
the C h a i r m a n  o f  the A I C P A ' s  S E C  Practice Section's Public Ove r s i g h t  B o a r d ,  the C h a i r m a n  of 
the IIA, the President of the F E I, the President of the N A A ,  the President of the National 
Association o f  State B o a r d s  o f  A c c o u n t a n c y ,  several m e m b e r s  o f  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  A d v i s o r y  
B o a r d ,  a n d  m a n y  other in d e p e n d e n t  public accountants, g o v e r n m e n t  regulators, corporate e x e c ­
utives, a n d  university professors. A p p e n d i x  D  lists the persons the C o m m i s s i o n  consulted.
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E x p o s u r e  Draft, P u b l i c  C o m m e n t ,  a n d  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  H e a r i n g s
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  first v o t e d  o n  the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  in O c t o b e r  1986. Thereafter, m e m b e r s  o f  the 
C o m m i s s i o n  a n d  the staff delivered several s p e e c h e s  airing the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  initial findings a n d  
conclusions to " p r e - e x p o s e "  the E x p o s u r e  Draft o f  the report a n d  thus start the c o m m e n t  process 
in a d v a n c e  of the draft's publication in late April 1987.
In addition to those w h o  c o n v e y e d  their reactions, suggestions, a n d  opinions informally during the 
p r e-exposure period, a p p r o x i m a t e l y  5 0  interested organizations a n d  individuals exp r e s s e d  their 
points of v i e w  in written c o m m e n t s .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  co nsidered all the c o m m e n t s — positive, 
negative, a n d  neutral— in its deliberations. In a n u m b e r  o f  areas, the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  in the 
E x p o s u r e  Draft b o r e  the imprint of these c o m m e n t s .
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  five sp ons ori ng organizations distributed o v e r  4 0 , 0 0 0  copies o f  the E x p o s u r e  
Draft. R e q u e s t i n g  a n d  w e l c o m i n g  public c o m m e n t ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  received o v e r  2 0 0  letters in 
reply. T h e s e  responses represented the v i e w s  o f  substantially m o r e  than 2 0 0  interested parties, 
since m a n y  o f  t h e m  presented the collective c o m m e n t s  o f  m e m b e r s  o f  professional a n d  trade 
organizations, including the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  five sp ons ori ng organizations, as well as large national 
acco u n t i n g  firms, state a n d  federal agencies, leading financial service institutions, a n d  F o r t u n e  5 0 0  
c o m p a n i e s .
T h e  process of reviewing, analyzing, a n d  considering the c o m m e n t  letters w a s  indispensable to the 
C o m m i s s i o n  in c o m p l e t i n g  a n d  issuing the report. T h e  o v e r w h e l m i n g  majority o f  responses 
c o m p l i m e n t e d  the C o m m i s s i o n  o n  its overall effort a n d  w e r e  g e n e r o u s  in their support o f  the 
C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  T h o s e  w h o  exp r e s s e d  selective d i s a g r e e m e n t  or raised particular 
c o n c e r n s  w i t h  regard to o n e  or m o r e  o f  the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  m a d e  m a n y  insightful c o m m e n t s  a n d  
constructive suggestions. T h e  report includes a n u m b e r  o f  c h a n g e s  m a d e  to reflect the c o m m e n ­
tators' suggestions, criticisms, a n d  other viewpoints. T h e  c o m m e n t  letters, part o f  the p e r m a n e n t  
record of the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  w o r k ,  are available to the public o n  request t h r o u g h  the offices o f  the 
A I C P A  in N e w  Y o r k .
Finally, the C o m m i s s i o n  a p p e a r e d  twice before the H o u s e  C o m m i t t e e  o n  E n e r g y  a n d  C o m m e r c e ' s  
S u b c o m m i t t e e  o n  O v e r s i g h t  a n d  Investigations, as part o f  the S u b c o m m i t t e e ' s  continuing inquiry 
into the a d e q u a c y  o f  auditing, accounting, a n d  financial reporting practices u n d e r  the federal 
securities laws.
II. M a j o r  G u i d i n g  C o n c l u s i o n s
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  taken together, f o r m  a b a l a n c e d  r e spo nse to fraudulent 
financial reporting. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  c a n n o t  o v e r e m p h a s i z e  the i m p o r t a n c e  of evaluating its 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  in their totality; n o  o n e  is m e a n t  to b e  singled out f r o m  the rest. Indeed, the 
C o m m i s s i o n  w i thh eld e n d o r s e m e n t  o f  a n y  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  u n d e r  consideration until the research 
a n d  briefing papers for substantially all r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  h a d  b e e n  c o m p l e t e d  a n d  the C o m m i s s i o n  
c o u l d  see the w e b  o f  relationships a m o n g  the p r o p o s e d  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
F r o m  the outset, the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  goal w a s  to d e v e l o p  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  that w o u l d  b e  practical, 
reasonable in the circumstances, justified b y  the benefits to b e  achieved, a n d  w o u l d  lend t h e m ­
selves to i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  w ithout u n d u e  burden. G u i d i n g  the C o m m i s s i o n  in this task w e r e  a 
n u m b e r  o f  conclusions.
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A c c o u n t a b i l i t y
W h e n  a  c o m p a n y  raises fu nds f r o m  the public, that c o m p a n y  a s s u m e s  a n  obligation of public trust 
a n d  a c o m m e n s u r a t e  level o f  accountability to the public. If a c o m p a n y  w i s h e s  access to the public 
capital a n d  credit markets, it m u s t  accept a n d  fulfill certain obligations necessary to protect the 
public interest. O n e  of the m o s t  f u n d a m e n t a l  obligations of the public c o m p a n y  is the full a n d  fair 
public disclosure o f  corporate information, including financial results.
T h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant w h o  audits the financial statements o f  a public c o m p a n y  also 
has a public obligation. A s  the U . S .  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  has recognized, w h e n  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
ac countant opines o n  a public c o m p a n y ' s  financial statements, h e  a s s u m e s  a public responsibility 
that transcends the contractual relationship w i th his client. T h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's 
responsibility ex tends to the corporation's stockholders, creditors, cu stomers, a n d  the rest of the 
investing public. T h e  regulations a n d  standards for auditing public c o m p a n i e s  m u s t  b e  a d e q u a t e  
to safeguard that public trust a n d  auditors m u s t  adh e r e  to those standards.
T h e  N e e d  for I m p r o v e m e n t
T h e  extensive financial reporting b y  public c o m p a n i e s  is the m o s t  critical c o m p o n e n t  of the full 
a n d  fair disclosure that ensures the effective functioning of the capital a n d  credit m a r k e t s  in the 
U n i t e d  States. T h e  financial reporting s y s t e m  in the U n i t e d  States is the best in the world, a m o d e l  
for other d e v e l o p e d  nations. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  nonetheless c o n c l u d e d  that it sh o u l d  e x a m i n e  the 
s y s t e m  objectively b e c a u s e  it is s o  im portant a n d  is s u c h  a m o d e l .  O u r  e x a m i n a t i o n  c a u s e d  us to 
c o n c l u d e  that steps n e e d  to b e  taken to i m p r o v e  o u r  financial reporting sy stem, despite its present 
excellence.
Q u a n t i f y i n g  the P r o b l e m
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  so u g h t  to quantify the p r o b l e m  o f  fraudulent financial reporting. T h a t  quanti­
fication p r o v e d  to b e  impossible. W e  f o u n d  n o  w a y  to g a u g e  either the a m o u n t  or the significance 
o f  undetected fraudulent financial reporting or the n u m b e r  o f  cases detected but, for a variety of 
reasons, not p u r s u e d  b y  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  officials. A s  a result, estimating the true extent of the 
p r o b l e m  is not s i m p l y  a matter of c o m p a r i n g ,  for e x a m p l e ,  the n u m b e r  of fraudulent financial 
reporting cases b r o u g h t  b y  the Securities a n d  E x c h a n g e  C o m m i s s i o n  ( S E C )  w i th the total n u m b e r  
o f  publicly filed financial reports.
T h r e e  R e l e v a n t  F a c t o r s
E v e n  t h o u g h  precise quantification p r o v e d  to b e  impossible, the C o m m i s s i o n  c o n c l u d e d  that three 
other factors are relevant: (1) the seriousness of the c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  fraudulent financial reporting, 
(2) the risk of its occurring in a n y  g i v e n  c o m p a n y ,  a n d  (3) the realistic potential for r educing that 
risk.
C o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g .  First, w h e n  fraudulent financial reporting 
occurs, serious c o n s e q u e n c e s  ensue. T h e  d a m a g e  that results is wi d e s p r e a d ,  w i th a s o m e t i m e s  
devastating ripple effect. T h o s e  affected m a y  r a n g e  f r o m  the i m m e d i a t e  victims— the c o m p a n y ' s  
stockholders a n d  creditors— to the m o r e  r e m o t e — those h a r m e d  w h e n  investor confidence in the 
stock m a r k e t  is shaken. B e t w e e n  these t w o  extremes, m a n y  others m a y  b e  affected: e m p l o y e e s  
w h o  suffer j o b  loss or d i m i n i s h e d  p e n s i o n  f u n d  value; depositors in financial institutions; the 
c o m p a n y ' s  underwriters, auditors, attorneys, a n d  insurers; a n d  e v e n  ho n e s t  competitors w h o s e  
reputations suffer b y  association.
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R i s k  o f  O c c u r r e n c e .  T o  assess the risk that fraudulent financial reporting m a y  occur, the 
C o m m i s s i o n  a n a l y z e d  its causes. W e  c o n c l u d e d  that the causal factors, the forces a n d  opportunities 
that w e r e  present in n u m e r o u s  S E C  e n f o r c e m e n t  cases, are present to s o m e  extent in all c o m p a n i e s .  
N o  c o m p a n y ,  regardless o f  size or business, is i m m u n e  f r o m  the possibility that fraudulent 
financial reporting will occur. T h a t  possibility is inherent in d o i n g  business.
Realistic Potential f o r  R e d u c i n g  Risk. W e  believe a realistic potential exists for re d u c i n g  the 
risk of fraudulent financial reporting, p r o v i d e d  the p r o b l e m  is co nsidered a n d  add r e s s e d  as m u l ­
tidimensional. T h e  p r o b l e m ' s  mu lti dim ens io nal nature b e c o m e s  clear w h e n  w e  m e r e l y  consider the 
m a n y  participants w h o  s h a p e  the financial reporting process: the c o m p a n y  a n d  its m a n a g e m e n t ,  the 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant, regulatory a n d  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  agencies, a n d  e v e n  educators. 
E a c h  o n e  ha s  the potential to influence the o u t c o m e  of the financial reporting process. T h u s  w e  
believe that a multi d i m e n s i o n a l  a p p r o a c h  that analyzes a n d  addresses the role of e a c h  participant 
has the m a x i m u m  potential for re d u c i n g  the incidence o f  fraudulent financial reporting.
Participants in th e F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  P r o c e s s
T h e  responsibility for reliable financial reporting resides first a n d  f o r e m o s t  at the corporate level. 
T o p  m a n a g e m e n t — starting with the chief executive officer— sets the tone a n d  establishes the 
financial reporting e n v i r o n m e n t .  Therefore, re d u c i n g  the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting m u s t  
start within the reporting c o m p a n y .
W e  h a v e  identified a n u m b e r  of practices already in place in m a n y  c o m p a n i e s  that c a n  help all 
public c o m p a n i e s  m e e t  their responsibilities a n d  r e d u c e  the incidence of fraudulent financial 
reporting. O n e  k e y  practice is the b o a r d  of  directors' establishment o f  a n  i n f o r m e d ,  vigilant a n d  
effective audit c o m m i t t e e  to ov ersee the c o m p a n y ' s  financial reporting process. A n o t h e r  is es­
tablishing a n d  maintaining a n  internal audit function.
Prior efforts to r e d u c e  the risk of fraudulent financial reporting h a v e  t e n d e d  to focus heavily o n  the 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant and, as such, w e r e  inherently limited. I n d e p e n d e n t  public a c c o u n ­
tants play a crucial, but s e c o n d a r y  role. T h e y  are not guarantors of the a c c u r a c y  or the reliability 
o f  financial statements. Th eir role, h o w e v e r ,  c a n  b e  e n h a n c e d ,  particularly w i t h  respect to d e ­
tecting fraudulent financial reporting, a n d  financial statement preparers a n d  users s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  
to u n d e r s t a n d  the e n h a n c e d  role.
A t  the s a m e  time, h o w e v e r ,  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  p r i m a r y  responsibility for reliable financial reporting 
sh o u l d  b e  e m p h a s i z e d ,  so that public u n der sta ndi ng o f  the relative a n d  c o m p l e m e n t a r y  obligations 
of corporate m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants is i m p r o v e d .
R e g u l a t o r y  a n d  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  agencies p rovide the deterrence that is critical to r e d u c i n g  the 
incidence o f  fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  S E C ,  t h r o u g h  its financial fraud e n f o r c e m e n t  
p r o g r a m ,  already has significantly raised corporate a w a r e n e s s  of the p r o b l e m  a n d  of the potential 
for detection a n d  p u n i s h m e n t .  B u t  i m p r o v e m e n t s  c a n  a n d  sh o u l d  b e  m a d e ,  b o t h  at the state a n d  
the federal level.
A l t h o u g h  educators are not generally co nsidered participants in the financial reporting process, 
they h a v e  a n  important role in helping to r e d u c e  the risk of fraudulent financial reporting. 
E d u c a t i o n  c a n  prepare business a n d  ac cou nti ng students to recognize the factors that c a n  contribute 
to this type of fraud a n d  the ethical values a n d  g o o d  business practices necessary to g u a r d  against 
it.
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I m p r o v e m e n t s  N e e d e d  in All A r e a s
O u r  analysis of the role o f  e a c h  participant in the financial reporting process led us to c o n c l u d e  that 
n o  o n e  a n s w e r  to the p r o b l e m  o f  fraudulent financial reporting exists. Rather, i m p r o v e m e n t  is 
n e e d e d  in all areas. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  c a n  b e  i m p l e m e n t e d  within the existing 
structure o f  corporate g o v e r n a n c e  a n d  regulation. A s  a c o n s e q u e n c e ,  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  report 
presents a unified set of c o m p l e m e n t a r y  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  to b e  carried out b y  a n u m b e r  of pe rsons 
a n d  entities. F e w e r  than one-third of the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  require regulatory or legislative action. 
In the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  estimation, alternatives to this a p p r o a c h  w o u l d  entail m o r e  drastic m e a s u r e s ,  
requiring a restructuring of corporate g o v e r n a n c e  a n d  greater regulatory intrusion, w i t h  n o  evi­
d e n c e  that greater results w o u l d  obtain.
In referring to the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  in this report as a "unified set o f  c o m p l e m e n t a r y  r e c o m ­
m e n d a t i o n s , "  the C o m m i s s i o n  e m p h a s i z e s  that the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  h a v e  b e e n  f o r m u l a t e d  to 
w o r k  together synergistically. Y e t  the C o m m i s s i o n  d o e s  not offer its r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  as a n  "all 
or n o t h i n g "  proposition to b e  a ccepted or rejected as a wh o l e .  Clearly, i m p l e m e n t i n g  s o m e  of the 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  w o u l d  b e  better than adopting n o n e  of t h e m .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  success in i m p l e ­
m e n t i n g  these r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  d o e s  not hi n g e  o n  the exclusive effort o f  a single participant or 
g r o u p  o f  participants. Rather, success d e p e n d s  o n  a significant effort b y  all participants d o i n g  their 
part to m a k e  the financial reporting process w o r k  better.
In s o m e  cases, m a k i n g  the process w o r k  better requires the participants to initiate n e w  practices; 
in others, it necessitates i m p r o v i n g  the present practices. In fact, s o m e  public c o m p a n i e s  a n d  
public accounting firms are already d o i n g  m a n y  of the things w e  r e c o m m e n d ,  as a matter of g o o d  
business practice.
L e g a l ,  Financial, a n d  O t h e r  A d v i s o r s
T h e  professional a n d  technical skills of several other g r o u p s  within the business a n d  professional 
c o m m u n i t y  enable t h e m  to w o r k  closely with k e y  participants in the financial reporting process. 
A m o n g  these g r o u p s  are lawyers, i n v e s t m e n t  bankers, financial analysts, business advisors, a n d  
those in c h a r g e  o f  s y s t e m s  for securing c o m p a n y  assets. W h e t h e r  they operate f r o m  inside or 
outside the public c o m p a n y ,  these advisors are u niquely situated to influence the tone set b y  the 
top m a n a g e m e n t  of corporations. T h r o u g h  the advice a n d  opinions they e x t e n d  to top m a n a g e m e n t  
or the b o a r d  o f  directors, these advisors c a n  affect the o u t c o m e  o f  the financial reporting process.
In fact, past incidents of fraudulent financial reporting h a v e  revealed m a n y  patterns of b e hav ior 
t h r o u g h  w h i c h  these types o f  advisors a d d  to the pressures a n d  the opportunities that m a y  lead to 
this k i n d  o f  w r o n g d o i n g .  L a w y e r s  w h o  a d o p t  a strictly legalistic a p p r o a c h  m a y  c ounsel clients to 
ac hieve desired e n d s  t h r o u g h  m e a n s  that are too close to the fine line b e t w e e n  w h a t  is legal a n d  
w h a t  is not. I n v e s t m e n t  b a n k e r s  m a y  exploit g a p s  or ambiguities in a c c ou nti ng standards to devise 
questionable financing techniques a n d  transactions. Financial analysts, th r o u g h  m y o p i c  notions of 
profitability a n d  other indicators of c o m p a n y  financial health, m a y  pressure top m a n a g e m e n t  to 
focus all their efforts o n  achieving short-term gains. T h r o u g h  s u c h  conduct, legal, financial, a n d  
other advisors b e c o m e  part o f  the p r o b l e m  o f  fraudulent financial reporting.
A l t h o u g h  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  d o  not specifically target t h e m ,  these critical a d ­
visors sh o u l d  recognize the extent to w h i c h  they contribute to a n d  collaborate in activity that c a n  
lead to fraudulent financial reporting. If these advisors d o  not e m b r a c e  the spirit b e h i n d  the 
C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  they c o u l d  hinder certain k e y  participants in the financial re­
porting process f r o m  successfully i m p l e m e n t i n g  the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  directed to t h e m .  A c c o r d ­
ingly, the C o m m i s s i o n  urges legal, financial, a n d  other advisors to support its r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s
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a n d  to consider t h e m  in f o r m i n g  their o w n  r e spo nse to the p r o b l e m  of fraudulent financial 
reporting.
T h e  efforts o f  these advisors to f o r m  a  r esponse to the p r o b l e m  o f  fraudulent financial reporting 
will necessarily entail reassessing their legal a n d  professional responsibilities a n d  accountability, 
not o n l y  to their clients, but also to the public a n d  to the s y s t e m  o f  w h i c h  they are a part. O f  
r e m a r k a b l e  relevance to this e n d e a v o r  is a m e s s a g e  that the late S u p r e m e  C o u r t  C h i e f  Justice 
H a r l a n  F. S t o n e  delivered m o r e  than a half-century a g o  to m e m b e r s  o f  the legal c o m m u n i t y :
T o d a y  antisocial business practices w h i c h  h a v e  not yet m e t  w it h o u r  refusal to c o u n t e n a n c e  t h e m ,  are 
equally in the public thought. It is true that the parallel to the earlier era is not precise, for m a n y  o f  
these practices are still within the law, a n d  to stand against t h e m  it is nec e s s a r y  that w e  d o  m o r e  than 
d e f e n d  legal rights; it is needful that w e  l o o k  b e y o n d  the club o f  the p o l i c e m a n  as a  civilizing a g e n c y  
to the sanctions o f  professional standards w h i c h  c o n d e m n  the d o i n g  o f  w h a t  the l a w  h a s  not yet 
forbidden. ( H a r v a r d  L a w  R e v i e w ,  V o l u m e  48, p a g e  13, 1 9 3 4 )
O v e r a l l  Benefits
In d e v e l o p i n g  o u r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  w e  w e i g h e d  the costs a n d  other b u r d e n s  they w o u l d  i m p o s e  
against the benefits they w o u l d  achieve. W e  recognize that there are limits to the ability to prevent 
or detect fraud, n o  matter h o w  m u c h  cost is incurred. W e  believe o u r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  are 
cost-effective.
T a k e n  collectively, the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  can:
• I m p r o v e  the financial reporting e n v i r o n m e n t  in the public c o m p a n y  in several important 
respects a n d  thus help to r e d u c e  the incidence o f  fraudulent financial reporting
• I m p r o v e  auditing standards, the standard-setting process, a n d  the s y s t e m  for ensuring audit 
quality, to detect fraudulent financial reporting earlier a n d  p e r h a p s  thus deter it
• E n h a n c e  the regulatory a n d  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  e n v i r o n m e n t  to strengthen deterrence
• E n h a n c e  the education o f  future participants in the financial reporting process.
I n h e r e n t  L i m i t a t i o n s  a n d  N e e d  for C o n t i n u e d  Efforts
O u r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  are b y  n o  m e a n s  the final answers. F r a u d  is as c o m p l e x  as h u m a n  nature, 
a n d  as society c hanges, the financial reporting s y s t e m  will c h a n g e .  A s  fraudulent financial re­
porting likewise evolves, so m u s t  counter responses. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  urges all participants in the 
financial reporting s y s t e m  to i m p l e m e n t  these r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  as the next step in the continuing 
process o f  r e s p o n d i n g  to fraudulent financial reporting. I m p l e m e n t i n g  o u r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  will 
require additional g u i d a n c e  in the f o r m  of r u l e m a k i n g  b y  regulators a n d  t h r o u g h  authoritative 
p r o n o u n c e m e n t s  b y  other interested a n d  k n o w l e d g e a b l e  parties.
Yet, i m p l e m e n t i n g  all 4 9  o f  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  w o u l d  still not guarantee that 
fraudulent financial reporting will disappear. Similarly, failure to i m p l e m e n t  s o m e  or all o f  the 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  s h o u l d  not automatically establish liability if fraudulent financial reporting 
occurs. T h o s e  w h o  allege that fraud has occurred m u s t  still offer affirmative p r o o f  of a n y  actual 
w r o n g d o i n g .
A  further w o r d  o f  caution also is in order. W h i l e  increased a w a r e n e s s  o f  fraudulent financial 
reporting within the business a n d  professional c o m m u n i t y  a n d  a m o n g  the investing public g e n ­
erally is important, it is equally important that public expectations not b e  raised u n d u l y  b e c a u s e  
e v e n  full i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  of the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  will not c o m p l e t e l y  eradicate
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fraudulent financial reporting. Fraudulent financial reporting m u s t  not b e  a s s u m e d  m e r e l y  b e c a u s e  
a business fails. T h e  public m u s t  recognize a n d  u n d e r s t a n d  the clear line that distinguishes the 
failure o f  top m a n a g e m e n t  to m a n a g e  well f r o m  the intentional or reckless c o n d u c t  that a m o u n t s  
to fraud. W e  h o p e  that our report will serve as a f r a m e w o r k  for action n o w  a n d  as a springboard 
for future efforts to red u c e  fraudulent financial reporting.
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S U M M A R Y  O F  R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S
T h i s  s u m m a r y  is a synopsis o f  the organization a n d  content o f  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a ­
tions, w h i c h  a p p e a r  in C h a p t e r s  T w o  t h r o u g h  F i ve o f  the report. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  urges readers 
to consider the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a l o n g  w i th the a c c o m p a n y i n g  text, w h i c h  explains, a d d s  g u i d ­
ance, a n d  in certain cases m a k e s  ancillary r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
I. R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for t h e  P u b l i c  C o m p a n y  ( C h a p t e r  T w o )
Prevention a n d  earlier detection of fraudulent financial reporting m u s t  start w i th the entity that 
prepares financial reports. T h u s  the first focus o f  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  is the public 
c o m p a n y .  T h e s e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  taken together, will i m p r o v e  a c o m p a n y ' s  overall financial 
reporting process a n d  increase the likelihood of preventing fraudulent financial reporting a n d  
detecting it earlier w h e n  it occurs. F o r  s o m e  c o m p a n i e s ,  i m p l e m e n t i n g  these r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  will 
require little or e v e n  n o  c h a n g e  f r o m  current practices; for other c o m p a n i e s ,  it will m e a n  a d d i n g  
or i m p r o v i n g  a r e c o m m e n d e d  practice. W h e t h e r  it m e a n s  a d d i n g  or i m p r o v i n g  a practice, the 
benefits justify the costs. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for the public c o m p a n y  deal with 
(1) the tone set b y  top m a n a g e m e n t ,  (2) the internal ac cou nti ng a n d  audit functions, (3) the audit 
c o m m i t t e e ,  (4) m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  audit c o m m i t t e e  reports, (5) the practice of seeking s e c o n d  
opinions f r o m  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants, a n d  (6) quarterly reporting.
T h e  T o n e  at t h e  T o p
T h e  first three r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  focus o n  a n  e l e m e n t  within the c o m p a n y  o f  overriding i m p o r t a n c e  
in preventing fraudulent financial reporting: the tone set b y  top m a n a g e m e n t  that influences the 
corporate e n v i r o n m e n t  within w h i c h  financial reporting occurs. T o  set the right tone, top m a n ­
a g e m e n t  m u s t  identify a n d  assess the factors that c o u l d  lead to fraudulent financial reporting; all 
public c o m p a n i e s  sho u l d  maintain internal controls that p rovide reasonable assurance that fraud­
ulent financial reporting will b e  pre v e n t e d  or subject to early detection— this is a bro a d e r  c o n c e p t  
than internal ac cou nti ng controls— a n d  all public c o m p a n i e s  sh o u l d  d e v e l o p  a n d  enforce effective, 
written c o d e s  o f  corporate conduct. A s  a part o f  its o n g o i n g  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  the effectiveness of 
internal controls, a c o m p a n y ' s  audit c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  annually r e v i e w  the p r o g r a m  that m a n ­
a g e m e n t  establishes to m o n i t o r  c o m p l i a n c e  w i th the code. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  also r e c o m m e n d s  that 
its sp ons ori ng organizations cooperate in d e v e l o p i n g  additional, integrated g u i d a n c e  o n  internal 
controls.
Internal A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  A u d i t  F u n c t i o n s
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  turn next to the ability of the participants in the financial 
reporting process within the c o m p a n y  to prevent or detect fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  
internal ac cou nti ng function m u s t  b e  d e s i g n e d  to fulfill the financial reporting responsibilities the 
corporation ha s  u n d e r t a k e n  as a public c o m p a n y .  M o r e o v e r ,  all public c o m p a n i e s  m u s t  h a v e  a n  
effective a n d  objective internal audit function. T h e  internal auditor's qualifications, staff, status 
within the c o m p a n y ,  reporting lines, a n d  relationship w i th the audit c o m m i t t e e  o f  the b o a r d  of 
directors m u s t  b e  a d e q u a t e  to ensure the internal audit function's effectiveness a n d  objectivity. T h e  
internal auditor sh o u l d  consider his audit findings in the context o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  financial
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statements a n d  should, to the extent appropriate, coordinate his activities w i t h  the activities o f  the 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant.
T h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e
T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e  o f  the b o a r d  of directors plays a role critical to the integrity o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  
financial reporting. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that all public c o m p a n i e s  b e  required to h a v e  
audit c o m m i t t e e s  c o m p o s e d  entirely of i n d e p e n d e n t  directors. T o  b e  effective, audit c o m m i t t e e s  
sh o u l d  exercise vigilant a n d  i n f o r m e d  oversight of  the financial reporting process, including the 
c o m p a n y ' s  internal controls. T h e  b o a r d  o f  directors s h o u l d  set forth the c o m m i t t e e ' s  duties a n d  
responsibilities in a written charter. A m o n g  other things, the audit c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  r e v i e w  
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  evaluation o f  the i n d e p e n d e n c e  of the public accountant a n d  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  plans 
for e n g a g i n g  the c o m p a n y ' s  i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant to p e r f o r m  m a n a g e m e n t  advisory 
services. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  highlights additional im portant audit c o m m i t t e e  duties a n d  responsi­
bilities in the course o f  discussing other r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  affecting public c o m p a n i e s .
M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  R e p o r t s
U s e r s  o f  financial statements sho u l d  b e  better i n f o r m e d  a b o u t  the roles m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the audit 
c o m m i t t e e  play in the c o m p a n y ' s  financial reporting process. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  a 
m a n a g e m e n t  report that a c k n o w l e d g e s  that the financial statements are the c o m p a n y ' s  a n d  that top 
m a n a g e m e n t  takes responsibility for the c o m p a n y ' s  financial reporting process. T h e  report should 
include m a n a g e m e n t ' s  o pinion o n  the effectiveness o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal controls. T h e  
C o m m i s s i o n  also r e c o m m e n d s  a letter f r o m  the c h a i r m a n  o f  the audit c o m m i t t e e  that describes the 
c o m m i t t e e ' s  activities. B o t h  of these c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  sh o u l d  a p p e a r  in the ann u a l  report to 
stockholders.
S e e k i n g  a  S e c o n d  O p i n i o n  a n d  Q u a r t e r l y  R e p o r t i n g
Finally, the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for the public c o m p a n y  focus o n  t w o  opportunities 
to strengthen the integrity of the financial reporting process. M a n a g e m e n t  sh o u l d  advise the audit 
c o m m i t t e e  w h e n  it seeks a s e c o n d  o pinion o n  a significant acco u n t i n g  issue, explaining w h y  the 
particular a c cou nti ng treatment w a s  chosen. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  also r e c o m m e n d s  additional public 
disclosure in the e v ent of a c h a n g e  in i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the C o m ­
m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  audit c o m m i t t e e  oversight o f  the quarterly reporting process.
II. R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t  
( C h a p t e r  T h r e e )
T h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's role, w h i l e  s e c o n d a r y  to that o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the b o a r d  
o f  directors, is crucial in detecting a n d  deterring fraudulent financial reporting. T o  ensure a n d  
i m p r o v e  the effectiveness o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant, the C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  
c h a n g e s  in auditing standards, in pr oce dur es that e n h a n c e  audit quality, in the i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
accountant's c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  ab o u t  his role, a n d  in the process o f  setting auditing standards. O n  
F e b r u a r y  14, 1987, the A u d i t i n g  St andards B o a r d  ( A S B )  e x p o s e d  for c o m m e n t  a series of p r o p o s e d  
auditing standards that address m a n y  issues the C o m m i s s i o n  considered. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  c o m ­
m e n d s  the A S B  for its efforts in these e x p o s u r e  drafts, s o m e  o f  w h i c h  are responsive to C o m ­
m i s s i o n  concerns.
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Responsibility for D e t e c t i o n  a n d  I m p r o v e d  D e t e c t i o n  Capabilities
Gen e r a l l y  A c c e p t e d  A u d i t i n g  St andards ( G A A S )  s h o u l d  b e  c h a n g e d  to re cognize better the in­
d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's responsibility for detecting fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  
standards s h o u l d  restate this responsibility to require the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant to take 
affirmative steps to assess the potential for fraudulent financial reporting a n d  d esign tests to provide 
reasonable assurance o f  detection. A m o n g  the affirmative steps r e c o m m e n d e d  is a s s e s s m e n t  o f  the 
c o m p a n y ' s  overall control e n v i r o n m e n t  a l o n g  w i t h  i m p r o v e d  g u i d a n c e  for identifying risks a n d  
de signing audit tests. In addition, the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant s h o u l d  b e  required to m a k e  
greater us e  o f  analytical r e v i e w  procedures, to identify areas w i th a h i g h  risk o f  fraudulent financial 
reporting. T h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant also sh o u l d  b e  required to r e v i e w  quarterly financial 
data before its release, to i m p r o v e  the likelihood of timely detection of fraudulent financial 
reporting.
A u d i t  Q u a l i t y
I m p r o v e d  audit quality increases the likelihood o f  detecting fraudulent financial reporting. In this 
regard, the C o m m i s s i o n  m a k e s  three r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  T h e  first t w o  are d e s i g n e d  to i m p r o v e  t w o  
aspects of the profession's existing quality assurance p r o g r a m .  P e e r  r e v i e w  s h o u l d  b e  strengthened 
b y  a d d i n g  reviews, in e a c h  office rev i e w e d ,  o f  all first-year audits p e r f o r m e d  for public c o m p a n y  
clients that w e r e  n e w  to the firm. C o n c u r r i n g ,  or s e c o n d  partner, r e v i e w  s h o u l d  b e  e n h a n c e d  b y  
a d d i n g  m o r e  explicit g u i d a n c e  as to t iming a n d  qualifications. In the third r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ,  the 
C o m m i s s i o n  e n c o u r a g e s  greater sensitivity o n  the part of public acco u n t i n g  firms to pressures 
within the accounting firm that m a y  adversely i m p a c t  audit quality.
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s  b y  the I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t
I n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants n e e d  to c o m m u n i c a t e  better to those w h o  rely o n  their w o r k .  T h e  
auditor's standard report c a n  a n d  s h o u l d  c o n v e y  a clearer sense o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
accountant's role, w h i c h  d o e s  not include guaranteeing the a c c u r a c y  o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  financial 
statements. T h e  standard audit report s h o u l d  explain that a n  audit is d e s i g n e d  to p rovide r e a s o n ­
able, but not absolute, assurance that the financial statements are free o f  material mi sstatements 
arising as a result o f  fraud or error. It also s h o u l d  describe the extent to w h i c h  the i n d e p e n d e n t  
public accountant has r e v i e w e d  a n d  evaluated the s y s t e m  of internal a c c ou nti ng control. T h e s e  t w o  
steps will p r o m o t e  a better appreciation o f  a n  audit a n d  its p u r p o s e  a n d  limitations a n d  un der sco re 
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  p r i m a r y  responsibility for financial reporting.
C h a n g e  in th e P r o c e s s  o f  Setting A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s
Finally, the C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that the process of setting auditing standards b e  i m p r o v e d  
b y  reorganizing the A I C P A ' s  A u d i t i n g  S t and ard s B o a r d  ( A S B ) .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  believes that the 
setting o f  auditing standards sh o u l d  involve k n o w l e d g e a b l e  pe rsons w h o s e  p r i m a r y  c o n c e r n  is with 
the u s e  o f  auditing products as well as practicing i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants. S u c h  individuals 
w o u l d  h a v e  particular sensitivity to the operating implications o f  auditing standards a n d  to e m e r g ­
ing policy issues c o n c e r n i n g  these standards. T h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  c o n t e m p l a t e s  a smaller A S B ,  
c o m p o s e d  o f  equal n u m b e r s  of practitioners a n d  qualified pe rsons not presently e n g a g e d  in public 
a c cou nti ng a n d  led b y  t w o  full-time officers, that w o u l d  l o o k  b e y o n d  the technical aspects of 
auditing a n d  set a n  a g e n d a  reflecting a b r o a d  r a n g e  o f  needs, serving public a n d  private interests. 
T h e  a g e n d a  w o u l d  b e  i m p l e m e n t e d  b y  auditing standards of continuing h i gh technical quality, a n d  
the A S B  w o u l d  a d o p t  these standards o n  the basis o f  their technical quality a n d  their addressing 
these public a n d  private needs.
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III. R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for t h e  S E C  a n d  O t h e r s  to I m p r o v e  t h e  
R e g u l a t o r y  a n d  L e g a l  E n v i r o n m e n t  ( C h a p t e r  F o u r )
S t r o n g  a n d  effective deterrence is essential in r e duc ing the incidence o f  fraudulent financial 
reporting. W h i l e  a c k n o w l e d g i n g  the S E C ' s  significant efforts a n d  a c h i e v e m e n t s  in deterring s u c h  
fraud, the C o m m i s s i o n  c o n c l u d e s  that the public- a n d  private-sector b odies w h o s e  activities s h a p e  
the regulatory a n d  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  e n v i r o n m e n t  c a n  a n d  sh o u l d  p rovide stronger deterrence. T h e  
C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for increased deterrence involve n e w  S E C  sanctions, greater 
criminal prosecution, i m p r o v e d  regulation of the public acco u n t i n g  profession, a d e q u a t e  S E C  
resources, i m p r o v e d  federal regulation o f  financial institutions, a n d  i m p r o v e d  oversight b y  state 
b o a r d s  of accountancy. In addition, the C o m m i s s i o n  m a k e s  t w o  final r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  in c o n ­
nection w i th the pe rceived insurance a n d  liability crises.
N e w  S E C  S a n c t i o n s  a n d  G r e a t e r  C r i m i n a l  P r o s e c u t i o n
T h e  r a n g e  of sanctions available to b e  i m p o s e d  o n  those w h o  violate the l a w  t h r o u g h  fraudulent 
financial reporting sh o u l d  b e  e x p a n d e d .  C o n g r e s s  sh o u l d  give the S E C  additional e n f o r c e m e n t  
tools so that it c a n  i m p o s e  fines, bring cease a n d  desist proceedings, a n d  bar or s u s p e n d  individual 
perpetrators f r o m  serving as corporate officers or directors, w h i l e  preserving the full r a n g e  o f  d u e  
process protections traditionally a c c o r d e d  to targets of e n f o r c e m e n t  activities. M o r e o v e r ,  w i t h  S E C  
support a n d  assistance, criminal prosecution for fraudulent financial reporting s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  a 
higher priority.
I m p r o v e d  R e g u l a t i o n  o f  the P u b l i c  A c c o u n t i n g  Pr of es si on
A n o t h e r  regulatory function, the regulation o f  the public a c c ou nti ng profession, seeks to re d u c e  
the incidence o f  fraudulent financial reporting t h r o u g h  ensuring audit quality a n d  thereby e n h a n c ­
ing early detection a n d  prevention of s u c h  fraud. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  studied the existing regulation 
a n d  oversight, w h i c h  includes the profession's quality assurance p r o g r a m ,  a n d  c o n c l u d e d  that 
additional regulation— particularly a statutory self-regulatory organization— is not necessary, p r o ­
v i d e d  t w o  k e y  e l e m e n t s  are a d d e d  to the present system. T h e  first e l e m e n t  is m a n d a t o r y  m e m ­
bership: all public a c cou nti ng firms that audit public c o m p a n i e s  m u s t  b e l o n g  to a professional 
organization that has peer r e v i e w  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  oversight functions a n d  is a p p r o v e d  b y  the S E C .  
T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  provide the s e c o n d  element: e n f o r c e m e n t  actions to i m p o s e  m e a n i n g f u l  sanctions 
w h e n  a firm fails to r e m e d y  deficiencies cited b y  a quality assurance p r o g r a m  a p p r o v e d  b y  the S E C .
A d e q u a t e  S E C  R e s o u r c e s
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  directs m a n y  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  to the S E C ,  the a g e n c y  w i th p r i m a r y  responsi­
bility to administer the federal securities laws. In that regard, the S E C  m u s t  h a v e  a d equ ate 
resources to p e r f o r m  its existing functions, as well as additional functions, that help prevent, 
detect, a n d  deter fraudulent financial reporting.
I m p r o v e d  F e d e r a l  R e g u l a t i o n  o f  F i n a n c i a l  Institutions
Federal regulatory agencies, other than the S E C ,  h a v e  responsibility for financial reporting b y  
certain public c o m p a n i e s  that are b a n k s  a n d  savings a n d  loans. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that 
these other agencies a d o p t  m e a s u r e s  patterned o n  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for the 
S E C .  T o  e n h a n c e  efforts to detect fraudulent financial reporting within financial institutions, the
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C o m m i s s i o n  also r e c o m m e n d s  that these federal agencies a n d  the public acco u n t i n g  profession 
p rovide for the regulatory e x a m i n e r  a n d  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant to h a v e  access to e a c h  
other's information a b o u t  e x a m i n e d  financial institutions.
I m p r o v e d  O v e r s i g h t  b y  State B o a r d s  o f  A c c o u n t a n c y
State b o a r d s  o f  a c c o u n t a n c y  c a n  a n d  s h o u l d  play a n  e n h a n c e d  role in their oversight of the 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that these bo a r d s  i m p l e m e n t  p o s ­
itive e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o g r a m s  to r e v i e w  o n  a periodic basis the quality of services re n d e r e d  b y  the 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants they license.
I n s u r a n c e  a n d  Liability C rises
Finally, the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  study o f  fraudulent financial reporting u n a v o i d a b l y  has led to certain 
topics b e y o n d  its c h a r g e  or ability to address. T h e  perceived liability a n d  insurance crises a n d  the 
tort r e f o r m  m o v e m e n t  h a v e  causes a n d  implications far b e y o n d  the financial reporting system. 
T h e y  are truly national issues, touching e v e r y  profession a n d  business, affecting financial reporting 
as well. T h o s e  c h a r g e d  w i th r e s p o n d i n g  to the various tort r e f o r m  initiatives s h o u l d  consider the 
implications for lon g - t e r m  audit quality a n d  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's detection of 
fraudulent financial reporting. M o r e o v e r ,  the S E C  s hould reconsider its long-standing position, 
insofar as it applies to i n d e p e n d e n t  directors, that corporate indemnification o f  officers a n d  
directors for securities l a w  liabilities is against public policy a n d  therefore unenforceable.
I V .  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for E d u c a t i o n  ( C h a p t e r  Five)
E d u c a t i o n  c a n  influence present or future participants in the financial reporting s y s t e m  b y  providing 
k n o w l e d g e ,  skills, a n d  ethical values that potentially m a y  help prevent, detect, a n d  deter fraudulent 
financial reporting. T o  e n c o u r a g e  educational initiatives t o w a r d  this end, the C o m m i s s i o n  rec­
o m m e n d s  c h a n g e s  in the business a n d  acco u n t i n g  curricula as well as in professional certification 
e x a m i n a t i o n s  a n d  continuing professional education.
B u s i n e s s  a n d  A c c o u n t i n g  C u r r i c u l a
T h e  c o m p l e x i t y  a n d  serious nature o f  fraudulent financial reporting led the C o m m i s s i o n  to c o n ­
clude that a n y  initiatives e n c o u r a g e d  b y  its r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  s h o u l d  p e r m e a t e  the un d e r g r a d u a t e  
a n d  graduate business a n d  ac cou nti ng curricula. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  first r e c o m m e n d s  that business 
a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  students gain k n o w l e d g e  a n d  u n derstanding o f  the factors that c a u s e  fraudulent 
financial reporting a n d  o f  the strategies that c a n  lead to a reduction in its incidence. T o  enable 
students to deal with risks o f  s u c h  fraud in the future at public c o m p a n i e s ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  
r e c o m m e n d s  that business a n d  a c cou nti ng curricula c o n v e y  a d e e p e r  under s t a n d i n g  of the function 
a n d  the i m p o r t a n c e  of internal controls a n d  the overall control e n v i r o n m e n t  within w h i c h  financial 
reporting takes place. Students sh o u l d  realize that practices a i m e d  at r e duc ing fraudulent financial 
reporting are not s i m p l y  defensive m e a s u r e s ,  but also m a k e  g o o d  business sense.
In addition, part o f  the k n o w l e d g e  students acquire a b o u t  the financial reporting s y s t e m  s h o u l d  b e  
a n  u n der sta ndi ng o f  the c o m p l e x  regulatory a n d  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  f r a m e w o r k  that g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  
private-sector bodies p rovide to safeguard that s y s t e m  a n d  to protect the public interest. A s  future 
participants in that system, students sh o u l d  gain a sense o f  w h a t  will b e  e x p e c t e d  o f  t h e m  legally 
a n d  professionally w h e n  they are ac countable to the public interest.
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T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that the business a n d  accounting curricula also foster the d e v e l ­
o p m e n t  o f  skills that c a n  help prevent, detect, a n d  deter s u c h  fraud. Analytical reasoning, p r o b l e m  
solving, a n d  the exercise o f  s o u n d  j u d g m e n t  are s o m e  of the skills that will e nable students to 
grapple successfully in the future with w a r n i n g  signs or no vel situations they will e n c o u n t e r  in the 
financial reporting process.
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the ethical d i m e n s i o n  of financial reporting sh o u l d  receive m o r e  e m p h a s i s  in the 
business a n d  ac cou nti ng curricula. T h e  curricula s h o u l d  integrate the d e v e l o p m e n t  of ethical values 
w i t h  the acquisition o f  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  skills. Unfortunately, the lack o f  challenging case studies 
b a s e d  o n  actual incidents o f  fraudulent financial reporting is a current obstacle to reform. T h e  
C o m m i s s i o n  therefore r e c o m m e n d s  that business schools give their faculty a variety o f  incentives 
a n d  opportunities to d e v e l o p  personal c o m p e t e n c e  a n d  suitable c l a s s r o o m  materials for teaching 
a b o u t  fraudulent financial reporting. B u s i n e s s  school faculty r e w a r d  s y s t e m s  s h o u l d  a c k n o w l e d g e  
a n d  r e w a r d  faculty w h o  d e v e l o p  s u c h  c o m p e t e n c e  a n d  materials.
Professional Certification E x a m i n a t i o n s  a n d  C o n t i n u i n g  Professional E d u c a t i o n
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  m a k e s  t w o  additional r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  relating to education. B o t h  professional 
certification e x a m i n a t i o n s  a n d  continuing professional education s h o u l d  e m p h a s i z e  the k n o w l e d g e ,  
skills, a n d  ethical values that further the u n derstanding o f  fraudulent financial reporting a n d  
p r o m o t e  a reduction in the incidence of s u c h  fraud.
F i v e - Y e a r  A c c o u n t i n g  P r o g r a m s  a n d  C o r p o r a t e  Initiatives
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  m a k e s  n o  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  w i th regard to the m u c h - d i s c u s s e d  proposal to e x p a n d  
the un d e r g r a d u a t e  ac cou nti ng c u r r i c u l u m  f r o m  4  to 5 years. Rather, the C o m m i s s i o n  offers a 
n u m b e r  o f  observations b a s e d  o n  its research a n d  deliberations. Similarly, the C o m m i s s i o n  out­
lines s o m e  o f  the n u m e r o u s  opportunities for public c o m p a n i e s  to e ducate their directors, m a n ­
a g e m e n t ,  a n d  e m p l o y e e s  a b o u t  the p r o b l e m  o f  fraudulent financial reporting.
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C h a p t e r  O n e
O V E R V I E W  O F  T H E  F I N A N C I A L  
R E P O R T I N G  S Y S T E M  A N D  
F R A U D U L E N T  F I N A N C I A L  R E P O R T I N G
I. B a c k g r o u n d  to t h e  R e p o r t
B e f o r e  d e v e l o p i n g  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  responsive to fraudulent financial reporting, the C o m m i s s i o n  
s o u g h t  to unde r s t a n d  h o w  a n d  w h y  it occurs. T h e  financial reporting s y s t e m  is so c o m p l e x ,  
h o w e v e r ,  that the C o m m i s s i o n  b e g a n  b y  e x a m i n i n g  the m a n y  c o m p o n e n t s  a n d  functions of the 
s y s t e m  itself. H a v i n g  g a i n e d  a n  under s t a n d i n g  a n d  appreciation o f  the c o m p l e x  s y s t e m  in w h i c h  
this type o f  fraud takes place, the C o m m i s s i o n  then c o u l d  e x a m i n e  instances w h e r e  the s y s t e m  
b r o k e  d o w n .
Similarly, this chapter provides b a c k g r o u n d  information to facilitate a n  under s t a n d i n g  o f  the 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  that a p p e a r  in C h a p t e r s  T w o  t h r o u g h  Five. T h e  chapter briefly explains the 
financial reporting s y s t e m  a n d  illustrates its c o m p o n e n t s  a n d  functions, then s u m m a r i z e s  the 
C o m m i s s i o n ' s  analysis o f  fraudulent financial reporting's causes, perpetrators a n d  m e a n s .
Finally, the chapter takes a m o r e  in-depth l o o k  at the extent a n d  effect o f  fraudulent financial 
reporting, its evolutionary nature, a n d  the n e e d  for cost-effective responses. T h e s e  are a m o n g  the 
f u n d a m e n t a l  conclusions that g u i d e d  the C o m m i s s i o n  in d e v e l o p i n g  its r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
II. F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  S y s t e m  fo r  P u b l i c  C o m p a n i e s
T h e  financial reporting s y s t e m  for public c o m p a n i e s  h a s  m a n y  c o m p o n e n t s ,  b r oad ly o r gan ize d into 
three m a j o r  groups:
• C o m p a n i e s
• I n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants
• O v e r s i g h t  bodies.
T h e  fo llowing exhibits illustrate the functional relationships a m o n g  these c o m p o n e n t s .
Exhibit 1-1, p a g e  18, illustrates the relationships of the three m a j o r  g r o u p s  in the financial reporting 
s y s t e m  to o n e  an other a n d  to those w h o  use publicly reported financial information.
T h e  c o m p a n y  a n d  its m a n a g e m e n t  are the k e y  players in the financial reporting system; they bear 
the p r i m a r y  responsibility for the preparation a n d  content o f  the financial statements. Financial 
statements are m a n a g e m e n t ' s  representation as to the c o m p a n y ' s  financial position a n d  results of 
operations. Several oversight b odies that establish financial reporting standards a n d  m o n i t o r  
c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  those standards influence the reporting function. T h e  c o m p a n y  e n g a g e s  i n de­
p e n d e n t  public accountants to render a n  o p ini on as to w h e t h e r  the financial reports fairly present 
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Exhibit 1-2, p a g e  19, e x p a n d s  o n  Exhibit 1-1, illustrating the c o m p o n e n t s  within the c o m p a n y  that 
play roles in preparing financial statements.
T h e  c o m p a n y ' s  a c cou nti ng d e p a r t m e n t  actually prepares the financial statements. T h e  chain of 
c o m m a n d  supervising this function typically p r o c e e d s  f r o m  the controller t h r o u g h  the chief fi­
nancial officer ( C F O )  to the chief executive officer ( C E O ) .  T h e  legal de par tme nt, or office o f  the 
general counsel, typically plays a  k e y  role in r e v i e w i n g  disclosure d o c u m e n t s  for c o m p l i a n c e  with 
applicable l a w s  a n d  regulations. T h e  legal d e p a r t m e n t  also assists m a n a g e m e n t  in establishing a n d  
maintaining internal controls to prevent a n d  detect n o n c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  other l a w s  a n d  regulations. 
T h e  internal audit function, if present, p e r f o r m s  a n  appraisal function within the c o m p a n y  to 
e x a m i n e ,  analyze, a n d  m a k e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o n  matters affecting the c o m p a n y ' s  internal c o n ­
trols. T h e  b o a r d  o f  directors has a responsibility to the c o m p a n y ' s  shareholders to ov ersee 
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  p e r f o r m a n c e .  T h e  b o a r d  o f  directors generally delegates its responsibility to oversee 
the c o m p a n y ' s  financial reporting process to a n  audit c o m m i t t e e .  All these participants a n d  the 
functions they p e r f o r m  are part o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal control e n v i r o n m e n t  for the financial 
reporting system.
Exhibit 1-3, p a g e  21, illustrates the n u m e r o u s  organizations a n d  agencies w h o s e  oversight, 
t h r o u g h  standard-setting a n d  c o m p l i a n c e  activities, affects the c o m p a n y ' s  preparation o f  financial 
statements.
T h e  S E C  is the federal a g e n c y  primarily responsible for administering the federal securities laws, 
a n d  it establishes disclosure requirements for public c o m p a n i e s .  T h e  S E C  traditionally ha s  del­
egated m u c h  o f  its responsibility for setting standards for financial reporting to the private sector, 
retaining a role largely o f  oversight. A c c o r d i n g l y ,  in preparing its financial statements, the public 
c o m p a n y  looks to acco u n t i n g  principles set b y  the Financial A c c o u n t i n g  S t and ard s B o a r d  ( F A S B )  
as well as to S E C  rules a n d  p r o n o u n c e m e n t s .  If a federal b a n k i n g  or financial institution regulatory 
a g e n c y  administers a public c o m p a n y ' s  disclosure obligation u n d e r  the securities laws, the c o m ­
p a n y  looks to that ag e n c y ' s  p r o n o u n c e m e n t s  rather than to those o f  the S E C .  In addition, the stock 
e x c h a n g e s  a n d  the National Association o f  Securities D ealers ( N A S D )  set certain disclosure a n d  
other standards as requirements for listing securities for trading. State securities or other c o m ­
missions m a y  i m p o s e  regulations o n  financial reporting at certain times, s u c h  as in initial public 
offerings, or o n  c o m p a n i e s  in certain industries, s u c h  as insurance. W i t h  the exception o f  the 
F A S B ,  e a c h  o f  these parties participates to v arying de grees w i th the c o m p a n y ' s  i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
ac countant in overseeing the c o m p a n y ' s  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  established standards. In addition, the 
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Exhibit 1-4, p a g e  22, illustrates the various private a n d  g o v e r n m e n t  organizations that oversee 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants.
T h e  organizations a n d  the agencies that set standards for i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants include 
the A I C P A ' s  A u d i t i n g  St andards B o a r d  ( A S B )  a n d  S E C  Practice Section ( S E C P S )  o f  its Division 
for C P A  Firms, state b o a r d s  o f  a c cou nta ncy , a n d  quality assurance p r o g r a m s  of individual public 
a c cou nti ng firms. T h e  S E C ,  the Public Ove r s i g h t  B o a r d  ( P O B ) ,  state boards, a n d  the courts 
m o n i t o r  the c o m p l i a n c e  of the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants w i th established standards.
III. B r e a k d o w n s  in t h e  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  S y s t e m :  C a u s e s ,  
P e r p e t r a t o r s ,  a n d  M e a n s
T h e  financial reporting s y s t e m  functions r e m a r k a b l y  well. Public c o m p a n i e s  generally live u p  to 
the public trust b y  disclosing timely, com p l e t e ,  a n d  relevant financial information. In addition, 
organizations c h a r g e d  w i th overseeing the process of setting standards b y  a n d  large d o  a n  a d m i ­
rable j o b  o f  appropriately balancing the public interest a n d  the b u r d e n s  regulation i m p o s e s  o n  
business. C o m p l i a n c e  a n d  e n f o r c e m e n t  efforts are serious a n d  generally effective.
Y e t  exceptions occur, a n d  the s y s t e m  occasionally breaks d o w n .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  studied those 
b r e a k d o w n s  to determine, if possible, h o w  a n d  w h y  they h a p p e n e d .
C a u s e s  o f  F r a u d u l e n t  Fi n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e v i e w e d  b o t h  alleged a n d  p r o v e n  instances of fraudulent financial reporting, 
including 1 1 9  e n f o r c e m e n t  actions against public c o m p a n i e s  or associated individuals a n d  4 2  cases 
against in d e p e n d e n t  public accountants or their firms b r o u g h t  b y  the S E C  f r o m  1 9 8 1  to 1986. A  
n u m b e r  o f  the S E C  cases are reflected in 2 c o m p o s i t e  case studies p r epa red b y  researchers at the 
H a r v a r d  B u s i n e s s  School, included in A p p e n d i x  E.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  studies revealed that fraudulent financial reporting usually occurs as the result 
o f  certain environmental, institutional, or individual forces a n d  opportunities. T h e s e  forces a n d  
opportunities a d d  pressures a n d  incentives that e n c o u r a g e  individuals a n d  c o m p a n i e s  to e n g a g e  in 
fraudulent financial reporting a n d  are present to s o m e  d e g r e e  in all c o m p a n i e s .  If the right, 
c o m b u s t i b l e  m i x t u r e  of forces a n d  opportunities is present, fraudulent financial reporting m a y  
occur.
A  frequent incentive for fraudulent financial reporting that i m p r o v e s  the c o m p a n y ' s  financial 
a p p e a r a n c e  is the desire to obtain a higher price f r o m  a stock or debt offering or to m e e t  the 
expectations o f  investors. A n o t h e r  incentive m a y  b e  the desire to p o s t p o n e  dealing w i th financial 
difficulties a n d  thus avoid, for e x a m p l e ,  violating a restrictive debt covenant. O t h e r  times the 
incentive is personal gain: additional c o m p e n s a t i o n ,  p r o m o t i o n ,  or esc a p e  f r o m  penalty for p o o r  
p e r f o r m a n c e .
Situational pressures o n  the c o m p a n y  or a n  individual m a n a g e r  also m a y  lead to fraudulent 
financial reporting. E x a m p l e s  o f  these situational pressures include:
• S u d d e n  decreases in r e v e n u e  or m a r k e t  share. A  single c o m p a n y  or a n  entire industry c a n  
ex perience these decreases.
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• Unrealistic b u d g e t  pressures, particularly for short-term results. T h e s e  pressures m a y  o c c u r  
w h e n  headquarters arbitrarily de ter min es profit objectives a n d  b u d g e t s  w i tho ut taking actual 
conditions into account.
• Financial pressure resulting f r o m  b o n u s  plans that d e p e n d  o n  short-term e c o n o m i c  perfor­
m a n c e .  T h is pressure is particularly acute w h e n  the b o n u s  is a significant c o m p o n e n t  o f  the 
individual's total c o m p e n s a t i o n .
Opportunities for fraudulent financial reporting are present w h e n  the fraud is easier to c o m m i t  a n d  
w h e n  detection is less likely. Frequently these opportunities arise from:
• T h e  a b s e n c e  of a b o a r d  of directors or audit c o m m i t t e e  that vigilantly oversees the financial 
reporting process.
• W e a k  or nonexistent internal ac cou nti ng controls. Th is situation c a n  occur, for e x a m p l e ,  w h e n  
a c o m p a n y ' s  r e v e n u e  s y s t e m  is o v e r l o a d e d  f r o m  a rapid e x p a n s i o n  o f  sales, a n  acquisition o f  
a n e w  division, or the entry into a n e w ,  unfamiliar line o f  business.
• U n u s u a l  or c o m p l e x  transactions. E x a m p l e s  include the consolidation o f  t w o  c o m p a n i e s ,  the 
divestiture or closing o f  a specific operation, a n d  a g r e e m e n t s  to b u y  or sell g o v e r n m e n t  
securities u n d e r  a re purchase ag ree men t.
• A c c o u n t i n g  estimates requiring significant subjective j u d g m e n t  b y  c o m p a n y  m a n a g e m e n t .  
E x a m p l e s  include reserves for loan losses a n d  the yearly provision for w a r r a n t y  expense.
• Ineffective internal audit staffs. T h is situation m a y  result f r o m  in adequate staff size a n d  
severely limited audit scope.
A  w e a k  corporate ethical climate exacerbates these situations. Opportunities for fraudulent finan­
cial reporting also increase dramatically w h e n  the accounting principles for transactions are 
nonexistent, evolving, or subject to va rying interpretations.
P e r p e t r a t o r s  a n d  th e M e a n s  T h e y  U s e
Individuals w i t h  m a n y  different roles within a c o m p a n y — sales representatives, operating m a n ­
agers, accountants, a n d  executives— h a v e  perpetrated fraudulent financial reporting. In a large 
majority o f  the cases the C o m m i s s i o n  studied, h o w e v e r ,  the c o m p a n y ' s  top m a n a g e m e n t ,  s u c h  as 
the C E O ,  the president, a n d  the C F O ,  w e r e  the perpetrators. In s o m e  cases, the c o m p a n y  m a d e  
deliberate misrepresentations to the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant, s o m e t i m e s  t h r o u g h  falsified 
d o c u m e n t s  a n d  records.
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  studies revealed that, w h i l e  the perpetrators of fraudulent financial 
reporting use m a n y  different m e a n s ,  the effect o f  their actions is a l m o s t  a l w a y s  to inflate or 
" s m o o t h "  earnings or to overstate the c o m p a n y ' s  assets. In addition, fraudulent financial reporting 
usually d o e s  not b e g i n  w i th a n  overt intentional act to distort the financial statements. In m a n y  
cases, fraudulent financial reporting is the culmination of a series of acts d e s i g n e d  to r e s p o n d  to 
operational difficulties. Initially, the activities m a y  not b e  fraudulent, but in time they m a y  b e c o m e  
increasingly questionable. W h e n  the tone set b y  top m a n a g e m e n t  permits or e n c o u r a g e s  s u c h  
activities, eventually the result m a y  b e  fraudulent financial reporting.
T h is scenario illustrates h o w  fraudulent financial reporting c a n  occur: T h e  C E O ,  u n d e r  pressure 
to continue increasing sales, has the shipping d e p a r t m e n t  w o r k  longer h o u r s  in the d a y s  prior to 
the e n d  o f  the quarter. A s  the pressure m o u n t s ,  h e  c o m p o u n d s  the situation b y  delaying the 
recognition o f  sales returns, instructing sales representatives to " m a k e  the sales stick." Finally, 
h e  c o m m i t s  a fraudulent act, b y  recognizing r e v e n u e  f r o m  inventory s h i p p e d  to a c u s t o m e r  without
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authorization or f r o m  inventory s h i p p e d  to a public w a r e h o u s e .  H e  m i g h t  also overstate sales b y  
recognizing r e v e n u e  f r o m  purported sales that w e r e  not c o n s u m m a t e d  o w i n g  to materially unsat­
isfied conditions; recognizing r e v e n u e  f r o m  purported fourth-quarter sales e v e n  t h o u g h  the ship­
m e n t s  did not o c c u r  until after year-end; a n d  i m p r o p e r l y  treating s h i p m e n t s  c o n s i g n e d  to s a l e s m e n  
as sales.
M e t h o d s  u s e d  to defer current-period e x p e n s e s  or to overstate assets are equally diverse. T h e y  
include issuing falsified p u r c h a s e  orders to vendors, w h o  then s u b m i t  false invoices that fr aud u­
lently decrease the cost of routine parts a n d  increase the cost o f  capitalized e q u i p m e n t ,  failing to 
write off assets that h a d  b e e n  s c r a p p e d  or c o u l d  not b e  located, i m p r o p e r l y  c h a n g i n g  the lives of 
the c o m p a n y ' s  depreciable assets, failing to create a n  a d e q u a t e  reserve for k n o w n  losses o n  
obsolete inventory or delinquent loans, a n d  recording nonexistent assets b y  falsifying inventory 
c o u n t  tags.
I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t s
A l m o s t  all the S E C ' s  fraudulent financial reporting cases against i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants 
alleged a failure to c o n d u c t  the audit in a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  G e ner all y A c c e p t e d  A u d i t i n g  Standards 
( G A A S ) .  T h e  m o s t  c o m m o n  alleged deviation f r o m  G A A S  is the lack of sufficient c o m p e t e n t  
evidential matter. E x a m p l e s  o f  this deficiency include failing to c o n f i r m  a c c o u n t  balances, n e ­
glecting to o b s e r v e  inventories, a n d  placing u n d u e  reliance o n  uncorr o b o r a t e d  m a n a g e m e n t  rep­
resentations instead of obtaining outside verification f r o m  third parties.
In m a n y  cases, although indications of  possible improprieties, or " r e d  flags," existed, i n d e p e n ­
dent public accountants failed to recognize or p u r s u e  t h e m  w i t h  skepticism. T h e  S E C  believed that, 
if the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants h a d  investigated these red flags, the fraudulent activity w o u l d  
h a v e  h a d  a greater likelihood o f  b e i n g  u n c o v e r e d .  W e a k  internal controls w e r e  the m o s t  c o m m o n l y  
i gnored red flag. In a n u m b e r  of cases, the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant k n e w  or sho u l d  h a v e  
k n o w n  that the c o m p a n y ' s  internal controls w e r e  w e a k ,  but did n othing to investigate their 
potential impact.
A l t h o u g h  national public a c c ou nti ng firms audit 8 4  percent o f  public c o m p a n i e s ,  7 5  percent o f  the 
S E C  actions against i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants a n d  firms involved nonnational firms or sole 
practitioners. T h e  alleged deficiencies in quality control included failure to train a n d  supervise the 
audit staffs adequately a n d  failure to tailor audit p r o g r a m s  to particular specialized industries. 
T h e s e  deficiencies correlate to the fact that a relatively h i g h  pe rcentage o f  the S E C ' s  cases against 
smaller, regional or local ac cou nti ng firms a n d  sole practitioners involved allegations of substan­
d a r d  audit w o r k .
I V .  E x t e n t  a n d  Eff e c t  o f  B r e a k d o w n s
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  also co nsidered the extent to w h i c h  b r e a k d o w n s  o c c u r  in the financial reporting 
s y s t e m  a n d  the effect s u c h  b r e a k d o w n s  h a v e  o n  affected parties. B o t h  these inquiries, together with 
the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  analysis of the S E C  cases, w e r e  critical to de t e r m i n i n g  that the p r o b l e m  of 
fraudulent financial reporting s h o u l d  b e  a d dre sse d a n d  to formulating r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  to c o m b a t  
the p r o b l e m .
I n d e t e r m i n a t e  N u m b e r  o f  Incidents
T h e  incidence o f  fraudulent financial reporting c a n n o t  b e  quantified w i th a n y  d e g r e e  of precision. 
N o  analysis yields a satisfactory result. T h e  n u m b e r  of S E C  p r o ce edi ngs against reporting c o m ­
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panies f r o m  1 9 8 1  to 1 9 8 6  c o m p a r e d  to the n u m b e r  o f  financial reports filed w i th the S E C  during 
the s a m e  period, for e x a m p l e ,  gives a n  incidence of considerably less than 1 percent. B u t  this 
figure takes n o  a c c o u n t  of instances the S E C  did not detect, or o f  k n o w n  or suspected instances 
o f  fraudulent financial reporting that the S E C  did not p u r s u e  b e c a u s e  o f  the lack o f  sufficient 
e v i d e n c e  or resources. M o r e o v e r ,  it e x clu des financial reporting b y  financial institutions that report 
to regulators other than the S E C .
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  reluctance to rely o n  the small n u m b e r  of S E C  cases to quantify the extent of 
fraudulent financial reporting w a s  influenced b y  the v i e w s  o f  others. T h e  C h a i r m a n  o f  the F D I C ,  
for e x a m p l e ,  c o n t e n d s  that m a n a g e m e n t  fraud contributed to one-third o f  b a n k  failures. Similarly, 
a C o m m i s s i o n  study o f  bankruptcies f o u n d  that 2 0  percent of the bankruptcies studied involved 
litigation against the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant. H a l f  o f  this 2 0  percent ( 1 0  percent of the total 
bankruptcies studied) also i n vol ved fraudulent financial reporting. All these findings indicate that 
a n y  n u m e r i c a l  estimate of the incidence o f  fraudulent financial reporting w o u l d  b e  u n s o u n d .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  has c o n c l u d e d  that s u c h  a n  estimate is u n n e c e s s a r y  for its purpose. 
O t h e r s  h a v e  f o u n d  the s a m e  to b e  true w h e n  considering other types o f  securities fraud. T h e  
m a g n i t u d e  o f  insider trading, for e x a m p l e ,  is equally difficult to quantify. S E C  C h a i r m a n  J o h n  
S h a d  testified before C o n g r e s s  to that effect in J u n e  1 9 8 6  a n d  r o u g h l y  estimated that fraudulent 
securities activities, o f  w h i c h  insider trading is o n ly o n e  type, a m o u n t  to a fraction of  1 percent 
of the $ 5 0  billion in U . S .  corporate a n d  g o v e r n m e n t  securities traded daily. A t  the s a m e  time, 
h o w e v e r ,  b e c a u s e  insider trading h a s  s u c h  a detrimental effect o n  public confidence in the fairness 
o f  the capital markets, C h a i r m a n  S h a d  a n d  the S E C  r e c o m m e n d e d  p a s s a g e  o f  the Insider T r a d i n g  
Sanctions A c t  o f  1 9 8 4  to increase deterrence o f  this type of  fraud, a n d  they h a v e  p u r s u e d  a well 
publicized e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o g r a m  against insider trading.
A l t h o u g h  b y  available m e a s u r e s  fraudulent financial reporting occurs infrequently, just as in the 
case o f  insider trading, w h e n  it d o e s  occur, its detrimental effects are serious a n d  w i d e  ranging.
V i c t i m s  of F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a nc ia l R e p o r t i n g
Public investors in the c o m p a n y ' s  equity or d e bt securities are, o f  course, victims o f  fraudulent 
financial reporting. B u t  they are not the o n l y  o n e s  w h o  suffer i m m e d i a t e  a n d  direct h a r m .  T h e  
victims also include others w h o  rely o n  the c o m p a n y ' s  reported financial information:
• B a n k s  a n d  other financial institutions that lend f u n d s  to the c o m p a n y
• Depositors a n d  shareholders of s u c h  institutions w h o s e  assets a n d  investments, respectively, 
are jeopardized
• Suppliers w h o  e x t e n d  credit
• C u s t o m e r s  w h o  l o ok to the c o m p a n y  to p e r f o r m  o n  its contracts
• M e r g e r  partners w h o  m a y  enter into a g r e e m e n t s  b a s e d  o n  inflated values
• Unde r w r i t e r s  w h o  distribute securities
• Financial analysts w h o  give i n v e s t m e n t  advice a b o u t  the issuer a n d  its securities
• T h e  c o m p a n y ' s  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants, w h o  m a y  find t h e m s e l v e s  n a m e d  defendants 
or the subject o f  a n  investigation
• At tor ney s for the issuer, a n d  p e r h a p s  for the underwriters
• Insurance c o m p a n i e s  that write directors' a n d  officers' liability insurance a n d  then experience 
large claims.
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S o m e  o f  these victims, particularly i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants, underwriters, a n d  attorneys, 
not o n l y  m a y  suffer losses t h e m s e l v e s  a n d  d a m a g e  to their reputations, but also m a y  b e  n a m e d  as 
de fendants in private litigation b e c a u s e  they represent " d e e p  p o c k e t s . "  W h e n  shareholders a n d  
others s e ek to recover their losses, the c o m p a n y ,  w h o s e  top m a n a g e m e n t  actually perpetrates the 
fraudulent financial reporting, is often insolvent, leading the victims to l o o k  to the accountants, 
underwriters, a n d  attorneys for d a m a g e s .
W h e n  the w r o n g d o i n g  c o m e s  to light, p e o p l e  within the c o m p a n y  w h o  reported fraudulent financial 
information are injured as well. T h e s e  e m p l o y e e s  a n d  other insiders include:
• T h e  c o m p a n y ' s  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  directors, w h o  m a y  suffer loss of m o n e y  as well as of 
reputation a n d  standing
• H o l d e r s  o f  large blocks o f  c o m p a n y  stock, s u c h  as estates or family trusts, the value o f  w h o s e  
holdings m a y  d r o p  dramatically
• E m p l o y e e  stockholders, w h o  m a y  h a v e  p u r c h a s e d  the issuer's securities directly or t h r o u g h  
e m p l o y e e  benefit plans
• E m p l o y e e s ,  frequently at m i d d l e  a n d  l o w e r  levels, w h o  b e c o m e  scapegoats for " t oei ng the 
c o m p a n y  line"
• H o n e s t  e m p l o y e e s  a n d  m a n a g e r s ,  w h o s e  careers m a y  suffer f r o m  guilt b y  association.
E v e n  if fraudulent financial reporting d o e s  not actually c o m e  to light, or e v e n  take place, the 
c o m p a n y  w i th w e a k  internal controls a n d  other deficiencies d o e s  its e m p l o y e e s  a disservice b y  
e x p o s i n g  t h e m  u n d u l y  to temptation.
Fr aud ule nt financial reporting also has a m o r e  r emote, potentially m o r e  d a m a g i n g  impact: loss of 
public confidence. W i d e s p r e a d  m e d i a  attention to e v e n  a single instance of fraudulent financial 
reporting c a n  s h a k e  public co nfidence in the integrity of financial reporting b y  a w h o l e  industry 
or, w o r s e ,  b y  all public c o m p a n i e s .  Public co nfidence in the fairness o f  financial reporting is 
critical to the effective functioning of the securities markets. T h e  U . S .  securities m a r k e t s  rely o n  
full a n d  fair disclosure, a n d  financial information is a n  essential e l e m e n t  o f  this disclosure. Also, 
loss o f  public confidence c a n  increase the costs o f  capital for c o m p a n i e s  that h a v e  not b e e n  
i n vol ved in fraudulent financial reporting. C o n s u m e r s  ultimately m a y  b e ar these increased costs.
V .  E v o l u t i o n a r y  N a t u r e  o f  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
T h e  forces a n d  opportunities that c a n  lead to fraudulent financial reporting e v o l v e  as society 
c h ang es, as d o  the m e t h o d s  b y  w h i c h  fraudulent financial reporting occurs. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  therefore c a n n o t  stand for all t i m e  as the m o s t  appropriate responses to the 
p r o b l e m .  C o n t i n u e d  studies o f  fraudulent financial reporting a n d  its prevention a n d  detection will 
b e  necessary.
T w o  e x a m p l e s  o f  societal c h a n g e s  that c a n  affect fraudulent financial reporting are the T a x  R e f o r m  
A c t  o f  1 9 8 6  a n d  d e v e l o p m e n t s  in c o m p u t e r s  a n d  information systems.
T a x  R e f o r m  A c t  o f  1 9 8 6
T h e  corporate alternative m i n i m u m  tax provision o f  the T a x  R e f o r m  A c t  o f  1 9 8 6  introduces n e w  
pressures that illustrate the evolutionary nature o f  fraudulent financial reporting. In the past, 
c o m p a n i e s  c o u l d  report earnings to the S E C  a n d  their shareholders that did not necessarily relate
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to earnings reported for tax purposes. T h e  n e w  tax l a w  requires corporations to c o m p u t e  a 
m i n i m u m  tax liability b a s e d  o n  their financial statement i n c o m e .  This c h a n g e  m a y  affect financial 
reporting to shareholders b y  introducing tax issues into the setting o f  Ge ner all y A c c e p t e d  A c ­
c o unt ing Principles ( G A A P )  a n d  b y  giving corporations tax incentives to consider in co nne cti on 
w i t h  their publicly reported earnings.
C o m p u t e r s ,  I n f o r m a t i o n  S y s t e m s ,  a n d  A u d i t  Trails
T h e  increasing p o w e r  a n d  sophistication o f  c o m p u t e r s  a n d  c o m p u t e r - b a s e d  information s y s t e m s  
m a y  contribute e v e n  m o r e  to the c h a n g i n g  nature of fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  last d e c a d e  
has seen the decentralization a n d  the proliferation o f  c o m p u t e r s  a n d  information s y s t e m s  into 
a l m o s t  e v ery part of the c o m p a n y .  T h i s  d e v e l o p m e n t  has e n a b l e d  m a n a g e m e n t  to m a k e  decisions 
m o r e  quickly a n d  o n  the basis of m o r e  timely a n d  accurate information. Y e t  b y  d o i n g  w h a t  they 
d o  best— placing vast quantities of data within e a sy reach— c o m p u t e r s  multiply the potential for 
m i s u s i n g  or ma nip ula tin g information, increasing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting.
O n  the other h a n d ,  a d v a n c e s  in c o m p u t e r s  a n d  information s y s t e m s  c a n  i m p r o v e  the m e a n s  of 
preventing a n d  detecting fraudulent financial reporting. Auditors c a n  use the c o m p u t e r ' s  s p e e d  a n d  
p o w e r  to test m o r e  transactions or calculations than otherwise possible. M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  internal 
auditors c a n  identify u n authorized access attempts, u n u s u a l  transactions, or deviations f r o m  
n o r m a l  processing m o r e  easily.
U s i n g  c o m p u t e r  t e c h n o l o g y  effectively to prevent, detect, a n d  deter fraudulent financial reporting 
is a challenge that requires foresight, j u d g m e n t ,  a n d  cooperation a m o n g  c o m p u t e r  specialists, 
m a n a g e m e n t ,  a n d  internal auditors. F o r  e x a m p l e ,  c o m p a n i e s  n o w  c a n  m o n i t o r  financial transac­
tions continuously b y  using auditing software m o d u l e s  e m b e d d e d  in the system. W h e n  a n  infor­
m a t i o n  s y s t e m  is de vel ope d, the c o m p a n y  s hould build in a n  audit trail. T o  ensure that controls 
are in place a n d  to integrate fraud prevention a n d  detection m e t h o d s  in the s y s t e m  itself, internal 
auditors sh o u l d  b e  involved w h e n  a c o m p a n y  d e v e l o p s  c o m p u t e r i z e d  ac cou nti ng applications.
D e v e l o p m e n t s  in c o m p u t e r s  a n d  information s y s t e m s  h a v e  a f u n d a m e n t a l  a n d  pervasive i m p a c t  o n  
all the participants in the financial reporting process. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  conclusion that all 
participants in the financial reporting process n e e d  to u n d e r s t a n d  c o m p u t e r - b a s e d  information 
s y s t e m s  is f u n d a m e n t a l  to m a n y  o f  the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  in this report. M a n a g e m e n t  n e e d s  to 
u n d e r s t a n d  current c o m p u t e r  t e c h n o l o g y  to b e  able, for e x a m p l e ,  to m a k e  i n f o r m e d  decisions a b o u t  
the required level o f  security. Internal auditors a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants n e e d  this 
k n o w l e d g e  to b e  able to r e v i e w  a n d  evaluate the a d e q u a c y  o f  internal controls for c o m p u t e r i z e d  
a c cou nti ng systems. Also, w i th a k n o w l e d g e  of information systems, they will b e  better e q u i p p e d  
to audit using the c o m p u t e r  rather than relying o n  user departments' m a n u a l  controls a n d  direct 
tests o f  e n d i n g  balances. T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e  n e e d s  sufficient u n der sta ndi ng of c o m p u t e r s  a n d  
information s y s t e m s  to exercise its oversight responsibilities.
V I .  N e e d  for C o s t - E f f e c t i v e  R e s p o n s e s
T h e  n e e d  for cost-effective responses ha s  b e e n  p a r a m o u n t  in the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  deliberations. 
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  has limited its responses to r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  that are reasonable in 
the c i rcu mst anc es a n d  that c o m p a n i e s  c a n  i m p l e m e n t  realistically, w i t h  costs a n d  b u r d e n s  justified 
b y  the benefits to b e  achieved. T h is a p p r o a c h  is particularly im portant because, although the
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k n o w n  n u m b e r  o f  fraudulent financial reporting cases is small, the n u m b e r  o f  c o m p a n i e s  that these 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  m a y  affect is large.
A t  the s a m e  time, the C o m m i s s i o n  agrees w i th a position the S E C  n o t e d  in the cost-benefit analysis 
o f  a recent r u l e m a k i n g  action:
It is f u n d a m e n t a l  to the capital f o r m a t i o n  process that investors w h o  f u n d  n e w  enterprises b e  treated 
fairly a n d  b e  g i v e n  rea sonable inf orma tion c o n c e r n i n g  the businesses in w h i c h  they invest. M o r e o v e r ,  
requiring small b usinesses to live w i t h  appropriate regulations as a q u i d  p r o  q u o  for access to public 
m a r k e t s  will doubtless h a v e  the salutary side effect o f  a c c u s t o m i n g  their m a n a g e r s  to a n  or d e r e d  
a p p r o a c h  to the c o n d u c t  o f  their businesses, thus facilitating their future access to the capital markets. 
( F r o m  c o m m e n t  letter o f  A m e r i c a n  B a r  Association, q u o t e d  in S E C  R e l e a s e  N o .  3 4  - 2 3 7 8 9 ,  N o v e m b e r  
10, 1986.)
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  recognizes that the cost-benefit issue will b e  of c o n c e r n  to s o m e  people. T h e  cost 
o f  i m p l e m e n t i n g  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  will vary greatly b e c a u s e  of the w i d e  dif­
ferences that exist in public c o m p a n y  sizes as well as in current policies a n d  practices. M a n y  public 
c o m p a n i e s  a n d  public ac cou nti ng firms will incur little or n o  additional cost b e c a u s e  they already 
h a v e  m o s t  o f  the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  in place as a matter o f  g o o d  business practice. C o m p a n i e s  a n d  
firms that n e e d  to i m p r o v e  present practices to a c c o m p l i s h  things the C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  
m a y  incur s o m e  slight additional cost.
O n  the other h a n d ,  c o m p a n i e s  a n d  firms that d o  not h a v e  a substantial n u m b e r  o f  the r e c o m m e n ­
dations in place will face considerable short-term i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  costs. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  studies 
indicate that for smaller, n e w l y  public c o m p a n i e s  a n d  smaller public acco u n t i n g  firms, these costs 
m a y  b e  especially significant. Yet, these entities m a y  h a v e  a disproportionately greater risk of 
fraudulent financial reporting a n d  thus m a y  reap proportionately greater benefits. F o r  these smaller 
entities a n d  larger o n e s  as well, the l o ng- ter m benefits o f  i m p l e m e n t i n g  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  set of 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  include e n h a n c e d  corporate control a n d  ethical business conduct.
Co sts m u s t  b e  v i e w e d  in t w o  w a y s .  T h e  cost of i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  c a n  b e  quantified. T h e  other cost—  
the cost o f  failing to i m p l e m e n t  these r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s — is impossible to quantify, yet it m a y  b e  
far larger a n d  m o r e  important. T h i s  cost is the potential loss o f  co nfidence o f  investors a n d  the 
public in corporate m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  in the financial reporting system. O u r  capital m a r k e t s  a n d  ou r  
private enterprise s y s t e m  c a n n o t  b e ar the loss of the public's trust a n d  confidence in the integrity 
o f  the financial reporting system.
T h e  Spirit o f  th e R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  urges all participants in the financial reporting process to i m p l e m e n t  b o t h  the 
substance a n d  the spirit o f  its r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  nonetheless recognizes that the 
resources to i m p l e m e n t  its r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  in smaller public c o m p a n i e s  a n d  smaller public 
acco u n t i n g  firms m a y  not a l w a y s  b e  available. In rare situations w h e r e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  the 
substance of a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  is not possible the C o m m i s s i o n  urges c o m p a n i e s  a n d  firms to 
introduce p r o c e d u r e s  that r e s p o n d  to its spirit.
T h e  next four chapters present the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for the participants in the 
financial reporting process— the public c o m p a n y ,  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant, a n d  the S E C  
a n d  other regulatory a n d  legal bodies— as well as for educators o f  present a n d  future participants.
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C h a p t e r  T w o
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S  F O R  T H E  
P U B L I C  C O M P A N Y
I. T h e  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  P u b l i c  C o m p a n y  f o r  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
T h e  federal securities l a w s  require public c o m p a n i e s  to disclose c o m p l e t e  a n d  accurate financial 
information regularly. T h e  l a w  i m p o s e s  this obligation w h e n  a c o m p a n y  begins the process o f  
b e c o m i n g  a public c o m p a n y ,  a n d  the obligation continues in effect as l o ng as the c o m p a n y  
maintains public status. Implicit in this obligation is the r e q u i r e m e n t  that the c o m p a n y ' s  financial 
statements b e  c o m p l e t e  a n d  not misl e a d i n g  in a n y  material respect.
C o n g r e s s  itself identified financial statements as a n  essential c o m p o n e n t  o f  the disclosure s y s t e m  
o n  w h i c h  the U . S .  securities m a r k e t s  are based. S o  important is financial statement disclosure, in 
fact, that C o n g r e s s  in enacting the F o r e i g n  C o r r u p t  Practices A c t  ( F C P A )  in 1 9 7 7  i m p o s e d  direct 
regulation d e s i g n e d  to ensure that public c o m p a n i e s  c a n  m e e t  their financial disclosure obligations. 
T h is a d d e d  statutory obligation requires public c o m p a n i e s  to k e e p  b o o k s  a n d  records that reflect 
their transactions a n d  assets accurately a n d  fairly a n d  to m a i n t a i n  a s y s t e m  o f  internal ac cou nti ng 
control that enables t h e m  to prepare financial statements in c o n f o r m i t y  w i th G e ner all y A c c e p t e d  
A c c o u n t i n g  Principles ( G A A P ) .
T h e  public c o m p a n y  has the initial a n d  the final responsibility for its financial statements. W i t h i n  
the c o m p a n y  lies the greatest potential for r e duc ing fraudulent financial reporting. T h u s  the 
C o m m i s s i o n  first l o o k e d  to the public c o m p a n y  w h e n  d e v e l o p i n g  its r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  b e g i n n i n g  
b y  exploring the forces a n d  opportunities that c a n  lead to fraudulent financial reporting.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  f o u n d  that n o  c o m p a n y ,  regardless o f  size or line o f  business, is i m m u n e  f r o m  
the possibility that fraudulent financial reporting will occur; that possibility is inherent in d o i n g  
business. T h e  forces a n d  opportunities that a p p e a r e d  in n u m e r o u s  S E C  e n f o r c e m e n t  cases are 
present to s o m e  extent in all c o m p a n i e s .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  also f o u n d  that c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  a 
n u m b e r  o f  practices already in place to help t h e m  deal w i th these forces a n d  opportunities. All 
c o m p a n i e s  w o u l d  benefit f r o m  a dopting similar practices to r e d u c e  the incidence of fraudulent 
financial reporting.
A d d r e s s i n g  th e P r o b l e m  at T w o  L e v e l s
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  will r e d u c e  the incidence o f  fraudulent financial reporting b y  
addressing the p r o b l e m  at t w o  levels. T o p  m a n a g e m e n t  should:
L e v e l  1. Establish the ap pro pri ate t o n e , the overall control e n v i r o n m e n t  in w h i c h  f i n a n ­
cial reporting o c c u r s
L e v e l  2. M a x i m i z e  the effectiveness o f  the f u n c t i o n s  within the c o m p a n y  that a r e  critical 
to the integrity o f  financial reporting: the a c c o u n t i n g  f u n c t i o n ,  the internal audit 
f u n c t i o n , a n d  the audit c o m m i t t e e  o f  the b o a r d  o f  directors.
T h e  first three r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  in this chapter are a i m e d  at the first level, the tone set b y  top 
m a n a g e m e n t .  All the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  that follow d e p e n d  o n  these r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  T o p  m a n ­
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a g e m e n t  first m u s t  establish the pr o p e r  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  o n e  in w h i c h  fraudulent financial reporting 
is less likely to o c c u r  and, if it d o e s  occur, is m o r e  likely to b e  detected.
T h e  section o f  the chapter that addresses the tone at the top suggests a f r a m e w o r k  for i m p r o v i n g  
the corporate e n v i r o n m e n t  or culture. T h e  f r a m e w o r k  includes three steps: identifying a n d  u n ­
derstanding the factors that c a n  lead to fraudulent financial reporting, assessing the risk o f  this type 
o f  fraud, a n d  designing a n d  i m p l e m e n t i n g  internal controls. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  then r e c o m m e n d s  
that e v e r y  public c o m p a n y  d e v e l o p  a n d  enforce a written c o d e  o f  corporate c o n d u c t  as a tangible 
e m b o d i m e n t  o f  the tone at the top.
T h e  chapter next turns to the s e c o n d  level, m a x i m i z i n g  the effectiveness o f  the functions within 
the c o m p a n y  that are critical to the integrity o f  financial reporting. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  first addresses 
t w o  k e y  functions within the c o m p a n y — the ac cou nti ng function a n d  the internal audit function. 
N e xt, the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  c o n c e r n  the role o f  another critical c o m p o n e n t  in the 
financial reporting process: the audit c o m m i t t e e  of the b o a r d  of directors. T h i s  section discusses 
w a y s  the audit c o m m i t t e e  c a n  b e  m o r e  effective in preventing a n d  detecting fraudulent financial 
reporting.
T h e  chapter then concentrates o n  the n e e d  for top m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the audit c o m m i t t e e  to 
c o m m u n i c a t e  their respective responsibilities to financial statement users. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  
presents r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for a m a n a g e m e n t  report a n d  a n  audit c o m m i t t e e  c h a i r m a n ' s  letter, b o t h  
as part o f  the a nnual report to stockholders. T h e  chapter then looks at t w o  specific areas for 
i m p r o v e m e n t :  seeking a s e c o n d  o pinion f r o m  another public acco u n t i n g  firm, a n d  the role of the 
audit c o m m i t t e e  in quarterly reporting. T h e  focus of the final section o f  the chapter is the 
C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  for its sp ons ori ng organizations to cooperate in d e v e l o p i n g  a d ­
ditional, integrated g u i d a n c e  o n  internal controls.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  has distinguished fraudulent financial reporting f r o m  other corporate illegal acts 
that c a n  c a u s e  a c o m p a n y ' s  financial statements to b e  misleading. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  p r i m a r y  
objective w a s  to identify causal factors that c a n  lead to fraudulent financial reporting a n d  to d e v e l o p  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  to r e d u c e  its incidence. W h i l e  other kinds o f  corporate illegality, s u c h  as 
n o n c o m p l i a n c e  with various l a w s  a n d  regulations, m a y  h a v e  a material effect o n  financial state­
m e n t s ,  the misl e a d i n g  financial statements are a b y - p r o d u c t  or a result, rather than the objective, 
o f  the illegal acts. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  nonetheless believes that i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  of the r e c o m m e n ­
dations this chapter presents will p rovide benefits to public c o m p a n i e s  b e y o n d  the increased 
prevention of fraudulent financial reporting, as it has defined that term. T h e  appropriate tone set 
b y  top m a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  e n h a n c e  a c o m p a n y ' s  c o m p l i a n c e  w i th l a w s  a n d  regulations as well as 
r e d u c e  the incidence o f  fraudulent financial reporting. Similarly, a properly d e s i g n e d  s y s t e m  of 
internal control to r e d u c e  the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting will inherently increase 
the prevention a n d  detection o f  n o n c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  l a w s  a n d  regulations.
II. T o n e  at t h e  T o p
T h e  tone set b y  top m a n a g e m e n t — the corporate e n v i r o n m e n t  or culture within w h i c h  financial 
reporting occurs— is the m o s t  important factor contributing to the integrity o f  the financial re­
porting process. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  a n  impressive set o f  written rules a n d  procedures, if the tone set 
b y  m a n a g e m e n t  is lax, fraudulent financial reporting is m o r e  likely to occur.
T h e  m e a s u r e s  a c o m p a n y  c a n  take to establish the right tone at the top include a w i d e  r a n g e  of 
options. But, to b e  effective, e a c h  option m u s t  include certain steps. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  suggests the
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fo llowing f r a m e w o r k  to help public c o m p a n i e s  incorporate these steps into their efforts to prevent 
a n d  detect fraudulent financial reporting.
F r a m e w o r k
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d e d  f r a m e w o r k  includes three steps:
S t e p  1. Identify a n d  u n d e r s t a n d  the factors that c a n  l e a d  to f r a u d u l e n t  financial report­
i n g , i n c l u d i n g  factors u n i q u e  to the c o m p a n y
S t e p  2. A s s e s s  the risk o f  f r a u d u l e n t  financial reporting that these factors create within 
the c o m p a n y
S t e p  3. D e s i g n  a n d  i m p l e m e n t  internal controls that will p r o v i d e  r e a s o n a b l e  a s s u r a n c e  
that f r a u d u l e n t  financial reporting will b e  p r e v e n t e d  o r  detected.
S t eps 1 a n d  2. Identifying, U n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d  A s s e s s i n g  the R i s k  o f  F r a u d u l e n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  F o r  the top m a n a g e m e n t  o f  a  pu b l i c  c o m p a n y  to d i s c h a r g e  its obli­
g a t i o n  to o versee the fi nancial reporting process, it m u s t  identify, u n d e r s t a n d ,  a n d  assess 
the factors that m a y  c a u s e  the c o m p a n y ' s  fi nancial st atements to b e  f r a u d u l e n t l y  misstated.
T h e  process o f  identifying, understanding, a n d  assessing the factors that m a y  create a risk of 
fraudulent financial reporting in a c o m p a n y  is vital. T h is a s s e s s m e n t  enables a c o m p a n y  to design 
a n d  i m p l e m e n t  internal controls to m i n i m i z e  the risks it identifies.
T h e  process o f  assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting requires j u d g m e n t  a n d  insight. 
R a t h e r  than entailing a separate effort or project, this process entails bringing to regular m a n a g e ­
m e n t  activities a heig h t e n e d  a w a r e n e s s  o f  a n d  sensitivity to the potential for fraudulent financial 
reporting. A c c o r d i n g l y ,  it is not intended that this process involve costly d o c u m e n t a t i o n ,  s u c h  as 
that w h i c h  m a n y  c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  u n d e r t a k e n  in r esponse to the F C P A .  T o p  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  
j u d g m e n t  dictates the extent a n d  the nature o f  the a s s e s s m e n t  appropriate to the particular c o m ­
pany.
Individuals at all levels o f  the c o m p a n y ,  including operating m a n a g e m e n t ,  attorneys, financial 
m a n a g e r s ,  a n d  internal auditors, participate in the assessment, but top-level corporate m a n a g e ­
m e n t ,  s u c h  as the C E O  a n d  the C F O ,  m u s t  supervise the process. In addition, the audit c o m m i t t e e  
o f  the b o a r d  o f  directors sh o u l d  r e v i e w  periodically the c o m p a n y ' s  risk a s s e s s m e n t  process a n d  
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  responses to significant identified risks.
T h e  G o o d  Practice Guidelines for A s s e s s i n g  the R i s k  o f  Fraudulent Financial Reporting, presented 
in A p p e n d i x  F, illustrate s o m e  o f  the factors that c a n  influence fraudulent financial reporting a n d  
c a n  serve as a f r a m e  of reference for under s t a n d i n g  a n d  assessing the risk o f  fraudulent financial 
reporting.
S t e p  3. D e s i g n i n g  a n d  I m p l e m e n t i n g  I nternal C o n t r o l s
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  P u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  m a i n t a i n  internal controls that p r o v i d e  r e a ­
s o n a b l e  a s s u r a n c e  that f r a u d u l e n t  financial reporting will b e  p r e v e n t e d  o r  subject to early 
detection.
T h e  role o f  internal control in preventing a n d  detecting fraud, well r e c o g n i z e d  in practice for m a n y  
years, w a s  r e c o g n i z e d  in federal legislation in 1977. T h e  F C P A  requires e a c h  S E C  registrant to 
devise a n d  maintain a s y s t e m  of internal a c c o u n t i n g  control sufficient to p rovide reasonable
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assurance that (1) transactions are authorized b y  m a n a g e m e n t ,  (2) transactions are re c o r d e d  as 
necessary to p ermit preparation of the financial statements a n d  to m a int ain accountability for 
assets, (3) access to assets is permitted o n ly with m a n a g e m e n t ' s  authorization, a n d  (4) existing 
assets are c o m p a r e d  with r e cor ded accountability, a n d  appropriate action is ta ken w i t h  respect to 
a n y  differences.
Internal accounting controls are generally interpreted to include the c o m p a n y ' s  accounting s y s t e m  
a n d  specific control procedures. T h e  acco u n t i n g  s y s t e m  consists o f  the m e t h o d s  a n d  the records 
that the c o m p a n y  uses to identify, a s sem ble , classify, a n d  record its transactions. T h e  c o m p a n y ' s  
specific control pr oce dur es are its individual policies for processing transactions s u c h  as clerical 
checks, d o c u m e n t  c o m p a r i s o n s ,  reconciliations, a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  assets counts. Internal a c c o u n t ­
ing controls are directed primarily at systematically r ecorded transactions that lower-level e m ­
ployees generally perform.
Fr aud ule nt financial reporting continues to o c c u r  despite the F C P A ' s  statutory r e q u i r e m e n t  that 
c o m p a n i e s  m aintain a d e q u a t e  internal a c c ou nti ng controls. A  C o m m i s s i o n  study o f  1 1 9  fraudulent 
financial reporting actions b r o u g h t  b y  the S E C  f r o m  1 9 8 1  to 1 9 8 6  f o u n d  that m a n a g e m e n t  in those 
c o m p a n i e s  repeatedly h a d  b e e n  able to override s y s t e m s  of internal acco u n t i n g  control. O t h e r  
instances of fraudulent financial reporting i nvolved transactions u n d e r  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  direct control 
a n d  not part o f  the s y s t e m  o f  internal acco u n t i n g  controls, s u c h  as those requiring significant 
estimates a n d  j u d g m e n t s .  Therefore, internal controls b r oad er than the internal ac cou nti ng controls 
c o n t e m p l a t e d  u n d e r  the F C P A  are necessary to r e d u c e  the incidence of fraudulent financial 
reporting.
T h e  b r o a d  t e r m  internal control is often u s e d  to describe b o t h  controls o v e r  operational tasks like 
p r odu ct quality assurance, production, a n d  plant m a i n t e n a n c e  a n d  controls o v e r  the financial 
reporting process. A l t h o u g h  operational or administrative controls are a n  essential e l e m e n t  of 
m a n a g i n g  a c o m p a n y ' s  affairs, s o m e  d o  not affect financial reporting directly a n d  therefore are 
b e y o n d  the s c o p e  of this report.
Controls that affect financial reporting directly include m o r e  than internal acco u n t i n g  controls. 
T h e y  also include e l e m e n t s  not generally considered part o f  internal a c c o u n t i n g  controls, s u c h  as 
the internal audit function a n d  the audit c o m m i t t e e  o f  the b o a r d  o f  directors. T h e s e  control e l eme nts 
a n d  all other c o m p o n e n t s  o f  the overall corporate control e n v i r o n m e n t ,  together w i t h  the internal 
a c c ou nti ng controls, c o m p r i s e  the internal controls that c a n  prevent a n d  detect fraudulent 
financial reporting.
T h e  corporate control e n v i r o n m e n t  is the a t m o s p h e r e  in w h i c h  the internal acco u n t i n g  controls are 
applied a n d  the financial statements are prepared. A  c o m p a n y ' s  control e n v i r o n m e n t  includes 
m a n a g e m e n t  p h i l o s o p h y  a n d  operating style, organizational structure, m e t h o d s  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i n g  
a n d  enforcing the a s s i g n m e n t  of authority a n d  responsibility, a n d  personnel m a n a g e m e n t  m e t h o d s .  
T h e  control e n v i r o n m e n t  has a pervasive i m p a c t  o n  the entire process b y  w h i c h  a  c o m p a n y ' s  
financial reports are prepared.
W e l l - r u n  public c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  effective s y s t e m s  o f  internal control not just b e c a u s e  internal 
control is the first line of defense against fraud, but b e c a u s e  a strong s y s t e m  o f  internal control 
m a k e s  g o o d  business sense a n d  is cost-effective.
E a c h  c o m p a n y  m u s t  design its internal controls according to its o w n  u n i q u e  circumstances, 
w e i g h i n g  the benefits o f  e a c h  control in relation to its cost. E v e r y  public c o m p a n y ,  h o w e v e r ,  
sho u l d  h a v e  a written c o d e  o f  corporate c o n d u c t  as a  prerequisite to a n  effective s y s t e m  of internal 
control, a n d  to establish the appropriate tone at the top a n d  t h r o u g h o u t  the c o m p a n y .
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C o d e  of C o r p o r a t e  C o n d u c t
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  P u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  d e v e l o p  a n d  e n f o r c e  written c o d e s  o f  c o r ­
p o r a t e  c o n d u c t .  C o d e s  o f  c o n d u c t  s h o u l d  foster a  s trong ethical climate a n d  o p e n  c h a n n e l s  
o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  to h e l p  protect a g ain st f r a u d u l e n t  fi nancial reporting. A s  a  p a r t  o f  its 
o n g o i n g  oversight o f  the effectiveness o f  internal controls, a  c o m p a n y ' s  a u dit c o m m i t t e e  
s h o u l d  r e v i e w  a n n u a l l y  the p r o g r a m  that m a n a g e m e n t  establishes to m o n i t o r  c o m p l i a n c e  
with the code.
A  strong corporate ethical climate at all levels is vital to the well-being o f  the corporation, all its 
constituencies, a n d  the public at large. S u c h  a climate contributes importantly to the effectiveness 
o f  c o m p a n y  policies a n d  control s y s t e m s  a n d  helps influence b e h a v i o r  that is not subject to e v e n  
the m o s t  elaborate s y s t e m  o f  controls. C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  a strong corporate ethical climate e m p h a ­
sizing accountability helps to protect a  c o m p a n y  against fraudulent financial reporting.
A  written c o d e  o f  corporate c o n d u c t  strengthens the corporate ethical climate b y  signaling to all 
e m p l o y e e s  standards for c o n d u c t i n g  the c o m p a n y ' s  affairs. W e ll-defined ethical standards a n d  
guidelines for acceptable b e h a v i o r  p r o m o t e  ethical d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  at all levels o f  the organization 
a n d  help resolve ethical d i l e m m a s  that arise.
T o  succeed, a c o d e  o f  corporate c o n d u c t  m u s t  h a v e  the full support o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the b o a r d  
of directors. T h e  m o s t  influential factors in de t e r m i n i n g  the code's effectiveness are the attitude 
a n d  the b e h a v i o r  of the top officers a n d  directors, w h o  set the e x a m p l e  for the entire c o m p a n y .  T h e  
C E O ,  in particular, h a s  a special role; his attitude, behavior, a n d  expectations of others strongly 
influence the actions o f  other upper-level m a n a g e r s .
T h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  of a corporate c o d e  is not a n  overnight task. A  c o m p a n y  m u s t  invest the 
necessary time, energy, a n d  resources to ensure that the c o d e  is tailored to its circumstances. Since 
those c i rcumstances will e v o l v e  to m e e t  c h a n g i n g  d e m a n d s ,  the c o m p a n y  m u s t  u p d a t e  the c o d e  
periodically.
Finally, the full support of m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the b o a r d  is n e e d e d  to e nsure that the c o d e  receives 
w i d e s p r e a d  u n derstanding a n d  support. E m p l o y e e s  representing all levels o f  the corporation sh o u l d  
b e  e n c o u r a g e d  to participate in the code's d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  evolution in a n  appropriate fashion. 
S u c h  collaboration c a n  m i n i m i z e  cases o f  n o n c o m p l i a n c e  d u e  to lack of u n der sta ndi ng a n d  c a n  
p r o m o t e  ac cep tan ce a n d  adherence. In addition, the c o d e  a n d  a n y  a m e n d m e n t s  m u s t  b e  publicized 
t h r o u g h o u t  the corporation.
A  c o d e  o f  corporate c o n d u c t  also c a n  help establish a n  e n v i r o n m e n t  w h e r e  o p e n  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  
is expected, accepted, a n d  protected. M a n a g e m e n t  n e e d s  a free f l ow o f  information to assist it in 
directing the c o m p a n y ' s  operations, especially in a large, decentralized business. T h is n e e d  is 
critical in assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting. A n  a t m o s p h e r e  o f  o p e n  c o m m u n i ­
cation allows a n  e m p l o y e e ,  w h e n  confronted w i th suspected fraud, to bring the p r o b l e m  to the 
attention o f  those h i gh e n o u g h  in the corporation to solve it w ithout fear o f  reprisal.
T h e  c o d e  also m u s t  p rovide a n  accessible internal c o m p l a i n t  a n d  appeal m e c h a n i s m .  T h i s  m e c h ­
a n i s m  s h o u l d  b e  d e s i g n e d  to facilitate internal disclosures, particularly those involving allegations 
o f  fraudulent financial reporting or other m i s c o n d u c t .  T h e  m e c h a n i s m  c o u l d  take a variety of 
forms, s u c h  as the use of a n  o m b u d s m a n .
S u c h  internal pr oce dur es offer a n u m b e r  o f  advantages. T h e y  a l low m a n a g e m e n t  to correct 
inadvertent mistakes a n d  mistakes that m a y  result f r o m  b a d  j u d g m e n t  or failure to recognize a 
p r o b l e m .  T h e y  also e n c o u r a g e  e m p l o y e e s  to act in g o o d  faith a n d  tend to ensure the validity o f  a n y
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complaint. In addition, effective internal action m a y  m a k e  external disclosures to g o v e r n m e n t  
authorities or other third parties unnecessary.
T h e  c o d e  o f  corporate c o n d u c t  sh o u l d  protect e m p l o y e e s  w h o  us e  these internal p r o c e d u r e s  against 
reprisal. Failure to a d o p t  guarantees against reprisal as well as to pro v i d e  a n  effective internal 
c o m p l a i n t  p r o c e d u r e  c o u l d  u n d e r m i n e  the vitality o f  c o d e s  o f  conduct, a n d  e n c o u r a g e  a call for 
antiretaliatory legislation, for w h i c h  there is a m p l e  precedent at the state a n d  the federal level.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  has o b s e r v e d  a great deal o f  diversity in written c o d e s  o f  corporate conduct. S o m e  
are general, others specific in their content a n d  direction. C o r p o r a t e  m a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  d e v e l o p  
a c o d e  that fits the particular c i rcu mst anc es of their business. N e a r l y  all c o d e s  o f  conduct, h o w e v e r ,  
s h o u l d  include a  conflict-of-interest policy, to prevent actual or apparent improprieties in c o n ­
nection w i t h  business transactions; a corporate policy o f  c o m p l i a n c e  w i th d o m e s t i c  a n d  foreign 
l a w s  affecting its business, including those l a w s  relating to financial disclosures; a n d  a policy of 
confidentiality relating to the c o m p a n y ' s  proprietary information.
Y e t  an other e l e m e n t  is indispensable to the success o f  a c o d e  o f  conduct: a d e q u a t e  m o n i t o r i n g  a n d  
e n f o r c e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m s .  M a n a g e m e n t  is responsible for d e t e r m i n i n g  h o w  best to establish 
a d e q u a t e  m o n i t o r i n g  a n d  e n f o r c e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m s  a n d  for i m p l e m e n t i n g  these m e c h a n i s m s .  This 
responsibility is typically carried out t h r o u g h  the legal department, internal audit department, or 
a separate o m b u d s m a n  function. T h e  b o a r d  of directors sh o u l d  b e  responsible t h r o u g h  its audit 
c o m m i t t e e  for r e v i e w i n g  the p r o g r a m  that m a n a g e m e n t  establishes to m o n i t o r  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  the 
c o d e  o f  conduct. E m p l o y e e s  at all levels sho u l d  u n d e r s t a n d  that violation o f  the l a w  or c o m p r o m i s e  
o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  c o d e  o f  c o n d u c t  c a n  result in serious disciplinary actions (including dismissal a n d  
criminal or civil pr o ce edi ngs w h e r e  appropriate) a n d  that n o  e m p l o y e e  is e x e m p t  f r o m  the code.
W ritten c o d e s  o f  corporate c o n d u c t  h a v e  further advantages. S u c h  c o d e s  foster a strong ethical 
climate, helping to create a w o r k  e n v i r o n m e n t  that appeals to c o m p a n y  personnel at all levels. W i t h  
a n  effective code, a c o m p a n y ' s  e m p l o y e e s  m a y  b e  m o r e  highly motivated, a n d  the c o m p a n y  m a y  
b e  able to attract a n d  retain better e m p l o y e e s .  In a n  era w h e n  loyalty b e t w e e n  organizations a n d  
their c u s t o m e r s  s e e m s  less enduring, a c o m p a n y ' s  c o n c e r n  for a strong ethical climate also m a y  
generate a positive i m a g e  outside the organization, w h i c h  c a n  lead to increased business 
opportunities.
III. T w o  K e y  F u n c t i o n s :  A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t
A s  the c o m p a n y  acts to set a n  e n v i r o n m e n t  that is a strong deterrent to fraudulent financial 
reporting, it also m u s t  address fraudulent financial reporting at a  s e c o n d  level b y  m a x i m i z i n g  the 
effectiveness o f  t w o  critical functions within the c o m p a n y :  the a c c o u n t i n g  function a n d  the internal 
audit function.
A .  A c c o u n t i n g  F u n c t i o n  a n d  C h i e f  A c c o u n t i n g  Officer
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  P u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  m a i n t a i n  a c c o u n t i n g  f u n c t i o n s  that a r e  d e ­
s i g n e d  to m e e t  their fi nancial reporting obligations.
A  public c o m p a n y ' s  ac cou nti ng function is a n  important control in preventing a n d  detecting 
fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  acco u n t i n g  function m u s t  b e  d e s i g n e d  to a l l o w  the c o m p a n y  a n d  
its officers to fulfill their statutory financial disclosure obligations.
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A s  a m e m b e r  o f  top m a n a g e m e n t ,  the chief acco u n t i n g  officer helps set the tone of the 
organization's ethical c o n d u c t  a n d  thus is part o f  the control e n v i r o n m e n t .  M o r e o v e r ,  the chief 
a c c ou nti ng officer is directly responsible for the financial statements, a n d  c a n  a n d  sh o u l d  take 
authoritative action to correct t h e m  if n e c e s s a r y . H e  generally h a s  the p r i m a r y  responsibility for 
designing, i m p l e m e n t i n g ,  a n d  m o n i t o r i n g  the c o m p a n y ' s  financial reporting s y s t e m  a n d  internal 
acco u n t i n g  controls. T h e  controller m a y  serve as the chief ac cou nti ng officer, or the chief financial 
officer also m a y  p e r f o r m  the functions o f  a  chief ac cou nti ng officer.
T h e  chief ac cou nti ng officer's actions especially influence e m p l o y e e s  w h o  p e r f o r m  the ac counting 
function. B y  establishing h i g h  standards for the c o m p a n y ' s  financial disclosures, the chief a c ­
c o unt ing officer guides others in the c o m p a n y  t o w a r d  legitimate financial reporting.
M o r e o v e r ,  the chief a c cou nti ng officer is in a u n i q u e  position. In n u m e r o u s  cases, other m e m b e r s  
of top m a n a g e m e n t ,  s u c h  as the chief executive officer, pressure the chief acco u n t i n g  officer into 
fraudulently m a n i p u l a t i n g  the financial statements. A n  effective chief a c c o u n t i n g  officer is familiar 
w i t h  the c o m p a n y ' s  financial position a n d  operations a n d  thus frequently is able to identify u n usu al 
situations c a u s e d  b y  fraudulent financial reporting perpetrated at the divisional level.
T h e  chief a c cou nti ng officer has a n  obligation to the organization h e  serves, to the public, a n d  to 
h i mse lf to maintain the highest standards o f  ethical conduct. H e  therefore m u s t  b e  p r epa red to take 
action necessary to prevent fraudulent financial reporting. H i s  efforts m a y  entail bringing matters 
to the attention o f  the C E O ,  the C F O ,  the chief internal auditor, the audit c o m m i t t e e ,  or the entire 
b o a r d  of  directors.
T h e  Financial E x ecu tiv es Institute (FEI) a n d  the National Association o f  A c c o u n t a n t s  ( N A A )  play 
active roles in e n h a n c i n g  the financial reporting process b y  sponsoring research, technical p r o ­
fessional guidance, a n d  continuing professional education a n d  b y  participating in the s h a p i n g  of 
standards. B o t h  organizations also h a v e  p r o m u l g a t e d  c o d e s  o f  c o n d u c t  that strongly e n c o u r a g e  
reliable financial reporting. Public c o m p a n i e s  sho u l d  e n c o u r a g e  their acco u n t i n g  e m p l o y e e s  to 
support these organizations a n d  ad h e r e  to their c o d e s  o f  conduct.
B .  Internal A u d i t  F u n c t i o n  a n d  C h i e f  Internal A u d i t o r
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  P u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  m a i n t a i n  a n  effective internal audit f u n c t i o n  
staffed with a n  a d e q u a t e  n u m b e r  o f  qualified p e r s o n n e l  a p p ro pri ate to the size a n d  the 
n a t u r e  o f  the c o m p a n y .
Properly o r g a n i z e d  a n d  effectively operated, internal auditing gives m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the audit 
c o m m i t t e e  a w a y  to m o n i t o r  the reliability a n d  the integrity o f  financial a n d  operating information. 
T h e  internal audit function thus is a n  important e l e m e n t  in preventing a n d  detecting fraudulent 
financial reporting.
S u p p o r t  o f  T o p  M a n a g e m e n t
T o  b e  effective, internal auditors m u s t  h a v e  the a c k n o w l e d g e d  support o f  top m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the 
b o a r d  o f  directors t h r o u g h  its audit c o m m i t t e e .  T h e  c o m p a n y  sh o u l d  set forth in writing the s c o p e  
o f  responsibilities for the internal audit function. T h e  s c o p e  of responsibilities as well as a n y  
c h a n g e  in role or function sh o u l d  b e  the subject o f  r e v i e w  b y  the audit c o m m i t t e e .  T h e  optimal size 
of the internal audit function a n d  the c o m p o s i t i o n  of its staff d e p e n d  o n  the c o m p a n y ' s  size a n d  
nature a n d  the s c o p e  o f  responsibilities assigned to the function.
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T h e  education, experience, a n d  professionalism o f  the internal auditors help d e t e r m i n e  the effec­
tiveness o f  the internal audit function. T h e  c o m p a n y  s h o u l d  e n c o u r a g e  the d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  its 
internal auditors b y  pr oviding continuing professional education p r o g r a m s  a n d  offering attractive 
career paths.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  recognizes that s o m e  smaller c o m p a n i e s  c o u l d  experience a significant hardship 
if c o m p e l l e d  to e m p l o y  pe rsons to serve exclusively as internal auditors. T h u s ,  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
use o f  the t e r m  internal auditor includes, w h e r e  appropriate, pe rsons w h o  d o  not function e x ­
clusively in that capacity.
I I A  S t a n d a r d s
T h e  professionalism of  internal auditors has b e e n  e n h a n c e d  in recent years b y  the efforts o f  the 
Institute o f  Internal Auditors (IIA), the professional organization for internal auditors. Standards 
o f  the I I A  offer excellent g u i d a n c e  for effective internal auditing a n d  reflect s o m e  of the m o s t  
a d v a n c e d  thinking o n  fraud prevention a n d  detection. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  e n c o u r a g e s  public c o m ­
panies w h o  h a v e  not d o n e  so to consider adopting the I I A  standards. T h e s e  standards a p p e a r  in 
A p p e n d i x  G .
T h e  IIA's standards call for a quality assurance p r o g r a m  to evaluate the operations o f  the internal 
audit function. T h e  standards pr ovide guidelines that describe, as suitable m e a n s  o f  m e e t i n g  the 
quality assurance standard, a p r o g r a m  that includes the following elements: supervision, internal 
reviews, a n d  external reviews. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  endorses these concepts as w a y s  to e n h a n c e  the 
effectiveness o f  the internal audit function. Confidentiality a n d  other issues associated w i th e x ­
ternal r e v i e w s  are im portant in m a n a g e m e n t ' s  decisions as to w h o  sh o u l d  c o n d u c t  s u c h  reviews, 
h o w  they sh o u l d  b e  c o n du cte d, a n d  w i th w h a t  f r e q u e n c y  they sh o u l d  b e  co nducted.
Objectivity o f  th e I nternal A u d i t  F u n c t i o n
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  P u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  e n s u r e  that their internal audit f u n c t i o n s  are 
objective.
T h e  effectiveness o f  a c o m p a n y ' s  internal audit function d e p e n d s  a great deal o n  the objectivity 
o f  the chief internal auditor a n d  his staff. Public c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  e nsure that their internal 
auditors are free to p e r f o r m  their functions in a n  objective m a n n e r ,  without interference a n d  able 
to report findings to the appropriate parties for corrective action. T h r e e  principal factors contribute 
to i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  objectivity: the organizational positioning o f  the function, the corporate 
stature o f  the chief internal auditor, a n d  the reporting relationship o f  the chief internal auditor to 
the audit c o m m i t t e e .
F o r  da y-to-day operational purposes, the chief internal auditor s h o u l d  report administratively to a 
senior officer w h o  is not directly responsible for preparing the c o m p a n y ' s  financial statements. T h e  
C o m m i s s i o n  e n c o u r a g e s  a n  administrative reporting relationship in w h i c h  the chief internal auditor 
reports directly to the C E O ,  but a c k n o w l e d g e s  that this organizational structure m a y  b e  impractical 
in s o m e  corporations. A t  a m i n i m u m ,  h o w e v e r ,  the chief internal auditor s h o u l d  h a v e  direct a n d  
unrestricted access to the C E O  a n d  the C o m m i s s i o n  e n c o u r a g e s  the C E O  to c o n d u c t  regularly 
s c h e d u l e d  m e e t i n g s  w i th the chief internal auditor, n o  less frequently than e v e r y  quarter.
T h e  chief internal auditor sh o u l d  b e  a n  e x p e r i e n c e d  executive, preferably w i th a b a c k g r o u n d  in 
auditing or a related field, a n d  h e  sh o u l d  h a v e  the necessary business a c u m e n  to w o r k  effectively 
w i th fellow senior officers. T h e  chief internal auditor sh o u l d  o c c u p y  a position o f  h i g h  stature 
within the organization.
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In addition, the chief internal auditor s h o u l d  h a v e  direct a n d  unrestricted access to the audit 
c o m m i t t e e  a n d  h e  s h o u l d  m e e t  privately w i th the c o m m i t t e e  o n  a regular basis. H e  also s hould 
attend all audit c o m m i t t e e  meetings, reporting to the c o m m i t t e e  at regular intervals o n  the activities 
o f  the internal audit function.
T h e  internal audit function c a n  b e  a n  important resource for the audit c o m m i t t e e — a valuable 
in-house source of information a n d  staff. T h e  i m p o r t a n c e  of the internal audit function to the audit 
c o m m i t t e e  leads the C o m m i s s i o n  to believe that the audit c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  r e v i e w  the appoint­
m e n t  a n d  the dismissal o f  the chief internal auditor.
I m p a c t  of  N o n f i n a n c i a l  A u d i t  F i n d i n g s
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  Internal auditors s h o u l d  c o n s i d e r  the implications o f  their 
n o n f i n a n c i a l  audit findings f o r  the c o m p a n y ' s  financial statements.
Internal auditors also p rovide services to the organization b r o a d e r  than those relating to financial 
auditing. Operational auditing, acquisition reviews, a n d  special investigations are a f e w  e x a m p l e s .  
T h e s e  services benefit the c o m p a n y  substantially a n d  give the internal auditor in-depth k n o w l e d g e  
o f  m a n y  different aspects o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  operations. T h is u n i q u e  perspective enables internal 
auditors to b e  highly effective in detecting fraudulent financial reporting, particularly if internal 
auditors systematically consider the results a n d  potential i m p a c t  o f  the nonfinancial audits o n  the 
financial statements.
I n v o l v e m e n t  at the C o r p o r a t e  L e v e l
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the audit c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  e n s u r e  that the internal 
auditors' i n v o l v e m e n t  in the au dit o f  the entire financial reporting p r o c e s s  is ap propriate 
a n d  p r o p e r l y  c o o r d i n a t e d  with the i n d e p e n d e n t  pu b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t .
W i t h  their k n o w l e d g e  o f  the organization a n d  its controls, internal auditors h a v e  considerable 
potential for preventing a n d  detecting fraudulent financial reporting. B u t  the full potential often is 
not realized, in part b e c a u s e  the role the internal auditors h a v e  in the audit o f  financial statements 
at the consolidated level is often limited.
A  C o m m i s s i o n - s p o n s o r e d  study f o u n d  that internal auditors often concentrate o n  the r e v i e w  of 
controls at the division, subsidiary, or other business c o m p o n e n t  level, rather than at the corporate 
level. I n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants, o n  the other h a n d ,  generally are responsible for the audit 
e x a m i n a t i o n  at the corporate level. A p p r o p r i a t e  i n v o l v e m e n t  b y  the internal auditors at the cor­
porate level, effectively coordinated to a v o i d  duplication o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants' 
efforts, c a n  help prevent a n d  detect fraudulent financial reporting.
I V .  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s
T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e  of a c o m p a n y ' s  b o a r d  o f  directors c a n  play a n  important role in preventing 
a n d  detecting fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  highlights important aspects o f  the 
audit c o m m i t t e e ' s  oversight function t h r o u g h o u t  this chapter in the course o f  its discussions of 
other r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  In addition, the C o m m i s s i o n  offers six specific r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
3 9
M a n d a t o r y  I n d e p e n d e n t  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : T h e  b o a r d  o f  directors o f  all p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y
S E C  rule to establish audit c o m m i t t e e s  c o m p o s e d  solely o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  directors.
P r i m a r y  responsibility for the c o m p a n y ' s  financial reporting lies w i th top m a n a g e m e n t ,  ov e r s e e n  
b y  the b o a r d  of directors. T o  help b o a r d s  of  directors carry out this oversight responsibility, the 
C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that all public c o m p a n i e s  establish audit c o m m i t t e e s  consisting of 
i n d e p e n d e n t  directors. E s tablishment o f  s u c h  c o m m i t t e e s ,  o f  course, d o e s  not relieve the other 
directors o f  their responsibility with respect to the financial reporting process.
M o s t  o f  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  research studies e m p h a s i z e d  the potentially positive influence o f  a n  
effective audit c o m m i t t e e .  O n e  study f o u n d  that, for e x a m p l e ,  w h i l e  8 5  percent o f  all public 
c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  audit c o m m i t t e e s ,  a significantly smaller pe rcentage (69 percent) o f  the public 
c o m p a n i e s  involved in the fraudulent financial reporting cases b r o u g h t  b y  the S E C  f r o m  1 9 8 1  to 
1 9 8 6  h a d  audit c o m m i t t e e s .  [In fact, the 6 9  percent figure is h i g h  because, in 3 9  o f  1 1 9  cases 
studied, the p r ese nce o f  a n  audit c o m m i t t e e  w a s  unlikely but these cases w e r e  e x c l u d e d  b e c a u s e  
that fact c o u l d  not b e  verified f r o m  available public sources. N o n e  o f  the 3 9  c o m p a n i e s  w a s  listed 
o n  the N Y S E  ( w h i c h  requires audit c o m m i t t e e s )  or filed p r o x y  material w i th the S E C  a n d  m a n y  
w e r e  i n vol ved in a n  initial public offering.]
T o  i m p l e m e n t  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  that all public c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  i n d e p e n d e n t  
audit c o m m i t t e e s ,  a n  S E C  rule is necessary. T h e  S E C  has long r e c o g n i z e d  the i m p o r t a n c e  of 
i n d e p e n d e n t  audit c o m m i t t e e s  to the integrity o f  financial reporting. B u t  the S E C  ha s  deferred to 
the policies a n d  practices o f  the N e w  Y o r k  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e  ( N Y S E )  a n d  other Self-Regulatory 
Organizations ( S R O s ) .  W h i l e  all the S R O s  h a v e  co nsidered the issue, o n l y  the N Y S E  requires that 
all its listed c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  audit c o m m i t t e e s  c o m p o s e d  solely o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  directors. T h e  
National Association o f  Securities D ealers ( N A S D )  has recently required that all national m a r k e t  
s y s t e m  c o m p a n i e s  establish a n d  m a int ain audit c o m m i t t e e s  that h a v e  a majority o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  
directors. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  c o m m e n d s  the S E C  for not w i s h i n g  to i m p o s e  a n y  u n n e c e s s a r y  direct 
g o v e r n m e n t  regulation, but ex perience w i t h  i n d e p e n d e n t  audit c o m m i t t e e  r e quirements d e m o n ­
strates that it is n o w  t i me for direct action b y  the S E C .
T h e  ultimate determination as to the S E C ' s  authority to require i n d e p e n d e n t  audit c o m m i t t e e s  
u n d e r  existing statutes is b e y o n d  the c h a r g e  o f  this C o m m i s s i o n .  If the S E C  lacks the requisite 
r u l e m a k i n g  authority, it s h o u l d  s e ek the legislation necessary to i m p l e m e n t  this r e c o m m e n d a t i o n .  
A t  the s a m e  time, the C o m m i s s i o n  notes that several potential sources o f  authority lie within the 
Securities A c t  o f  1 9 3 3  a n d  the Securities E x c h a n g e  A c t  o f  1934. In particular, the S E C  m i g h t  
predicate its rule o n  provisions o f  those A c t s  w h i c h  (1) i m p o s e  r e qui rem ent s for financial infor­
m a t i o n  certified b y  " i n d e p e n d e n t "  public accountants, (2) grant the S E C  the express p o w e r  to 
define t e r m s  u s e d  in the Acts, including " a c c o u n t i n g "  terms, (3) require public c o m p a n i e s  to 
devise a n d  m a int ain s y s t e m s  o f  internal acco u n t i n g  controls, a n d  (4) grant the S E C  b r o a d  r u l e m a k ­
ing authority to a d o p t  rules a n d  regulations necessary a n d  appropriate to effectuate the pu r p o s e s  
o f  the statutes.
W i t h  respect to the S E C ' s  b r o a d  r u l e m a k i n g  authority, the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  study o f  fraudulent 
financial reporting cases m a y  provide a factual predicate that a rule m a n d a t i n g  audit c o m m i t t e e s  
is necessary a n d  appropriate to i m p l e m e n t  the disclosure provisions o f  the federal securities laws. 
In this regard, the C o m m i s s i o n  believes that the audit c o m m i t t e e ' s  role is im portant to the financial 
reporting process. T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  the i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  the public accountant 
a n d  its r e v i e w  o f  the a d e q u a c y  of, a n d  c o m p l i a n c e  with, internal acco u n t i n g  controls contribute 
significantly, as d o e s  its role in the c o m p a n y ' s  overall control e n v i r o n m e n t .
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M a n d a t i n g  audit c o m m i t t e e s  is necessary but d o e s  not g o  far e n o u g h .  T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e  m u s t  
b e  c o m p o s e d  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  directors to p r ovi de truly effective oversight o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  
financial reporting process. In considering " i n d e p e n d e n c e , "  the C o m m i s s i o n  n o t e d  that the N Y S E  
audit c o m m i t t e e  policy defines a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  director, for the p u r p o s e  o f  audit c o m m i t t e e  
m e m b e r s h i p ,  as i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  free f r o m  a n y  relationship that, in the op inion of 
the b o a r d  o f  directors, w o u l d  interfere w i t h  the exercise of i n d e p e n d e n t  j u d g m e n t  as a c o m m i t t e e  
m e m b e r .  Directors w h o  are affiliates o f  the c o m p a n y  or officers or e m p l o y e e s  o f  the c o m p a n y  or 
its subsidiaries are not " i n d e p e n d e n t . "  A  director w h o  w a s  formerly a n  officer o f  the c o m p a n y  or 
a n y  o f  its subsidiaries m a y  qualify for m e m b e r s h i p  if, in the o pinion o f  the b o a r d  o f  directors, s u c h  
p e r s o n  will exercise i n d e p e n d e n t  j u d g m e n t  a n d  will assist materially the functions o f  the c o m ­
mittee. A  majority of the m e m b e r s ,  h o w e v e r ,  m u s t  b e  directors w h o  are not f o r m e r  officers.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  agrees w i t h  the c o n c e p t  un derlying the N Y S E  definition o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  director. 
T h e  N Y S E  d e v e l o p e d  this definition, including the s u p p l e m e n t a r y  material offering g u i d a n c e  o n  
particular types o f  relationships, w i th the benefit o f  extensive public c o m m e n t a r y ,  a n d  the defi­
nition has b e e n  in place for a l m o s t  a decade. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  believes that the N Y S E  definition 
a n d  g u i d a n c e  are appropriate for inclusion in a n  S E C  rule applicable to all public c o m p a n i e s .  (See 
A p p e n d i x  H  for the c o m p l e t e  N Y S E  audit c o m m i t t e e  policy.) M e m b e r s  of senior m a n a g e m e n t ,  
particularly those w i th financial a n d  legal responsibilities, w o u l d  m e e t  w i th the audit c o m m i t t e e  
to p r ovi de the benefit o f  their expertise, w h e t h e r  or not they h a p p e n  also to b e  directors of the 
c o m p a n y .
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  recognizes the difficulties t o d a y  in e n c o u r a g i n g  a sufficient n u m b e r  of qualified 
pe rsons to serve as i n d e p e n d e n t  directors, particularly in small, n e w l y  public c o m p a n i e s .  A c ­
cordingly, the S E C  sho u l d  b e  able to grant exceptions o n  a case-by-case basis, but the basic 
r e q u i r e m e n t  sh o u l d  ap ply to all c o m p a n i e s  regardless of size. T h e  S E C  rules s h o u l d  p rovide a n  
exception for c o m p a n i e s  u n a b l e  to m e e t  the requirement, if they c a n  d e m o n s t r a t e  that they h a v e  
(1) a t tem pte d diligently to attract the necessary i n d e p e n d e n t  directors to c o m p r i s e  a n  audit c o m ­
mittee a n d  (2) instituted various proc e d u r e s  a n d  controls that are functionally equivalent to a n  audit 
c o m m i t t e e .  Similarly, the S E C  c o u l d  provide a n  exception for other public c o m p a n i e s ,  s u c h  as 
w h o l l y  o w n e d  subsidiaries for w h i c h  the parent c o m p a n y ' s  audit c o m m i t t e e  fulfills this function. 
E x c e p t i o n s  sh o u l d  b e  granted o n ly in the m o s t  u n u s u a l  cases, a n d  sh o u l d  b e  reconsidered at 
appropriate intervals rather than granted o n  a p e r m a n e n t  basis.
I n f o r m e d ,  Vigilant, a n d  Effective A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e s
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  b e  i n f o r m e d , vigilant, a n d  effective overseers
o f  the financial reporting p r o c e s s  a n d  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal controls.
T h e  m e r e  existence of a n  audit c o m m i t t e e  is not e n o u g h .  T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e  m u s t  b e  vigilant, 
in for med , diligent, a n d  p r o b i n g  in fulfilling its oversight responsibilities. T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e  
m u s t ,  o f  course, a v o i d  u n n e c e s s a r y  or inappropriate interventions w i t h  the prerogatives of cor­
porate m a n a g e m e n t ;  but the oversight m u s t  b e  effective. A s  m e n t i o n e d  previously, 6 9  percent of 
the c o m p a n i e s  involved in S E C  e n f o r c e m e n t  cases for fraudulent financial reporting h a d  audit 
c o m m i t t e e s .  T h a t  statistic raises do u b t s  as to w h e t h e r  audit c o m m i t t e e s  are m e e t i n g  their potential 
for r e duc ing the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e v i e w  s h o w e d  
great disparities in the p r oba ble effectiveness o f  audit c o m m i t t e e s ,  the functions they p e rfo rm, a n d  
the m a n n e r  in w h i c h  they carry out their functions— all a d d i n g  to the doubts.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  therefore reinforces its general r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  b y  delineating certain duties a n d  
responsibilities that it believes are essential for audit c o m m i t t e e  effectiveness. T h e  r e c o m m e n d a ­
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tions in this section of the chapter reflect s o m e  of these specific r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  In addition, the 
C o m m i s s i o n  highlights other important audit c o m m i t t e e  functions t h r o u g h o u t  this chapter. T h e s e  
audit c o m m i t t e e  functions relate to the c o m p a n y ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  of, a n d  re s p o n s e  to, the risk of 
fraudulent financial reporting, to m a n a g e m e n t ' s  p r o g r a m  to m o n i t o r  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  the c o d e  of 
corporate conduct, a n d  to o p e n  lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w i th the chief ac cou nti ng officer a n d  the 
chief internal auditor. In fact, the chief internal auditor's direct a n d  unrestricted access to the audit 
c o m m i t t e e  is vital to his objective actions. S u b s e q u e n t  parts of this chapter outline the audit 
c o m m i t t e e ' s  role w h e n  m a n a g e m e n t  seeks a s e c o n d  o pinion o n  a significant ac cou nti ng issue a n d  
with respect to oversight o f  the quarterly reporting process. Finally, the C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  
that the c h a i r m a n  o f  the audit c o m m i t t e e  write a letter describing the c o m m i t t e e ' s  activities a n d  
responsibilities for inclusion in the an n u a l  report to stockholders.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  d e v e l o p e d  this set o f  r e c o m m e n d e d  audit c o m m i t t e e  duties a n d  responsibilities 
after r e v i e w i n g  a n d  considering the practices m a n y  w e l l - m a n a g e d  c o m p a n i e s  follow today, the 
extensive g u i d a n c e  the public ac cou nti ng a n d  legal professions h a v e  published o n  the subject, a n d  
practices suggested b y  the results o f  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  research projects a n d  b y  presentations m a d e  
to the C o m m i s s i o n .
M o r e  detailed delineation a n d  description o f  responsibilities are best left to the discretion of 
m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the b o a r d  of directors to tailor to the n e e d s  a n d  c i rcumstances o f  e a c h  c o m p a n y .  
H o w e v e r ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  has identified additional, m o r e  specific practices a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  that 
c a n  help audit c o m m i t t e e s  p e r f o r m  their oversight role effectively. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  is not p r e ­
scribing these additional m e a s u r e s ,  a n d  therefore h a s  not included t h e m  as r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  but 
offers t h e m  instead in the f o r m  o f  the G o o d  Practice Gu idelines for the A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  in 
A p p e n d i x  I. C o m p a n i e s  c a n  consider these guidelines within the exercise o f  their j u d g m e n t .  T o  
c o m p a n i e s  that already h a v e  audit c o m m i t t e e s ,  the guidelines will serve as a standard for r e v i e w  
a n d  assessment. O t h e r  c o m p a n i e s — those just establishing audit c o m m i t t e e s  or those se eking to 
i m p r o v e  their c o m m i t t e e s '  effectiveness— m a y  find the guidelines o f  assistance in suggesting 
practical w a y s  for audit c o m m i t t e e s  to discharge their responsibilities.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  is a w a r e  o f  current difficulties in recruiting directors b e c a u s e  o f  director liability 
a n d  in adequate or unavailable insurance coverage. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  h o p e s  that its r e c o m m e n d a ­
tions, particularly those calling for a n  effective, i n d e p e n d e n t  audit c o m m i t t e e ,  will ameliorate 
these concerns. T h e  f o r m a l  charter of the audit c o m m i t t e e  clarifies its duties a n d  responsibilities, 
a n d  the guidelines in A p p e n d i x  I c a n  assist audit c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  in m e e t i n g  these r e s p o n ­
sibilities. B o t h  c a n  b e  helpful in the e v e n t  o f  litigation a n d  m a y  offer insurers the d e g r e e  o f  c o m f o r t  
they n e e d  to issue m o r e  favorable insurance c o v e r a g e  to directors.
W r i t t e n  C h a r t e r
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : A l l  pub l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  d e v e l o p  a  written ch arter setting f o r t h  the 
duties a n d  responsibilities o f  the audit c o m m i t t e e .  T h e  b o a r d  o f  directors s h o u l d  a p p r o v e  
the charter, r e v i e w  it periodically, a n d  m o d i f y  it a s  necessary.
T o  e n h a n c e  their effectiveness in carrying out their responsibilities for oversight o f  the financial 
reporting process o n  behalf o f  the b o a r d  o f  directors, audit c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  h a v e  written charters 
that set forth their duties a n d  responsibilities. T h e  charter s h o u l d  b e  goal-oriented rather than taking 
a detailed " c o o k b o o k "  approach. A  charter c a n  take the f o r m  o f  a b y - l a w  provision, a b o a r d  
resolution, or w h a t e v e r  other written d o c u m e n t  a b o a r d  of directors chooses. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
G o o d  Practice Guidelines ( A p p e n d i x  I) c a n  help in d e v e l o p i n g  a charter, but e a c h  b o a r d  of
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directors s h o u l d  see that the charter re s p o n d s  to the particular n e e d s  of the c o m p a n y .  A s  those 
n e e d s  c h a n g e ,  the audit c o m m i t t e e ' s  charter s h o u l d  c hange.
R e s o u r c e s  a n d  A u t h o r i t y
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  h a v e  a d e q u a t e  r e s o u r c e s  a n d  authority to 
d i s c h a r g e  their responsibilities.
A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  m u s t  h a v e  resources c o m m e n s u r a t e  w i t h  the duties a n d  responsibilities assigned 
to t h e m  b y  their bo a r d s  o f  directors. Public c o m p a n i e s  s hould give audit c o m m i t t e e s  these 
necessary resources, including in-house staff a n d  administrative support. Generally, support for a n  
audit c o m m i t t e e  sho u l d  c o m e  f r o m  existing e m p l o y e e s .  O n l y  in the m o s t  u n u s u a l  c i rcumstances 
w o u l d  a n  audit c o m m i t t e e  n e e d  a separate staff a n d  then not o n  a continuing basis.
A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  sh o u l d  h a v e  the discretion to institute investigations o f  improprieties or sus­
p ected improprieties, including the standing authority to retain special c o uns el or experts.
R e v i e w  o f  t h e  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t ' s  I n d e p e n d e n c e
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  r e v i e w  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  ev aluation o f  f a c ­
tors related to the i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  pu b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t .  B o t h  the audit 
c o m m i t t e e  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  assist the p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  in p r e s e r v i n g  his i n d e ­
p e n d e n c e .
T h e  credibility o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  audit function is a n  integral e l e m e n t  in the financial reporting 
process. A c c o r d i n g l y ,  S E C  rules require public c o m p a n i e s  to h a v e  their financial statements 
audited annually b y  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant.
B o t h  the public c o m p a n y  a n d  the public accountant are responsible for ensuring that a n  i n d e p e n ­
dent audit has b e e n  p e r f o r m e d .  I n d e p e n d e n c e  is a cornerstone o f  the public a c c ou nti ng profession, 
a n d  the public ac countant m u s t  m a int ain his i n d e p e n d e n c e  at all times. M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the audit 
c o m m i t t e e  sh o u l d  carry out their responsibility b y  specifically asking the public ac countant a b o u t  
factors affecting his i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  a sking for his affirmation that h e  is in fact i n d e p e n d e n t  of 
the c o m p a n y .  In this connection, m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the audit c o m m i t t e e  m a y  w i s h  to consider the 
e c o n o m i c  significance of the client to the public ac cou nti ng firm as a w h o l e  a n d  to the e n g a g e m e n t  
office.
Issue R e l a t e d  to t h e  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t ' s  I n d e p e n d e n c e
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  B e f o r e  the b e g i n n i n g  o f  e a c h  y e a r , the au dit c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  r e v i e w  
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  p l a n s  f o r  e n g a g i n g  the c o m p a n y ' s  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  to p e r ­
f o r m  m a n a g e m e n t  advisory services d u r i n g  the c o m i n g  y e a r , c o n s i d e r i n g  b o t h  the types o f  
services that m a y  b e  r e n d e r e d  a n d  the p r oje cte d fees.
O n e  issue c o n c e r n i n g  public accountants' i n d e p e n d e n c e — the possible a dverse effect of m a n a g e ­
m e n t  advisory services p e r f o r m e d  for audit clients— has b e e n  d e b a t e d  continually o v e r  the past 
decade. S trong opinions h a v e  b e e n  e x p r e s s e d  o n  b o t h  sides of the issue.
S o m e  a r g u e  that the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's p e r f o r m a n c e  of m a n a g e m e n t  advisory ser­
vices i m p r o v e s  the quality o f  audits. T h e y  c l a i m  that in the process of advising m a n a g e m e n t  the 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant acquires a  d e e p e r  under s t a n d i n g  o f  the client's business. M a n y  in
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the public ac cou nti ng profession also m a int ain that benefits accrue to the audit process w h e n  the 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant is already familiar w i th the c o m p a n y ' s  operations.
Ot h e r s  believe that s o m e  m a n a g e m e n t  advisory services place i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants in 
the role of m a n a g e m e n t ,  a d d  c o m m e r c i a l  pressures to the audit e x a m i n a t i o n  and, as a result, impair 
i n d e p e n d e n c e .  T h e s e  individuals also a r gue that, at the v e ry least, the public accountant's p e r ­
f o r m a n c e  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  advisory services raises the perception o f  i m p a i r e d  i n d e p e n d e n c e .
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e v i e w e d  previous studies of this issue a n d  s p o n s o r e d  its o w n  research study. 
N o n e  o f  the studies indicated a n y  actual case w h e r e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  w a s  c o m p r o m i s e d .  T h i s  finding 
is reassuring. Nevertheless, t w o  recent studies, a Harris s urvey s p o n s o r e d  b y  the A I C P A  a n d  a 
research report p r e p a r e d  for the A I C P A ' s  Public Ove r s i g h t  B o a r d  ( P O B ) ,  s h o w e d  that a substantial 
percentage o f  m e m b e r s  o f  the k e y  public g r o u p s  i nvolved in the financial reporting process believe 
that p e r f o r m i n g  certain m a n a g e m e n t  advisory services c a n  impair a public auditor's objectivity a n d  
in d e p e n d e n c e .  T h e  existence o f  this perception c a n n o t  b e  ignored.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  c o n c l u d e d  that the audit c o m m i t t e e  sh o u l d  ov ersee m a n a g e m e n t  j u d g m e n t s  
relating to the i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  the public accountant. T h e  rules o f  the A I C P A ' s  S E C  Practice 
Section ( S E C P S )  o f  its Division for C P A  F i r m s  require the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant to 
disclose to the audit c o m m i t t e e  or the b o a r d  o f  directors the total fees received f r o m  the audit client 
for m a n a g e m e n t  advisory services during the past year a n d  a description of the types o f  s u c h  
services rendered. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that the audit c o m m i t t e e ,  in its oversight c a ­
pacity, also r e v i e w  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  plans to e n g a g e  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant to p e r f o r m  
m a n a g e m e n t  advisory services during the c o m i n g  year. T h is entails r e v i e w i n g  the types or cat­
egories o f  services that m a n a g e m e n t  m a y  e n g a g e  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant to p e r f o r m  as 
well as the projected fees. T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  w e i g h  carefully the possible a d v a n t a g e s  of 
s u c h  us e  against the possible effects it m a y  h a v e  o n  the i n d e p e n d e n c e — or e v e n  the perceived 
i n d e p e n d e n c e — of the public accountant, considering, a m o n g  other factors, the type o f  service to 
b e  p e r f o r m e d ,  helpful k n o w l e d g e  of the c o m p a n y  that the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant m a y  bring 
to the task b e c a u s e  o f  its audit services, the extent to w h i c h  audit a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  advisory 
services staffs are positioned to take a d v a n t a g e  of e a c h  other's k n o w l e d g e ,  a n d  the a m o u n t  o f  the 
m a n a g e m e n t  advisory services fee relative to the audit fee.
V .  R e p o r t i n g  to t h e  P u b l i c  o n  M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  
Responsibilities
T o p  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the audit c o m m i t t e e  sh o u l d  c o m m u n i c a t e  explicitly their respective r e s p o n ­
sibilities for the c o m p a n y ' s  financial reporting to those w h o  use that information.
M a n a g e m e n t  R e p o r t
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  All p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  rule to in clude in 
their a n n u a l  reports to stockholders m a n a g e m e n t  reports s i g n e d  b y  the c h i e f  executive 
officer a n d  the c h i e f  a c c o u n t i n g  officer a n d / o r  the ch ief financial officer. T h e  m a n a g e m e n t  
report s h o u l d  a c k n o w l e d g e  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  responsibilities f o r  the financial statements a n d  
internal control, discuss h o w  these responsibilities w e r e  fulfilled, a n d  p r o v i d e  
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  the effectiveness o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal controls.
T h e  investing public h a s  a legitimate interest in the extent of m a n a g e m e n t ' s  responsibilities for the 
c o m p a n y ' s  financial statements a n d  internal control a n d  the m e a n s  b y  w h i c h  m a n a g e m e n t  dis­
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c harges its responsibilities. Y e t  these responsibilities are not a l w a y s  c o m m u n i c a t e d  to the investing 
public.
S o m e  public c o m p a n i e s  presently c o m m u n i c a t e  s u c h  information in their a n n u a l  reports to stock­
holders. A  n u m b e r  o f  organizations c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  financial reporting publicly e m b r a c e d  the 
c o n c e p t  o f  a m a n a g e m e n t  report in the late 1 9 7 0 s  a n d  early 1980s.
T h e  F E I  a n d  the A I C P A  c o n c l u d e d  that a m a n a g e m e n t  report c a n  i m p r o v e  public u n der sta ndi ng 
o f  the respective roles o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant. B o t h  o f  these g r o u p s  
issued guidelines o n  the content o f  m a n a g e m e n t  reports, including suggestions that m a n a g e m e n t  
reports discuss m a n a g e m e n t ' s  responsibilities for the financial statements a n d  assess the effec­
tiveness o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal controls.
In 1979, the S E C  p r o p o s e d  requiring a m a n a g e m e n t  report that includes m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  
o f  internal control. T h e  S E C ' s  p r o p o s e d  rule o n  m a n a g e m e n t  reports w a s  criticized b e c a u s e  o f  the 
close correlation o f  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  o pinion o n  internal control w i th the internal acco u n t i n g  control 
provisions o f  the F o r e i g n  C o r r u p t  Practices A c t  ( F C P A ) .  M a n y  c o m m e n t a t o r s  v i e w e d  the proposal 
essentially as a r e q u i r e m e n t  for a statement o f  c o m p l i a n c e  w i th the law. T h e y  su gge ste d that the 
proposal w a s  apparently intended not to give stockholders useful information, but rather to 
establish the existence o f  violations o f  the F C P A  for e n f o r c e m e n t  purposes. T h e s e  c o m m e n t a t o r s  
q u est ion ed w h e t h e r  the proposal violated constitutional protections against self-incrimination.
T h e  S E C  w i t h d r e w  its p r o p o s e d  release in 19 80, a c k n o w l e d g i n g  the criticisms but indicating that 
it c o n t i n u e d  to believe that m a n a g e m e n t  reports w o u l d  give investors useful information a n d  that 
private-sector initiatives in this area sh o u l d  continue.
W i d e s p r e a d  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  reports, tailored to fit individual c o m p a n y  c i r c u m ­
stances, w o u l d  i m p r o v e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  to financial statement users a b o u t  the nature o f  financial 
information a n d  the processes that s u r r o u n d  its preparation a n d  presentation. T h i s  report w o u l d  b e  
separate f r o m ,  a n d  thus in addition to, the usual letter f r o m  the C E O  in the front o f  the a nnual 
report. M a n a g e m e n t ' s  op inion o n  internal control is important b e c a u s e  the internal control s y s t e m  
provides the basis for the preparation o f  financial statements and, m o r e  broadly, the overall s y s t e m  
of accountability. T h e  C E O ' s  signature o n  the m a n a g e m e n t  report w o u l d  heighten his a w a r e n e s s  
o f  his responsibilities for the financial statements a n d  internal control. Similarly, the chief a c ­
c ounting officer's and/or the chief financial officer's signatures w o u l d  u n d er sco re their role in a n d  
responsibility for the financial reporting process. T h e  controller m a y  serve as the chief accounting 
officer, or the chief financial officer also m a y  p e r f o r m  the functions o f  a chief ac cou nti ng officer.
D espite the support o f  several influential private-sector organizations, after s e v e n  years a signif­
icant n u m b e r  of public c o m p a n i e s  still d o  not include m a n a g e m e n t  reports in their a n n u a l  reports 
to stockholders. T h e  t i me for voluntary c o m p l i a n c e  is past; the S E C  again sh o u l d  take action to 
require m a n a g e m e n t  reports.
Criticisms o f  the S E C ' s  earlier proposal are not relevant to this r e c o m m e n d a t i o n .  First, the 
provisions o f  the F C P A  are not limited b y  a standard of materiality. F o r  the p u r p o s e s  of the 
m a n a g e m e n t  report, h o w e v e r ,  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  limited to material matters 
a b o u t  w h i c h  stockholders re asonably s h o u l d  b e  informed; this aspect will limit the cost o f  the 
disclosure. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  is not suggesting that m a n a g e m e n t  c o m p a r e  its controls 
to s o m e  exact standard or express a n  o pinion as to w h e t h e r  its internal controls are perfect or "fail 
safe." M a n a g e m e n t ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  s h o u l d  recognize that the cost of controls s h o u l d  not e x c e e d  the 
e x p e c t e d  benefits. S e c o n d ,  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  opi n i o n  o n  internal control w o u l d  b e  included in a 
c o m p r e h e n s i v e  m a n a g e m e n t  report. M a n y  c o m m e n t a t o r s  o n  the S E C ' s  proposal indicated that
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m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  of the effectiveness of internal control w o u l d  b e  m o r e  informative in 
that b r o a d e r  context. Finally, m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  the effectiveness of internal controls 
sh o u l d  not parallel the definition of internal ac cou nti ng control included in the F C P A .  
M a n a g e m e n t ' s  o pinion sho u l d  e n c o m p a s s  the entire s y s t e m  of internal control, a b r o a d e r  c o n c e p t  
than the F C P A ' s  internal acco u n t i n g  control.
M a n a g e m e n t ,  o f  course, sho u l d  h a v e  a s o u n d  a n d  a d e q u a t e  basis for expressing its opinion. M a n y  
C E O s  will b e  able to rely to s o m e  extent o n  the establishment a n d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  o f  written 
policies a n d  p r o ce dur es a n d  the selection a n d  training o f  qualified personnel. M o s t  C E O s  also will 
r e v i e w  the c o m p a n y ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting a n d  internal control 
evaluation w i t h  the C F O  a n d  the controller. Since the internal audit function evaluates the 
c o m p a n y ' s  internal controls, the C E O  n o r m a l l y  also will discuss the effectiveness o f  the 
c o m p a n y ' s  internal controls wi th his chief internal auditor as well as wi th the i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
accountant. T h e  C E O  s hould take w h a t e v e r  steps h e  considers necessary in the circumstances.
G o o d  Practice Guidelines for M a n a g e m e n t ' s  Report, including a s a m p l e  m a n a g e m e n t  report, 
a p p e a r  in A p p e n d i x  J.
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  C h a i r m a n ' s  Le tt er
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  A l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  rule to in clude in 
their a n n u a l  reports to stockholders a  letter s i g n e d  b y  the c h a i r m a n  o f  the audit c o m m i t t e e  
de scribing the c o m m i t t e e ' s  responsibilities a n d  activities d u r i n g  the year.
T h e  role o f  the audit c o m m i t t e e  is largely h i d d e n  f r o m  the investing public; it s h o u l d  b e  m o r e  
visible a n d  m o r e  effectively c o m m u n i c a t e d .  M o r e o v e r ,  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  research indicated a 
n e e d  to reinforce the audit c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s '  a w a r e n e s s  a n d  acce p t a n c e  o f  the i m p o r t a n c e  of 
their responsibilities. A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that the S E C  require the an nua l 
report to include a letter signed b y  the audit c o m m i t t e e  c h a i r m a n  discussing the audit c o m m i t t e e ' s  
responsibilities a n d  activities during the year.
A p p e n d i x  K  includes suggestions for the contents o f  the audit c o m m i t t e e  c h a i r m a n ' s  letter a n d  a 
s a m p l e  letter. Certain contents o f  the s u gge ste d audit c o m m i t t e e  letter duplicate existing p r o x y  
statement disclosures. Nonetheless, this r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  sho u l d  lead to m o r e  flexible a n d  illu­
m i n a t i n g  disclosure than m o s t  p r o x y  statements presently provide. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  d o e s  not 
believe that s i m p l y  e x p a n d i n g  the p r o x y  statement disclosure or including the information in the 
m a n a g e m e n t  report w o u l d  a c c o m p l i s h  the s a m e  purpose.
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V I .  T w o  A d d i t i o n a l  A r e a s
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  is offering r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  in c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t w o  additional practices: seeking 
s e c o n d  opinions f r o m  public accounting firms a n d  quarterly reporting. B o t h  offer opportunities for 
strengthening the integrity o f  the financial reporting process.
S e e k i n g  a  S e c o n d  O p i n i o n
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  M a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  advise the audit c o m m i t t e e  w h e n  it seeks a  s e c o n d  
o p i n i o n  o n  a  significant a c c o u n t i n g  issue.
A  difference o f  o pinion o v e r  a significant financial reporting issue b e t w e e n  a c o m p a n y  a n d  its 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant m a y  p r o m p t  m a n a g e m e n t  to seek a n  o pinion f r o m  a s e c o n d  public 
ac cou nti ng firm. O n  the o n e  h a n d ,  the decision to d o  so m a y  b e  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  legitimate attempt 
to obtain a technically correct opinion. O n  the other h a n d ,  it m a y  b e  a n  attempt to obtain a n  opinion 
that coincides w i th m a n a g e m e n t ' s  interest in presenting the results in the m o s t  favorable light.
B o n a  fide differences of opinion arise in financial reporting, especially if c o m p l e x  or novel 
transactions are involved. Generally a ccepted ac cou nti ng principles m a y  not a l w a y s  b e  clear o n  the 
appropriate ac cou nti ng treatment a n d  the c o m p a n y  a n d  its i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant m u s t  use 
j u d g m e n t  in m a k i n g  a decision. U n d e r  those circumstances, the c o m p a n y  m a y  w i s h  another 
o pinion a n d  the C o m m i s s i o n  d o e s  not intend to u n d e r m i n e  its ability to s e e k  one. B u t  w h e n  a 
c o m p a n y  decides to s e e k  a n  op inion f r o m  other than its existing firm, c o m m e r c i a l  pressures are 
introduced into the process o f  resolving the financial reporting issue. R e c e n t  cases h a v e  s h o w n  that 
these c o m m e r c i a l  pressures s o m e t i m e s  lead to fraudulent financial reporting.
M a n a g e m e n t  has, a n d  sh o u l d  have, the prerogative to seek s e c o n d  opinions. W h e n  s u c h  a n  op inion 
ha s  b e e n  s o u g h t  o n  a significant ac cou nti ng issue, m a n a g e m e n t  sh o u l d  discuss the issue wi th the 
audit c o m m i t t e e  a n d  explain w h y  the particular accounting treatment w a s  chosen.
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  W h e n  a  p u b l i c  c o m p a n y  c h a n g e s  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s ,  it 
s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  rule to disclose the n a t u r e  o f  a n y  m a ter ial a c c o u n t i n g  o r  
auditing issue d i s c u s s e d  with b o t h  its o l d  a n d  n e w  auditor d u r i n g  the three-year p e r i o d  
p r e c e d i n g  the c h a n g e .
A s  a further deterrent to possible fraudulent financial reporting, w h e n  a c h a n g e  in i n d e p e n d e n t  
public accountants occurs, public c o m p a n i e s  sh o u l d  b e  required to disclose p r o m p t l y  in a n  S E C  
filing the nature of a n y  material ac cou nti ng or auditing issue they discussed w i t h  b o t h  their old a n d  
n e w  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant during the three-year period p r e c e d i n g  the c h a n g e .  T h e s e  
requirements s h o u l d  apply w i t h  equal force to n e w l y  public c o m p a n i e s .
Q u a r t e r l y  R e p o r t i n g
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  ov ersee the quarterly reporting process.
Financial statement users rely heavily o n  quarterly financial statements. Quarterly reporting, 
h o w e v e r ,  is subject to f e w e r  controls than an n u a l  reporting. T h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant 
d o e s  not audit quarterly data. H e  is required to p e r f o r m  a limited r e v i e w  o f  the quarterly results 
disclosed in the an n u a l  report to stockholders, but h e  s o m e t i m e s  c o n d u c t s  this r e v i e w  after
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year-end. M o s t  audit c o m m i t t e e s  play a limited role in the quarterly reporting process, e v e n  t h o u g h  
quarterly information is a n  integral c o m p o n e n t  of  the financial reporting they oversee.
T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e ' s  oversight responsibilities u n d e r t a k e n  o n  behalf o f  the b o a r d  of directors 
e x t e n d  to the quarterly reporting process. T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  r e v i e w  the controls that 
m a n a g e m e n t  has established to protect the integrity o f  the quarterly reporting process. T h i s  r e v i e w  
sho u l d  b e  on g o i n g .  T i m e l y  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  b e t w e e n  the b o a r d  o f  directors or the audit c o m m i t t e e  
a n d  senior m a n a g e m e n t ,  the chief internal auditor, a n d  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant is a n  
im portant e l e m e n t  of this o n g o i n g  process. S u c h  discussions w o u l d  n o r m a l l y  take place during 
regular m e e t i n g s  of the audit c o m m i t t e e  or the b o a r d  o f  directors.
Directors n o r m a l l y  receive b u dge ted , projected, a n d  actual financial data during the course of 
business t h r o u g h o u t  the year. If actual financial results for a quarter v a r y  significantly f r o m  
b u d g e t e d  or projected results previously disclosed to the directors, m a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  advise the 
b o a r d  or the audit c o m m i t t e e  before the actual financial results are released to the public. M a n ­
a g e m e n t  also sh o u l d  i n f o r m  the b o a r d  or the audit c o m m i t t e e  in a d v a n c e  o f  a n y  p r o p o s e d  c h a n g e s  
in acco u n t i n g  or financial reporting practices a n d  o f  a n y  other un u s u a l  events that c o u l d  h a v e  a 
significant i m p a c t  o n  the financial statements. S u c h  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  d o e s  not require the audit 
c o m m i t t e e  to m e e t  a n d  c a n  b e  h a n d l e d  b y  telephone if necessary. T h e r e  is n o  re a s o n  w h y  i n f o r m i n g  
the audit c o m m i t t e e  of s u c h  u n u s u a l  c i rcumstances s hould interfere w i th the p r o m p t  release of 
quarterly results to the public.
In C h a p t e r  Three, w h i c h  focuses o n  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's role, the C o m m i s s i o n  
r e c o m m e n d s  that the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant p e r f o r m  a timely r e v i e w  o f  the quarterly 
financial statements. T h is r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  w o r k s  w i th the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  for increased audit 
c o m m i t t e e  oversight to i m p r o v e  the integrity o f  quarterly reporting.
V I I .  G u i d a n c e  o n  I n t e r n a l  C o n t r o l
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  s p o n s o r i n g  organizations s h o u l d  c o o p e r a t e  in d e ­
v e lop ing additional, integrated g u i d a n c e  o n  internal control.
Internal control is a c o m p l e x ,  d y n a m i c ,  constantly e v olv ing concept, a n d  o n e  that m a n y  diverse 
organizations h a v e  studied. T h e  A u d i t i n g  Standards B o a r d  a n d  the Institute of Internal Auditors 
h a v e  issued authoritative p r o n o u n c e m e n t s  o n  internal control. T h e  A I C P A  Special A d v i s o r y  
C o m m i t t e e  o n  Internal A c c o u n t i n g  Co ntrol a n d  the R e s e a r c h  F o u n d a t i o n  o f  the Financial E x e c ­
utives Institute also h a v e  studied the topic.
T h e s e  g r o u p s  h a v e  i m p r o v e d  the overall u n der sta ndi ng of  internal control. Y e t  their studies also 
h a v e  resulted in va rying interpretations a n d  philosophies. A s  a result, i n d e p e n d e n t  public a c c o u n t ­
ants, m a n a g e m e n t ,  a n d  internal auditors s o m e t i m e s  disagree a b o u t  the a d e q u a c y  o f  a g i v e n  internal 
control system.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that the organizations sponsoring the C o m m i s s i o n  w o r k  together to 
integrate the various internal control c oncepts a n d  definitions a n d  to d e v e l o p  a c o m m o n  reference 
point. T h i s  g u i d a n c e  w o u l d  build o n  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  help public c o m p a n i e s  
j u d g e  the effectiveness o f  their internal controls, a n d  thus help public c o m p a n i e s  i m p r o v e  their 
internal control systems. T h e  sp ons ori ng organizations s h o u l d  d e t e r m i n e  the m o s t  appropriate 
m e a n s  for providing this additional guidance.
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S  F O R  T H E  I N D E P E N D E N T  
P U B L I C  A C C O U N T A N T
I. T h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t ' s  R o l e  in D e t e c t i n g  
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
T h e  financial statements are first a n d  f o r e m o s t  the responsibility of the m a n a g e m e n t  o f  the 
reporting entity. B u t  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant plays a crucial role in the financial 
reporting process.
U s e r s  of financial statements ex pec t auditors to bring to the reporting process technical c o m p e ­
tence, integrity, i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  a n d  objectivity. U s e r s  also expect auditors to search for a n d  detect 
material misstatements, w h e t h e r  intentional or unintentional, a n d  to pr event the issuance of 
m i s le adi ng financial statements. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  has identified a n u m b e r  o f  steps to i m p r o v e  the 
auditor's ability to detect fraudulent financial reporting a n d  better serve users of the auditor's 
report.
First, the public a c cou nti ng profession m u s t  recognize its responsibility to d esign the audit s c o p e  
to consider the potential for fraudulent financial reporting a n d  to d esign audit proc e d u r e s  to pr ovide 
reasonable assurance o f  detecting s u c h  reporting. T h e  first step s h o u l d  b e  a restatement o f  the 
auditor's responsibility for detecting fraudulent financial reporting.
S e c o n d ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants c a n  a n d  s hould d o  m o r e  to i m p r o v e  their detection 
capabilities. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  offers r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  that w o u l d  require greater use o f  analytical 
r e v i e w  p r o ce dur es a n d  timely r e v i e w  of quarterly financial data.
Third, the C o m m i s s i o n  m a k e s  three r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  d e s i g n e d  to i m p r o v e  audit quality. T w o  are 
d e s i g n e d  to strengthen aspects o f  the profession's quality assurance p r o g r a m ;  the third highlights 
the n e e d  for public ac cou nti ng firms to identify, assess, a n d  m a n a g e  pressures that m a y  affect audit 
quality.
Fourth, b e c a u s e  o f  the h e a v y  reliance placed o n  the auditor's w o r k  a n d  his opinion, users sh oul d 
clearly u n d e r s t a n d  the nature, the scope, a n d  the limitations o f  a n  audit. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  offers 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  to strengthen c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w i th users of the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's 
report.
Finally, the C o m m i s s i o n  co nsidered the process of setting auditing standards. T h e  w o r k  of the 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant i m p a c t s  a b r o a d  r a n g e  of parties, b o t h  preparers a n d  users. T h e  
C o m m i s s i o n  therefore is r e c o m m e n d i n g  that the auditing standard-setting process provide for m o r e  
direct i n v o l v e m e n t  o f  these constituencies. Specifically, the C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that the 
A u d i t i n g  Standards B o a r d  ( A S B )  o f  the A I C P A  b e  reorganized to include equal representation a n d  
participation b y  k n o w l e d g e a b l e  representatives o f  the constituencies that h a v e  a significant interest 
in the financial reporting process.
O n  F e b r u a r y  14, 1987, the A S B  e x p o s e d  for c o m m e n t  a series of p r o p o s e d  auditing standards that 
address m a n y  issues the C o m m i s s i o n  considered. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  c o m m e n d s  the A S B  for its 
efforts in these e x p o s u r e  drafts, s o m e  o f  w h i c h  are responsive to C o m m i s s i o n  concerns.
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II. R e c o g n i z i n g  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  for D e t e c t i n g  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  
R e p o r t i n g
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : T h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  s h o u l d  revise s t a n d a r d s  to restate the 
i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t ' s  responsibility f o r  detection o f  f r a u d u l e n t  financial re­
porting, re quiring the i n d e p e n d e n t  pu b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  to (1) take affirmative steps in e a c h  
audit to assess the potential f o r  s u c h  reporting a n d  (2) de s i g n  tests to p r o v i d e  r e a s o n a b l e  
a s s u r a n c e  o f  detection. R e v i s e d  s t a n d a r d s  s h o u l d  include g u i d a n c e  f o r  assessing risks a n d  
p u r s u i n g  detection w h e n  risks a r e  identified.
T h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant has accepted the responsibility to design his audit to detect 
material errors in financial statements. T h e  d e g r e e  o f  responsibility for designing the audit to detect 
fraudulent financial reporting, h o w e v e r ,  h a s  b e e n  a source of continuing debate.
A  r e v i e w  of past a n d  current auditing literature illustrates the debate. Early auditing texts set forth 
three objectives for the audit: the detection o f  fraud, the detection o f  technical errors, a n d  the 
detection of  errors o f  principle. A s  the m a r k e t  for auditing services g r e w  in the early 1 9 0 0 s  a n d  
auditors increasingly ex p e r i e n c e d  difficulty in detecting carefully c o n c e a l e d  frauds, pressure built 
within the profession to m o d i f y  auditing standards relating to the responsibility for detecting fraud. 
A u d i t i n g  literature w a s  subsequently rewritten, a n d  auditors b e g a n  to v i e w  the detection of fraud 
a n d  similar irregularities as b e y o n d  the r e a l m  o f  their responsibilities.
B y  the 1 9 6 0 s  the d i s a v o w a l  o f  responsibility o n  the part of m a n y  auditors b e c a m e  un acceptable 
to b o t h  financial statement users a n d  the profession itself. O n c e  again, auditing literature w a s  
modified, this t i me to a c k n o w l e d g e  that, in p e r f o r m i n g  the audit e x ami nat ion , the auditor m u s t  b e  
a w a r e  o f  the possibility that fraud m a y  exist. E v e n  w i t h  this a c k n o w l e d g m e n t ,  the auditing 
literature m a d e  it clear that the auditor's responsibility for fraud detection w a s  quite limited a n d  
that financial statement users sh o u l d  not rely o n  the audit for assurance o f  detection.
T h e  next attempt to struggle w i t h  the auditor's responsibility for detecting fraud c a m e  in 1975. A n  
A I C P A  c o m m i t t e e  w a s  f o r m e d  to d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  the failure o n  the part o f  the auditors to detect 
m a s s i v e  fraud in the w i d e l y  publicized Eq u i t y  F u n d i n g  case pointed to a n e e d  for revised standards. 
T h e  c o m m i t t e e  c o n c l u d e d  that n o  substantive c h a n g e  in the d e g r e e  o f  responsibility w a s  necessary, 
but that g u i d a n c e  describing the auditor's responsibility for detecting fraud s h o u l d  b e  i m p r o v e d .
T h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  as well as C o n g r e s s i o n a l  pressure a n d  the w o r k  of the C o m m i s s i o n  o n  
Auditors' Responsibilities (widely k n o w n  as the C o h e n  C o m m i s s i o n ,  after its c h a i r m a n ,  M a n u e l  
F. C o h e n )  led the A I C P A  in 1 9 7 7  to issue S t a t e m e n t  o n  A u d i t i n g  Standards ( S A S )  N o .  16, T h e  
I n d e p e n d e n t  Auditor's Responsibility f o r  the Detection o f  E r r o r s  o r  Irregularities. T h a t  statement, 
w h i c h  r e m a i n s  in effect today, contains the following description o f  the responsibility the auditor 
as s u m e s :
U n d e r  generally a c c e p t e d  auditing standards the i n d e p e n d e n t  auditor h a s  the responsibility, within the 
inherent limitations o f  the auditing process..., to plan his examination... to search for errors or 
irregularities that w o u l d  h a v e  a material effect o n  the financial statements, a n d  to exercise d u e  skill a n d  
care in the c o n d u c t  o f  that ex a m i n a t i o n .  T h e  auditor's search for material errors or irregularities 
ordinarily is a c c o m p l i s h e d  b y  the p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  those auditing p r o c e d u r e s  that in his j u d g m e n t  are 
appropriate in the c i r c u m s t a n c e s  to f o r m  a n  o p i n i o n  o n  the financial statements; e x t e n d e d  auditing 
p r o c e d u r e s  are required if the auditor's e x a m i n a t i o n  indicates that material errors or irregularities m a y  
exist.... A n  i n d e p e n d e n t  auditor's standard report implicitly indicates his belief that the financial 
statements tak en as a w h o l e  are not materially misstated as a  result o f  errors or irregularities.
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N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  its specific re q u i r e m e n t  that the auditor has the obligation to plan his e x a m i n a t i o n  
to search for irregularities, S A S  N o .  16 d o e s  not specify h o w  s u c h  a  search is to b e  conducted. 
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's responsibility 
for the detection o f  fraudulent financial reporting b e  restated. T h e  auditing standards s hould 
include requirements to (1) assess the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting a n d  (2) design tests to 
p rovide reasonable assurance o f  detection.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  appreciates the limitations inherent in the audit process. T h e  auditor c a n n o t  a n d  
sh o u l d  not b e  held responsible for detecting all material frauds, particularly those involving careful 
c o n c e a l m e n t  t h r o u g h  forgery or collusion b y  m e m b e r s  of m a n a g e m e n t  or m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  third 
parties. Auditors nonetheless sho u l d  b e  responsible for actively considering the potential for 
fraudulent financial reporting in a g i v e n  audit e n g a g e m e n t  a n d  for designing specific audit tests to 
recognize these risks.
Existing literature e m p h a s i z e s  the auditor's responsibility to assess the risk o f  error or irregularity 
at the specific a c c o u n t  level. T h e  existing literature d o e s  not require auditors to evaluate the control 
e n v i r o n m e n t ,  a n d  it allows the auditor to a s s u m e  m a n a g e m e n t  integrity unless his e x a m i n a t i o n  
reveals e v i d e n c e  to the contrary. T h e  auditor's pr oce dur es thus d o  not focus at a sufficiently high 
level. M o r e o v e r ,  b e c a u s e  the C o m m i s s i o n  has f o u n d  that the majority of fraudulent financial 
reporting cases involve top m a n a g e m e n t ,  the auditor sh o u l d  not a s s u m e  m a n a g e m e n t  integrity but 
sho u l d  a p ply professional skepticism to this determination.
A s  n o t e d  in C h a p t e r  T w o ,  a strong control e n v i r o n m e n t  is essential. W i t h o u t  a strong corporate 
ethical climate, the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting increases. T h e  standards sh o u l d  require 
the auditor to assess the c o m p a n y ' s  control e n v i r o n m e n t ,  including its m a n a g e m e n t ,  in p lanning 
the audit. T h e  a s s u m p t i o n  of m a n a g e m e n t  integrity is o n e  o f  the k e y  areas w h e r e  g u i d a n c e  s hould 
b e  c h a n g e d .
A u d i t i n g  g u i d a n c e  the profession de v e l o p s  sh o u l d  identify specific factors that m a y  increase the 
likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. T o  aid auditors in designing audit tests, the g u i d a n c e  
s h o u l d  present illustrative audit objectives for factors identified, al ong w i t h  e x a m p l e s  o f  audit tests 
that m a y  achieve those audit objectives. G u i d a n c e  also s hould recognize the difficulties in as­
sessing risks, designing tests, a n d  evaluating audit e v i d e n c e  a n d  it sh o u l d  require substantial 
i n v o l v e m e n t  b y  s e a s o n e d  audit professionals.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  has o b s e r v e d  that fraudulent financial reporting usually follows a predictable 
path, n o r m a l l y  in response to the p r ese nce of certain environmental, institutional, a n d  individual 
pressures. T h i s  pattern differs f r o m  that of unintentional errors, w h i c h  m a y  o c c u r  r a n d o m l y  in the 
reporting process. M o s t  S E C  fraudulent financial reporting cases, for e x a m p l e ,  not o n ly s h o w e d  
significant m a n a g e m e n t  i n v o l v e m e n t  but also i nvolved i m p r o p e r  r e v e n u e  recognition, overstate­
m e n t  of assets, or i m p r o p e r  deferral o f  expenses. Frequently, these improprieties w e r e  a c c o m ­
plished t h r o u g h  u n u s u a l  transactions near the e n d  o f  a reporting period or t h r o u g h  accounting 
estimates a n d  o c cur red m o s t  frequently in industries characterized b y  rapid cha n g e .  In d e v e l o p i n g  
additional guidance, the profession s h o u l d  consider carefully the internal a n d  external pressures 
that increase the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  profession m a y  find it helpful to 
consider the G o o d  Practice Guidelines for A s s e s s i n g  the R i s k  o f  Fr audulent Financial Reporting, 
included as A p p e n d i x  F.
T h e  restated responsibility for detecting fraudulent financial reporting a n d  the additional g u i d a n c e  
described w o u l d  recognize a responsibility that m a n y  in C o n g r e s s  a n d  the courts already say exists. 
M o r e o v e r ,  the recognition w o u l d  b e  in a positive vein, p r o m o t e  consistency in auditing practice,
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e n h a n c e  detection of fraudulent financial reporting, a n d  r e d u c e  c o nfu sio n a m o n g  i n d e p e n d e n t  
public accountants a n d  the public as to the auditor's role.
III. I m p r o v i n g  D e t e c t i o n  Capabilities
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  d o e s  not w i s h  to understate the significant role that audits presently play in 
detecting fraudulent financial reporting: audits c a n  a n d  v e ry often d o  detect instances o f  fraudulent 
financial reporting. T h e  audit process e n c o m p a s s e s  a w i d e  r a n g e  o f  p r o c e d u r e s  d e s i g n e d  to detect 
material misstatements in the financial statements. T h u s  audits h a v e  a decidedly preventive a n d  
deterrent effect.
B u t  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants c a n  d o  m o r e  a n d  the C o m m i s s i o n  is r e c o m m e n d i n g  t w o  
specific steps. T h e  first, greater use o f  analytical r e v i e w  procedures, will, a m o n g  other things, 
e n h a n c e  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's ability to identify areas o f  h i g h  risk o f  fraudulent 
financial reporting. T h e  second, timely r e v i e w  of quarterly financial data b y  i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
accountants, prior to public release, will i m p r o v e  the likelihood of  early detection o f  fraudulent 
financial reporting.
Analy t i c a l  R e v i e w  P r o c e d u r e s
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  s h o u l d  establish s t a n d a r d s  to require 
i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  to p e r f o r m  analytical r e v i e w  p r o c e d u r e s  in all audit 
e n g a g e m e n t s  a n d  s h o u l d  p r o v i d e  i m p r o v e d  g u i d a n c e  o n  the ap pro pri ate u s e  o f  these 
p r o c e d u r e s .
T h e  public ac cou nti ng profession w i d e l y  recognizes the usefulness o f  analytical r e v i e w  p r o c e ­
dures, a n d  auditors p e r f o r m  s u c h  proc e d u r e s  in m a n y  audits today. Analytical r e v i e w  procedures 
c a n  e n c o m p a s s  a b r o a d  ra nge o f  audit steps. U s u a l l y  involving c o m p a r i s o n s  o f  relationships a m o n g  
data, they r a n g e  f r o m  relatively s imple c o m p a r i s o n s  of ratios a n d  trends to sophisticated statistical 
m o d e l i n g  techniques. Rega r d l e s s  of specific f o r m ,  they focus o n  the overall reasonableness o f  a 
reported a m o u n t  in relation to the su rro und ing circumstances.
T h e  potential o f  analytical r e v i e w  p r o ce dur es for detecting fraudulent financial reporting has not 
b e e n  realized fully. U n u s u a l  year-end transactions, deliberate manipulations o f  estimates or re­
serves, a n d  mi sstatements o f  r e v e n u e s  a n d  assets often introduce aberrations in otherwise pre­
dictable a m o u n t s ,  ratios, or trends that will stand out to a skeptical auditor. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  
o b s e r v e d  a n u m b e r  o f  cases w h e r e  p e r f o r m i n g  analytical r e v i e w  proc e d u r e s  w o u l d  h a v e  increased 
the likelihood o f  the auditor's detecting fraudulent financial reporting.
Existing auditing standards allow, but d o  not require, analytical r e v i e w  procedures. T h e  C o m ­
m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that auditing standards b e  revised to require the u s e  of analytical r e v i e w  
proc e d u r e s  o n  all audit e n g a g e m e n t s .  T h e  revised standards s h o u l d  require auditors to us e  a n a ­
lytical r e v i e w  pr oce dur es t h r o u g h o u t  the audit including at the p l ann ing phase. Further, the 
C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that the public ac cou nti ng profession p rovide greater g u i d a n c e  o n  the 
application o f  analytical r e v i e w  procedures. Executive-level auditors s h o u l d  b e  required to par­
ticipate in selecting the analytical r e v i e w  pr oce dur es to b e  p e r f o r m e d  a n d  evaluating the results. 
M e a n i n g f u l  audit e v i d e n c e  f r o m  these p r o ce dur es d e p e n d s  o n  the s e a s o n e d  j u d g m e n t  o f  executive- 
level professionals w h o  sh o u l d  h a v e  a greater u n derstanding o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  industry as well as 
the environmental, institutional, a n d  individual factors that increase the risk o f  fraudulent financial 
reporting.
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T i m e l y  R e v i e w  o f  Q u a r t e r l y  F i n a n c i a l  D a t a
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  require i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  to r e v i e w  
quarterly financial d a t a  o f  all p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  before release to the public.
Investors a n d  other financial statement users rely heavily on, a n d  react quickly to, quarterly results. 
Y e t  u n d e r  existing S E C  disclosure rules, quarterly financial information is u n a u d i t e d  a n d  d o e s  not 
require the i n d e p e n d e n t  auditor's r e v i e w  prior to its public release.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that all public c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  their i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants 
review, but not audit, quarterly data before releasing it to the public. T h e  r e v i e w  sh o u l d  b e  a 
" l i m i t e d "  review, as described in existing A S B  guidance.
S E C  rules currently require larger, w i d e l y  traded public c o m p a n i e s  to include s u m m a r i z e d  q u a r ­
terly data in the an nua l reports to stockholders. T h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant is required to 
r e v i e w  s u c h  data, but h e  m a y  r e v i e w  t h e m  o n  a timely basis, prior to public release, or o n  a 
retrospective basis in c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  ye a r - e n d  audit w o r k .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  d o e s  not r e c o m m e n d  
c h a n g i n g  the s c o p e  o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's r e v i e w  for these larger, w i d e l y  traded 
public c o m p a n i e s ,  but it d o e s  r e c o m m e n d  that the r e v i e w  b e  d o n e  o n  a quarterly basis, before 
public release o f  the data. In addition, the C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that c o m p a n i e s  not subject 
to the current S E C  r e q u i r e m e n t  for s u m m a r i z e d  quarterly data in a n  a n n u a l  report e n g a g e  their 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants to p e r f o r m  a limited r e v i e w  o f  quarterly financial data prior to 
release to the public.
C u rre nt auditing standards provide g u i d a n c e  o n  the nature a n d  extent o f  p r o c e d u r e s  that the auditor 
s h o u l d  a p p l y  w h e n  e n g a g e d  to r e v i e w  interim financial information. T h e s e  procedures, w h ile not 
as c o m p r e h e n s i v e  as a n  audit, nevertheless e n h a n c e  the reliability o f  quarterly data. T h e  p r o c e ­
dures include, a m o n g  other things, (1) a p ply ing analytical r e v i e w  p r o c e d u r e s  to identify u n u s u a l  
items, (2) m a k i n g  inquiries o f  m a n a g e m e n t  o n  a b r o a d  r a n g e  o f  issues a n d  events that m a y  i m p a c t  
the quarterly data, a n d  (3) obtaining written representations f r o m  m a n a g e m e n t  regarding events 
a n d  transactions un derlying the quarterly results a n d  a n y  other representations that the auditor 
d e e m s  appropriate.
A  r e v i e w  differs f r o m  a n  audit in the d e g r e e  o f  e v i d e n c e  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant m u s t  
obtain to support the financial information a n d  also in the d e g r e e  o f  assurance a user m a y  place 
o n  s u c h  information. B e c a u s e  a r e v i e w  is not d e s i g n e d  to express a n  o pinion o n  the financial 
information, it requires significantly less supporting e v i d e n c e  than a n  audit requires. Existing 
standards for a r e v i e w  a l low the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant to state that h e  is not a w a r e  of a n y  
material adjustments that sh o u l d  b e  m a d e  to the financial information for it to b e  in c o n f o r m i t y  with 
generally a c cep ted ac cou nti ng principles.
T h e  timely i n v o l v e m e n t  of the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant w i th quarterly financial data c a n  
i m p r o v e  the reliability o f  quarterly reporting a n d  increase the likelihood of preventing or detecting 
fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  r e v i e w  o f  quarterly financial data before public release assures 
the public of  m o r e  frequent r e v i e w  o f  reporting practices o f  public c o m p a n i e s  b y  a n  in d e p e n d e n t  
a n d  objective party. T h i s  in turn sho u l d  i m p r o v e  the financial reporting discipline in m a n y  public 
c o m p a n i e s .
T h e  increased discipline that r e v i e w  b y  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant contributes is partic­
ularly important in light o f  a study c o n d u c t e d  for the C o m m i s s i o n .  A  s a m p l e  o f  1 , 088 public 
c o m p a n i e s  revealed that nearly two-thirds of the dollar a m o u n t  of writeoffs f r o m  1 9 8 0  to 1 9 8 5  w e r e  
concentrated in the fourth quarter. T h e  study also f o u n d  that fourth-quarter writeoffs h a v e  b e e n
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increasing, b o t h  in f r e q u e n c y  a n d  in dollar value, a n d  n o t e d  that o n e  possible contributing factor 
to the increasing level o f  writeoffs m a y  b e  the a m b i g u i t y  of a c c ou nti ng standards.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  understands that various individuals a n d  groups, including the E m e r g i n g  Issues 
T a s k  F o r c e  a n d  the A c c o u n t i n g  St andards E x e c u t i v e  C o m m i t t e e  o f  the A I C P A ,  h a v e  raised the 
issue as to w h e n  to recognize the i m p a i r m e n t  of long-lived assets a n d  that the Financial A c c o u n t i n g  
Standards B o a r d  is currently studying it. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  ap p l a u d s  these efforts a n d  anticipates 
that m o r e  clearly defined ac cou nti ng standards will contribute significantly to recording writeoffs 
o n  a timely basis a n d  otherwise i m p r o v i n g  the reliability o f  quarterly financial information.
I V .  I m p r o v i n g  A u d i t  Q u a l i t y
T h e  ability o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant to detect fraudulent financial reporting is related 
directly to the quality o f  the audit. T h u s  efforts to i m p r o v e  overall audit quality are important 
e l e m e n t s  of the financial reporting process.
In C h a p t e r  Four, the C o m m i s s i o n  e x a m i n e s  the regulation of the public a c c o u n t i n g  profession, 
including the profession's quality assurance p r o g r a m ,  a n d  presents conclusions a n d  r e c o m m e n ­
dations for i m p r o v i n g  regulation. O n e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  w o u l d  close a n  existing regulatory g a p  b y  
requiring all firms that audit S E C  public c o m p a n i e s  to b e l o n g  to a professional organization that 
ha s  p e er r e v i e w  a n d  in d e p e n d e n t  oversight a n d  is a p p r o v e d  b y  the S E C .  T h e  A I C P A  h a s  s u c h  a 
p r o g r a m ,  the S E C  Practice Section ( S E C P S )  o f  its Division for C P A  Firms. A n o t h e r  r e c o m m e n ­
dation w o u l d  a d d  m e a n i n g f u l  sanctions to the profession's quality assurance p r o g r a m  t h r o u g h  S E C  
e n f o r c e m e n t  action. A s  C h a p t e r  F o u r  details, the C o m m i s s i o n  sees n o  n e e d  for separate or greater 
regulation, subject to adoption o f  these i m p r o v e m e n t s  to the existing f r a m e w o r k .
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  has identified several steps that the profession c a n  take to e n h a n c e  audit quality 
within the existing f r a m e w o r k .  T h e  first t w o  steps, relating to peer r e v i e w  a n d  s e c o n d  partner 
review, pertain to the profession's quality assurance p r o g r a m .  T h e  third step urges greater s e n ­
sitivity in recognizing a n d  controlling pressures within public a c c ou nti ng firms that m a y  i m p a c t  
audit quality.
P e e r  R e v i e w
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  A I C P A ' s  S E C  Practice Se ction s h o u l d  s t r e n g t h e n  its p e e r  r e v i e w  
p r o g r a m  b y  increasing r e v i e w  o f  au dit e n g a g e m e n t s  involving p u b l i c  c o m p a n y  clients n e w  
to a  firm. F o r  e a c h  office selected f o r  p e e r  r e v i e w , the first au dit o f  all s u c h  n e w  clients 
s h o u l d  b e  reviewed.
A  public acco u n t i n g  firm's p r oce dur es for accepting n e w  clients, r e v i e w i n g  a n e w  client's a c ­
counting policies, a n d  resolving di s a g r e e m e n t s  w i th clients are important parts o f  its quality 
assurance p r o g r a m .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e v i e w  of fraud-related cases revealed that a significant 
n u m b e r  i nvolved c o m p a n i e s  that h a d  recently c h a n g e d  their i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants, often 
b e c a u s e  o f  di s a g r e e m e n t s  o v e r  acco u n t i n g  policies. Acco r d i n g l y ,  the profession's quality assur­
a n c e  p r o g r a m  w o u l d  b e  strengthened if, in e a c h  office selected for p e er review, the p r o g r a m  
required the r e v i e w  o f  all first-year audits p e r f o r m e d  during the p e er r e v i e w  period for public 
c o m p a n y  clients that w e r e  n e w  to the firm.
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C o n c u r r i n g ,  o r  S e c o n d  P a r t n e r ,  R e v i e w
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  A I C P A ' s  S E C  Practice Se ction r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  a  c o n c u r r i n g , o r  
s e c o n d  partner, r e v i e w  o f  the audit report s h o u l d  b e  revised a s  p a r t  o f  a n  o n g o i n g  p r o c e s s  
o f  r e v i e w  o f  this r e q u i r e m e n t .  S t a n d a r d s  f o r  the c o n c u r r i n g  r e v i e w  should, a m o n g  other 
th i n g s , (1) require c o n c u r r i n g  r e v i e w  p a r t n e r  i n v o l v e m e n t  in the p l a n n i n g  stage o f  the audit 
in addition to the final r e v i e w  stage, (2) specify qualifications o f  the c o n c u r r i n g  r e v i e w  
p a r t n e r  to require p r ior e x p e r i e n c e  with audits o f  S E C  registrants a n d  familiarity with the 
client's industry, a n d  (3) require the c o n c u r r i n g  r e v i e w  p a r t n e r  to c o n s i d e r  h i m s e l f  a  p e e r  
o f  the e n g a g e m e n t  p a r t n e r  f o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  the review.
T h e  S E C P S  requires a concurring, or s e c o n d  partner, r e v i e w  in all audits o f  S E C  registrants. A  
concurring r e v i e w  of the audit report a n d  the financial statements, prior to issuance, is required b y  
a partner other than the audit partner-in-charge of the e n g a g e m e n t .  T h e  S E C P S  requires all m e m b e r  
firms to establish policies a n d  proc e d u r e s  that m e e t  certain m i n i m u m  standards as to the nature, 
the extent, a n d  the timing o f  the review, the qualifications of the concurring r e v i e w  partner, a n d  
the d o c u m e n t a t i o n  of the review.
In considering the S E C P S ' s  standards, the C o m m i s s i o n  n o t e d  the a b s e n c e  of a r e q u i r e m e n t  to 
involve the concurring r e v i e w  partner in the p l ann ing stage o f  the audit. Au d i t s  m u s t  b e  carefully 
d e s i g n e d  to address the risk of fraud a n d  pr ovide reasonable assurance o f  detection. A n  early 
co ncurring r e v i e w  o f  the audit plan w o u l d  pr ovide a d d e d  assurance that the audit s c o p e  is 
appropriate for the detection of fraudulent financial reporting. S e c o n d  partner r e v i e w  of the audit 
s c o p e  is consistent w i t h  the f u n d a m e n t a l  reasoning o f  quality assurance underlying the existing 
r e q u i r e m e n t  for a s e c o n d  partner review. T h e  s a m e  concurring r e v i e w  partner generally w o u l d  b e  
i n vol ved at b o t h  the p l ann ing a n d  the final r e v i e w  stage, but if c i rcu mst anc es s u c h  as a partner 
transfer m a k e  that impractical, t w o  different partners c o u l d  c o n d u c t  the co ncurring review.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  e x a m i n e d  the stated policies m a n y  o f  the largest public a c c ou nti ng firms h a v e  to 
ensure that the concurring r e v i e w  partner has sufficient technical expertise a n d  experience. T h e  
C o m m i s s i o n  f o u n d  a b r o a d  r a n g e  o f  g u i d a n c e  offered, particularly w i th regard to qualifications 
required for the concurring r e v i e w  partner. W h i l e  s o m e  of the policies require S E C  and/or industry 
experience, m o r e  than one-third of t h e m  d o  not require a n y  specific qualifications for the c o n ­
curring r e v i e w  partner. A  n u m b e r  of firms m a y ,  as a matter of practice, insist that concurring 
r e v i e w  partners h a v e  S E C  a n d  industry experience. Nevertheless, S E C P S  r e quirements sho u l d  b e  
explicit in requiring s u c h  b a c k g r o u n d  a n d  experience.
T h e  co ncurring r e v i e w  partner generally is, a n d  considers h i mse lf to be, a p e e r  o f  the e n g a g e m e n t  
partner b y  virtue o f  his partnership in the firm. It is important, h o w e v e r ,  that the co ncurring r e v i e w  
partner b e  free f r o m  a n y  influence that c o u l d  adversely affect his objectivity a n d  in d e p e n d e n c e .  In 
practice, c i rcumstances m a y  c a u s e  o n e  partner not to consider h i mse lf a p e er of another partner, 
s u c h  as the partner in c h a r g e  o f  the office to w h i c h  h e  reports. Subor d i n a t e  stature within a practice 
office, for e x a m p l e ,  co u l d  influence w o r k  as the concurring r e v i e w  partner. A  different partner in 
similar circumstances, h o w e v e r ,  m a y  feel free of a n y  influence that c o u l d  affect the objectivity of 
his review. St andards sh o u l d  explicitly require that the co ncurring r e v i e w  partner consider himself 
a p e er o f  the partner w h o s e  e n g a g e m e n t  h e  is assigned to review.
In addition to these r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  notes a n d  supports the present efforts of 
the Public O v e r s i g h t  B o a r d  ( P O B )  to study the policies a n d  practices of public ac cou nti ng firms 
relating to co ncurring reviews. T h e  objective o f  the P O B ' s  study is to d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  the 
S E C P S  sho u l d  m a k e  a n y  further c h a n g e s  to clarify a n d  e n h a n c e  its m e m b e r s h i p  requirements with 
regard to this important quality control m e a s u r e .
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F i r m  P r e s s u r e s
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  P u b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g  f i r m s  s h o u l d  r e c o g n i z e  a n d  control the o r g a n i z a ­
tional a n d  individual p r e s s u r e s  that potentially r e d u c e  au dit quality.
T h e  tone that the top m a n a g e m e n t s  of public ac cou nti ng firms set is just as im portant in the firms 
as that set b y  top m a n a g e m e n t s  in public c o m p a n i e s .  M a n y  public a c c ou nti ng firms are large 
organizations in w h i c h  personnel face institutional a n d  individual pressures not unlike those that 
personnel o f  public c o m p a n i e s  face. In public c o m p a n i e s  s u c h  pressures h a v e  the potential to 
contribute to fraudulent financial reporting. In b o t h  large a n d  small public acco u n t i n g  firms, these 
pressures h a v e  the potential to c o m p r o m i s e  the skepticism a n d  professional j u d g m e n t  that are 
critical to audit quality a n d  the detection of fraudulent financial reporting.
S o m e  o f  these organizational a n d  situational pressures include:
• Tight reporting deadlines. Ti ght reporting deadlines i m p o s e d  b y  c o m p a n i e s  a n d  a g r e e d  to b y  
the auditor are the n o r m .  P r o p e r  p l ann ing o f  the audit, therefore, s h o u l d  anticipate tight 
deadlines w h e n  allocating pe rsonnel a n d  other resources a n d  thereby relieve deadline pressures 
that m a y  e n c o u r a g e  auditors p r e m a t u r e l y  to stop p ursuing identified p r o b l e m s .  T h e s e  pressures 
are particularly t r o u b l e s o m e  because, as the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  studies indicate, activities that 
result in fraudulent financial reporting typically o c c u r  near the e n d  o f  a reporting period.
• F e e  a n d  b u d g e t  pressures. Intense competition a m o n g  acco u n t i n g  firms contributes to sig­
nificant pressure o n  audit fees, often w i t h  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  pressure to r e d u c e  staff, t i me budgets, 
a n d  partner i n v o l v e m e n t  in audit e n g a g e m e n t s .  S u c h  pressures m a y  not b e  c o n d u c i v e  to the 
t h o r o u g h  investigation o f  red flags indicating the potential for fraudulent financial reporting or 
to the t h o r o u g h  exercise o f  professional j u d g m e n t  a n d  skepticism.
• B r o a d  a c c o u n t i n g  principles. A c c o u n t i n g  principles in s o m e  areas a l l o w  a b r o a d  r a n g e  of 
acceptable practices. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  did not consider the a d v a n t a g e s  a n d  disadvantages of 
broad-versus-specific ac cou nti ng principles to b e  a n  issue within its scope, but nonetheless it 
n o t e d  that b r o a d  or v a g u e  a c c ou nti ng standards m a y  lead auditors to accept overly aggressive 
acco u n t i n g  practices. Pressure to agree to the outer limit o f  acceptability o f  a n u m b e r  of 
acco u n t i n g  issues has a n  aggregating a n d  undesirable i m p a c t  o n  the financial statements that 
m a y  m a k e  t h e m  un acc ept abl e taken as a w h o l e .
Public acco u n t i n g  firms m u s t  design their s y s t e m s  o f  quality control to recognize the organizational 
a n d  individual pressures in today's audit e n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  control t h e m  t h r o u g h  s u c h  pr oce dur es 
as concurring, or s e c o n d  partner, reviews.
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V .  C o m m u n i c a t i n g  t h e  A u d i t o r ' s  R o l e
A u dit ors c a n  a n d  s h o u l d  d o  a better j o b  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i n g  their role a n d  responsibilities to those 
w h o  rely o n  their w o r k .  U s e r s  o f  audited financial statements n e e d  to u n d e r s t a n d  better the nature 
a n d  the s c o p e  of a n  audit a n d  the limitations of the audit process.
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s  W i t h  Us e r s :  D e g r e e  of  R e l i a n c e
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  s h o u l d  revise the auditor's s t a n d a r d  
report to state that the audit p r o v i d e s  r e a s o n a b l e  b u t  n o t  absolute a s s u r a n c e  that the a u d i t e d  
financial st atements ar e  f r e e  f r o m  material m i s s t a t e m e n t s  a s  a  result o f  f r a u d  o r  error.
U s e r s  o f  financial statements n e e d  clarification o f  the role a n d  responsibilities of the auditor, as 
outlined in this chapter. Since the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's standard report is his p r i m a r y  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w i th those w h o  rely o n  his w o r k ,  the report sh o u l d  b e  revised to c o m m u n i c a t e  
better the responsibilities the auditor a s s u m e s .
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that the standard report clearly explain the de g r e e  to 
w h i c h  users c a n  rely o n  the audit to ensure that audited financial statements are free f r o m  material 
misstatements. T h e  report also sh o u l d  describe the limitations o f  the audit process: that a n  audit 
c a n n o t  a n d  d o e s  not guarantee or pr ovide absolute assurance that the financial statements are 
reliable or accurate. T h e s e  clarifications will help to c o n f i r m  to all c o n c e r n e d  that m a n a g e m e n t  has 
p r i m a r y  responsibility for the financial statements a n d  to prevent users o f  financial statements f r o m  
placing m o r e  reliance o n  the audit process than is reasonable.
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s  W i t h  Use r s :  R e v i e w  of  Internal A c c o u n t i n g  C o n t r o l s
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  s h o u l d  revise the auditor's s t a n d a r d  
report to describe the extent to w h i c h  the i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  h a s  r e v i e w e d  a n d  
e v a l u a t e d  the s y s t e m  o f  internal a c c o u n t i n g  control. T h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  also 
s h o u l d  p r o v i d e  explicit g u i d a n c e  to a d d r e s s  the situation w h e r e , as a  result o f  his k n o w l e d g e  
o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal a c c o u n t i n g  controls, the i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  dis­
a g r e e s  with m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  a s  stated in the p r o p o s e d  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  report.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  d o e s  not p r o p o s e  c h a n g i n g  existing standards to increase the extent to w h i c h  the 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant m u s t  r e v i e w  a n d  evaluate the s y s t e m  o f  internal a c c o u n t i n g  control. 
Rather, the C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  disclosure, in the auditor's standard report, o f  the r e v i e w  of 
internal ac cou nti ng controls that existing auditing standards require in c o n n e c t i o n  w i th a n  audit of 
financial statements. T h is disclosure will r e d u c e  the likelihood that report users m a y  m i s u n d e r s t a n d  
the extent o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's review, a n d  the de g r e e  to w h i c h  that r e v i e w  c a n  
v a ry u n d e r  existing standards.
G e ner all y accepted auditing standards require the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant to p e r f o r m  a 
preliminary r e v i e w  of the s y s t e m  of  internal ac cou nti ng control. T h is r e v i e w  is d e s i g n e d  for the 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant to gain sufficient u n derstanding of the s y s t e m  to d e t e r m i n e  the 
d e g r e e  of reliance h e  will place o n  it in de t e r m i n i n g  the nature, the extent, a n d  the timing o f  audit 
tests.
T h e  extent o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's i n v o l v e m e n t  with the s y s t e m  of internal a c ­
c o unt ing control s u b s e q u e n t  to this preliminary r e v i e w  m a y  v a ry widely. After c o m p l e t i n g  his
5 7
preliminary review, the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant m a y  d ecide not to rely o n  the c o m p a n y ' s  
internal acco u n t i n g  controls, a n d  therefore h e  m a y  not s p e n d  t i m e  to gain a n  in-depth u n d e r s t a n d ­
ing of the s y s t e m  or to test the system. O n  the other h a n d ,  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant m a y  
c h o o s e  to evaluate, test, a n d  rely extensively o n  the s y s t e m  for p u r p o s e s  o f  the audit.
T h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant decides w h e t h e r  h e  will test internal ac cou nti ng controls o n  the 
basis o f  his preliminary review. T h is r e v i e w  assesses (1) w h e t h e r  the nature a n d  the strength of 
the controls are likely to justify a n y  restriction in audit tests a n d  (2) w h e t h e r  the effort required to 
study a n d  evaluate the controls is likely to e x c e e d  the reduction in audit effort that c o u l d  b e  
a s s u m e d  b y  reliance o n  t h e m .  T h u s  in s o m e  c i rcumstances adequately d e s i g n e d  internal accounting 
controls m a y  not b e  tested a n d  evaluated b e c a u s e  reliance o n  s u c h  controls is not cost justified. 
Further, the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant m a y  decide to test a n d  evaluate o n l y  those internal 
a c cou nti ng controls o n  w h i c h  h e  plans to rely; h e  n e e d  not evaluate or test other internal ac cou nti ng 
controls in depth.
In the first r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  in this chapter, the C o m m i s s i o n  p r o p o s e d  that the i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
accountant's study a n d  evaluation o f  the control e n v i r o n m e n t  b e  a m o n g  the affirmative steps 
required in e a c h  audit to assess the potential of fraudulent financial reporting. A n  in-depth study 
a n d  evaluation o f  the s y s t e m  of internal acco u n t i n g  control, h o w e v e r ,  is not necessary o n  all audits. 
O n e  o f  the p r i m a r y  functions o f  the internal auditor is to evaluate internal acco u n t i n g  controls a n d  
report thereon to m a n a g e m e n t .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  defers to the public acco u n t i n g  profession o n  the 
determination o f  the appropriate extent o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's r e v i e w  o f  the s y s t e m  
of internal ac cou nti ng control.
Existing auditing literature allows the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant to render a n  affirmative 
o pinion o n  internal ac cou nti ng controls if the c o m p a n y  so requests, a n d  it provides g u i d a n c e  for 
that w o r k .  S o m e  c o m p a n y  m a n a g e m e n t s  m a y  w i s h  to request s u c h  a n  opinion to serve as part o f  
their support for the a s s e s s m e n t  o f  internal controls they express in the m a n a g e m e n t  report in the 
ann u a l  report to stockholders.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  is c o n c e r n e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  that users o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  financial statements m a y  not 
b e  a w a r e  o f  the extent o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's r e v i e w  o f  the s y s t e m  of internal 
a c c ou nti ng control b e c a u s e  this r e v i e w  c a n  v a r y  so greatly. T h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's 
standard report sh o u l d  b e  revised to a v o i d  possible m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of the report a n d  m i s t a k e n  
reliance o n  it b y  describing the r e v i e w  of the s y s t e m  o f  internal a c c o u n t i n g  control that is required 
b y  auditing standards. S u c h  standard l a n g u a g e  w o u l d  m a k e  clear the d e g r e e  to w h i c h  the user c a n  
rely o n  the auditor h a v i n g  assessed the a d e q u a c y  o f  the s y s t e m  o f  control. Further, the standard 
report s h o u l d  indicate that auditing standards require the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant to c o m ­
m u n i c a t e  to m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the b o a r d  o f  directors, or to the audit c o m m i t t e e ,  a n y  significant 
material w e a k n e s s e s  that c o m e  to his attention during the course o f  his audit.
W h i l e  the C o m m i s s i o n  is not r e c o m m e n d i n g  a special project for the i n d e p e n d e n t  public a c c o u n t ­
ant to r e v i e w  a n d  evaluate internal controls, it is r e c o m m e n d i n g  that auditing standards explicitly 
address the situation that c o u l d  arise as a result o f  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  calling for 
a m a n a g e m e n t  report in the an n u a l  report to stockholders. T h e  report w o u l d  include m a n a g e m e n t ' s  
a s s e s s m e n t  o f  internal controls. Standards s h o u l d  p rovide explicit g u i d a n c e  for the i n d e p e n d e n t  
public ac countant if the k n o w l e d g e  h e  has g a i n e d  a b o u t  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal ac cou nti ng controls 
leads h i m  to disagree w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  of controls in its report.
C o m m u n i c a t i o n  W i t h  O t h e r s  R e g a r d i n g  M a t e r i a l  Irregularities
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  also considered possible c h a n g e s  in the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's current 
obligation to c o m m u n i c a t e  to others outside the client a n y  material irregularities a n d  illegal acts
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h e  discovers in the c ourse o f  a n  audit. C u rre nt re qui rem ent s obligate the auditor to report s u c h  
events to parties other than the client's m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  b o a r d  o f  directors w h e n  the i m p a c t  is so 
material as to affect his o pinion o n  the financial statements. In s u c h  c i rcu mst anc es the auditor is 
required to m o d i f y  his opinion, thus pr oviding public disclosure of the impropriety, or to consider 
w i t h d r a w i n g  f r o m  the audit e n g a g e m e n t .  T h e  practical effect o f  this r e q u i r e m e n t  is a w i t h d r a w a l  
or termination o f  the relationship, w h i c h  in turn triggers a public disclosure obligation u n d e r  the 
provisions o f  F o r m  8 - K ,  w h i c h  public c o m p a n i e s  m u s t  file w i th the S E C  in c o n n e c t i o n  w i th 
c h a n g e s  in public ac cou nti ng firms. Also, current auditing standards require that the auditor discuss 
his audit findings w i t h  the auditor w h o  s u c c e e d s  h i m .  In the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  v i e w ,  these existing 
r e quirements h a v e  p r o m o t e d  the appropriate reporting o f  material improprieties that m i g h t  oth­
erwise h a v e  resulted in fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  nevertheless urges the S E C  
a n d  the public a c c ou nti ng profession to continue their efforts to i m p r o v e  the t iming a n d  the quality 
o f  s u c h  disclosures.
V I .  T h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  study o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's role e n c o m p a s s e d  not o n ly certain 
specific auditing standards but also the process b y  w h i c h  standards are set. A m o n g  other things, 
auditing standards establish the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's responsibility for detecting fraud­
ulent financial reporting a n d  g u i d e  h i m  in fulfilling this responsibility. A u d i t i n g  standards thus are 
a critical c o m p o n e n t  o f  the financial reporting system.
S t u d y  o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's role in detecting fraudulent financial reporting m u s t  
not limit itself to specific auditing standards existing at a point in time. It m u s t  recognize the 
constantly e v olv ing nature o f  auditing a n d  o f  the business a n d  e c o n o m i c  e n v i r o n m e n t  in w h i c h  
financial reporting takes place, a n d  it m u s t  consider the standard-setting process itself.
O l d  a n d  N e w  P r o p o s a l s  for C h a n g e
P r evi ous efforts to study a n d  evaluate the role o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant r e a c h e d  a 
similar conclusion. In the late 1 9 7 0 s  the C o h e n  C o m m i s s i o n ,  several C o n g r e s s i o n a l  studies, a n d  
a special A I C P A  c o m m i t t e e  considered the subject a n d  r e c o m m e n d e d  a n u m b e r  of changes. M o r e  
recently, the h e a d s  o f  7 m a j o r  public a c c o u n t i n g  firms presented r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  to the A I C P A  
( " T h e  Future R e l e v a n c e ,  Reliability, a n d  Credibility o f  Financial In f o r m a t i o n , "  April 1 9 8 6 )  that 
included calls for e n h a n c i n g  the capacity o f  the A u d i t i n g  Standards B o a r d  ( A S B )  to d e v e l o p  
auditing standards.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e v i e w e d  the profession's responses to past suggestions for c h a n g e  a n d  recent 
c h a n g e s  in the A S B ' s  composition. T h e  C o h e n  C o m m i s s i o n  believed the responsibility for setting 
standards s h o u l d  stay w i t h  the public ac cou nti ng profession, but it r e c o m m e n d e d  replacing the 
existing c o m m i t t e e  structure w i th a smaller, full-time, sufficiently c o m p e n s a t e d  b o d y .  T h e  C o h e n  
C o m m i s s i o n  w e n t  o n  to suggest steps to support that b o d y ,  s u c h  as i m p r o v i n g  the quality of 
supporting staff. T h e  S E C  reported to C o n g r e s s  in July 1 9 7 8  that, w h i l e  it did not necessarily agree 
w i t h  the profession's rejection o f  the C o h e n  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  o f  a small, full-time 
board, it believed that the n e w l y  a d o p t e d  A S B  w o u l d  e n h a n c e  the objectivity o f  the process a n d  
w a s  a n  appropriate r e spo nse at that time. T h e  S E C  o b s e r v e d  that there w a s  n o  n e e d  to g o  further 
at that t i m e  b ecause, a m o n g  other reasons, there w a s  n o  b a c k l o g  of urgent p r o b l e m s .  T h e  m o r e  
recent r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  b y  the s e v e n  m a j o r  firms, h o w e v e r ,  reflected a conclusion within the
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profession that the structure a n d  the organization d evised in 1 9 7 8  m a y  n o  longer strike the optimal 
balance.
After considering b o t h  old a n d  n e w  proposals for c h a n g e ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  c o n c l u d e d  that the 
process o f  setting auditing standards involves highly technical aspects but, further, that it also 
involves substantial policy aspects. T h e  c o n d u c t  o f  the audit i m p a c t s  a b r o a d  r a n g e  of parties, 
within b o t h  preparer a n d  user groups. C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  the auditing standard-setting process s hould 
incorporate m o r e  direct i n v o l v e m e n t  o f  all interested parties.
R e o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  the B o a r d
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  A I C P A  s h o u l d  r e o r g a n i z e  the A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  to afford 
a  full participatory role in the standard-setting p r o c e s s  to k n o w l e d g e a b l e  p e r s o n s  w h o  are 
affected b y  a n d  interested in auditing s t a n d a r d s  b u t  w h o  either a r e  n o t  C P A s  o r  ar e  C P A s  
n o  l o n g e r  in p u b l i c  practice.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  carefully r e v i e w e d  the A S B ' s  p e r f o r m a n c e  o v e r  the past d e c a d e  a n d  c o n c l u d e d  
that the process o f  setting auditing standards c a n  b e  i m p r o v e d .  T h e  present a r r a n g e m e n t  provides 
highly c o m p e t e n t  preparation o f  technical d o c u m e n t s  a n d  standards, to w h i c h  the A S B ' s  recent 
publication o f  1 0  e x p o s u r e  drafts stands witness. T h e  publication of these drafts as a group, 
h o w e v e r ,  serves to illustrate the n e e d  to recognize a n d  address e m e r g i n g  policy issues o n  a m o r e  
timely basis.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  believes that the setting o f  auditing standards sh o u l d  involve k n o w l e d g e a b l e  
p ersons w h o s e  p r i m a r y  c o n c e r n  is w i t h  the u s e  o f  auditing products as well as practicing inde­
p e n d e n t  public accountants. S u c h  individuals w o u l d  h a v e  particular sensitivity to the operating 
implications of auditing standards a n d  to e m e r g i n g  policy issues c o n c e r n i n g  these standards. T h e  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  w h i c h  follow c o n t e m p l a t e  a smaller A S B  c o m p o s e d  of equal n u m b e r s  o f  p r a c ­
titioners a n d  qualified pe rsons not presently e n g a g e d  in public accounting. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  
believes that s u c h  a board, led b y  t w o  full-time officers, w o u l d  l o o k  b e y o n d  the technical aspects 
of auditing a n d  set a n  a g e n d a  w h i c h  reflects a b r o a d  r a n g e  of needs, serving public a n d  private 
interests. T h e  a g e n d a  w o u l d  b e  i m p l e m e n t e d  b y  auditing standards of continuing h i g h  technical 
quality, a n d  the A S B  w o u l d  a d o p t  these standards o n  the basis o f  their technical quality a n d  their 
addressing these public a n d  private needs.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  recognizes that i m p l e m e n t i n g  this r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  will necessitate m a j o r  
c h a n g e s  in the existing organization o f  the A S B .  Acc o r d i n g l y ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  offers the fol­
l o w i n g  suggestions for i m p l e m e n t i n g  its r e c o m m e n d a t i o n :
1. T h e  A S B  sh o u l d  continue to b e  u n d e r  the auspices of, a n d  to b e  su ppo rte d by, the A I C P A .
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  sees n o  n e e d  to r e m o v e  auditing standard-setting f r o m  the d o m a i n  of the public 
acco u n t i n g  profession. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  agrees w i t h  the co nclusion of the C o h e n  C o m m i s s i o n  that 
the auditing standard-setting process has w o r k e d  re asonably well a n d  notes the profession's 
positive record o f  responsiveness to proposals for cha n g e .  M o r e o v e r ,  as the C o h e n  C o m m i s s i o n  
observed, r e m o v i n g  standard-setting f r o m  the profession c o u l d  h a v e  a n  a d verse effect o n  profes­
sionalism a n d  o n  auditors' motivation to accept a n d  support auditing p r o n o u n c e m e n t s .  Establish­
ing a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  b o d y  w o u l d  involve substantial costs; these costs d o  not a p p e a r  to b e  justified. 
T h e  existing A S B ,  reorganized as r e c o m m e n d e d  in this report, sh o u l d  b e  fully c apable o f  setting 
standards as n e e d e d  in the future.
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2. T h e  A S B  s h o u l d  b e  significantly smaller than the present b o a r d  a n d  h a v e  a n  e v e n  n u m b e r  of 
m e m b e r s .  H a l f  sh o u l d  b e  practicing public accountants; half sho u l d  b e  pe rsons w h o  are not 
e n g a g e d  in public ac cou nti ng practice but are qualified a n d  k n o w l e d g e a b l e  a b o u t  auditing.
O u t s i d e  participation, to b e  m e a n i n g f u l  a n d  to attract highly qualified outside m e m b e r s ,  m u s t  b e  
equal to the participation o f  the practicing profession. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  recognizes that the A S B  
currently receives the benefit o f  input f r o m  m a n y  sectors but believes actual participation o n  the 
A S B  will e n h a n c e  the value a n d  the effectiveness of this input.
N i n e t e e n  o f  the 21 m e m b e r s  o f  the A S B  as currently org a n i z e d  are f r o m  the practicing public 
acco u n t i n g  profession. T h u s ,  reaching 5 0  percent outside participation within the existing o r g a ­
nizational structure w o u l d  increase the b o a r d  to a n  u n w i e l d y  size. T h e  smaller size the C o m m i s s i o n  
r e c o m m e n d s  —  o n  the order o f  8 to 12 m e m b e r s  —  w o u l d  provide a n  i m p r o v e d  f o r u m  for the 
m e m b e r s  to focus o n  the policy aspects o f  auditing standards.
T h e  outside m e m b e r s  sh o u l d  c o m e  f r o m  sectors affected b y  or otherwise interested in auditing 
standards, s u c h  as c o m p a n i e s ,  w h i c h  are purchasers of audit services, a n d  investors, financial 
analysts, a n d  creditors, w h o  u s e  audited financial statements. E x a m p l e s  of qualified individuals are 
business persons, a c ademicians, internal auditors, g o v e r n m e n t  auditors, a n d  f o r m e r  i n d e p e n d e n t  
public accountants w h o  h a v e  since g a i n e d  ex perience in m a n a g e m e n t  or other fields. E x p e r i e n c e  
as a m e m b e r  o f  a n  audit c o m m i t t e e  w o u l d  b e  particularly beneficial. In a n y  event, the outside, or 
public, m e m b e r s  m u s t  b e  able to appreciate a n d  ba lance issues o f  c o n c e r n  to the public ac counting 
profession, s u c h  as liability, issues of c o n c e r n  to public c o m p a n i e s ,  s u c h  as cost, a n d  issues of 
c o n c e r n  to users, n a m e l y  the reliability o f  reported financial information.
3. T h e  A I C P A  B o a r d  o f  Directors s h o u l d  select the A S B  m e m b e r s .  Selection sh o u l d  b e  b a s e d  
o n  personal expertise a n d  qualifications, not o n  the basis o f  constituencies other than those 
discussed a b o v e  for the outside m e m b e r s .
4. T h e  c h a i r m a n  a n d  vice c h a i r m a n  o f  the A S B  s h o u l d  b o t h  serve full time. O n e  sh o u l d  b e  f r o m  
current professional auditing practice; the other sh o u l d  b e  f r o m  the ranks of k n o w l e d g e a b l e  
persons not e n g a g e d  in that practice. T o  attract qualified m e m b e r s ,  the A S B  sho u l d  suffi­
ciently c o m p e n s a t e  all m e m b e r s ,  b o th full- a n d  part-time.
A l t h o u g h  the recent r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o f  the 7 m a j o r  firms w e n t  further, including all full-time 
A S B  m e m b e r s  a m o n g  the possible e n h a n c e m e n t s  r e c o m m e n d e d ,  it m a y  b e  m o r e  appropriate to 
start w i t h  a  full-time c h a i r m a n  a n d  vice c h a i r m a n .  Full-time service of at least those m e m b e r s  is 
important to ensure the A S B ' s  capacity to focus o n  the b r o a d  policy level a n d  to pr ovide timely 
guidance.
5. T h e  reorganized A S B ,  in setting auditing standards, sh o u l d  p e r f o r m  a m a n a g e m e n t  role: (1) 
setting the a g e n d a ,  priorities, a n d  policy direction a n d  (2) considering, approving, disap­
p r o v i n g  or c h a n g i n g  technical auditing standards.
T h e  A S B  itself w o u l d  not p e r f o r m  technical standards drafting but w o u l d  l o o k  to its staff a n d  other 
sources for this support.
6. T h e  A I C P A  s h o u l d  ensure that the A S B  ha s  a n  adequate, technically qualified senior staff.
W i t h  the reduction in the size o f  the A S B ,  additional highly qualified staff m a y  b e  necessary. T o  
attract qualified individuals, the A I C P A  s h o u l d  consider asking partners, senior m a n a g e r s ,  or 
similar individuals f r o m  the public acco u n t i n g  firms to serve as practice fellows. T h e  A I C P A  a n d
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the a c c o u n t i n g  firms n e e d  to ensure that these positions h a v e  a n  e n h a n c e d  career path, similar to 
that p r o v i d e d  to practice fellows of the S E C  a n d  the F A S B .
7. In addition to using the services of A I C P A  staff a n d  rotating practice fellows, the A S B  also 
sh o u l d  b e  able to continue to d r a w  o n  the technical expertise o f  partners currently e n g a g e d  in 
auditing practice, w h o  n o w  serve the A S B  o n  a part-time basis, for difficult, technical matters 
that d e m a n d  the partner's level o f  experience a n d  j u d g m e n t .
R e o r g a n i z i n g  the A S B  as outlined s hould ensure its technical capacity a n d  at the s a m e  t i me b r o a d e n  
its policy-level capacity. W i t h  the addition o f  k n o w l e d g e a b l e  outside m e m b e r s  a n d  the other 
su gge ste d organizational c h ang es, the A S B  will b e  in a better position to bal a n c e  the n e e d s  a n d  
the interests of the profession, the public c o m p a n y ,  a n d  the users o f  financial information.
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C h a p t e r  F o u r
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S  F O R  T H E  S E C  A N D  
O T H E R S  T O  I M P R O V E  T H E  R E G U L A T O R Y  
A N D  L E G A L  E N V I R O N M E N T
I. Effec t i v e n e s s  o f  R e g u l a t o r y  a n d  L a w  E n f o r c e m e n t  A g e n c i e s  a n d  
t h e  L e g a l  E n v i r o n m e n t  G e n e r a l l y
A  strong a n d  effective regulatory a n d  legal e n v i r o n m e n t  plays a critical role in preventing, 
detecting, a n d  deterring fraudulent financial reporting. In C h a p t e r s  T w o  a n d  T h r e e  the C o m m i s ­
sion r e c o m m e n d e d  several specific regulatory a g e n c y  actions a i m e d  at preventing a n d  detecting 
fraudulent financial reporting. In addition, the regulatory a n d  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  e n v i r o n m e n t  c a n  
a n d  sh o u l d  b e c o m e  a stronger deterrent.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  recognizes the effectiveness of today's o n g o i n g  efforts, a n d  those o f  the past, to 
strengthen the regulatory a n d  legal e n v i r o n m e n t .  Indeed, the C o m m i s s i o n  congratulates the S E C  
for its financial fraud e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o g r a m  a n d  for its m a n y  contributions to i m p r o v i n g  the 
financial reporting process.
T h e  S E C ' s  recent e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o g r a m  highlighted the existence a n d  the seriousness o f  fraudulent 
financial reporting. T h e  p r o g r a m  is particularly c o m m e n d a b l e  in v i e w  o f  the S E C ' s  limited 
resources a n d  the fact that financial disclosure cases usually are c o m p l e x ,  often requiring m o r e  
resources than other cases that involve violations of the federal securities laws.
T h e  S E C  has i m p o s e d  m a n y  of the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o n  a case-by-case basis, in the 
f o r m  o f  ancillary relief (additional r e m e d i e s  to support those a l l o w e d  b y  statute) obtained w h e n  
settling e n f o r c e m e n t  actions. T h e s e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  include re qui rem ent s that public c o m p a n i e s  
f o r m  audit c o m m i t t e e s  a n d  appoint i n d e p e n d e n t  directors a n d  that public acco u n t i n g  firms b e c o m e  
m e m b e r s  o f  the A I C P A ' s  S E C  Practice Section ( S E C P S ) .
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  the S E C ' s  positive actions, the C o m m i s s i o n  has c o n c l u d e d  that a strengthened 
regulatory a n d  legal e n v i r o n m e n t  is n e ede d. Prosecution of, a n d  sanctions i m p o s e d  on, those w h o  
violate the l a w  b y  their i n v o l v e m e n t  in fraudulent financial reporting s h o u l d  b e  increased. T h e  
public acco u n t i n g  profession's quality assurance p r o g r a m ,  w h i c h  generally functions well, s hould 
b e  e x t e n d e d  to the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants of all S E C  public c o m p a n i e s  a n d  reinforced b y  
m e a n i n g f u l  sanctions. T h e  effectiveness of the legal e n v i r o n m e n t  generally in deterring fraudulent 
financial reporting s hould b e  e n h a n c e d .
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  specifically r e c o m m e n d s  i m p r o v e m e n t s  in the following areas:
• Additional S E C  e n f o r c e m e n t  r e m e d i e s  to p r ovi de m o r e  severe penalties a n d  better tailoring of 
the sanctions to the case
• Increased criminal prosecution
• I m p r o v e d  regulation o f  the public acco u n t i n g  profession to include (1) m a n d a t o r y  m e m b e r s h i p  
in a quality assurance p r o g r a m  w i t h  p e er r e v i e w  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  oversight functions a p p r o v e d  
a n d  m o n i t o r e d  b y  the S E C  a n d  (2) S E C  e n f o r c e m e n t  to ensure a d h e r e n c e  to that p r o g r a m
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• S E C  resources available to p e r f o r m  the functions r e c o m m e n d e d  in addition to all traditional 
functions
• Financial institution regulatory action to (1) c o r r e s p o n d  to the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
relating to financial reporting that are directed to the S E C  a n d  (2) p r ovi de for staff e x a m i n e r s  
o f  the federal regulators a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants to h a v e  m u t u a l  access to infor­
m a t i o n  d e v e l o p e d  a b o u t  e x a m i n e d  financial institutions
• E n h a n c e d  e n f o r c e m e n t  b y  state b o a r d s  o f  a c c o u n t a n c y  to m o n i t o r  the quality of auditing 
services
• A c k n o w l e d g m e n t  o f  the relationship o f  the national liability crisis to fraudulent financial 
reporting.
II. A d d i t i o n a l  S E C  E n f o r c e m e n t  R e m e d i e s
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  a p p l a u d s  the S E C  for seeking a n d  obtaining e n h a n c e d  e n f o r c e m e n t  authority 
f r o m  C o n g r e s s  in the context o f  the Insider T r a d i n g  Sanctions A c t  of 1 9 8 4  ( I T S A ) .  A t  that time, 
C o n g r e s s  authorized the S E C  to bring administrative pr o c e e d i n g s  against individuals w h o  " c a u s e ' ' 
a c o m p a n y ' s  violation o f  the co nti nuo us reporting, p r o x y  a n d  tender offer sections o f  the E x c h a n g e  
Act. Prior to that time, w h ile the S E C  c o u l d  bring either a n  injunctive action in court or a n  
administrative a g e n c y  p r o c e e d i n g  against the c o m p a n y ,  it c o u l d  o n ly bring a n  injunctive action 
against the individuals.
T h i s  c h a n g e  closed a large g a p  in the S E C ' s  e n f o r c e m e n t  authority. In the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  v i e w  
several additional r e m e d i e s  are necessary to r o u n d  out the S E C ' s  e n f o r c e m e n t  options. T h e  ability 
to tailor e n f o r c e m e n t  actions m o r e  precisely to particular facts will enable the S E C  to m a x i m i z e  
its e n f o r c e m e n t  effectiveness. T h e  S E C  w o u l d  n o  longer b e  p e r s u a d e d  to d r o p  a n  action b e c a u s e  
the available r e m e d y  is a rguably too harsh. A t  the s a m e  time the S E C  c o u l d  i m p o s e  harsher 
penalties than it n o w  c a n  or does.
T o u g h e r  sanctions clearly w o u l d  inject a greater punitive aspect into the S E C ' s  e n f o r c e m e n t  
p r o g r a m .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  finds that the increased e m p h a s i s  o n  punitive aspects in a p r o g r a m  that 
ha s  b e e n  primarily r e med ial is justified. S o  t r e m e n d o u s  are today's pressures a n d  opportunities to 
e n g a g e  in fraudulent financial reporting that the existing array of penalties n o  longer provides a 
l o n g - t e r m  recipe for achieving a  satisfactory level o f  deterrence. T h e  pressures a n d  opportunities 
C h a p t e r  O n e  details represent a set o f  c i rcu mst anc es that warrant a stronger a n d  m o r e  flexible 
battery of disincentives.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  w o u l d  give the S E C  a b r o a d e r  r a n g e  of penalties to apply to 
a securities l a w  violation u n d e r  existing l a w  a n d  legal standards. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  intent is not 
to c h a n g e  the substantive l a w  or the legal standards of w h a t  constitutes a violation but to ensure 
that n o  violation involving fraudulent financial reporting g o e s  u n p u n i s h e d  b e c a u s e  it c a n n o t  b e  
m a t c h e d  w i t h  a n  appropriate sanction.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  call for additional punitive tools is not a n  entirely n e w  direction for S E C  
enf o r c e m e n t .  T h e  S E C  has h a d  three years' ex perience administering I T S A  w i th its e n h a n c e d  
e n f o r c e m e n t  capabilities. A n d  the possibility of criminal referrals in appropriate cases f r o m  the 
S E C  to the D e p a r t m e n t  o f  Justice or the U n i t e d  States Attorneys has l o ng existed.
Naturally, before i m p o s i n g  a n y  sanctions (existing or proposed), the S E C  w o u l d  continue to afford 
the d u e  process protections that are available in its existing e n f o r c e m e n t  proceedings. A n d  o n c e
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S E C  administrative r e m e d i e s  h a v e  b e e n  e x h a u s t e d  a n d  final a g e n c y  action has b e e n  taken, parties 
w h o  are adversely affected w o u l d  b e  a l l o w e d  to petition the appropriate federal appellate court for 
r e v i e w  o f  the S E C ' s  final order.
A .  F i n e s
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  h a v e  the authority to i m p o s e  civil m o n e y  penalties in 
administrative p r o c e e d i n g s  [including R u l e  2(e) p r o c e e d i n g s ]  a n d  to s e e k  civil m o n e y  
penalties f r o m  a  c o u r t  directly in a n  injunctive p r o c e e d i n g .
T h e  S E C  lacks the ability to s e ek or i m p o s e  civil m o n e y  penalties o n  violators o f  the securities 
laws, ex c e p t  in o n e  n a r r o w  area: insider trading. N o t  until 1984, w i th the p a s s a g e  o f  I T S  A ,  did 
the S E C  obtain the authority to seek a c o u r t - i m p o s e d  civil m o n e y  penalty. U n d e r  I T S A ,  the S E C  
c a n  s e e k  a penalty o f  u p  to three times the a m o u n t  o f  profit g a i n e d  or loss a v o i d e d  b e c a u s e  o f  the 
insider trading.
E v e n  w i t h  this recent e x p a n s i o n  o f  authority, the S E C  d o e s  not h a v e  the flexibility or the breadth 
of r e spo nse in seeking or i m p o s i n g  civil m o n e y  d a m a g e s  that a fellow regulator, the C o m m o d i t y  
Futures T r a d i n g  C o m m i s s i o n  ( C F T C ) ,  does. B y  statute, the C F T C  c a n  assess a penalty of u p  to 
$ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  for e a c h  violation in a b r o a d  r a n g e  of violative conduct, including the filing of false or 
misl e a d i n g  reports w i th the agency.
In a similar vein, the S E C  appears to b e  d i s a d v a n t a g e d  in its limited fining capacity in c o m p a r i s o n  
w i th several o f  the Self-Regulatory Organizations ( S R O s )  that it oversees. T h e  N e w  Y o r k  S t o c k  
E x c h a n g e ,  the A m e r i c a n  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e ,  a n d  the National Association o f  Securities D ealers all 
h a v e  the authority to tailor fines to fit a host o f  objectionable activities, w h e t h e r  after f o r m a l  or 
s u m m a r y  disciplinary p r o ce edi ngs or in the context o f  a negotiated settlement. T h e  c o nti nue d 
a b s e n c e  o f  express fining authority for the S E C  is a n  i m p e d i m e n t  that o u g h t  to b e  rectified.
T h e  S E C  o n  o c cas ion has settled e n f o r c e m e n t  actions involving ancillary relief that i m p o s e ,  in 
effect, a fine. This relief has c o m e  in the f o r m  o f  d i s g o r g e m e n t  o f  the value o f  c o m p e n s a t i o n  
received b a s e d  o n  fraudulently reported earnings or profits. Y e t  the propriety a n d  the extent of the 
ancillary relief a court c a n  i m p o s e  in injunctive actions r e m a i n s  a topic o f  continuing debate. 
Ancillary relief theoretically has b e e n  limited to r emedial sanctions a n d  has not e x t e n d e d  to 
punitive sanctions s u c h  as fines. T o  r e m o v e  a n y  d o u b t  as to its capacity to s e e k  or i m p o s e  fines 
in e n f o r c e m e n t  actions, the S E C  sho u l d  ask C o n g r e s s  to a m e n d  the securities l a w s  to pr ovide 
express fining authority.
E x p r e s s  fining authority also w o u l d  e nable the S E C  to distinguish better a m o n g  perpetrators of 
fraudulent financial repotting, i m p o s i n g  h e a v y  fines, in addition to other sanctions, at o n e  e n d  of 
the spectrum, a n d  i m p o s i n g  smaller fines in lieu o f  excessively harsh sanctions at the other e n d  of 
the sp ectrum. D e p r i v i n g  perpetrators o f  fraudulent financial reporting o f  a n y  ill-gotten gains w o u l d  
help to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the financial reporting process a n d  the 
securities markets, to the s a m e  extent as d o  civil m o n e t a r y  penalties i m p o s e d  o n  inside traders.
B .  C e a s e  a n d  Desist O r d e r s
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  h a v e  the authority to issue a  c e a s e  a n d  desist o r d e r  
w h e n  it finds a  securities l a w  violation.
C e a s e  a n d  desist authority w o u l d  p ermit the S E C  to issue a n  administrative order, o n c e  a securities 
l a w  violation is found. B y  issuing the order, the S E C  c o u l d  direct a p e r s o n  to refrain, or cease a n d
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desist, f r o m  e n g a g i n g  in s u c h  conduct. T h e  p o w e r  to i m p o s e  a cease a n d  desist r e m e d y  w o u l d  
increase the S E C ' s  flexibility in tailoring r e m e d i e s  to the c i rcumstances o f  a case.
In m o s t  cases, a cease a n d  desist p r o c e e d i n g  w o u l d  afford a mi l d e r  r e m e d y  than a civil injunctive 
action, a voiding the harsh side-effects o f  a n  injunction, s u c h  as the statutory disqualification f r o m  
serving as a n  officer or director of a n  i n v es tme nt c o m p a n y .  A l t h o u g h  a m o r e  m e a s u r e d  response 
than civil injunction, the cease a n d  desist r e m e d y  nonetheless w o u l d  p r ovi de increased deterrence 
in at least t w o  kinds of financial reporting cases: (1) cases in w h i c h  the S E C  lacks sufficient 
e v i d e n c e  to d e m o n s t r a t e  a reasonable likelihood of future violations a n d  (2) those in w h i c h  the S E C  
m i g h t  hesitate to p u r s u e  injunctive relief b e c a u s e  the side-effects m a y  s e e m  too harsh a n d  therefore 
inappropriate. A s  a further benefit, the cease a n d  desist r e m e d y  w o u l d  i m p r o v e  the ability o f  the 
public to distinguish degrees o f  culpability.
F o r  the cease a n d  desist r e m e d y  to b e  the effective sanction the C o m m i s s i o n  envisions, the S E C  
m u s t  a s k  C o n g r e s s  not m e r e l y  for the p o w e r  to exercise the r e m e d y ,  but also for the authority to 
m a k e  the r e m e d y  truly meaningful. If a cease a n d  desist order is violated, the S E C  sho u l d  h a v e  
the right (1) to s e ek a n  order in federal district court c o m m a n d i n g  c o m p l i a n c e  a n d  (2) to assess a n d  
collect a n  ad e q u a t e  civil m o n e y  penalty for e a c h  d a y  during w h i c h  the violation or a n y  action 
contributing to the violation continues.
S o m e  h a v e  a r g u e d  that cease a n d  desist authority c o u l d  e n c o u r a g e  the S E C ,  o n  the o n e  h a n d ,  to 
settle cases for too light a sanction or, o n  the other h a n d ,  to bring cases that h a v e  not b e e n  
t h o ro ugh ly co nsidered b e c a u s e  o f  the ease o f  obtaining a cease a n d  desist order. S E C  procedures 
a n d  practice as well as continuing Cong r e s s i o n a l  oversight m a k e  b o t h  fears unjustified. T h e s e  
internal a n d  external safeguards ensure that the S E C  w o u l d  not us e  cease a n d  desist authority in 
cases that otherwise w o u l d  merit a civil injunctive action, but w o u l d  instead u s e  the authority to 
provide a strong sanction in cases that otherwise m i g h t  not b e  brought. T h e  creation of this r e m e d y  
w o u l d  thus a d d  to, not detract f r o m ,  the S E C ' s  repertoire of e n f o r c e m e n t  remedies.
C .  B a r s  o r  S u s p e n s i o n s  F r o m  S e r v i n g  as C o r p o r a t e  Officer o r  D i r e c t o r
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  s e e k  explicit statutory authority to b a r  o r  s u s p e n d  
c o rpo rat e officers a n d  directors i n vol ved in f r a u d u l e n t  financial reporting f r o m  f u t u r e  
service in that capacity in a  pub l i c  c o m p a n y .
A  C o m m i s s i o n - s p o n s o r e d  study of the S E C ' s  role in c o m b a t t i n g  fraudulent financial reporting 
f o u n d  a w i d e s p r e a d  belief that stiffer penalties for corporate officers a n d  directors i n vol ved in 
fraudulent financial reporting w o u l d  b e  a n  effective deterrent. In considering e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o ­
c eedings against individual corporate officers or directors w h o  aid a n d  abet, cause, or participate 
in fraudulent financial reporting, the S E C  therefore sh o u l d  consider w h e t h e r  to bar those indi­
viduals f r o m  future service in that capacity in a public c o m p a n y .  T h e  bar, w h i c h  the S E C  c o u l d  
tailor as appropriate to the case, c o u l d  b e  either te mpo rar y, like a suspension, or p e r m a n e n t .  T h e  
p e r m a n e n t  bar w o u l d  b e  appropriate if the violation w e r e  particularly egregious or the violator w e r e  
a repeat offender.
T h e  authority to bar or s u s p e n d  w o u l d  give the S E C  a sanction to use w h e n  the five-year p r o x y  
statement disclosure o f  S E C  e n f o r c e m e n t  action a n d  the side-effects of a civil injunction w o u l d  not 
b e  sufficient deterrents to possible i n v o l v e m e n t  in future fraudulent financial reporting. In addition 
to affording the S E C  a greater d e g r e e  o f  flexibility in its e n f o r c e m e n t  response, this r e c o m m e n ­
dation w o u l d  stiffen sanctions against individual offenders.
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U n d e r  these circumstances, affording the usual d u e  process protections a n d  rights of appeal for 
e n f o r c e m e n t  targets b e c o m e s  e v e n  m o r e  important. E q u a l l y  im portant to those w h o  are barred or 
s u s p e n d e d  w o u l d  b e  r e v i e w  within the S E C  to a l low these disciplinary sanctions to b e  r e m o v e d  
or m o d i f i e d  after a reasonable interval, w h e n  the barred or s u s p e n d e d  officer or director m a y  
petition to serve again w i th a public c o m p a n y .
T h e  u s e  o f  bars or suspensions is b y  n o  m e a n s  unc h a r t e d  or ex treme. O t h e r  individuals w h o  
participate in the financial reporting process, notably i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants, are subject 
to bars or suspensions. T h e  S E C  ha s  already barred or s u s p e n d e d  individual corporate officers in 
a n u m b e r  o f  settled cases involving repeat violators. T h e  S E C  also has b e c o m e  familiar w i th bars 
or suspensions b y  hearing appeals f r o m  p r o c e e d i n g s  in w h i c h  these sanction's h a v e  b e e n  i m p o s e d  
b y  S R O s  u n d e r  its supervision.
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  in a n u m b e r  of litigated cases the S E C  has obtained m a n y  f o r m s  o f  ancillary relief 
that a m o u n t e d  to a  d e  f a c t o  partial bar w i tho ut using the actual t e r m  b a r .  W h e t h e r  involving the 
judicial a p p o i n t m e n t  of a "special a g ent ," a "limited receiver," or the like, this ancillary relief 
barred directors a n d  officers f r o m  p e r f o r m i n g  functions a n d  exercising p o w e r s  c o n t e m p l a t e d  b y  
state l a w  (including s o m e  related to financial reporting a n d  the disclosure process) as effectively 
as if the court decree w e r e  labelled a partial bar.
In addition, the British Inso l v e n c y  Act, recently ena c t e d  b y  H e r  M a jes ty' s G o v e r n m e n t ,  provides 
for the disqualification of directors o f  insolvent c o m p a n i e s  w h o  h a v e  b e e n  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  a court 
to b e  unfit. A m o n g  the m a n y  g r o u n d s  supporting a determination o f  unfitness are a n y  m i s f e a s a n c e  
or b r e a c h  o f  a n y  fiduciary or other d u ty b y  the director in relation to the c o m p a n y .  O n c e  issued, 
the disqualification order w o u l d  prohibit the disqualified director f r o m  direct or indirect involve­
m e n t  in the p r o m o t i o n ,  formation, or m a n a g e m e n t  of a n y  c o m p a n y  for a period o f  not less than 
t w o  years. U n d e r  certain circumstances a p e r s o n  w h o  violates a disqualification order c o u l d  e v e n  
b e  held personally liable for the debts o f  the insolvent c o m p a n y .
T h e  S E C ' s  limited use o f  the bar nonetheless has taken place in the context o f  settled, rather than 
litigated, cases. A n d  the issue o f  the S E C ' s  statutory authority to i m p o s e  bars or suspensions has 
b e e n  the subject o f  extensive legal debate. In v i e w  o f  (1) the a b s e n c e  o f  express statutory authority 
or judicial approval a n d  (2) the n e e d  for legislative action to give the S E C  cease a n d  desist authority 
a n d  the p o w e r  to i m p o s e  fines, the C o m m i s s i o n  believes that the S E C  s h o u l d  s e ek explicit statutory 
authority to bar or s u s p e n d  corporate officers a n d  directors.
A s  a further advantage, the C o m m i s s i o n  believes that these additional r e m e d i e s  of bar a n d  
susp e n s i o n  p rovide s o m e  assurance of a lessened likelihood o f  repeat violators. T h e  S E C  w o u l d  
not b e  limited to the difficult task o f  successfully bringing a criminal c o n t e m p t  p r o c e e d i n g  for the 
violation o f  a previously entered court order o f  injunction. A n d  availability o f  bar a n d  su spension 
m a y  help the S E C  m a x i m i z e  the u s e  o f  its resources— n o  insignificant factor in a t i me o f  b u d g e t a r y  
restraint.
III. I n c r e a s e d  C r i m i n a l  P r o s e c u t i o n
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  C r i m i n a l  p r o s e c u t i o n  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  financial reporting cases s h o u l d  
b e c o m e  a  h i g h e r  priority. T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  c o n d u c t  a n  affirmative p r o g r a m  to p r o m o t e  
i n c r e a s e d  c r i m i n a l  p r o s e c u t i o n  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  financial reporting cases b y  e d u c a t i n g  a n d  
assisting g o v e r n m e n t  officials with c r i m i n a l  p r o s e c u t i o n  p o w e r s .
C r i m i n a l  prosecution in appropriate cases of fraudulent financial reporting s h o u l d  b e c o m e  a higher 
priority. U n d e r l y i n g  this r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  is the premise, basic to the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  entire report,
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that fraudulent financial reporting is a significant p r o b l e m  that requires m o r e  attention f r o m  m a n y  
constituencies, including regulatory a n d  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  agencies. T h e  majority of respondents 
in a n  informal C o m m i s s i o n  s urvey a m o n g  the m e m b e r s  o f  the W h i t e  Collar C r i m e  C o m m i t t e e  of 
the A m e r i c a n  B a r  Association's C r i m i n a l  Justice Section share this point o f  view.
Furt h e r m o r e ,  although the S E C  sho u l d  increase the n u m b e r  of administrative a n d  civil p r o ce edi ngs 
it brings a n d  the severity of the sanctions it seeks in cases involving fraudulent financial reporting, 
these m e a s u r e s  alone c a n n o t  provide the d e g r e e  of deterrence that is n e e d e d  to protect against 
fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  S E C  ha s  the p r i m a r y  responsibility for enforcing the federal 
securities laws, but it d o e s  not h a v e  the authority to bring criminal actions. T h e  D e p a r t m e n t  of 
Justice is the o n l y  b o d y  authorized to d o  so. T h e  S E C  is authorized, h o w e v e r ,  to transmit e v i d e n c e  
to the U n i t e d  States A t t o r n e y  General, w h o  has the discretion to institute criminal proceedings. T h e  
S E C  c a n  a n d  d o e s  assist the D e p a r t m e n t  o f  Justice a n d  the U . S .  A ttorneys b y  discussing w i t h  t h e m  
cases that m a y  b e  o f  interest, providing access to investigative files, a n d  providing S E C  personnel 
familiar w i t h  the case to assist in presenting it to a g r a n d  jury or at trial. T h e  o v e r w h e l m i n g  majority 
o f  re spondents in a study p e r f o r m e d  for the C o m m i s s i o n  f o u n d  criminal referrals to the Justice 
D e p a r t m e n t  or state prosecutors' offices to b e  a n  effective e n f o r c e m e n t  activity.
T o  increase criminal proce e d i n g s  for fraudulent financial reporting, the S E C  s h o u l d  und e r t a k e  a n  
organized, affirmative p r o g r a m  to e ducate g o v e r n m e n t  officials w h o  h a v e  criminal prosecution 
p o w e r s  a b o u t  the seriousness of the c r i m e  of fraudulent financial reporting, thus e n c o u r a g i n g  t h e m  
to take a greater interest in fraudulent financial reporting cases. T h i s  p r o g r a m  also s h o u l d  ensure 
coordination, cooperation, a n d  w h a t e v e r  other assistance the S E C  believes n ecessary to p r o m o t e  
increased criminal prosecution.
I V .  I m p r o v e d  R e g u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t i n g  P r o f e s s i o n
Si nce the effectiveness of a n  audit in detecting fraudulent financial reporting is related directly to 
the quality o f  that audit, the i m p o r t a n c e  o f  audit quality to the financial reporting process c a n n o t  
b e  overstated. F o r  this reason, the acco u n t i n g  profession is subject to extensive regulation to ensure 
that i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants p r ovi de reliable ac cou nti ng a n d  auditing services. A n  i m p o r ­
tant aspect of the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  deliberations ha s  b e e n  to assess w h e t h e r  this regulation is 
sufficient or w h e t h e r  additional regulation, particularly in the f o r m  o f  a separate statutory S R O ,  
is n e e d e d  to ensure audit quality.
T o  a n s w e r  these questions, the C o m m i s s i o n  applied a functional analysis to the issue o f  regulation 
a n d  oversight o f  the public ac cou nti ng profession. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  conclusion after p e r f o r m i n g  
this analysis is that the existing f r a m e w o r k  of regulation a n d  oversight is preferable to the 
establishment o f  a separate statutory S R O .  T h i s  position is p r e m i s e d  o n  the a s s u m p t i o n  that the 
C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for i m p r o v e m e n t s  in the existing f r a m e w o r k — m a n d a t o r y  quality 
assurance a n d  peer r e v i e w  a n d  m e a n i n g f u l  sanctions t h r o u g h  S E C  e n f o r c e m e n t — will b e  i m p l e ­
m e n t e d  or that these necessary e l e m e n t s  will otherwise b e  a d d e d  to the present system.
In formulating its final r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  considered the S E C ' s  recent proposal 
for a m a n d a t o r y  p e er r e v i e w  r e q u i r e m e n t  a n d  public c o m m e n t  in re s p o n s e  to that proposal. 
A l t h o u g h  there are differences b e t w e e n  the S E C ' s  proposal a n d  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a ­
tion, the C o m m i s s i o n  believes that it shares w i th the S E C  a f u n d a m e n t a l  a g r e e m e n t  in objectives. 
P e e r  r e v i e w  contributes to the i m p r o v e m e n t  o f  the quality o f  audits, w h i c h  in turn i m p r o v e s  the 
reliability of financial statements p r e p a r e d  b y  public c o m p a n i e s .
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T o  set the context for the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a n d  analysis, a brief but m o r e  detailed 
o v e r v i e w  o f  the existing f r a m e w o r k  than a p p e a r e d  earlier in C h a p t e r  O n e  is in order.
A .  O v e r v i e w  o f  Existing R e g u l a t o r y  F r a m e w o r k
T h e  existing regulation of the ac cou nti ng profession is c o m p l e x .  It is a process directed to 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants as well as to the public ac cou nti ng firms to w h i c h  they m a y  belong. 
Further, different parties carry the regulation out at different levels.
1. R e g u l a t i o n  o f  I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t s
I n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants are licensed as individuals b y  state b o a r d s  o f  a c c o u n t a n c y  a n d  m u s t  
m e e t  m i n i m u m  educational requirements a n d  pass a rigorous qualifying e x a m i n a t i o n  d e v e l o p e d  b y  
the A I C P A  to b e  eligible to practice. Applicants for the C P A  license also are generally required 
to (1) h a v e  ex perience in the practice o f  accounting, (2) s h o w  e v i d e n c e  o f  m o r a l  character, a n d  
(3) und e r t a k e  continuing professional education.
In addition, all 5 0  states a n d  4  other jurisdictions h a v e  a c c o u n t a n c y  l a w s  g o v e r n i n g  the practice 
o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants in their jurisdictions. A m o n g  other requirements, these l a w s  
require a d h e r e n c e  during the course o f  a n  audit e n g a g e m e n t  w i t h  Gen e r a l l y  A c c e p t e d  A u d i t i n g  
Standards ( G A A S )  as d e v e l o p e d  b y  the A I C P A ' s  A u d i t i n g  S tandards B o a r d  ( A S B ) .  State bo a r d s  
o f  a c c o u n t a n c y  established pursuant to these l a w s  generally h a v e  authority to discipline i n d e p e n d ­
ent public accountants w h o  deviate f r o m  G A A S  or otherwise fail to m e e t  the legal re quirements 
o f  practice. T h e  sanctions i m p o s e d  m a y  include the su spe nsi on or revocation o f  a license to 
practice.
O v e r  a n d  a b o v e  regulation b y  their respective states, i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants face other 
g o v e r n m e n t  action a d dre sse d to audit quality. A t  the federal level the S E C  is responsible for 
ov erseeing a n d  then enforcing regulations that affect the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants o f  public 
c o m p a n i e s .  In addition, civil or criminal suits in federal a n d  state courts help to ensure audit 
quality. D e p e n d i n g  o n  the judicial f o r u m  a n d  the factual context, i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants 
w h o  fail to c o m p l y  w i t h  G A A S  c a n  face liability for d a m a g e s ,  fines, or other civil or criminal 
sanctions. C o u r t  decisions also affect the d u ty of care i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants o w e  to 
clients or third-party users o f  audited financial statements.
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants are subject as individuals to additional oversight 
outside of g o v e r n m e n t .  W h i l e  the A I C P A  is a totally voluntary organization, m o s t  i n d e p e n d e n t  
public accountants are m e m b e r s  and, as such, m u s t  abide b y  its c o d e  o f  professional ethics, w h i c h  
i m p o s e s  r e quirements relating to i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  integrity, a n d  objectivity as well as to c o m p l i a n c e  
w i th G A A S . T h e  A I C P A  m o n i t o r s  a n d  p r o m o t e s  a d h e r e n c e  to the c o d e  a n d  publicly identifies its 
m e m b e r s  w h o  violate the code.
Finally, m a n y  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants are subject to internal quality controls a n d  other 
p r o g r a m s  established b y  public ac cou nti ng firms. T h e s e  firms often are the first line of defense 
against unsatisfactory audit practice. T h e i r  internal s y s t e m s  o f  quality control ensure c o m p l i a n c e  
with professional standards, S E C  rules, a n d  other legal requirements. A s  part o f  their quality 
control efforts, the firms c o n d u c t  periodic inspections to m o n i t o r  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  p e r f o r m a n c e  
standards. T h e y  also m a y  take disciplinary a n d  remedial steps against partners a n d  staff m e m b e r s  
w h o  are f o u n d  to p e r f o r m  substandard w o r k .
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2. R e g u l a t i o n  of  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t i n g  F i r m s
A  s y s t e m  o f  regulation a n d  oversight also exists at the firm level. A  significant c o m p o n e n t  in this 
s y s t e m  is the A I C P A ' s  Division for C P A  Firms, w h i c h  w a s  created in 1 9 7 7  in r e spo nse to c o n c e r n s  
b y  C o n g r e s s  a n d  the S E C  a b o u t  regulation a n d  oversight of the acco u n t i n g  profession. T h e  
Division consists o f  t w o  sections, a n  S E C  Practice Section ( S E C P S )  a n d  a Private C o m p a n i e s  
Practice Section. M e m b e r s h i p  in the Division a n d  either, or both, o f  these t w o  sections is 
voluntary. F i r m s  that join c o m m i t  t h e m s e l v e s  to the requirements set b y  e a c h  section, including 
p e er r e v i e w  a n d  continuing professional education, a n d  to the quality control standards enunciated 
b y  the A I C P A  c o ver ing ac cou nti ng a n d  auditing practice.
In addition to the general quality control standards i m p o s e d  b y  m e m b e r s h i p  in the Division for 
C P A  Firms, firms w h o  join the S E C P S  agree to (1) p e r f o r m  concurring, or s e c o n d  partner, r e vie ws 
of the audits of S E C  registrants, (2) rotate partners in c h a r g e  o f  s u c h  audits e v e r y  7  years, (3) file 
reports o f  k e y  firm data annually w i th the A I C P A ,  (4) report to the S E C P S ' s  Special Investigations 
C o m m i t t e e  (SIC) a n y  litigation (including criminal indictments) against the firm or its personnel 
or a n y  p r o c e e d i n g  or investigation publicly a n n o u n c e d  b y  a regulatory a g e n c y  alleging audit failure 
w i t h  respect to a public c o m p a n y ,  (5) report serious d i s a g r e e m e n t s  w i th a client's m a n a g e m e n t  to 
the b o a r d  o f  directors o f  the client, a n d  (6) accept penalties i m p o s e d  b y  the executive c o m m i t t e e  
for n o n c o m p l i a n c e  with m e m b e r s h i p  requirements.
T h e  thrust o f  the regulation a n d  oversight b y  the A I C P A ' s  Di vision for C P A  F i r m s  is preventive 
a n d  r e med ial rather than punitive. It focuses o n  strengthening s y s t e m s  o f  quality control a n d  
i m p r o v i n g  the p e r f o r m a n c e  of m e m b e r  firms t h r o u g h  p e er r e v i e w s  that evaluate c o m p l i a n c e  with 
m e m b e r s h i p  requirements.
T h e  Public Ove r s i g h t  B o a r d  ( P O B )  closely oversees all the activities o f  the S E C P S ,  including the 
S I C  process a n d  peer review. C o m p o s e d  primarily o f  nonaccountants, the P O B  is a fully inde­
p e n d e n t  b o d y  that n o m i n a t e s  its o w n  successors, selects its o w n  c h a i r m a n ,  a n d  sets its o w n  
c o m p e n s a t i o n .  B e c a u s e  it also has its o w n  staff, the P O B  c a n  systematically m o n i t o r  all p h a s e s  of 
the p e er r e v i e w  p r o g r a m  t h r o u g h  observation o f  fieldwork, r e v i e w  o f  p e er r e v i e w  w o r k p a p e r s ,  a n d  
attendance at exit conferences. T h is c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  " h a n d s  o n "  oversight 
enables the P O B  to u p h o l d  the public interest a n d  to m a k e  m e a n i n g f u l  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for 
i m p r o v e m e n t s  in the S E C P S ' s  operations.
T h e  S E C ,  in turn, maintains liaisons w i t h  a n d  m o n i t o r s  the P O B .  M o r e o v e r ,  the S E C  i n d e p e n d ­
ently evaluates the Division's peer r e v i e w  process as it affects the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants 
w h o  audit S E C  registrants. T h e  S E C  also receives certain information f r o m  the S I C  c o n c e r n i n g  its 
closed investigations. T h e  extent o f  access to the S I C ' s - w o r k i n g  papers a n d  files, h o w e v e r ,  r e m a i n s  
a n  o p e n  issue b e t w e e n  the Division a n d  the S E C .
In addition to the regulation p r o v i d e d  b y  the Division, the g o v e r n m e n t  also directly oversees public 
ac cou nti ng firms. T h e  S E C  a n d  m a n y  state b o a r d s  o f  a c c o u n t a n c y  h a v e  the authority to i m p o s e  
fines or other sanctions against firms w h e n  audit failure results f r o m  a systemic b r e a k d o w n  in 
quality control. C o u r t s  also i m p o s e  significant d a m a g e s  against public a c c o u n t i n g  firms f o u n d  
negligent in professional liability lawsuits.
B .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  O b s e r v a t i o n s
T o  b e  effective, regulation o f  the public ac cou nti ng profession m u s t  consist o f  four m a j o r  c o m ­
ponents: (1) it m u s t  h a v e  the ability to set professional standards; (2) it m u s t  m o n i t o r  c o m p l i a n c e  
w i th those standards; (3) it m u s t  b e  applicable to all i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants or all public
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acco u n t i n g  firms that audit public c o m p a n i e s ;  a n d  (4) it m u s t  h a v e  the capacity to enforce its 
standards in a m e a n i n g f u l  fashion.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  finds that m o s t  o f  these c o m p o n e n t s  exist within the present regulatory f r a m e ­
w o r k  a n d  that they are functioning well a n d  as intended. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  applauds, for e x a m p l e ,  
the role the A S B  plays in establishing professional standards. In addition, the C o m m i s s i o n  believes 
the role the Division for C P A  F i r m s  plays t h r o u g h  its p e er r e v i e w  process is directly responsible 
for a significant increase in the quality o f  audits. A  recent e x a m p l e  o f  the continuing effort to 
i m p r o v e  audit quality is the n e w  S E C P S  m e m b e r s h i p  r e q u i r e m e n t  that significantly e x p a n d e d  
required c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  w i th a client's audit c o m m i t t e e  or b o a r d  of directors. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  in C h a p t e r  T h r e e  relating to the A S B  a n d  the S E C P S  s i m p l y  are d e s i g n e d  to 
m a k e  t h e m  m o r e  effective. T h e  contributions of the S E C  t h r o u g h  its oversight of existing r e g u ­
latory efforts b y  the private sector a n d  its o w n  standard-setting a n d  e n f o r c e m e n t  activities h a v e  
already b e e n  noted.
Nonetheless, the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  functional analysis reveals that several necessary c o m p o n e n t s  for 
effective regulation are m i s s i n g  u n d e r  the existing system. T o  provide these m i s s i n g  c o m p o n e n t s ,  
the C o m m i s s i o n  co nsidered but dis m i s s e d  the possibility o f  replacing the existing private-sector 
regulation w i th direct g o v e r n m e n t  regulation o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants.
B e c a u s e  m o s t  o f  the necessary c o m p o n e n t s  for effective regulation already exist a n d  are f u n c ­
tioning well, a proposal for deeper, across-the-board i n v o l v e m e n t  b y  g o v e r n m e n t  in the public 
acco u n t i n g  profession s e e m s  of doubtful merit. T h e  efforts b y  the A S B  a n d  the A I C P A ' s  Division 
for C P A  F i r m s  d e m o n s t r a t e  that the public ac cou nti ng profession c a n  w o r k  to protect the public 
interest a n d  still b e  sensitive to the n e e d s  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants a n d  their firms. 
T a x p a y e r s  w o u l d  b e ar the cost of a n y  s c h e m e  o f  direct g o v e r n m e n t  regulation. M o r e o v e r ,  direct 
g o v e r n m e n t  regulation o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants of public c o m p a n i e s  w o u l d  not 
necessarily result in increased public protection or i m p r o v e d  audit quality.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  studied w h e t h e r  a statutory S R O  sh o u l d  b e  established or w h e t h e r  the existing 
regulatory f r a m e w o r k  c o u l d  b e  adjusted to ac hieve all the necessary c o m p o n e n t s  of effective 
regulation. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  f o u n d  that in m a n y  areas a n  S R O  w o u l d  o n l y  duplicate functions that 
the present s y s t e m  p e r f o r m s  quite well a n d  that s u c h  duplication w o u l d  not b e  cost-effective. 
Alternatively, the present s y s t e m  c o u l d  b e  d i s m a n t l e d  to provide for a n  S R O  that executes all 
ne cessary regulatory functions. A g a i n s t  this alternative, h o w e v e r ,  is the risk that a n  S R O  m i g h t  
not p e r f o r m  its regulatory functions as effectively.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  believes that the present f r a m e w o r k  is flexible e n o u g h  to a c c o m m o d a t e  all the 
c o m p o n e n t s  necessary for effective regulation, if the t w o  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  that follow are i m ­
p l e m e n t e d .  T h e  present f r a m e w o r k ,  as m o d i f i e d  b y  these r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  w o u l d  b e  preferable 
to b o t h  direct g o v e r n m e n t a l  regulation a n d  a statutory S R O .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  c o n c l u d e d  that 
i m p r o v i n g  the existing f r a m e w o r k  offers the best alternative for effective regulation, because, 
a m o n g  the three options considered, it is b y  far the least intrusive a n d  least costly, without 
sacrificing audit quality assurance or protection o f  the public interest.
Professional O r g a n i z a t i o n  M e m b e r s h i p
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  require all pu b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g  f i r m s  that audit pu b l i c  
c o m p a n i e s  to b e  m e m b e r s  o f  a  pr ofe ssi ona l o r ganization that h a s  p e e r  r e v i e w  a n d  i n d e ­
p e n d e n t  oversight f u n c t i o n s  a n d  is a p p r o v e d  b y  the S E C ,  s u c h  as that specified b y  the 
S E C P S  o f  the A I C P A ' s  Division f o r  C P A  F i r m s .
W i t h  respect to the first c o m p o n e n t  n e e d e d  for effective regulation— setting standards— the C o m ­
m i s s i o n  has n o t e d  that b o t h  the A S B  a n d  the public ac cou nti ng profession's existing quality
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assurance p r o g r a m  are executing this function effectively a n d  sh o u l d  continue their activities in this 
area. Similarly, w i t h  respect to the s e c o n d  regulatory c o m p o n e n t — m o n i t o r i n g  c o m p l i a n c e  with 
standards— the C o m m i s s i o n  ha s  m e n t i o n e d  the effectiveness o f  the S E C P S  o f  the A I C P A ' s  
Division for C P A  Firms, w h i c h  is o v e r s e e n  b y  the P O B  a n d  includes the S I C .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  
c o n c u r s  w i th the P O B  that the quality assurance p r o g r a m  o f  the S E C P S  continues to b e  a n  
im portant force in i m p r o v i n g  the quality o f  audit practice.
A  significant deficiency exists, h o w e v e r ,  u n d e r  the current regulatory f r a m e w o r k  w i th respect to 
the third c o m p o n e n t — applicability to all public acco u n t i n g  firms that audit public c o m p a n i e s .  
F i r m s  that d o  not w a n t  to c o m p l y  w i t h  the public acco u n t i n g  profession's quality assurance 
p r o g r a m  are free to a v o i d  it s i m p l y  b y  not joining the S E C P S .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  a n  S E C  rule to 
m a n d a t e  m e m b e r s h i p  in a professional quality assurance p r o g r a m  is required to ac hieve this 
m i s s i n g  c o m p o n e n t .
In addition, s u c h  a rule is necessary to i m p l e m e n t  the provisions o f  the federal securities laws. T h e  
quality o f  audit practice is related directly to the prevention, detection, a n d  deterrence o f  fraudulent 
financial reporting. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  research d e m o n s t r a t e d  a n  u n a c c e p t a b l y  higher incidence o f  
failure to detect fraudulent financial reporting b y  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants w h o s e  firms w e r e  
not m e m b e r s  o f  the S E C P S .  In v i e w  o f  the public trust pl ace d in the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant, 
m a n d a t o r y  m e m b e r s h i p  is essential to e nsure that the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac cou nta nt has the 
requisite professional qualifications to represent a public c o m p a n y  b y  auditing its financial state­
m e n t s  a n d  o p ining thereon in public disclosure d o c u m e n t s .
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  study o f  a professional quality assurance p r o g r a m  f o c u s e d  o n  the p r o g r a m  
s p o n s o r e d  b y  the A I C P A ' s  Division for C P A  F i r m s  b e c a u s e  it is the o n l y  established p r o g r a m  w i t h  
a substantial track record a n d  experience. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  in support of 
m a n d a t o r y  m e m b e r s h i p  in a quality assurance p r o g r a m  nonetheless is not intended to preclude the 
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  other p r o g r a m s .  A s  l o ng as the functions vital to e nsure audit quality are p e r f o r m e d  
(that is, that the p r o g r a m  h a s  p e er r e v i e w  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  oversight functions a n d  is a p p r o v e d  b y  
the S E C ) ,  the objective o f  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  w o u l d  b e  met.
E n f o r c e m e n t
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  take e n f o r c e m e n t  action w h e n  a  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g  
f i r m  fails to r e m e d y  deficiencies cited b y  the p u b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g  profession's quality a s s u r ­
a n c e  p r o g r a m .
T h e  fourth vital regulatory ingredient— e n f o r c e m e n t  w i t h  m e a n i n g f u l  sanctions— exists u n d e r  the 
current f r a m e w o r k ,  but it s h o u l d  b e  b r o a d e n e d  to include the threat of public sanctions. U n d e r  the 
current regulatory system, the A I C P A ' s  Division for C P A  F i r m s  is g e a r e d  t o w a r d  r e med ial rather 
than punitive action. M e m b e r s  w h o  fail to c o m p l y  w i t h  m e m b e r s h i p  re qui rem ent s or to r e s p o n d  
satisfactorily to p e er r e v i e w  c o m m e n t s  generally incur n o  substantive punitive m e a s u r e s  for e v e n  
the m o s t  egregious violations. T h e  Division's m a j o r  punitive m e a s u r e  or threat of p u n i s h m e n t ,  
expulsion or threat o f  ex pulsion f r o m  a voluntary p r o g r a m ,  w o u l d  n o  longer b e  available if 
m e m b e r s h i p  is m a n d a t o r y .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  if the public ac cou nti ng profession's quality assurance 
efforts are to w o r k ,  credible e n f o r c e m e n t  m u s t  occur. T h e  S E C  c a n  a n d  s h o u l d  p rovide this 
function. S E C  e n f o r c e m e n t  actions to reinforce the public acco u n t i n g  profession's quality assur­
a n c e  p r o g r a m  c o u l d  take place within existing procedures, but a n y  exercise o f  a g e n c y  authority 
s h o u l d  b e  d e s i g n e d  to preserve those f u n d a m e n t a l  safeguards w h i c h  s h o u l d  b e  built into a n y  s y s t e m  
of m a n d a t o r y  p e er review. Implicit in the notion of a n  S E C  rule requiring m e m b e r s h i p  in a
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professional quality assurance p r o g r a m  is c o m p l i a n c e  w i th that p r o g r a m ' s  standards a n d  require­
me nts . T h u s  failure to r e m e d y  cited deficiencies w o u l d  constitute violation o f  a n  S E C  rule.
T h e  S E C ' s  long-standing rule for disciplining professionals w h o  practice before the a g e n c y ,  R u l e  
2(e), includes as a  basis for disciplinary action finding a  p e r s o n  " n o t  to possess the requisite 
qualifications to represent others.'' A  finding o f  n o n c o m p l i a n c e  w i th the r e qui rem ent s o f  the public 
a c c ou nti ng profession's quality assurance p r o g r a m ,  after the Rule's standard notice a n d  o p p o r ­
tunity for hearing, w o u l d  m e a n  a lack o f  " t h e  requisite qualification to represent others" within 
the m e a n i n g  o f  R u l e  2(e).
T h e  R u l e  2(e) p r o c e e d i n g  then w o u l d  a l l o w  the S E C  to i m p o s e  a m e a n i n g f u l  sanction: t e m p o r a r y  
or p e r m a n e n t  denial of the privilege o f  p e r f o r m i n g  audits o f  public c o m p a n i e s  for the inclusion of 
a n  audit report in public disclosure d o c u m e n t s .  W i t h i n  this general sanction, the S E C  has the 
ability to fashion appropriate sanctions not unlike those w h i c h  the securities industry's i n d e p e n d e n t  
S R O s  i m p o s e  o n  broker-dealers.
F o r  S E C  e n f o r c e m e n t  o f  the public a c c o u n t i n g  profession's quality assurance p r o g r a m  to take place 
within existing procedures, the S E C  w o u l d  h a v e  to b e  a w a r e  o f  a n y  slippage in the quality o f  the 
p e er r e v i e w  process. A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the S E C  s h o u l d  continue to m o n i t o r  a n d  m a i n t a i n  liaisons with 
the public a c cou nti ng profession's quality assurance p r o g r a m .  In addition, the S E C P S  sh oul d 
i n f o r m  the S E C  of firms that fail to r e m e d y  deficiencies cited in a p e er r e v i e w  pursuant to the 
quality assurance p r o g r a m .
V .  S E C  R e s o u r c e s
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : T h e  S E C  m u s t  b e  g i v e n  a d e q u a t e  r e s o u r c e s  to p e r f o r m  existing a n d  
additional f u n c t i o n s  that h e l p  p r e v e n t , detect, a n d  deter f r a u d u l e n t  financial reporting.
T h e  S E C ' s  resources sh o u l d  b e  a d e q u a t e  to enable the S E C  to p e r f o r m  effectively the further 
functions the C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s ,  in addition to its existing functions. In particular, the S E C  
sh o u l d  h a v e  a d e q u a t e  resources to enforce the public ac cou nti ng profession's quality assurance 
standards, a n  additional function that w o u l d  obviate the n e e d  for a separate, ultimately m o r e  
costly, S R O .
T h e  S E C ' s  existing functions include not o n l y  e n f o r c e m e n t ,  but also oversight a n d  surveillance of 
financial reporting t h r o u g h  the interpretation o f  standards a n d  rules a n d  the r e v i e w  of filings. T h e  
sheer v o l u m e  o f  n e w  issues a n d  other pressures has inevitably led to a reduction in the r e v i e w  
function.
A d e q u a t e  resources s h o u l d  e x t e n d  b e y o n d  f u n d i n g  to salary a n d  grade-level m e c h a n i s m s  that 
w o u l d  en abl e the S E C  to attract a n d  retain highly qualified personnel. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  is e n ­
c o u r a g e d  that the S E C  has requested a b u d g e t  increase o f  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  $ 3 0  million, a rise in 
excess o f  2 6  percent.
7 3
V I .  F i n a n c i a l  Institution R e g u l a t o r y  A g e n c i e s
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  Office o f  the C o m p t r o l l e r  o f  the C u r r e n c y , the F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e  
B o a r d ,  the F e d e r a l  D e p o s i t  I n s u r a n c e  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  a n d  the F e d e r a l  H o m e  L o a n  B a n k  
B o a r d  (including the F e d e r a l  S a v i n g s  a n d  L o a n  I n s u r a n c e  C o r p o r a t i o n )  s h o u l d  a d o p t  
m e a s u r e s  p a t t e r n e d  o n  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  directed to the S E C  to carry o u t  
their o w n  regulatory responsibility relating to financial reporting u n d e r  the f e d e r a l  s e c u ­
rities l a w s .
T h e  p r i m a r y  focus o f  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for federal regulatory a g e n c y  action is 
the S E C .  T h a t  a g e n c y  has p r i m a r y  responsibility for administering a n d  enforcing the federal 
securities laws. W h e r e  the public entity is a  b a n k ,  savings a n d  loan, or other financial institution, 
this responsibility b e l o n g s  to, or m a y  b e  divided a m o n g ,  a n u m b e r  o f  other federal agencies.
B e c a u s e  fraudulent financial reporting has o c c u r r e d  in public c o m p a n i e s  that report to regulators 
other than the S E C ,  all regulatory agencies w i th responsibility for the federal securities l a w s  sh o u l d  
a d o p t  regulatory m e a s u r e s  patterned o n  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  calling for S E C  
action. T h u s  the Office o f  the C o m p t r o l l e r  o f  the C u r r e n c y ,  the Federal R e s e r v e  B o a r d ,  the Federal 
D e p o s i t  I nsurance Corporation, a n d  the Federal H o m e  L o a n  B a n k  B o a r d  (including the Federal 
S a v i n g s  a n d  L o a n  I nsurance Corporation) should:
• A d o p t  rules, or if necessary s e ek legislation, to i m p l e m e n t  the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for public 
c o m p a n i e s  that a p p e a r  in C h a p t e r  T w o .
• E n h a n c e  e n f o r c e m e n t  efforts to pro v i d e  a stronger deterrent to fraudulent financial reporting, 
including, if necessary, seeking additional sanctions a n d  p o w e r s  f r o m  C o n g r e s s .
• Join the S E C  a n d  the D e p a r t m e n t  of Justice in their p r o g r a m  to increase criminal prosecutions 
for fraudulent financial reporting.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  c o n c l u d e s  that the financial institution regulatory agencies n e e d  not duplicate its 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  to the S E C  regarding regulation o f  the public acco u n t i n g  profession, n a m e l y  
required m e m b e r s h i p  in a professional quality assurance p r o g r a m  a n d  S E C  e n f o r c e m e n t  of the 
p r o g r a m ' s  quality assurance standards. T h i s  part of the regulatory s y s t e m  w o u l d  b e  m i s s i n g  o n ly 
in the case o f  a  public a c c o u n t i n g  firm w h o s e  public c o m p a n y  audit clients are exclusively financial 
institutions that d o  not report to the S E C .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the other regulatory agencies a n d  the 
acco u n t i n g  profession sh o u l d  m o n i t o r  this area a n d  m a k e  adjustments in the future if this g a p  
begins to b e c o m e  serious.
A c c e s s  to I n f o r m a t i o n
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  financial institution regulatory a g e n c i e s  a n d  the p u b l i c  a c c o u n t ­
i n g  pr ofe ssi on s h o u l d  p r o v i d e  f o r  the regulatory e x a m i n e r  a n d  the i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n t a n t  to h a v e  m u t u a l  ac c e s s  to i n f o r m a t i o n  they d e v e l o p  a b o u t  e x a m i n e d  financial 
institutions.
If regulatory e x a m i n e r s  o f  financial institutions a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants pro v i d e  e a c h  
other access to information they d e v e l o p  a b o u t  financial institutions, they will i m p r o v e  the ability 
o f  b o t h  parties to p e r f o r m  their duties, thus helping to p revent a n d  detect fraudulent financial 
reporting. A  financial institution, for e x a m p l e ,  s h o u l d  give its i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant 
access to the regulatory e x a m i n e r ' s  report; the i n d e p e n d e n t  public a c cou nta nt s h o u l d  give b a n k  
e x a m i n e r s  access to his letter to m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  response.
7 4
W h e n  the regulatory e x a m i n e r ' s  a n d  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's e x a m i n a t i o n s  o f  the 
financial institution are concurrent, e a c h  s h o u l d  provide the other w i t h  relevant information during 
the examination. This information m a y  include information, for e x a m p l e ,  a b o u t  questionable loans 
a n d  policies that m a y  indicate the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  is confident that the public a c cou nti ng profession a n d  the financial institution 
regulatory agencies c a n  m a k e  a r r a n g e m e n t s  for information access that satisfactorily address a n y  
issues raised, s u c h  as client confidentiality. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  c o m m e n d s  the public accounting 
profession a n d  the financial institution regulatory agencies for their efforts to date to provide access 
to information after c o m p l e t i o n  o f  examinations. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  e n c o u r a g e s  the public a c c o u n t ­
ing profession a n d  the financial institution regulatory agencies to b r o a d e n  these efforts, b y  p r o ­
viding e a c h  other access to information during concurrent e x a m i n a t i o n s  a n d  b y  otherwise 
continuing to explore w a y s  that m u t u a l  access to information c a n  help to r e d u c e  the likelihood o f  
fraudulent financial reporting.
T h e  c o n c e p t  o f  sharing information s h o u l d  b e  applied t h r o u g h o u t  g o v e r n m e n t ,  w h e r e v e r  there are 
regulated industries a n d  the regulatory e x a m i n e r s  n o r m a l l y  c o n d u c t  e x a m i n a t i o n s  o f  financial 
information.
V I I .  E n h a n c e d  E n f o r c e m e n t  b y  S t a t e  B o a r d s  o f  A c c o u n t a n c y
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  State b o a r d s  o f  a c c o u n t a n c y  s h o u l d  i m p l e m e n t  positive e n f o r c e m e n t  
p r o g r a m s  that periodically w o u l d  r e v i e w  the quality o f  services that the i n d e p e n d e n t  p ublic 
a c c o u n t a n t s  they license render.
T o  a significant degree, as this chapter n o t e d  earlier, state l a w s  a n d  state g o v e r n m e n t  agencies 
g o v e r n  the regulation of public a c countancy. State bo a r d s  o f  a c c o u n t a n c y  (or equivalent g o v e r n ­
m e n t  agencies) h a v e  b e e n  established b y  statute in all 5 0  states (as well as in four other jurisdic­
tions) to administer state l a w s  g o v e r n i n g  various aspects o f  the public acco u n t i n g  profession, s u c h  
as certification, licensing, professional conduct, a n d  continuing professional education. State 
b o a r d s  are in fact the o n ly entities that, ta ken together, h a v e  jurisdiction o v e r  all w h o  are licensed 
to practice public a c c o u n t a n c y  in the U n i t e d  States. B e c a u s e  o f  this u n i q u e  jurisdictional m a n d a t e  
a n d  the ultimate sanctioning authority that g o e s  w i t h  it, state bo a r d s  c a n  play a critical role in 
assuring the public that the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants w h o m  they h a v e  licensed are c o n ­
tinuing to p r ovi de c o m p e t e n t  service.
S o m e  states h a v e  t a ken g e n u i n e  strides to m e e t  this challenge. A  g r o w i n g  n u m b e r  o f  states are 
e x p e r i m e n t i n g  w i th positive e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o g r a m s ,  in addition to maintaining the co m p l a i n t - b a s e d  
s y s t e m  o f  e n f o r c e m e n t  a n d  discipline u n d e r  w h i c h  state b o a r d s  traditionally h a v e  operated. P o s ­
itive e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o g r a m s  require state bo a r d s  to a d o p t  a regulatory a p p r o a c h  that is proactive. 
T h e s e  p r o g r a m s  periodically m o n i t o r  the w o r k  of all licensees o n  a u n i f o r m  or r a n d o m  basis, a n d  
a concerted effort is m a d e  to u n c o v e r  su bstandard practice that has not b e e n  the subject o f  fo r m a l  
complaint. T h e  a i m  o f  positive e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o g r a m s  appears to b e  primarily preventive a n d  
rehabilitative, but a b r o a d  r a n g e  o f  disciplinary m e a s u r e s  also m u s t  b e  available a n d  i m p o s e d ,  if 
warranted.
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B y  contrast, in the jurisdictions that still a d h e r e  exclusively to a c o m p l a i n t - b a s e d  sy stem, state 
b o a r d s  of a c c o u n t a n c y  r e m a i n  reactive bodies; their disciplinary a n d  e n f o r c e m e n t  m a c h i n e r y  c a n  
b e  set into m o t i o n  o n ly t h r o u g h  fo r m a l  co mpl ain ts a b o u t  audit quality. Relatively f e w  complaints 
a b o u t  substandard w o r k  ever surface, a n d  cases involving substandard w o r k  tend not to d r a w  the 
strongest sanctions.
B e c a u s e  a majority o f  all state boa r d s  has not a d o p t e d  positive e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o g r a m s ,  m u c h  m o r e  
r e m a i n s  to b e  d o n e  to p r o m o t e  a n d  d e v e l o p  these p r o g r a m s .  T h e  c o m m e n d a b l e  c a m p a i g n  b y  the 
National Association of the State B o a r d s  o f  A c c o u n t a n c y ,  a voluntary federation of state boards, 
is in the right direction. In the final analysis, h o w e v e r ,  the creation a n d  the support o f  s u c h  
p r o g r a m s  require a state-by-state c o m m i t m e n t  b y  governors, legislatures, a n d  b o a r d s  o f  a c c o u n ­
tancy in jurisdictions that lack positive e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o g r a m s .
Jurisdictions that h a v e  successfully i m p l e m e n t e d  positive e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o g r a m s  d e m o n s t r a t e  that 
state regulatory s y s t e m s  c a n  w o r k  if they receive the appropriate levels o f  authority a n d  direction 
f r o m  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  support f r o m  the public a c cou nti ng profession a n d  the public at large. 
Effective state regulation w o u l d  give a d d e d  assurance that all i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants are 
fulfilling their public trust to render accounting a n d  auditing services that are truly professional. 
T h a t  assurance c o u l d  in turn g o  a l ong w a y  t o w a r d  deterring fraudulent financial reporting.
V I I I .  C u r r e n t  L e g a l  C l i m a t e
T h e  national crisis o f  liability a n d  insurance, a n d  the various tort r e f o r m  initiatives to address this 
perceived crisis, g o  b e y o n d  the m a n d a t e  a n d  the ability o f  this C o m m i s s i o n  to resolve. A t  the s a m e  
time, h o w e v e r ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  is a w a r e  of the legal climate in w h i c h  the participants in the 
financial reporting process operate today. T h e  liability to w h i c h  individuals, particularly officers 
a n d  directors a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants, are subject is related to fraudulent financial 
reporting, a n d  this relationship m a y  n e e d  to b e  r e e x a m i n e d .
Traditionally, individual liability for violations o f  the disclosure provisions of the federal securities 
l a w s  has b e e n  v i e w e d  as b e i n g  a discipline that is necessary to the integrity o f  the disclosure 
process w h i c h  those l a w s  m a n d a t e .  In fact, potential legal liability for negligence to private parties 
w h o  suffer d a m a g e s  has long b e e n  considered the m o s t  effective m e c h a n i s m  for assuring that 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants p e r f o r m  their public responsibilities c o m p e t e n t l y  a n d  diligently. 
B y  s u p p l e m e n t i n g  the g o v e r n m e n t ' s  limited l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  resources, private parties w h o  bring 
lawsuits as "private attorneys-general" p rovide a n  incentive for i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants 
a n d  corporate officers a n d  directors to serve responsibly.
In recent years, h o w e v e r ,  co n c e r n s  h a v e  b e e n  e xp r e s s e d  that potential private liability u n d e r  the 
current tort s y s t e m  has b e c o m e  excessive. W h i l e  this a r g u m e n t  has b e e n  m a d e  in the past, it m a y  
b e ar h e e d i n g  n o w .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  is c o n c e r n e d  that private liability m a y  h a v e  r e a c h e d  a level 
at w h i c h  it n o  longer a d d s  to the quality o f  financial reporting a n d  corporate disclosure generally.
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C o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  Liability o n  A u d i t  Q u a l i t y
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  Parties c h a r g e d  with r e s p o n d i n g  to various tort r e f o r m  initiatives 
s h o u l d  c o n s i d e r  the implications that the p e r c e i v e d  liability crisis h o l d s  f o r  l o n g - t e r m  audit 
quality a n d  the i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t ' s  detection o f  f r a u d u l e n t  financial 
reporting.
T h e  e x p a n s i o n  o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's liability in recent years has p r o m o t e d  a 
d r ama tic increase in the n u m b e r  a n d  the size o f  legal claims, w h i c h  in turn h a v e  contributed to a n  
increasingly unstable insurance market. T h e s e  d e v e l o p m e n t s  are jeopardizing the public a c c o u n t ­
ing profession's ability to attract a n d  retain high-caliber professionals a n d  its future e c o n o m i c  
viability. T o  the extent that the p e rce ive d liability a n d  insurance crisis m a k e s  recruiting a n d  
retaining professionals m o r e  difficult, it m a y  h a v e  a l o ng- ter m detrimental effect o n  audit quality. 
In addition, liability c o n c e r n s  h a v e  a direct relationship w i th the public accounting profession's 
willingness to a s s u m e  greater responsibility for detecting fraudulent financial reporting.
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  w h i l e  the C o m m i s s i o n  w o u l d  b e  c o n c e r n e d  if shareholders' rights w e r e  u n d u l y  
restricted a n d  takes n o  position o n  a n y  o f  the public acco u n t i n g  profession's specific proposals for 
legislative r e f o r m  o f  the tort sy stem, it urges those w h o  d o  so to consider the implications for 
l o n g - t e r m  audit quality a n d  the detection b y  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac countant of fraudulent 
financial reporting.
R e c o n s i d e r i n g  C o r p o r a t e  I n d e m n i f i c a t i o n
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  r e c o n s i d e r  its l o n g - s t a n d i n g  position, insofar a s  it 
applies to i n d e p e n d e n t  directors, that the c o rpo rat e in demnification o f  officers a n d  directors 
f o r  liabilities that arise u n d e r  the Securities A c t  o f  1 9 3 3  is a g a i n s t  p ublic policy a n d  
therefore u n e n f o r c e a b l e .
T h e  perceived crisis of liability a n d  the difficulties in obtaining directors' a n d  officers' ( " D & O " )  
insurance h a v e  b e e n  w i d e l y  reported f r o m  the perspective o f  corporate m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  well- 
d o c u m e n t e d  in the press. T h i s  aspect o f  the perceived liability crisis also c o u l d  affect financial 
reporting adversely.
T h e  implications o f  the liability crisis for recruiting qualified i n d e p e n d e n t  directors, particularly 
those w h o  are to serve o n  audit c o m m i t t e e s  o f  public c o m p a n i e s ,  c o n c e r n  the C o m m i s s i o n  greatly. 
A s  the C o m m i s s i o n  stressed in C h a p t e r  T w o ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  directors are necessary c o m p o n e n t s  o f  
a n  effective audit c o m m i t t e e ,  w h i c h  in turn is a k e y  to preventing fraudulent financial reporting. 
S i n c e  the factors are interrelated, b a lan ce is essential. If c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  personal liability e x c e e d  
their traditional role as a necessary discipline a n d  b e g i n  to jeopardize the essential contribution of 
i n d e p e n d e n t  directors, the S E C  s h o u l d  reconsider its long-standing position that the corporate 
indemnification o f  directors for liabilities arising u n d e r  the Securities A c t  o f  1 9 3 3  is against public 
policy a n d  therefore unenforceable. If certain limited indemnification, particularly o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  
directors, helps c o m p a n i e s  recruit a n d  retain highly qualified directors, its benefits m a y  well 
o u t w e i g h  the public policy issue underlying the S E C ' s  traditional stand.
M o r e  than a half-dozen states h a v e  r e s p o n d e d  w i t h  legislation to r e d u c e  the pressures corporations 
face as a result o f  the D & O  liability crisis. T h e  legislative initiatives include m e a s u r e s ,  for 
e x a m p l e ,  to limit the liability of directors a n d  to b r o a d e n  the indemnification that a corporation m a y  
offer its directors a n d  officers.
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O n e  state, D e l a w a r e ,  n o w  permits c o m p a n i e s  to limit or e v e n  eliminate their directors' financial 
liability for a b r e a c h  of the d u ty of care but leaves director liability intact in cases o f  disloyalty, 
b a d  faith, or m i s c o n d u c t .  In derivative actions (a suit b y  a shareholder to enforce a corporate ca use 
o f  action), D e l a w a r e  has c h o s e n  to limit indemnification to expenses, taking a s o m e w h a t  m o r e  
conservative a p p r o a c h  than that o f  m a n y  recent initiatives. O n  the other h a n d ,  in the nonderivative 
area, m o s t  o f  the n e w  legislation mirrors D e l a w a r e ' s  recent statute that allows a corporation to 
i n d e m n i f y  its directors a n d  officers for expenses, j u d g m e n t s ,  fines a n d  settlement, if certain criteria 
are met. States that h a v e  not acted face pressures similar to those faced b y  states that h a v e  acted, 
a n d  so the C o m m i s s i o n  expects the initiatives m e n t i o n e d  here to b e  part o f  a continuing trend.
T o  help address b o t h  the liability that exists a n d  the difficulties in obtaining D & O  insurance, the 
C o m m i s s i o n  offers G o o d  Practice Guidelines for the A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e ,  w h i c h  a p p e a r  in 
A p p e n d i x  I.
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C h a p t e r  F i v e
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S  F O R  E D U C A T I O N
I. T h e  R o l e  o f  E d u c a t i o n  in P r e p a r i n g  P a r t i c i p a n t s  in t h e  F i n a n c i a l  
R e p o r t i n g  S y s t e m
Participants in the financial reporting s y s t e m  m u s t  first u n d e r s t a n d  the mu l t i d i m e n s i o n a l  nature of 
fraudulent financial reporting to b e  able to address it w i th appropriate responses. T h e i r  k n o w l e d g e ,  
skills, a n d  ethical values— g a i n e d  t h r o u g h  ed ucation— m u s t  b e  c o m m e n s u r a t e  w i t h  this challenge.
T h e  process o f  educating present a n d  future participants in the financial reporting s y s t e m  c a n  take 
place in the u n d e r g r a d u a t e  a n d  graduate business school cl assroom, in continuing education 
p r o g r a m s ,  or t h r o u g h  on-the-job training or experience. In all these settings the participants sh o u l d  
b e  e x p o s e d  to the k n o w l e d g e ,  the skills, a n d  the ethical values that potentially m a y  help t h e m  
prevent, detect, a n d  deter fraudulent financial reporting. T h r o u g h  this process, education a n d  
educators c a n  h a v e  a n  especially im portant positive influence o n  the financial reporting system.
T h i s  chapter presents the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  that are d e s i g n e d  to help m a k e  present 
a n d  future participants in the financial reporting process better i n f o r m e d  a b o u t  fraudulent financial 
reporting a n d  better p r epa red to prevent, detect, a n d  deter it. T h e  next section presents r e c o m ­
m e n d a t i o n s  for i m p r o v i n g  today's business a n d  acco u n t i n g  curricula. B e c a u s e  the A m e r i c a n  
A s s e m b l y  o f  Collegiate S c h o o l s  of B u s i n e s s  ( A A C S B ) ,  w h i c h  accredits these a c a d e m i c  p r o g r a m s ,  
is o n e  o f  the m o s t  important influences o n  the content a n d  the structure o f  business a n d  ac cou nti ng 
curricula, it sh o u l d  consider h o w  best to reflect these r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  in its accreditation stan­
dards. A l t h o u g h  the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  presented here are targeted to the u n d e r g r a d u a t e  a n d  g r a d ­
uate school curricula, educators c a n  a n d  s h o u l d  adapt t h e m  to appropriate aspects o f  the l a w  school 
curriculum.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  then offers its observations a b o u t  recent calls for e x p a n d i n g  the accounting 
curriculum. T h e  following section presents the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for professional 
certification e x a m i n a t i o n s  for accountants. In the s u b s e q u e n t  section the C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  
i m p r o v e m e n t s  in continuing professional ed ucation for accountants. Finally, the last section 
discusses opportunities within the public c o m p a n y  for educating m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  other e m p l o y e e s  
a b o u t  the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting a n d  m e a s u r e s  required to r e d u c e  its incidence.
II. B u s i n e s s  a n d  A c c o u n t i n g  C u r r i c u l a
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  e ndorses recent calls for additional liberal arts r e quirements in the business a n d  
a c c ou nti ng curricula, to serve as a strong foundation o n  w h i c h  to build additional k n o w l e d g e ,  
skills, a n d  values. T h e  National Institute o f  Education, the Association o f  A m e r i c a n  Colleges, a n d  
the A m e r i c a n  A c c o u n t i n g  Association e a c h  h a v e  r e c o m m e n d e d  increasing the curricula's e m p h a s i s  
o n  analytical a n d  p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g  skills, ethical values, a n d  historical a n d  cultural a w a r e n e s s —  
all benefits of liberal arts studies a n d  useful g r o u n d w o r k  for future participants in the financial 
reporting process.
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A s  t o m o r r o w ' s  top corporate m a n a g e r s  a n d  partners of public ac cou nti ng firms, today's business 
a n d  acco u n t i n g  students will b e  responsible a n d  ac countable for the financial reporting process o n  
w h i c h  the capital a n d  credit m a r k e t s  d e p e n d .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  in this chapter 
are d e s i g n e d  to reinforce a n d  s u p p l e m e n t  the foundation o f  liberal arts studies a n d  thereby help 
students deal with the forces a n d  the opportunities they will e n c o u n t e r  in business that m a y  
contribute to fraudulent financial reporting. R i g o r o u s  a n d  t h o r o u g h  a c a d e m i c  preparation will not 
only help today's students a d v a n c e  to leadership positions in c o m p a n i e s  a n d  public ac counting 
firms, it also will help t h e m  face the challenge of preventing, detecting, a n d  deterring fraudulent 
financial reporting m o r e  successfully.
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the business a n d  ac cou nti ng curricula s h o u l d  e x a m i n e  fraudulent financial reporting 
in depth, highlighting ethical, analytical, a n d  j u d g m e n t a l  considerations. B e c a u s e  o f  the c o m p l e x  
nature of this t ype of fraud a n d  of e v e r y  strategy a i m e d  at its reduction, faculty s h o u l d  teach its 
nature a n d  possible solutions t h r o u g h o u t  s u c h  curricula. Limiting students' e x p o s u r e  to the p r o b ­
l e m  o f  fraudulent financial reporting to a single course o n  ethics is s i m p l y  not e n o u g h .
C u r r i c u l u m - w i d e  E x p o s u r e  to F r a u d u l e n t  Fi na nc ia l R e p o r t i n g
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h r o u g h o u t  the b u sin ess a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  curricula, e d u c a t o r s  s h o u l d  
foster k n o w l e d g e  a n d  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  the factors that m a y  c a u s e  f r a u d u l e n t  financial 
reporting a n d  the strategies that c a n  l e a d  to a  r e duc tio n in its incidence.
W h e n  a C o m m i s s i o n - s p o n s o r e d  su r v e y  s a m p l e d  a c cou nti ng a n d  auditing textbooks, it f o u n d  little 
to n o  discussion o f  fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  fact that students lack a n  a d e q u a t e  u n d e r ­
standing o f  this fraudulent activity a n d  a sensitivity to the forces a n d  opportunities that m a y  
contribute to it is therefore not surprising. T h e  serious nature o f  fraudulent financial reporting 
warrants a c h a n g e  in this situation.
T h r o u g h o u t  their studies, business a n d  a cco u n t i n g  students s h o u l d  receive sufficient e x p o s u r e  to 
the p r o b l e m  o f  fraudulent financial reporting, including its causes, its w i d e s p r e a d  impact, a n d  the 
practical, cost-effective responses that participants in the financial reporting s y s t e m  c a n  a n d  s hould 
undertake. In addition, these students s h o u l d  e x a m i n e  the c o m p l e x  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  professional 
issues that s u r r o u n d  fraudulent financial reporting.
M a n y  opportunities for discussing the topic o f  fraudulent financial reporting o c c u r  t h r o u g h o u t  the 
entire curricula. M a n a g e m e n t  courses, for e x a m p l e ,  are a natural setting for e x a m i n i n g  the 
oversight functions of the audit c o m m i t t e e  a n d  the critical i m p o r t a n c e  o f  the ethical tone set b y  top 
m a n a g e m e n t .  T o  s h o w  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  effect o n  the corporate e n v i r o n m e n t ,  these courses also 
sho u l d  l o o k  at h o w  m a n a g e m e n t  sets c o m p a n y  goals a n d  h o w  it uses r eward, feedback, a n d  support 
s y s t e m s  to m o tiv ate personnel to achieve those goals. F i n a n c e  classes s h o u l d  stress the ethical a n d  
the e c o n o m i c  un d e r p i n n i n g s  o f  full a n d  fair disclosure that g o v e r n  access to public fu nds t h r o u g h  
capital a n d  credit markets. T h e  risks of fraud that m a n a g e m e n t  b y  objectives, decentralized 
operations, incentive c o m p e n s a t i o n  plans, a n d  t o p - d o w n  profit p l ann ing m a y  p o s e  are appropriate 
topics for cost a n d  m a n a g e r i a l  acco u n t i n g  classes to discuss. B u s i n e s s  l a w  courses s h o u l d  include 
securities law, d e m o n s t r a t i n g  h o w  fraudulent financial reporting violates the l a w  a n d  h o w  the 
regulatory a n d  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  s y s t e m  operates to prevent, detect, a n d  deter reporting violations.
E l s e w h e r e  in the curricula, s y s t e m s  classes s h o u l d  address risks o f  fraudulent financial reporting 
introduced b y  c o m p l e x  information systems, a n d  s u c h  classes should, for e x a m p l e ,  c o v e r  internal 
controls. A u d i t i n g  classes sh o u l d  e m p h a s i z e  the use o f  analytical r e v i e w  techniques a n d  the n e e d  
for healthy skepticism. In addition, behavioral courses sh o u l d  a nalyze h o w  forces a n d  o p p o r t u ­
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nities at various levels o f  the organization e n c o u r a g e  m i s l e a d i n g  financial reporting a n d  h o w  the 
corporation c a n  help individuals c o p e  w i t h  t h e m .
T h e i r  a c a d e m i c  training sh o u l d  give business a n d  acco u n t i n g  students a solid u n der sta ndi ng of 
fraudulent financial reporting a n d  the a w a r e n e s s  that the p r o b l e m  h a s  n o  quick, simple, or final 
solution. S i n c e  the c o m p l e x  nature o f  fraudulent financial reporting will continue to evolve, the 
p r o b l e m  will require periodic, if not continual, reexamination. E d u c a t o r s  s h o u l d  e n c o u r a g e  stu­
dents to m a k e  this r e e x a m i n a t i o n  part o f  their continuing education.
B e t t e r  U n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  Internal C o n t r o l s
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  b u sin ess a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  curricula s h o u l d  p r o m o t e  a  better u n ­
d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  the f u n c t i o n  a n d  the i m p o r t a n c e  o f  internal controls, i n c l u d i n g  the control 
e n v i r o n m e n t ,  in preventing, detecting, a n d  deterring f r a u d u l e n t  f i nan cia l reporting.
In C h a p t e r  T w o  a n d  t h r o u g h o u t  this report, the C o m m i s s i o n  ha s  stressed the i m p o r t a n c e  of strong 
internal controls, b r o a d e r  than internal a c c o u n t i n g  controls. In addition to pr oviding a first line of 
d e fen se against fraudulent financial reporting, internal controls m a k e  g o o d  business sense. N e v ­
ertheless, m a n y  business a n d  ac cou nti ng curricula d o  not highlight internal controls. In particular, 
they pass lightly o v e r  the b r o a d  controls that constitute the control e n v i r o n m e n t ,  s u c h  as the c o d e  
o f  corporate conduct, the internal audit function, a n d  the audit c o m m i t t e e  o f  the b o a r d  o f  directors. 
C o v e r a g e  o f  the p o w e r f u l  influence that top m a n a g e m e n t  exerts o n  the control e n v i r o n m e n t  has 
b e e n  especially inadequate.
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  a d v a n c e s  in c o m p u t e r  technology, s y s t e m s  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  a n d  data processing h a v e  
h e i g h t e n e d  the n e e d  for teaching students a b o u t  internal controls, including the control e n v i r o n ­
m e n t .  T h e s e  a d v a n c e s  rapidly h a v e  t r a n s f o r m e d  the financial reporting process. Acc o r d i n g l y ,  
students m a j o r i n g  in acco u n t i n g  or business, w h o  will graduate w i t h  a greater u n der sta ndi ng of 
data processing concepts than that of their predecessors, also require a n  u n der sta ndi ng o f  the 
h e i g h t e n e d  internal controls a n d  security required in c o m p u t e r - b a s e d  en v i r o n m e n t s .  Curricula that 
e m p h a s i z e  the i m p o r t a n c e  o f  internal controls will help students b e c o m e  better p r e p a r e d  partici­
pants in the financial reporting process.
K n o w l e d g e  o f  R e g u l a t i o n  a n d  L a w  E n f o r c e m e n t
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  B u s i n e s s  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  students s h o u l d  b e  w e l l - i n f o r m e d  a b o u t  the 
regulation a n d  e n f o r c e m e n t  activities b y  w h i c h  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  private b odies s a f e g u a r d  
the f i nan cia l reporting s y s t e m  a n d  t h e r e b y  protect the p u b l i c  interest.
T h e  business a n d  acco u n t i n g  curricula s h o u l d  i n f o r m  students a b o u t  the regulatory a n d  l a w  
e n f o r c e m e n t  f r a m e w o r k  so that students d e v e l o p  a clear u n der sta ndi ng of the responsibilities a n d  
the functions o f  federal a n d  state agencies, courts, Self-Regulatory Organizations ( S R O s ) ,  other 
private bodies, a n d  professional organizations a n d  of h o w  they interact. Students also sh oul d 
d e v e l o p  a n  appreciation o f  h o w  the public trust is i n v o k e d  w h e n  a c o m p a n y  solicits a n d  operates 
w i t h  f u n d s  f r o m  public investors or w h e n  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac cou nta nt audits a public 
c o m p a n y .  T h e y  m u s t  u n d e r s t a n d  their o w n  legal a n d  professional obligations to m a int ain this 
public trust as well as the c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  failing to d o  so.
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D e v e l o p i n g  t h e N e c e s s a r y  Skills
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : T h e  b u sin ess a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  curricula s h o u l d  h e l p  students d e v e l o p  
s t ron ger analytical, p r o b l e m  solving, a n d  j u d g m e n t  skills to h e l p  prevent, detect, a n d  deter 
f r a u d u l e n t  financial reporting w h e n  they b e c o m e  participants in the financial reporting 
process.
M a n a g i n g  a corporation well a n d  serving as a chief financial officer, internal auditor, or i n de­
p e n d e n t  public accountant requires g o o d  j u d g m e n t ,  the ability to r e a s o n  analytically, a n d  the 
ability to solve p r o b l e m s .  Preventing, detecting, a n d  deterring fraudulent financial reporting 
require similar skills. T h e  lack o f  these skills c a n  contribute to fraudulent financial reporting. In 
fact, m a n y  instances o f  fraudulent financial reporting that the C o m m i s s i o n  r e v i e w e d  w e n t  u n d e ­
tected for s o m e  t i me b e c a u s e  o f  faulty j u d g m e n t  or in adequate analytical reasoning o n  the part of 
the participants in the financial reporting process.
Also, fraudulent financial reporting a n d  its c o v e r - u p  generally involve a n  u n u s u a l  set o f  c i r c u m ­
stances: a u n i q u e  c o m b i n a t i o n  of forces a n d  opportunities c o n d u c i v e  to s u c h  fraud, w h e t h e r  the 
fraudulent s c h e m e  involves inappropriate r e v e n u e  recognition, o v erstatement o f  assets, override 
o f  controls, or collusion. Frequently, those w h o  are in a position to prevent, detect, or deter the 
fraudulent action d o  not c o n t e m p l a t e  or foresee the risks of the specific set o f  circumstances.
O v e r e m p h a s i z i n g  course content a n d  e x p o s i n g  students o n l y  to si mpl e factual case histories, w h i c h  
c a n  pr event t h e m  f r o m  d e v e l o p i n g  the ability to u s e  analytical a n d  p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g  skills a n d  to 
m a k e  s o u n d  j u d g m e n t s  in unusual, d e m a n d i n g  circumstances, are s o m e  o f  the pitfalls to w h i c h  
educators are p r o n e  in their attempts to i m p r o v e  students' thinking a n d  j u d g m e n t  skills. E d u c a t o r s  
s h o u l d  r e cognize these obstacles a n d  attempt to redress the i m b a l a n c e  b y  stressing analysis a n d  
j u d g m e n t  as well as p r o b l e m  solving. T h e  business a n d  acco u n t i n g  curricula s h o u l d  help students 
d e v e l o p  g o o d  j u d g m e n t  a n d  analytical thinking skills a n d  the ability to confront n o v e l  situations 
in a c o m p a n y ' s  financial reporting process, especially if those situations involve w a r n i n g  signs or 
red flags.
E m p h a s i z i n g  Ethics
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  bu s i n e s s  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  curricula s h o u l d  e m p h a s i z e  ethical val­
u e s  b y  integrating their d e v e l o p m e n t  with the acquisition o f  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  skills to h e lp 
prevent, detect, a n d  deter f r a u d u l e n t  financial reporting.
T h e  business a n d  a c c ou nti ng curricula h a v e  g i v e n  too little attention to the ethics o f  financial 
reporting. Restricting c o v e r a g e  o f  ethics issues to a n  elective co urs e near the e n d  o f  the fo r m a l  
education process is too little a n d  too late. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that the curricula 
e m p h a s i z e  ethics issues, integrating t h e m  w i t h  the c o v e r a g e  o f  technical information a n d  the 
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  skills to help prevent, detect, a n d  deter fraudulent financial reporting.
T h i s  goal is difficult to accomplish. It requires the interest a n d  i n v o l v e m e n t  o f  business school 
faculty f r o m  all areas o f  concentration. Attention to ethics issues m u s t  p e r m e a t e  the curricula, w i t h  
ethical inquiry a n  e x p e c t e d  part of a n y  analysis o f  a business or a cco u n t i n g  case study. Cur r e n t  
business events also c a n  offer opportunities for c l a s s r o o m  discussions o f  ethics issues.
In the typical a c cou nti ng curriculum, h o w e v e r ,  the o n ly ethics study takes place in the auditing 
course, w h e r e  it usually a m o u n t s  to n o  m o r e  than a procedure-based, one-class discussion o f  the 
A I C P A ' s  R u l e s  of C o n d u c t .  B e c a u s e  the A I C P A ' s  R u l e s  f o r m  the basis for disciplinary action, 
discussions o f  t h e m  tend to b e  n a r r o w l y  focused. Unfortunately, the level o f  ethical inquiry is also
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m i n i m a l  in the business c u r r i c u l u m  a n d  again frequently limited to a single course. S u c h  in ade­
quate c o v e r a g e  o f  ethics issues c a n  s e n d  a n  u n i n t e n d e d  m e s s a g e  to students that ethics is of 
s e c o n d a r y  importance.
T h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's responsibility a n d  accountability to the public requires a 
m u c h  b r o a d e r  e x p o s u r e  to ethics. B u s i n e s s  schools sh oul d include ethics discussions in e v e r y  
a c c o u n t i n g  course. Students s h o u l d  study c o d e s  o f  corporate c o n d u c t  a n d  other ethics c o d e s  s u c h  
as those p r o m u l g a t e d  b y  the National Association o f  A c c o u n t a n t s ,  the Institute o f  Internal A u ­
ditors, a n d  the Financial E x e c u t i v e s  Institute, in addition to the A I C P A ' s  R u l e s  of C o n d u c t .  A t  a 
m i n i m u m ,  b e c a u s e  all business m a j o r s  are required to take s o m e  accounting, treatment of ethics 
issues t h r o u g h o u t  the acco u n t i n g  c u r r i c u l u m  w o u l d  e x p o s e  e v e r y  business graduate to at least s o m e  
ethical inquiry c o n c e r n i n g  the financial reporting process. Y e t  ethics ideally s h o u l d  b e  a part o f  all 
business courses.
F a c u l t y  D e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  C l a s s r o o m  M a t e r i a l s
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  B u s i n e s s  sch o o l s  s h o u l d  e n c o u r a g e  business a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  faculty to 
d e v e l o p  their o w n  p e r s o n a l  c o m p e t e n c e  a s  well a s  c l a s s r o o m  materials f o r  c o n v e y i n g  
i n f o r m a t i o n ,  skills, a n d  ethical values that c a n  h e l p  prevent, detect, a n d  deter f r a u d u l e n t  
fin a n c i a l  reporting. B u s i n e s s  s c h o o l  faculty r e w a r d  s y s t e m s  s h o u l d  r e c o g n i z e  a n d  r e w a r d  
the contribution o f  faculty w h o  d e v e l o p  s u c h  c o m p e t e n c e  a n d  materials.
T h e  m o s t  serious deficiency in attempts to i m p r o v e  the business c u r r i c u l u m  a l o n g  the lines the 
C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  is the lack o f  relevant c l a s s r o o m  discussions o f  real situations a n d  of 
challenging c l a s s r o o m  materials. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that business schools e n c o u r a g e  
faculty m e m b e r s  to d e v e l o p  their o w n  c o m p e t e n c e  a n d  to p r o d u c e  c l a s s r o o m  materials that help 
students u n d e r s t a n d  fraudulent financial reporting.
T h e r e  is n o  substitute for business a n d  professional experience in contributing insight a n d  infor­
m a t i o n  to c l a s s r o o m  analyses a n d  discussions of cases o f  fraudulent financial reporting. B u s i n e s s  
faculty m e m b e r s  s h o u l d  therefore— w i t h  the business schools' support— gain actual w o r k  e x p e ­
rience in a corporate setting directly relating to their area o f  a c a d e m i c  expertise. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  
business schools s h o u l d  bring executives a n d  professional accountants into the c l a s s r o o m  t h r o u g h  
guest lectures, part-time residence p r o g r a m s ,  a n d  part- a n d  full-time faculty a p p o i n t m e n t s  o n  a 
p e r m a n e n t  or t e m p o r a r y  basis. Interaction b e t w e e n  a c a d e m i a  a n d  the m a r k e t p l a c e  w o u l d  bridge the 
g a p  b e t w e e n  the a c a d e m i c  a n d  c o m m e r c i a l  w o r l d s  a n d  a d d  m o r e  reality to case studies o f  fraud­
ulent financial reporting.
S u p p o r t  for d e v e l o p i n g  materials b a s e d  o n  actual incidents o f  fraudulent financial reporting c a n  
c o m e  in several forms. Case-writing w o r k s h o p s ,  s u c h  as those the D e c i s i o n  Sciences Institute 
sponsors, a n d  a central registry or clearinghouse for existing case studies w o u l d  foster support 
within a c a d e m i a  for writing cases. Financial support f r o m  c o m p a n i e s ,  private institutions a n d  
foundations, professional organizations, a n d  public accounting firms w o u l d  en a b l e  faculty to 
d e v e l o p  n e w  materials.
E d u c a t o r s  n e e d  access to information o n  actual incidents of fraudulent financial reporting to b e  able 
to help their students u n d e r s t a n d  w h y  a n d  h o w  this type o f  fraud occurs. C o r p o r a t e  executives, 
internal auditors, i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants, a n d  regulatory a n d  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  officials 
therefore s h o u l d  m a k e  e v e r y  effort to grant this access a n d  support the dissemination o f  infor­
m a t i o n  a b o u t  these incidents.
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A p p e n d i x  E  presents, as e x a m p l e s  o f  the kinds o f  cases that business school faculty s hould 
develop, t w o  cases d e v e l o p e d  as part o f  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  research effort. E a c h  case is b a s e d  o n  
k n o w l e d g e  o f  actual situations involving public c o m p a n i e s ,  a l tho ugh the facts h a v e  b e e n  altered 
a n d  a n y  r e s e m b l a n c e  to real p e o p l e  or events is unintentional. T h e s e  cases h a v e  b e e n  tested 
successfully w i t h  m i x e d  g r o u p s  o f  corporate executives a n d  other professionals, including inde­
p e n d e n t  public accountants, attorneys, a n d  securities analysts as well as students.
D e v e l o p i n g  materials like these w o u l d  h a v e  m a n y  benefits. Students r e s p o n d  favorably to learning 
situations that reflect real life. T h e i r  e n t h u s i a s m  in turn w o u l d  inspire the faculty to increase their 
efforts to help students u n d e r s t a n d  fraudulent financial reporting a n d  the appropriate responses to 
it. In s u m ,  business schools s h o u l d  create a learning e n v i r o n m e n t  in w h i c h  the i m p o r t a n c e  of 
effective controls, h i g h  ethical standards, g o o d  j u d g m e n t  a n d  analytical skills, a n d  a c o n c e r n  for 
the public interest are c o m m u n i c a t e d  effectively.
E n c o u r a g i n g  faculty to d e v e l o p  i m p r o v e d  c l a s s r o o m  materials a n d  their o w n  personal c o m p e t e n c e  
will require additional incentives in business school faculty r e w a r d  systems. T h e  faculty r e w a r d  
s y s t e m  s h o u l d  b e  flexible, recognizing relevant practical w o r k  experience, case writing, a n d  
professional service that ultimately e n h a n c e s  the education o f  future participants in the financial 
reporting process.
III. F i v e - Y e a r  A c c o u n t i n g  P r o g r a m s
T h e  n e e d  to e x p a n d  un d e r g r a d u a t e  a c c o u n t i n g  curricula f r o m  4  to 5 years h a s  b e e n  a frequent topic 
o f  discussion in recent years. T h e  A m e r i c a n  A c c o u n t i n g  Association ( A A A )  a n d  the A m e r i c a n  
Institute o f  Certified Public A c c o u n t a n t s  ( A I C P A )  h a v e  s u ppo rte d this ex pan sio n, a n d  s o m e  
universities n o w  require 5 years o f  study for acco u n t i n g  majors. W h i l e  discussion a b o u t  this 
p r o p o s e d  c u r r i c u l u m  c h a n g e  is best left to these a n d  other professional groups, s u c h  as the 
Financial E x e c u t i v e s  Institute (FEI), the Institute o f  Internal A uditors (IIA), a n d  the National 
Association o f  A c c o u n t a n t s  ( N A A ) ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  offers the f o llowing observations b a s e d  o n  
its research a n d  deliberations:
• S i n c e  liberal arts courses offer a strong f r a m e w o r k  for evaluating a n d  adjusting to rapid c h a n g e s  
in business during a t i m e  o f  continuing e c o n o m i c  a n d  technological d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  evolution 
o f  the acco u n t i n g  profession, e x p a n d i n g  acco u n t i n g  curricula to deal w i t h  fraudulent financial 
reporting, as the C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s ,  sho u l d  not b e  at the e x p e n s e  o f  the liberal arts 
c o m p o n e n t  o f  business a n d  a cco u n t i n g  education.
• A  significant explosion o f  information related to accounting, systems, a n d  related fields has 
b e e n  taking place, a n d  studying this information m a y  require m o r e  t i m e  in course w o r k .
• Entry-level positions for corporate accountants, internal auditors, a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
accountants require increasing levels o f  c o m p e t e n c e  a n d  therefore m o r e  educational pr epara­
tion.
• D e v e l o p i n g  ethical inquiry, analytical reasoning, s o u n d  j u d g m e n t ,  a n d  p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g  skills 
requires m o r e  t i me than d e v e l o p i n g  simpler cognitive skills s u c h  as m e m o r i z a t i o n  requires.
• Just as the M a s t e r s  o f  B u s i n e s s  Administration d e g r e e  has b e c o m e  increasingly i mportant for 
corporate a d v a n c e m e n t  in areas like m a n a g e m e n t ,  ma rketing, finance, a n d  internal audit, a 
c o m p a r a b l e  ac cou nti ng d e g r e e  m a y  b e c o m e  m o r e  necessary for a d v a n c e m e n t  as a corporate 
accountant a n d  as a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant.
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I V .  P r o f e s s i o n a l  Certification E x a m i n a t i o n s
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  P r o f e s s i o n a l  certification e x a m i n a t i o n s  s h o u l d  test students o n  the 
i n formation, skills, a n d  ethical values that f u r t h e r  the u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n ­
cial reporting a n d  that p r o m o t e  its reduction.
Professional certification e x a m i n a t i o n s  influence business a n d  ac cou nti ng education. T e x t b o o k s  
a n d  c ourse syllabi quickly reflect c h a n g e s  in the subject matter that these e x a m i n a t i o n s  cover.
T h e  A I C P A  e x a m i n a t i o n  for accountants (the C P A  examination), the Certified Internal A u d i t o r  
E x a m i n a t i o n ,  a n d  the Certified M a n a g e m e n t  A c c o u n t a n t  E x a m i n a t i o n  are d e s i g n e d  to m e a s u r e  the 
professional c o m p e t e n c e  o f  candidates in public accounting, internal auditing, a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  
accounting. All three professional certification ex aminations, especially the C P A  examination, 
influence business a n d  a c cou nti ng education. A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the A I C P A ' s  B o a r d  o f  E x a m i n e r s  as 
well as the B o a r d s  o f  R e g e n t s  o f  the I I A  a n d  the N A A  sh o u l d  m o d i f y  future professional certi­
fication e x a m i n a t i o n s  in light of the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  in this report, testing students o n  the 
information, skills, a n d  ethical values that will d e t e r m i n e  their responses to the p r o b l e m  of 
fraudulent financial reporting.
V .  C o n t i n u i n g  P r o f e s s i o n a l  E d u c a t i o n
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  A s  p a r t  o f  their c o n t i n u i n g  pr ofe ssi ona l education, i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n t a n t s ,  internal auditors, a n d  co r p o r a t e  a c c o u n t a n t s  s h o u l d  study the f o r c e s  a n d  
opportunities that contribute to f r a u d u l e n t  financial reporting, the risk factors that m a y  
indicate its o c c u r r e n c e ,  a n d  the relevant ethical a n d  technical standards.
C o n t i n u i n g  professional ed ucation influences the quality of w o r k  p e r f o r m e d  b y  i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
accountants, internal auditors, or corporate accountants. C o n t i n u i n g  professional education is 
available to these professionals in a variety o f  forms, s u c h  as in-house training p r o g r a m s ,  education 
p r o g r a m s  o f  professional organizations, c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  courses, a n d  business school courses, a n d  
helps t h e m  adjust to c h a n g e  a n d  k e e p  current o n  n e w  d e v e l o p m e n t s .
M o r e o v e r ,  professionals in public accounting, internal auditing, a n d  corporate ac cou nti ng w h o  
h a v e  b e e n  certified as C P A s ,  Certified Internal A uditors (CIAs), or Certified M a n a g e m e n t  A c ­
countants ( C M A s )  are e x p e c t e d  to m a int ain their professional c o m p e t e n c e  t h r o u g h  a regular 
p r o g r a m  of continuing professional education. R e q u i r e m e n t s  for C P A s  are set b y  the state b o a r d  
o f  a c c o u n t a n c y  of the jurisdiction licensing the individual professional as well as indirectly t h r o u g h  
m e m b e r s h i p  in the S E C  Practice Section o f  the A I C P A ' s  Division for C P A  Firms. C I A s  report 
progress e a c h  y e ar t o w a r d  c o m p l e t i n g  1 0 0  h o u r s  of activity in e a c h  3-year rolling period. T o  
r e m a i n  in g o o d  standing, C M A s  m u s t  c o m p l e t e  9 0  h o u r s  of continuing education activity in e a c h  
3-year period s u b s e q u e n t  to passing the examination.
M o s t  o f  the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  in this chapter for the business a n d  a c cou nti ng curricula generally 
a p p l y  to continuing professional e d ucation as well. T h e  professional e d ucation process that c o n ­
tinues t h r o u g h o u t  these professionals' careers s h o u l d  further their k n o w l e d g e  o f  fraudulent finan­
cial reporting, refine the skills required to c o m b a t  s u c h  fraud, a n d  sensitize these professionals to 
the related ethics issues.
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V I .  E d u c a t i o n a l  Initiatives b y  P u b l i c  C o m p a n i e s
A  public c o m p a n y  has m a n y  opportunities to e ducate its directors, m a n a g e m e n t ,  a n d  e m p l o y e e s  
a b o u t  fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e  o f  the b o a r d  o f  directors h a s  a n  important 
responsibility to b e  alert to the risk of s u c h  fraud a n d  to e ducate its m e m b e r s  a n d  the rest of the 
b o a r d  m e m b e r s  a b o u t  the forces a n d  the opportunities within the c o m p a n y ' s  financial reporting 
s y s t e m  that c o u l d  lead to its occurrence. C h a p t e r  T w o  a n d  the G o o d  Practice Gu idelines for the 
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  in A p p e n d i x  I suggest s o m e  of the educational resources that are available to 
assist the audit c o m m i t t e e  in this task.
In addition, continuing m a n a g e r i a l  education, w h e t h e r  p e r f o r m e d  in-house or b y  outside consult­
ants, s h o u l d  focus o n  the information, the skills, a n d  the ethical values required to safeguard 
against fraudulent financial reporting. Familiarity with the G o o d  Practice Gu idelines for A s s e s s i n g  
the R i s k  o f  Fraudulent Financial R e p o r t i n g  in A p p e n d i x  F, for e x a m p l e ,  c o u l d  help raise 
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a w a r e n e s s  a b o u t  the possibility of fraudulent financial reporting occurring in its 
o w n  c o m p a n y .
Finally, the process of d e v e l o p i n g  a n d  publicizing a c o d e  o f  corporate c o n d u c t  is a n  opportunity 
to let e m p l o y e e s  at all levels of the c o m p a n y  k n o w  w h a t  they c a n  d o  if they e n c o u n t e r  actual or 
suspected instances of fraudulent financial reporting. Training in the m e a n i n g  a n d  the application 
o f  the c o d e  is o n e  m e a n s  o f  alerting e m p l o y e e s  a b o u t  s u c h  fraud a n d  enlisting their support as part 
o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  s y s t e m  of internal control.
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H  N e w  Y o r k  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e  Listed C o m p a n y  M a n u a l ,  Section 3, C o r p o r a t e
Responsibility— A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  17 7
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B I O G R A P H I E S  O F  C O M M I S S I O N E R S  
A N D  E X E C U T I V E  S T A F F
W I L L I A M  M .  B A T T E N
W i l l i a m  M i l f r e d  B a t t e n  w a s  elected C h a i r m a n  a n d  C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e  Officer of  the N e w  Y o r k  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e  
in M a y  1 9 7 6  a n d  retired f r o m  that position in M a y  1984. H e  first b e c a m e  associated w i t h  the E x c h a n g e  in 
1 9 7 2  as a public m e m b e r  o f  the B o a r d  of  Directors. H e  c a m e  to the N e w  Y o r k  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e  f r o m  J.C. 
P e n n e y  C o . ,  f r o m  w h i c h  h e  retired as C h a i r m a n  a n d  C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e  Officer in O c t o b e r  1974.
M r .  Bat t e n  currently serves as C h a i r m a n  o f  the B o a r d  A d v i s o r y  C ouncil, T e x a s  Instruments, as director of  
the Z w e i g  F u n d ,  a n d  as a director o f  the M a n a g e r i a l  E c o n o m i c s  R e s e a r c h  Center, W i l l i a m  E. S i m o n  
G r a d u a t e  S c h o o l  o f  B u s i n e s s  Administration, University o f  Rochester. H e  is a F e l l o w  o f  the faculty o f  the 
K e n n e d y  S c h o o l  o f  G o v e r n m e n t  at H a r v a r d  University. H e  s e r ved o n  the B o a r d s  o f  A T & T ,  B o e i n g ,  
Citibank, J.C. P e n n e y ,  a n d  T e x a s  Instruments.
A c t i v e  in civic a n d  g o v e r n m e n t a l  affairs, M r .  B a t t e n  ser v e d  as a  m e m b e r  of  the B o a r d  o f  the W h i t e  H o u s e  
Preservation F u n d  a n d  the President's C o m m i s s i o n  o n  E x e c u t i v e  E x c h a n g e .  H e  w a s  President o f  the 
E c o n o m i c  C l u b  o f  N e w  Y o r k  in 1 9 6 7 - 6 8 ,  a n d  in 1 9 7 3  ser v e d  as the N ational C h a i r m a n  o f  the U . S .  Industrial 
Payroll S a v i n g s  C o m m i t t e e  a n d  w a s  C h a i r m a n  o f  the B u s i n e s s  C o u n c i l  in 1 9 7 1 - 7 2 .  H e  also w a s  inducted 
into the N ational B u s i n e s s  Hall o f  F a m e  in 1980.
M r .  B a t t e n  received a B . S .  d e g r e e  in e c o n o m i c s  f r o m  O h i o  State University, C o l u m b u s ,  in 193 2, a n d  did 
g raduate w o r k  at the University o f  C h i c a g o .  H e  ser v e d  in the U . S .  A r m y  f r o m  1 9 4 2  to 1 9 4 5 ,  w h e r e  h e  
attained the r a n k  o f  Lieutenant Colonel.
W I L L I A M  S. K A N A G A
W i l l i a m  S. K a n a g a  is C h a i r m a n  o f  the A d v i s o r y  B o a r d  o f  A r t h u r  Y o u n g  &  C o m p a n y ,  a n  international 
accounting, tax, a n d  consulting firm. H e  s e r v e d  as C h a i r m a n  o f  that firm f r o m  1 9 7 7  t h r o u g h  1 9 8 5  a n d  w a s  
M a n a g i n g  Partner f r o m  1 9 7 2  t h r o u g h  1977.
L o n g  active in the A m e r i c a n  Institute o f  Certified Public A c c o u n t a n t s ,  M r .  K a n a g a  s e r v e d  as C h a i r m a n  of  
its B o a r d  o f  Directors for the 1 9 8 0 - 8 1  t e r m  a n d  is currently serving as the C h a i r m a n  o f  the profession's 
centennial celebration in 1987.
In addition to his professional activities, h e  is a  m e m b e r  of  the B o a r d s  of  Trustees or A d v i s o r y  C o u n c i l s  to 
the Presbyterian Hospital in the City o f  N e w  Y o r k ,  B a b s o n  College, U . C . L . A .  G r a d u a t e  S c h o o l  o f  
M a n a g e m e n t ,  S tanford University G r a d u a t e  S c h o o l  o f  Business, a n d  the C o n s o r t i u m  o f  Christian Colleges. 
H e  is V i c e  C h a i r m a n  o f  the B o a r d  o f  Directors o f  the C h a m b e r  o f  C o m m e r c e  o f  the U n i t e d  States, a n d  also 
serves o n  the B o a r d  o f  Directors o f  the B u s i n e s s  C o u n c i l  for the U n i t e d  Nations, V a l u e  Line, Inc., a n d  
M c D o n n e l l  D o u g l a s  Corporation.
M r .  K a n a g a  received his B . S .  d e g r e e  in metallurgical e n g inee ring in 1 9 4 7  f r o m  the University o f  K a n s a s  
a n d  w a s  elected to T a u  B e t a  Pi a n d  S i g m a  T a u .  H e  did postgraduate w o r k  at B a b s o n  C o l l e g e  a n d  C o l u m b i a  
University a n d  in 1 9 6 8  c o m p l e t e d  the A d v a n c e d  M a n a g e m e n t  P r o g r a m  o f  the H a r v a r d  B u s i n e s s  School.
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H U G H  L .  M A R S H
H u g h  L. M a r s h  is Director-Internal A u d i t  for A l u m i n u m  C o m p a n y  o f  A m e r i c a  a n d  is responsible for its 
w o r l d w i d e  audit activities. H e  s e r ved as 1 9 8 4 - 8 5  C h a i r m a n  o f  the B o a r d  o f  the Institute o f  Internal Auditors.
Previously, M r .  M a r s h  held various financial positions w i t h  A l u m i n u m  C o m p a n y  o f  A m e r i c a  a n d  its 
subsidiaries, including a n  a s s i g n m e n t  in Australia. H e  h a s  served in several international positions w i t h  the 
Institute o f  Internal Auditors, including International T r e asur er a n d  C h a i r m a n  o f  the B u d g e t  a n d  F i n a n c e  
C o m m i t t e e .  In 1 9 8 3 - 8 4  h e  w a s  S e n i o r  V i c e  C h a i r m a n  o f  the B o a r d .
M r .  M a r s h  has b e e n  a frequent lecturer a n d  c o n f e r e n c e  c h a i r m a n  o n  a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  auditing subjects. A  
f o r m e r  Nati o n a l  Director for the N ational A s s ocia tion o f  A c c o u n t a n t s ,  h e  is also a m e m b e r  o f  the Financial 
E x e c u t i v e s  Institute, the Institute o f  Certified M a n a g e m e n t  A c c o u n t a n t s ,  the A m e r i c a n  A c c o u n t i n g  A s s o ­
ciation, a n d  the Stuart C a m e r o n  M c L e o d  Society. H e  h a s  ser v e d  o n  the A d v i s o r y  C o u n c i l  for the P a t o n  
A c c o u n t i n g  C e n t e r  at the University o f  M i c h i g a n  a n d  presently serves o n  the N ational A d v i s o r y  F o r u m  of  
B e t a  A l p h a  Psi, the national a c c o u n t i n g  fraternity, a n d  the E x e c u t i v e  C o m m i t t e e  o f  the Institute o f  Internal 
Auditors.
In 1 9 8 4 ,  the g o v e r n m e n t  o f  the People's R e p u b l i c  o f  C h i n a  invited M r .  M a r s h  to consult o n  the establishment 
of, a n d  training p r o g r a m s  for, their n e w  audit a g e n c y ,  w h i c h  is e x p e c t e d  to h a v e  6 0 , 0 0 0  m e m b e r  auditors 
within 5 years.
M r .  M a r s h ,  a Certified M a n a g e m e n t  A c c o u n t a n t  a n d  a Certified Internal Auditor, is a graduate o f  the 
University of  T e n n e s s e e ,  w i t h  a B . S .  d e g r e e  in industrial m a n a g e m e n t .  H e  h a s  also attended special courses 
in a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  finance at the University o f  A l a b a m a ,  Evansville University, a n d  G e e l o n g  T e c h n i c a l  
C o l l e g e  in Australia.
T H O M A S  I. S T O R R S
T h o m a s  I. Storrs retired in 1 9 8 3  as C h a i r m a n  a n d  C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e  Officer o f  N C N B  C o r p o r a t i o n  a n d  its 
subsidiary banks. H e  continues to serve as a  director o f  the corporation.
B o r n  in 1 9 1 8  in Nashville, T e n n e s s e e ,  h e  b e g a n  his b a n k i n g  career in 1 9 3 4  at the Federal R e s e r v e  B a n k  of 
R i c h m o n d ,  Virginia. H e  g r a d u a t e d  f r o m  the University o f  Virginia in 194 0, a n d  later received M . A .  a n d  
P h . D .  d e g r e e s  in e c o n o m i c s  f r o m  H a r v a r d  University.
In 1 9 6 0 ,  h e  joined N C N B  N ational B a n k  as E x e c u t i v e  V i c e  President. H e  w a s  n a m e d  President in 1 9 6 9  a n d  
C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e  Officer in J a n u a r y  1973. H e  w a s  n a m e d  C h a i r m a n  a n d  C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e  Officer o f  N C N B  
C o r p o r a t i o n  in J a n u a r y  1974.
M r .  Storrs s e r ved as President of  the Association o f  R e s e r v e  City B a n k e r s  in 1 9 8 0 - 8 1 .  H e  w a s  President of  
the Federal A d v i s o r y  C o u n c i l  of  the Federal R e s e r v e  S y s t e m  in 1 9 7 5  a n d  1976. H e  is a  Director o f  B l a c k  
a n d  D e c k e r  M a n u f a c t u r i n g  C o m p a n y  a n d  R o y a l  In s u r a n c e  G r o u p .  M r .  Storrs also serves as C h a i r m a n  o f  the 
B o a r d  o f  Trustees o f  the University o f  N o r t h  Caro l i n a  at Charlotte a n d  as a T r u stee o f  D a v i d s o n  College.
H e  ser v e d  o n  active d u t y  as a  N a v a l  Officer f r o m  1 9 4 1  t h r o u g h  1 9 4 5  a n d  f r o m  1 9 5 1  t h r o u g h  195 2, retiring 
as a C o m m a n d e r  U S N R .
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D O N A L D  H .  T R A U T L E I N
D o n a l d  H .  Trautlein retired in 1 9 8 6  as C h a i r m a n  a n d  C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e  Officer o f  B e t h l e h e m  Steel C o r p o ­
ration, a  position h e  a s s u m e d  in 1980.
Prior to joining B e t h l e h e m  in 1 9 7 7 ,  h e  w a s  w i t h  the international a c c o u n t i n g  firm o f  Price W a t e r h o u s e  in 
N e w  Y o r k ,  w h e r e  h e  w a s  n a m e d  a Partner in 196 4. W h i l e  w i t h  Price W a t e r h o u s e ,  his responsibilities 
inc lude d supervision o f  the a n n u a l  i n d e p e n d e n t  audit o f  several m a j o r  c o m p a n i e s ,  including B e t h l e h e m .  
After joining B e t h l e h e m ,  h e  ser v e d  successively as Com ptro ller , S e n i o r  V i c e  President, A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  
E x e c u t i v e  V i c e  President. H e  w a s  a Director f r o m  N o v e m b e r  1 9 7 7  until A u g u s t  31, 1986.
M r .  Trautlein is a m e m b e r  o f  the B o a r d  o f  Directors of  T h e  C h a s e  M a n h a t t a n  B a n k ,  N . A .  a n d  the C h a s e  
M a n h a t t a n  Corporation. H e  served as C h a i r m a n  o f  the A m e r i c a n  Iron a n d  Steel Institute f r o m  1 9 8 4  t h r o u g h  
1 9 8 6  a n d  w a s  a  m e m b e r  o f  the B o a r d  o f  Directors a n d  the E x e c u t i v e  C o m m i t t e e s  o f  b o t h  the A m e r i c a n  Iron 
a n d  Steel Institute a n d  the International Iron a n d  Steel Institute f r o m  1 9 8 0  t h r o u g h  1986. H e  is a m e m b e r  
o f  the B u s i n e s s  C o u n c i l  a n d  a f o r m e r  m e m b e r  o f  the Policy C o m m i t t e e  o f  T h e  B u s i n e s s  R o u n d t a b l e  a n d  the 
L a b o r - I n d u s t r y  Coalition for International Trade.
A  native o f  S a n d u s k y ,  O h i o ,  M r .  Trautlein ser v e d  in the U . S .  N a v y  in 1 9 4 5  a n d  1946. H e  g r a d u a t e d  in 1 9 5 0  
f r o m  M i a m i  University c u m  laude, w i t h  a B . S .  d e g r e e  a n d  w a s  elected to Phi B e t a  K a p p a ,  B e t a  G a m m a  
S i g m a ,  a n d  B e t a  A l p h a  Psi. H e  is a D e a n ' s  A s s o c i a t e  o f  M i a m i  University. In 1 9 8 1  h e  received a n  H o n o r a r y  
D o c t o r  o f  L a w  d e g r e e  f r o m  L e h i g h  University.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J A M E S  C .  T R E A D W A Y ,  J R . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
J a m e s  C .  T r e a d w a y ,  Jr., is E x e c u t i v e  V i c e  President, G e n e r a l  C o u n s e l ,  m e m b e r  o f  the E x e c u t i v e  G r o u p ,  
a n d  a  Director o f  P a i n e  W e b b e r  Incorporated. Until J u n e  1, 1 9 8 7 ,  h e  w a s  a Partner in the W a s h i n g t o n ,  D . C . , 
office o f  the l a w  firm o f  B a k e r  &  Botts. M r .  T r e a d w a y  ser v e d  as a C o m m i s s i o n e r  o f  the U n i t e d  States 
Securities a n d  E x c h a n g e  C o m m i s s i o n  f r o m  1 9 8 2  t h r o u g h  1985.
M r .  T r e a d w a y  is a  frequent writer a n d  s p e a k e r  o n  matters involving corporate, securities, a n d  b a n k i n g  laws, 
w i t h  special e m p h a s i s  o n  a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  financial disclosure issues. H e  currently is a  m e m b e r  o f  the 
P l a n n i n g  C o m m i t t e e  of  the N o r t h w e s t e r n  Uni versity R a y  Garrett, Jr., C o r p o r a t e  a n d  Securities L a w  Insti­
tute, a n d  the A d v i s o r y  B o a r d  o f  the University o f  S o u t h e r n  California S E C  a n d  Financial R e p o r t i n g  Institute. 
H e  is a m e m b e r  o f  the District o f  C o l u m b i a ,  M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,  G e o r g i a ,  N e w  Y o r k ,  A m e r i c a n ,  a n d  Federal 
b a r  associations.
M r .  T r e a d w a y  received his u n d e r g r a d u a t e  e d u c a t i o n  at Rollins C o l l e g e  a n d  the University o f  Geor g i a .  H e  
received his legal edu c a t i o n  at W a s h i n g t o n  &  L e e  University, w h e r e  h e  w a s  conferred a L L . B .  degree, 
s u m m a  c u m  laude, in 1967. H e  served as Editor-in-Chief, W a s h i n g t o n  &  L e e  University L a w  R e v i e w ,  a n d  
is a m e m b e r  o f  Phi B e t a  K a p p a ,  O r d e r  o f  the Coif, O m i c r o n  D e l t a  K a p p a ,  a n d  O m i c r o n  D e l t a  Epsilon.
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G .  D E W E Y  A R N O L D — E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r
G .  D e w e y  A r n o l d  w a s  a partner in the a c c o u n t i n g  firm o f  Price W a t e r h o u s e  until his retirement in J u n e  1985. 
H e  b e c a m e  partner-in-charge o f  Price W a t e r h o u s e ' s  W a s h i n g t o n  office in 196 6, w a s  elected to their Policy 
C o m m i t t e e  in 197 5, a n d  w a s  a p p o i n t e d  R e g i o n a l  M a n a g i n g  Partner in 1976. A t  the t i m e  o f  his retirement, 
h e  w a s  a  m e m b e r  o f  the firm's M a n a g e m e n t  C o m m i t t e e  a n d  O p e r a t i n g  C o m m i t t e e .
M r .  A r n o l d  is a m e m b e r  o f  the A m e r i c a n  Arbitration Association, w a s  a m e m b e r  o f  the A u d i t  A d v i s o r y  
C o m m i t t e e  to the Secretary o f  the N a v y  a n d  ser v e d  as V i c e  C h a i r m a n  o f  the Bicentennial C o m m i s s i o n .  H e  
is a  m e m b e r  o f  the A m e r i c a n  Institute o f  Certified Public A c c o u n t a n t s ,  the Florida Institute o f  Certified 
Public A c c o u n t a n t s  a n d  B e t a  A l p h a  Psi. H e  w a s  f o r m e r l y  a n  a c c o u n t i n g  instructor at the R o b e r t  M o r r i s  
S c h o o l  o f  A c c o u n t i n g  in Pittsburgh a n d  a lecturer a n d  c o u r s e  director at the Institute M e x i c a n o  d e  A d m i n ­
istration d e  N e g o c i a s ,  A . C .
J A C K  L .  K R O G S T A D — R e s e a r c h  D i r e c t o r
Dr. J a c k  L. K r o g s t a d  is the J o h n  P. B e g l e y  Professor o f  A c c o u n t i n g  at C r e i g h t o n  University in O m a h a ,  
N e b r a s k a .  Prior to joining the faculty at Cre ight on, h e  taught at the University o f  T e x a s  at Austin, K a n s a s  
State University, a n d  the University of  M i c h i g a n  at A n n  A r b o r .  Dr. K r o g s t a d  is the author of  n u m e r o u s  
scholarly articles, including w o r k s  pub l i s h e d  in journals o f  four o f  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  five s p o n s o r i n g  
organizations. H e  is active in m a n y  professional a n d  a c a d e m i c  organizations, m o s t  recently serving as Editor 
o f  Auditing: A  J o u r n a l  o f  Practice &  T h e o r y ,  a  publication o f  the A u d i t i n g  Section o f  the A m e r i c a n  
A c c o u n t i n g  Association. H e  also h a s  b e e n  C h a i r m a n  o f  the A u d i t i n g  Section a n d  a R e g i o n a l  V i c e  President 
o f  the A m e r i c a n  A c c o u n t i n g  Association.
Dr. K r o g s t a d  received his P h . D .  f r o m  the University o f  N e b r a s k a  at Lincoln. H e  also h o l d s  a B . S .  degree, 
s u m m a  c u m  laude, f r o m  U n i o n  College, a n d  a n  M . B . A .  f r o m  the University of  N e b r a s k a .
C A T H E R I N E  C O L L I N S  M c C O Y — D e p u t y  E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r  a n d
G e n e r a l  C o u n s e l
Cat h e r i n e  Collins M c C o y  s e r ved o n  the staff o f  the Securities a n d  E x c h a n g e  C o m m i s s i o n  f r o m  1 9 7 5  until 
1 9 8 6 ,  m o s t  recently as A ss ocia te Director— L e g a l  o f  the Division o f  C o r p o r a t i o n  Finance. A s  the Division's 
chief legal officer, s h e  h a d  responsibility for the Office o f  C h i e f  C o u n s e l ,  as well as for r u l e m a k i n g  t h r o u g h  
the Office o f  D is clos ure Policy a n d  liaison w i t h  respect to the D ivision o f  E n f o r c e m e n t ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
for C o m m i s s i o n  e n f o r c e m e n t  action. H e r  extensive r u l e m a k i n g  e x p e r i e n c e  w h i l e  at the S E C  inc lude d all 
p h a s e s  o f  the Integrated Disclosure S y s t e m  a n d  R u l e  4 1 5 ,  the " s h e l f "  registration rule.
M r s .  M c C o y  h a s  b e e n  a frequent s p e a k e r  a n d  panelist for con tinuing legal e d u c a t i o n  a n d  industry p r o g r a m s .  
S h e  received h e r  J.D. d e g r e e  f r o m  the A m e r i c a n  University W a s h i n g t o n  C o l l e g e  o f  L a w  in A u g u s t  1 9 7 7  a n d  
h e r  B . A .  d e g r e e  f r o m  Man h a t t a n v i l l e  C o l l e g e  in P u r chas e, N e w  Y o r k  in 1969.
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A p p e n d i x  B
S U M M A R Y  O F  E X T E R N A L  R E S E A R C H
P R O G R A M
T h i s  a p p e n d i x  presents descriptions o f  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  external research studies a n d  brief s u m m a r i e s  of  
the results. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  u s e d  these studies in d e v e l o p i n g  its conclusions a n d  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  T h e  
v i e ws, conclusions, a n d  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  e x p r e s s e d  in the various research studies, h o w e v e r ,  are those of  
the researchers. T h e  projects are as follows:
R e s e a r c h  Study P a g e
C o m p u t e r  F r a u d  9 6
F r a u d u l e n t  a n d  Q u e s t i o n a b l e  Financial Reporting: A  C o r p o r a t e  Perspective 9 7
C o n t r o l  a n d  Internal A u d i t i n g  9 9
T h e  R o l e  of  the Internal A u d i t o r  in the Deterrence, Detection, a n d
R e p o r t i n g  o f  F r a u d u l e n t  Financial R e p o r t i n g  1 0 0
I m p a c t  o f  Professionalism a n d  C o d e s  o f  C o r p o r a t e  C o n d u c t  o n
Financial R e p o r t i n g  101
E x p a n s i o n  o f  N o n a u d i t  Services a n d  A u d i t o r  I n d e p e n d e n c e  1 0 2
Surprise Writeoffs— Financial Reporting, Disclosure a n d  A n a l y s i s  1 0 3
T h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  Public A c c o u n t a n t ' s  Responsibility for the D e t ecti on of
F r a u d u l e n t  Financial R e p o r t i n g  1 0 5
R e d u c i n g  the I n c iden ce o f  Fr a u d u l e n t  Financial Reporting: T h e  R o l e  o f  the S E C  1 0 6
F r a u d u l e n t  Financial Reporting: T h e  Potential for E d u c a t i o n a l  I m p a c t  1 0 8
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R E S E A R C H  S T U D Y :  C o m p u t e r  F r a u d
P R I M A R Y  R E S E A R C H E R :  S t e p h e n  M .  P a r o b y ,  P a r t n e r
E r n s t  &  W h i n n e y
S T U D Y  S P O N S O R :  E r n s t  &  W h i n n e y
A B S T R A C T
T h i s  stu dy d o c u m e n t s  the g r o w i n g  e x p o s u r e  to fraud that c o m p u t e r  s y s t e m s  are creating a n d  explores the 
implications o f  these s y s t e m s  for the prevention a n d  detection of  fraudulent financial reporting. It points out 
that it is difficult to segregate frauds a i m e d  at m a n i p u l a t i o n  o f  financial statement i nformation f r o m  those 
w i t h  other p r i m a r y  objectives, s u c h  as the m i sappropriation o f  assets, since, in m a n y  cases, the latter also 
will materially misstate the financial statements. Nevertheless, the study recognizes a n  increasing potential 
to u s e  the c o m p u t e r  to a u t o m a t e  perpetration o f  fraudulent financial reporting.
T h e  study c o n c l u d e s  that c o m p u t e r  fraud is likely to cont i n u e  to increase in f r e q u e n c y  a n d  sophistication in 
the future unless (1) corporate m a n a g e m e n t s ,  w i t h  oversight f r o m  b o a r d s  o f  directors a n d  audit c o m m i t t e e s ,  
establish a n d  m a i n t a i n  a d e q u a t e  s y s t e m s  o f  internal control o v e r  their c o m p u t e r i z e d  data processing e n v i ­
r o n m e n t  a n d  (2) internal auditors a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants regularly r ev iew, mon itor , a n d  report 
o n  these systems. O t h e r  observations a n d  c onclusions include the following:
• S i n c e  audit trails in m a n y  sophisticated e n v i r o n m e n t s  exist for o n l y  a short period o f  time, if at all, the 
audit process (both internal a n d  external) m u s t  m o v e  closer to the a c c o u n t i n g  transaction at its entry point 
into the system.
• Internal auditors n e e d  to b e  i n v o l v e d  in the s y s t e m s  d e v e l o p m e n t  process to e n s u r e  that controls are 
c o n s i d e r e d  a n d  to integrate fraud p re vent ion a n d  detection m e a s u r e s  into the s y s t e m  itself.
• S i n c e  sophisticated s y s t e m s  create a n e e d  for increased reliance o n  internal controls, internal auditors or 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public acc ountants n e e d  periodically to p e r f o r m  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  r e v i e w s  o f  internal controls 
that e x t e n d  b e y o n d  those n o r m a l l y  p e r f o r m e d  d u r i n g  the c o u rse o f  a n  audit, including r e v i e w s  of  controls 
o v e r  c o m p u t e r i z e d  systems.
• Professional auditing standards s h o u l d  clarify the m i n i m u m  p r o c e d u r e s  i n d e p e n d e n t  public acc ountants 
s h o u l d  p e r f o r m  to evaluate the c o m p u t e r i z e d  portions o f  the a c c o u n t i n g  s y s t e m  in c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  the 
e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  a n  organization's financial statements.
• I n d e p e n d e n t  public a ccountants c a n  n o  l o n ger take a functional a p p r o a c h  to audits (e.g., a c c ount s 
receivable, inventory, a c c o u n t s  payable) b e c a u s e  o f  the i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  o f  data a m o n g  various f u n c ­
tional areas created b y  c o m p u t e r  systems. T h e y  s h o u l d  u n d e r s t a n d  the overall business e n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  
h o w  the various a c c o u n t i n g  s y s t e m s  relate to o n e  another.
• In the not-so-distant future, organizations possibly will report their financial results b y  establishing a data 
b a s e  o f  i n f orma tion that c a n  b e  a c c e s s e d  b y  interested parties.
• M a n a g e m e n t ,  internal auditors, a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants all face a n  urgent n e e d  to b e c o m e  
m o r e  c o m p u t e r  literate, to b e  better able to m a k e  a n d  evaluate decisions a b o u t  the desired level of 
security, a n d  to take m e a s u r e s  to prevent, detect, a n d  limit the potential for c o m p u t e r  fraud.
• C o m p a n i e s  n e e d  to a d o p t  f o r m a l  c o d e s  o f  c o n d u c t  that include policies related to c o m p u t e r  resources.
• Internal auditors a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants n e e d  to m a k e  greater u s e  o f  c o m p u t e r  t e c h n o l o g y  
in p e r f o r m i n g  audits.
• C o l l e g e s  a n d  universities, as well as professional organizations s u c h  as the A m e r i c a n  Institute of 
Certified Public A c c o u n t a n t s ,  the Institute o f  Internal Auditors, the National Asso c i a t i o n  o f  A c c o u n t a n t s ,  
the Financial E x e c u t i v e s  Institute, a n d  the E D P  A u d i t o r s  Association, n e e d  to d o  all they c a n  to increase 
the c o m p u t e r  literacy o f  professionals. F o r  e x a m p l e ,  a heavier e m p h a s i s  n e e d s  to b e  g i v e n  to E D P  issues 
o n  professional certification examinations.
9 6
R E S E A R C H  S T U D Y :  F r a u d u l e n t  a n d  Q u e s t i o n a b l e  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g :
A  C o r p o r a t e  Pe rs pe ct iv e
P R I M A R Y  R E S E A R C H E R :  D r .  K e n n e t h  A .  M e r c h a n t ,  A s s o c i a t e  P r o f e s s o r
H a r v a r d  U niversity
S T U D Y  S P O N S O R :  Fi na nc ia l E x e c u t i v e s  R e s e a r c h  F o u n d a t i o n
A B S T R A C T
T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  this study w a s  to gain a n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  (1) fraudulent a n d  questionable financial reporting 
practices that m a y  o c c u r  in public corporations, (2) organizational a n d  individual factors that m a y  contribute 
to the o c c u r r e n c e  o f  these practices, a n d  (3) alternative solutions to help pr e v e n t  or detect s u c h  practices. 
T h e  findings o f  the study are b a s e d  o n  a r e v i e w  o f  relevant literature; a n  analysis o f  recent cases o f  fraudulent 
financial reporting; interviews w i t h  o v e r  1 0 0  general m a n a g e r s ,  controllers, a n d  internal auditors; a n d  
discussions o f  t w o  fictional, but realistic, cases b y  panels c o m p r i s e d  o f  preparers o f  financial statements, 
audit c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s ,  internal auditors, i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants, a n d  financial sta tement users.
T h e  stu dy identifies a  b r o a d  r a n g e  of  deceptive financial reporting practices. W h i l e  s o m e  of  these practices 
clearly are fraudulent, m a n y ,  a l t h o u g h  deceptive, are c o n s i d e r e d  acceptable b y  s o m e  pro portion o f  interested 
parties. T h i s  acceptability-judgment p r o b l e m  creates difficulty in dealing w i t h  deceptive financial reporting. 
Nevertheless, the study cautions that a l l o w i n g  e v e n  slightly dec eptive reporting practices creates a n  e n v i ­
r o n m e n t  that is c o n d u c i v e  to m o r e  serious deceptions. T h e  study c o n c l u d e s  that in the vast majority of  
fraudulent financial reporting cases, the p e o p l e  i n v o l v e d  w e r e  g o o d  p e o p l e  w h o  got i n v o l v e d  in small, 
n o n m a t e r i a l  manipulations, p e r h a p s  e v e n  w i t h  g o o d  intentions. T h e n ,  o v e r  time, the m a g n i t u d e  o f  the 
m a n i p u l a t i o n s  g r e w ,  a n d  eventually l a w s  w e r e  b ro ken.
S o m e  o f  the organizational factors that m a y  contribute to the incidence o f  deceptive financial reporting 
practices include:
• L a c k  o f  leadership a n d  m o r a l  g u i d a n c e
• C o m p l e x i t y  in rules, regulations, a n d  policies
• Unrealistic b u d g e t  targets, particularly w h e n  these e m p h a s i z e  short-term results
• H i g h  incentives for financial p e r f o r m a n c e
• I n a d e q u a t e  internal controls, especially in the p r e s e n c e  o f  organizational c h a n g e
• H i g h  divisional a u t o n o m y
• I n a d e q u a t e  internal audit function
• Ineffective b o a r d  o f  directors a n d  audit c o m m i t t e e .
T h e s e  organizational factors interact w i t h  individual factors in p r o d u c i n g  deceptive financial reporting 
practices. P e o p l e  within the organization are sensitive to its ethical culture, its incentives a n d  p u n i s h m e n t s ,  
a n d  its social affirmation. O v e r  time, a n  individual's j u d g m e n t  o f  right a n d  w r o n g  c a n  b e  greatly affected 
b y  the a t m o s p h e r e  in the w o r k  place. F o r  e x a m p l e ,  individuals are frequently m o t i v a t e d  to participate in 
deceptive financial reporting practices b e c a u s e  they believe or rationalize that they are acting in the 
organization's best interests or they h a v e  d e v e l o p e d  a corporate " t e a m  spirit" o f  deception.
S o m e t i m e s  individuals m a y  get d r a w n  into deceptive financial reporting practices t h r o u g h  ignorance. 
A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  reporting rules a n d  S E C  r e q u i r e m e n t s  are technical, extensive, a n d  subject to c on tinu ing 
c h a n g e .  Individuals in the m a r k e t i n g  or sales areas o f  the organization, for e x a m p l e ,  s i m p l y  m a y  not k n o w  
w h e n  they h a v e  b e e n  a s k e d  to violate generally a c c e p t e d  a c c o u n t i n g  principles in recording u ndelivered 
g o o d s  as a  sale.
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C o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  organizational a n d  individual factors together points to the i m p o r t a n c e  o f  establishing a n  
ethical con science, a n  effective audit c o m m i t t e e ,  strong internal controls, clear financial reporting r e s p o n ­
sibilities a n d  practices, a n  effective internal audit function, m e a n i n g f u l  organizational sanctions, a n d  a p ­
propriate b u d g e t  targets a n d  c o m p e n s a t i o n  s c h e m e s .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  o p e n  lines o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  b e t w e e n  the 
audit c o m m i t t e e  a n d  b o t h  the controller a n d  the internal auditor are critical.
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R E S E A R C H  S T U D Y :  C o n t r o l  a n d  Internal A u d i t i n g
P R I M A R Y  R E S E A R C H E R S :  D r .  M i c h a e l  J. Barrett, P r o f e s s o r
U n i v e r s i t y  of Illinois at C h i c a g o  
R o g e r  N .  C a r o l u s ,  S e n i o r  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t —  
D e p u t y  G e n e r a l  A u d i t o r ,  N C N B  C o r p o r a t i o n
S T U D Y  S P O N S O R :  Institute o f  Internal A u d i t o r s
A B S T R A C T
T h i s  s tu dy builds o n  prior p r o n o u n c e m e n t s  o f  the Institute o f  Internal A u d i t o r s  (IIA) in describing the 
c o n c e p t  o f  control a n d  h o w  the internal audit function c a n  help a public c o m p a n y  to a c h i e v e  a positive control 
result t h r o u g h  a s s e s s m e n t s  o f  the control culture. T h e  study describes the control culture as fl o w i n g  f r o m  
the fol l o w i n g  four interrelated c o m p o n e n t s :
• T h e  attitudes a n d  b e h a v i o r  o f  the b o a r d  o f  directors a n d  exe cutive m a n a g e m e n t  set the tone o f  the 
organization a n d  signal to all parties the w a y  that business affairs will b e  c o n d u c t e d .
• T h e  business plan, f o r m u l a t e d  b y  the b o a r d  o f  directors a n d  executive m a n a g e m e n t ,  states w h a t  the 
c o m p a n y  desires to be, identifies a n d  ran ks the business e x p o s u r e s  e x p e c t e d  to b e  e n c o unt ered , a n d  
specifies the n e t w o r k  o f  business f u n d a m e n t a l s  n e e d e d  to address the business e x p o s u r e s  identified.
• T h e  n e t w o r k  o f  business f u n d a m e n t a l s  establishes the e l e m e n t s  a n d  linkages n e e d e d  to i n f o r m  individuals 
a b o u t  h o w  to p e r f o r m  their w o r k .  T h i s  n e t w o r k  includes policy statements, operating procedures, 
p e r f o r m a n c e  standards, budgets, a n d  p e r f o r m a n c e  m o n i t o r i n g  systems.
• Controlling activates the n e t w o r k  o f  business f u n d a m e n t a l s  t h r o u g h  board, m a n a g e m e n t ,  e m p l o y e e ,  
c u s t o m e r ,  supplier, a n d  regulator activities s u c h  as supervising, c o m p a r i n g ,  reconciling, monitoring, 
con firming, a n d  reporting.
T h i s  characterization o f  control led to the f o l l o w i n g  selected observations or conclusions:
• A  relevant c o n c e p t  o f  control incorporates the activities a n d  actions o f  the b o a r d  o f  directors a n d  
exe cutive m a n a g e m e n t .
• T h e  single m o s t  i mp orta nt control c o m p o n e n t  is the attitude a n d  b e h a v i o r  o f  the chief executive officer, 
f o l l o w e d  closely b y  that o f  the audit c o m m i t t e e .
• A l t h o u g h  a c h ievi ng a positive control result b e g i n s  w i t h  the chief exe cutive officer a n d  the b o a r d  of 
directors, responsibility for its a c c o m p l i s h m e n t  rests w i t h  e v e r y  e m p l o y e e  as well as w i t h  entities closely 
related to the c o m p a n y  s u c h  as suppliers, c u s t o m e r s ,  a n d  regulators.
• M e a n i n g f u l  evaluation o f  control s h o u l d  e x t e n d  to e v e r y  level affected in the organization a n d  to closely 
related external entities. A  positive control result c a n  b e  a c h i e v e d  at o n e  or m o r e  levels in a c o m p a n y  
(e.g., headquarters, divisions, subsidiaries, dep a r t m e n t s )  w h i l e  a negative result is a c h i e v e d  at other 
levels.
• T o  e x p a n d  a s s e s s m e n t  a n d  reporting responsibilities in regard to the a d e q u a c y  o f  the des i g n  a n d  
effectiveness o f  control, internal auditors need:
—  T h e  support a n d  e n c o u r a g e m e n t  o f  the b o a r d  o f  directors a n d  exe cutive m a n a g e m e n t  to a d o p t  a n d  
a d h e r e  to professional (IIA) internal auditing standards a n d  practices
—  Org anizational status a n d  objectivity
—  E n h a n c e d  internal auditing career incentives
—  T h e  support o f  the public a c c o u n t i n g  profession.
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T h i s  research study prov i d e s  a  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  analysis of  h o w  the internal auditor c a n  play a n  effective role 
in the deterrence, detection, a n d  reporting o f  fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  analysis d r a w s  o n  profes­
sional internal auditing standards, a n u m b e r  o f  other related research studies, current pro posals o f  public 
a c c o u n t i n g  firms, p r o p o s e d  federal legislation, a n  i nformal s u r v e y  o f  2 0  leaders in the internal auditing 
profession, a n d  interviews w i t h  m e m b e r s  o f  the S E C  E n f o r c e m e n t  D i v i s i o n  a n d  the A u d i t i n g  Sta n d a r d s  
B o a r d .  T h e  f ol lowi ng selected observations a n d  c o n clus ions result f r o m  the study:
• T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e  h a s  the potential for playing the m o s t  critical role in assuring that m e c h a n i s m s  are 
in place to deter, detect, a n d  report fraudulent financial reporting.
• Internal audit c o v e r a g e  focuses primarily o n  the evaluation o f  controls at the division, subsidiary, or  other 
operating unit level a n d  allocates m u c h  less effort to auditing the financial reporting process a n d  its 
controls at the corporate or s e n i o r m o s t  level o f  consolidation.
• T h e r e  is a trend t o w a r d  increased reliance b y  i n d e p e n d e n t  public a ccountants o n  the w o r k  o f  the internal 
auditor, particularly in the areas o f  control evaluation a n d  c o m p u t e r  systems.
• T h e r e  is a n e e d  for i m p r o v e d  auditing coordination b e t w e e n  internal auditors a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
accountants.
• Internal auditors administratively report m o s t  frequently to the chief financial officer w h o  also m a y  h a v e  
responsibility for financial sta tement preparation.
• In m o s t  cases, internal auditors h a v e  a well-defined, f o r m a l  reporting responsibility to the audit c o m ­
mittee o r  the b o a r d  o f  directors.
• Internal auditing is v i e w e d  b y  m a n y  as a transient profession rather than a l o n g - t e r m  career.
• Organizational status a n d  i n d e p e n d e n c e  are essential in insulating internal auditors f r o m  c o m p r o m i s i n g  
organizational influence a n d  pressure.
• W h e n  the c o d e  o f  corporate c o n d u c t  receives top m a n a g e m e n t ' s  support, it is instrumental in establishing 
a  positive ethical e n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  is a n  i m p o r t a n t  control.
Internal auditors are a n x i o u s  to play a n  effective role in the deterrence, detection, a n d  reporting o f  fraudulent 
financial reporting. T o  d o  this, they n e e d  the support o f  the audit c o m m i t t e e  a n d  top m a n a g e m e n t .  T h e y  
believe that their w o r k  s h o u l d  b e  carefully c o o rdin ated w i t h  the w o r k  o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accou n t a n t  
a n d  that they s h o u l d  b e  m o r e  i n v o l v e d  w i t h  the financial reporting p ro cess a n d  its controls at the corporate 
level o f  consolidation. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  there m u s t  b e  appropriate incentives to attract a n d  retain c o m p e t e n t  
career internal auditors, a n d  organizational status a n d  i n d e p e n d e n c e  m u s t  insulate t h e m  f r o m  c o m p r o m i s i n g  
organizational pressures.
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T h i s  study describes a n d  analyzes t w o  p r e d o m i n a n t  ethical forces that c o m e  to b e a r  o n  the financial reporting 
process— the corporate ethical climate a n d  professional c o d e s  o f  ethics. W i t h  respect to the corporate ethical 
climate, i n-house d o c u m e n t a t i o n  o f  ethically related policies a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  w a s  r eq uest ed f r o m  1 0 3  chief 
executives o f  4 8  industrial a n d  5 5  nonindustrial c o m p a n i e s  selected r a n d o m l y  f r o m  F o r t u n e  5 0 0  listings. 
Fifty-one usable res p o n s e s  w e r e  received (19 industrial a n d  3 2  nonindustrial) f r o m  c o m p a n i e s  h e a d q u a r t e r e d  
in 2 0  states a n d  the District o f  C o l u m b i a .  T h e  3 2  nonindustrial participants i n c lude d b a n k s  (9), utilities (6), 
retail m e r c h a n d i s i n g  (6), transportation (5), insurance (3), a n d  other services (3).
R e s p o n s e s  to the request for d o c u m e n t a t i o n  o f  ethically related policies a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  indicated w i d e s p r e a d  
a w a r e n e s s  o f  the effective role that ethical g u i d a n c e  c a n  play in corporate administration. A l t h o u g h  the v i e w s  
a n d  policies o f  the participants differed considerably, the ethical climate did not s e e m  to b e  correlated w it h 
respective m a n a g e m e n t  styles. Rather, the basic a i m  o f  ethical g u i d a n c e  generally w a s  to a c h i e v e  a corporate 
ethical climate consistent w i t h  the pro fessed corporate self-image. A r e a s  specifically c o v e r e d  usually w e r e  
those requiring extra diligence, those offering opportunities for undesirable behavior, those involving ethical 
d i l e m m a s ,  or areas w h e r e  a n y  b e l o w - s t a n d a r d  actions or attitudes m i g h t  b e  especially harmful.
T h e  study also e x a m i n e s  professional c o d e s  o f  ethics o f  the A m e r i c a n  Institute o f  Certified Public A c c o u n ­
tants ( A I C P A ) ,  the Financial E x e c u t i v e s  Institute, the Institute o f  Internal Auditors, a n d  the National 
A s s ocia tion o f  A c c o u n t a n t s .  B o t h  standards o f  c o m p e t e n c e  a n d  integrity are incorporated into these c o d e s  
as exp ressions o f  professionalism. H o w e v e r ,  d u e  in part to the a b s e n c e  o f  strong e n f o r c e m e n t  clauses in these 
codes, organizational a n d  situational forces t en d to b e  d o m i n a n t  w h e n  on-the-job ethical d i l e m m a s  arise. 
T h i s  finding points o n c e  again to the critical role that a positive corporate ethical climate plays in e n h a n c i n g  
the reliability o f  the financial reporting process.
T h e  stu dy also cautions that w h i l e  i m p r o v e d  a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  auditing standards m a y  he l p  i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
acc ount ants p re vent a n d  detect fraudulent financial reporting, these are not substitutes for a willingness to 
place professional ethics a b o v e  the pressures of  the a c c o u n t i n g  marketplace. T h e  A I C P A ' s  c o d e  o f  ethics 
presently e n d o r s e s  several levels o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e  to a c c o m m o d a t e  a  variety o f  services p e r f o r m e d  b y  its 
m e m b e r s .  T h e  study suggests that the A I C P A  c onsider linking the ethical c o n c e p t  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e  m o r e  
directly to the auditor's public trust. T h i s  linkage m a y  result in a different interpretation o f  w h a t  constitutes 
undesirable conflicts o f  interest in the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's u n i q u e  role.
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T h i s  study analyzes the c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  the actual a n d  potential i m p a c t  of  m a n a g e m e n t  a dvisory services o n  
the quality o f  audits in general a n d  o n  the effectiveness o f  the audit process in deterring a n d  detecting 
fraudulent financial reporting in particular. T h e  c o n c e p t  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e  is the pivotal link b e t w e e n  
m a n a g e m e n t  advisory services a n d  the auditor's ability to deter a n d  detect fraudulent financial reporting. 
I n d e p e n d e n c e  h a s  l o n g  b e e n  the cor nerstone o f  the audit process, a n d  a n y  erosion o f  it m a y  create potential 
d a n g e r s  to audit quality a n d  r e d u c e  the likelihood that the auditor will detect fraudulent financial reporting.
O n e  objective o f  the study w a s  to an a l y z e  a n d  c o n d e n s e  available i nformation w i t h  relevance to this issue. 
S i n c e  m u c h  h a s  b e e n  written o n  this topic, substantial effort w a s  d e v o t e d  to a  r e v i e w  o f  publicly available 
i n f orma tion s u c h  as the 1 9 7 9  R e p o r t  o f  the Public O v e r s i g h t  B o a r d  a n d  sup porting files, the 1 9 7 8  R e p o r t  
o f  the C o m m i s s i o n  o n  Auditors' Responsibilities ( C o h e n  C o m m i s s i o n ) ,  transcripts a n d  v i d e o  tapes of 
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  hearings, S E C  d o c u m e n t s ,  p u b l i s h e d  articles, a n d  the b o o k  recently written b y  Dr. G a r y  J o h n  
Previts entitled T h e  S c o p e  o f  C P A  Services ( J o h n  W i l e y  &  S o n s ,  Inc., 1985).
A  s e c o n d  objective w a s  to u p d a t e  the 1 9 7 9  R e p o r t  o f  the Public O v e r s i g h t  B o a r d  ( P O B )  as called for b y  
A r t h u r  M .  W o o d ,  th e n  C h a i r m a n  o f  the P O B .  T h i s  portion o f  the study h a d  t w o  separate phases. O n e  p h a s e  
i n v o l v e d  a  r e v i e w  of  firm literature that lists a n d  describes the m a n a g e m e n t  adv isor y services offered b y  a 
s a m p l e  o f  large public a c c o u n t i n g  firms. A  s e c o n d  p h a s e  consisted o f  obtaining questionnaire r e s pons es a n d  
interviews f r o m  a s a m p l e  c o m p r i s e d  o f  m a n a g e m e n t ,  financial executives, financial analysts, m a n a g e m e n t  
consultants, regulators, a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants.
T h e  study c o n c l u d e s  that the nature a n d  the s c o p e  of  the services that m a n y  public a c c o u n t i n g  firms p r o v i d e  
h a v e  e x p a n d e d  at a n  u n p r e c e d e n t e d  rate o v e r  the past 1 0  years. H o w e v e r ,  as w i t h  the findings o f  the C o h e n  
C o m m i s s i o n  in 1 9 7 8  a n d  the P O B  in 1 9 7 9 ,  this study f o u n d  n o  established e v i d e n c e  that i n d e p e n d e n c e  h a d  
b e e n  i m p a i r e d  or fraudulent financial reporting abetted w h e r e  a n  audit firm also p e r f o r m e d  m a n a g e m e n t  
a d v isor y services. Nevertheless, the stu dy cautions that the historical precepts o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e  are giving 
w a y  to m o d e r n  v a n g u a r d s  o f  professionalism, n a m e l y  con curr ent " s a v v y "  a n d  " c o m m i t m e n t "  to quality 
service a n d  the public interest.
T h e  study classifies m a n a g e m e n t  advisory services into three groups: (1) services that h a v e  a direct i m p a c t  
o n  the financial statements, (2) services that h a v e  o n l y  a n  indirect i m p a c t  o n  the financial statements, a n d  
(3) services that are not related to the financial statements. T h e  study arg u e s  that services in the first g r o u p  
(e.g., actuarial determinations or appraisals u p o n  w h i c h  the allocation o f  acquisition cost is b as e d )  create 
a n  inherent conflict w i t h  i n d e p e n d e n c e  b e c a u s e  they result in the public a c c o u n t i n g  firm auditing its o w n  
w o r k .
T h e  s e c o n d  g r o u p  of  services (e.g., i nformation s y s t e m s  design) generally d o e s  not i m p a i r  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  
m a y  actually contribute to the pre vent ion a n d  detection o f  fraudulent financial reporting. M o r e o v e r ,  these 
services a n d  the audit m a y  n e e d  to b e  c o o rdin ated to take full a d v a n t a g e  o f  the separate efforts. Services in 
the third g r o u p  are not related to fraudulent financial reporting e x c e p t  to the extent that they m a y  place the 
audit in a subordinate role (e.g., as a loss-leader) or involve i n d e p e n d e n t  public a ccountants m a k i n g  
decisions for their clients.
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T h e  objective o f  this study w a s  to p r o v i d e  a c c o u n t i n g  regulatory b o d i e s  a n d  other interested parties w i t h  a 
descriptive a n d  limited analytical report o n  the nature a n d  characteristics o f  writeoffs that h a v e  o c c u r r e d  in 
business dur i n g  the years 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 5 .  T h e  data u s e d  in the study w e r e  d e v e l o p e d  f r o m  press reports of  
a n n o u n c e m e n t s  b y  publicly traded c o m p a n i e s ,  as c o m p i l e d  b y  the D o w  J o n e s  N e w s  Service. All a n n o u n c e ­
m e n t s  relating to writeoffs, w r i t e d o w n s ,  restructurings, a n d  plant closings o v e r  the per i o d  f r o m  J a n u a r y  1, 
1 9 8 0  to M a r c h  31, 1 9 8 6  w e r e  analyzed. After omitting irrelevant data, the study e x a m i n e s  the final data­
base, consisting of  1 , 0 8 8  c o m p a n i e s  that reported a total of  1 , 3 5 4  writeoffs, a n d  categorizes it into four 
different classifications:
• A s s e t  i m p a i r m e n t s  including w r i t e d o w n s  a n d  writeoffs
• Plant closings a n d  restructurings
• W r i t e d o w n s  a n d  writeoffs o f  i n v estm ents
• W r i t e d o w n s  a n d  writeoffs o f  goodwill.
T h e  stu dy r e v i e w s  the current status o f  reporting a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  standards for writeoffs a n d  w r i t e d o w n s  a n d  
th e n  ana lyze s the data b y  classifying it a l o n g  several d i m e n s i o n s :  frequency, type, industry, timing, a n d  
dollar value. Finally, s o m e  pre liminary analysis w a s  p e r f o r m e d  to assess the financial i m p a c t  o f  the writeoffs 
o n  a s a m p l e  o f  the c o m p a n i e s  in the database. S o m e  o f  the p r i m a r y  observations a n d  con clus ions include 
the following:
• T h e  a c c o u n t i n g  standards address " p e r m a n e n t "  w r i t e d o w n s  or writeoffs to a m u c h  greater extent than 
"partial" w r i t e d o w n s .
• T h e  f r e q u e n c y  o f  reported writeoffs increased rapidly o v e r  the 6-year p e r iod (1980-85). Als o, 10 
c o m p a n i e s  reported writeoffs in 4  o f  the 6  years w h i l e  4 1  c o m p a n i e s  reported writeoffs 3 tim es dur i n g  
the s a m e  6-year period, indicating that writeoffs m a y  not necessarily b e  no n r e c u r r i n g  in nature.
• T h e  oil a n d  g a s  industry reported the largest n u m b e r  o f  writeoffs, a c c o u n t i n g  for m o r e  than 1 6  percent 
of  the total for the 6-year period.
• F o r t y - s e v e n  percent o f  the writeoffs related to asset i m p a i r m e n t s .
• O v e r  the 6-year period, 5 2  percent o f  the writeoffs w e r e  reported in the fourth quarter a n d  this pattern 
o f  reporting occurs in e a c h  o f  the years u n d e r  study a n d  across all industries.
• S o m e  of  the significant findings related to the dollar a m o u n t  of  the writeoffs were:
—  T h e  dollar a m o u n t  o f  writeoffs increased significantly o v e r  the 6-year period.
—  A s s e t  i m p a i r m e n t s  a c c o u n t e d  for 5 1 . 3  percent o f  the dollar val ue o v e r  the 6  years, w h i l e  plant 
closings a c c o u n t e d  for 3 6  percent.
—  In dollar value, 6 4  percent o f  the writeoffs w e r e  reported in the fourth quarter.
• Wri teoffs te n d  to b e  large relative to i n c o m e  reported a n d  frequently o c c u r  in years w h e n  a n n u a l  i n c o m e  
is negative.
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In a s a m p l e  o f  1 0 9  c o m p a n i e s  f r o m  the original population, the study e x a m i n e s  the b e h a v i o r  o f  financial 
ratios o v e r  time. B o t h  turnover a n d  profitability ratios indicated a  deteriorating situation in the years prior 
to the writeoff, a stabilizing s u b s e q u e n t  to the writeoff, a n d  then a  gradual i m p r o v e m e n t .  S t o c k  m a r k e t  
reaction to the writeoffs w a s  consistent; f o l lowi ng the writeoffs, stock p e r f o r m a n c e  r e b o u n d e d  in antici­
pation, perhaps, o f  the reversal in the reported financial results o f  the c o m p a n i e s  d u r i n g  the ne x t  2  to 3 years.
T h e  study c o n c l u d e s  that, in a  climate o f  v a g u e  a c c o u n t i n g  standards, reported writeoffs h a v e  increased 
dramatically in f r e q u e n c y  a n d  in dollar value, the reporting o f  the writeoffs is c on cent rate d heavily in the 
fourth quarter, a n d  the writeoffs h a v e  significant i m p a c t  o n  financial p e r f o r m a n c e .
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T h i s  study s u m m a r i z e s  h o w  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's responsibility for the detection o f  fraudulent 
financial reporting has d e v e l o p e d  since the early 1 9 0 0 s  a n d  analyzes a s a m p l e  o f  4 7 2  cases o f  litigation 
against i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants f r o m  1 9 6 0  t h r o u g h  1 9 8 5  to d e t e r m i n e  the role o f  m a n a g e m e n t  fraud 
a n d  business failures in litigation against external auditors.
Interpreting the historical literature is not e a s y  b e c a u s e  a clear distinction b e t w e e n  types o f  irregularities or 
fraud has not b e e n  maintained. It is clear, h o w e v e r ,  that professional standards h a v e  a l w a y s  lac k e d  a clear 
statement affirming auditors' responsibility for detecting a n d  reporting material irregularities w h e n  c o n ­
d uc ting a n  audit. O n  the other h a n d ,  e v i d e n c e  exists that detection of  intentional material m i s s t a t e m e n t s  b y  
m a n a g e m e n t  h a s  b e e n  a legitimate objective o f  audits at least since the late 1930s.
T h e  analysis o f  litigation against i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants c o n f i r m s  the historical s u m m a r y .  Cu r r e n t  
professional standards w i t h  their e m p h a s i s  o n  the inherent limitations o f  the audit process h a v e  not p r e v e n t e d  
litigation against the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accou n t a n t  or significant p a y m e n t s  in settlement w h e r e  fraudulent 
financial reporting is involved. N e a r l y  one-half o f  the 4 7 2  cases involve fraudulent financial reporting b y  
m a n a g e m e n t .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  cases involving fraudulent financial reporting generally lead to larger d a m a g e  
settlements b y  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac c o u n t a n t  than d o  other types o f  cases.
T h e  study also challenges the c o m m o n  notion that business failure automatically leads to allegations o f  audit 
failure. A l t h o u g h  increases in litigation against i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants d o  a p p e a r  to b e  correlated 
w i t h  e c o n o m i c  d o w n t u r n s ,  o nl y a b o u t  2 0  percent of  the s a m p l e  o f  bankruptcies studied (458) led to litigation 
against auditors. M o r e o v e r ,  o v e r  one-half of  the bankruptcies involving litigation against i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
acc ount ants also i n v o l v e d  fraudulent financial reporting. A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the study c o n c l u d e s  that proposals to 
f oc us increased auditor attention o n  a c o m p a n y ' s  financial a n d  business difficulties are useful primarily 
b e c a u s e  they direct the auditor's attention to conditions that m a y  increase the likelihood o f  fraudulent 
financial statements.
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T h i s  study addresses the a d e q u a c y  of  existing a n d  p r o p o s e d  S E C  m e t h o d s  a n d  rules for c o m b a t t i n g  fraud­
ulent financial reporting. T h e  study p rovides a perspective o n  the historical role o f  the S E C  in r e d u c i n g  the 
incidence o f  fraudulent financial reporting b a s e d  o n  a c o m p r e h e n s i v e  r e v i e w  o f  the literature, including 
b o o k s ,  periodicals, a n d  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  a n d  S E C  d o c u m e n t s .  T h e  r e v i e w  identified a p p r o x i m a t e l y  2 0  existing 
S E C  activities a n d  2 5  p r o p o s e d  activities that h a v e  potential for b e i n g  effective in the pre vent ion or detection 
o f  fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  results of  the r e v i e w  p r o v i d e d  the f o u n d a t i o n  for the m a i l  s u r v e y  a n d  
personal interviews c o n d u c t e d  in c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  this project.
T h e  researchers s u r v e y e d  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  1 , 1 5 0  p e r s o n s  a n d  received 5 1 5  replies (45 percent r e s p o n s e  rate). 
T h e  s u r v e y  dealt w i t h  questions regarding participants' v i e w s  o n  the m a g n i t u d e  o f  the p r o b l e m  o f  fraudulent 
financial reporting, the effectiveness o f  current S E C  policies a n d  activities, a n d  the potential effectiveness 
o f  possible c h a n g e s  to the current system. T h e  s u r v e y  population included attendees at the 1 9 8 6  University 
o f  S o u t h e r n  California S E C  a n d  Financial R e p o r t i n g  Institute C o n f e r e n c e ,  a s a m p l e  o f  m e m b e r s  o f  the 
A m e r i c a n  Society o f  C o r p o r a t e  Secretaries w h i c h  represents corporate officers a n d  directors (65 percent 
N Y S E  c o m p a n i e s ,  19  percent A M E X  c o m p a n i e s ,  a n d  1 6  percent O T C  c o m p a n i e s ) ,  a s a m p l e  o f  m e m b e r s  
of  the Financial E x e c u t i v e s  Institute, a n d  a s a m p l e  o f  m e m b e r s  of  the Institute o f  Internal Auditors.
T h e  researchers also c o n d u c t e d  in-depth interviews w i t h  2 0  individuals w h o  h a v e  a h i g h  d e g r e e  of  k n o w l ­
e d g e  a b o u t  s o m e  aspects of  the securities l a w s  a n d  the functioning o f  the S E C .  T h e s e  interviews a d d r e s s e d  
the s a m e  issues as the m a i l  survey. T h e  interviewees inc lude d t w o  executives o f  publicly he l d  c o m p a n i e s ,  
five i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants, s e v e n  high-level e m p l o y e e s  o f  the S E C ,  four attorneys, a  financial 
analyst, a n d  a representative o f  users o f  financial information.
A p p r o x i m a t e l y  5 0  percent o f  the 5 1 5  questionnaire r e s p o n d e n t s  believed that fraudulent financial reporting 
is a  p r o b l e m  o f  m o d e r a t e  to serious proportions. W h i l e  the p r i m a r y  foc us of  the study w a s  o n  the role a n d  
effectiveness o f  the S E C  in addressing this p r o b l e m ,  a  n u m b e r  of  closely related findings a n d  con clusions 
also e m e r g e d .  A  f e w  selected findings a n d  c o n clus ions w h e r e  b o t h  s u r v e y  r e s p o n d e n t s  a n d  interviewees 
generally agr ee follow.
• T h e  S E C ' s  fraudulent financial reporting p re vent ion a n d  detection activities are s o m e w h a t  effective.
• C r e atio n o f  " r e d  flag" profiles w o u l d  b e  useful in identifying cases for S E C  investigation.
• Stiffer sanctions for registrant c o m p a n i e s  a n d  m e m b e r s  o f  their m a n a g e m e n t  f o u n d  to b e  i n v o l v e d  in 
cases o f  fraudulent financial reporting w o u l d  b e  a n  effective deterrent. Effective sanctions w o u l d  include 
barring the individual f r o m  h i g h  office in a publicly h el d c o m p a n y ,  stiffer penalties, a n d  longer prison 
terms.
• T h e r e  is a  n e e d  for better clarification/definition o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's fraud detection 
responsibilities.
• T h e r e  s h o u l d  b e  a m a n d a t o r y  r e q u i r e m e n t  that all publicly h el d c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  a n  audit c o m m i t t e e .  T h e  
audit c o m m i t t e e  w a s  t h o u g h t  to b e  potentially effective for b o t h  fraud p re vent ion a n d  detection. T h e
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c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  b e  c o m p o s e d  o f  m e m b e r s  w h o  are capable, i n d e pen dent , a n d  protected f r o m  e x p o s u r e  
to liability w h e n  acting in g o o d  faith.
O n e  area w h e r e  general a g r e e m e n t  w a s  not s h a r e d  b y  s u r v e y  r e s p o n d e n t s  a n d  interviewees c o n c e r n e d  
internal a c c o u n t i n g  controls. T h e  s u r v e y  r e s p o n d e n t s  did not v i e w  m a n d a t o r y  disclosure o f  internal a c ­
c o u n t i n g  control w e a k n e s s e s  or m a n d a t o r y  auditor e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  internal a c c o u n t i n g  control as p r o m i s i n g  
c h a n g e s .  M o s t  interviewees believed that c h a n g e s  w e r e  p r o b a b l y  desirable in current standards a n d  practices 
c o n c e r n i n g  the evaluation o f  a n d  reporting o n  internal control.
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T h i s  study addresses the question o f  h o w  e d u c a t i o n  c a n  h a v e  a n  i m p a c t  o n  the w a y  in w h i c h  corporate 
m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  public a ccountants confront instances o f  fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  
st u d y  d r a w s  o n  the a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  auditing educational literature as well as s o m e  selected w o r k s  f r o m  higher 
education. A  limited s u r v e y  also w a s  c o n d u c t e d  o f  the w a y  in w h i c h  ethical, situational, a n d  technical 
aspects o f  fraudulent financial reporting are c o v e r e d  in a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  auditing textbooks. W h i l e  the study's 
observations a n d  c o n clus ions largely generalize to the entire business cur riculum, the discussion focuses 
primarily o n  a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  auditing education.
T h e  study c on cent rate d o n  t w o  areas: (1) the w a y  in w h i c h  a c c o u n t i n g  k n o w l e d g e  is i m p a r t e d  to students 
a n d  (2) the w a y  in w h i c h  a c c o u n t i n g  students receive instruction o n  ethical values. T h e  f o l l o w i n g  selected 
observations a n d  c onclusions resulted f r o m  the study:
• B e i n g  able to record a  transaction correctly often h a s  t w o  c o m p o n e n t s .  T h e  first is a n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of 
the m e c h a n i c s  o f  the a c c o u n t i n g  m o d e l ,  the attendant disclosure requirements, a n d  the operations o f  the 
specific a c c o u n t i n g  s y s t e m s  generating the financial statements. T h e  s e c o n d ,  w h i c h  is m u c h  h a r der to 
teach, is the ability to w o r k  a b o v e  a s i m p l e  p r o g r a m m e d  level in the application o f  c o n c e p t s  to a n o m a l o u s  
data.
• M a n y  a c c o u n t i n g  tex t b o o k s  rely v e r y  heavily o n  a  pro cedu ral a p p r o a c h  concentrating o n  individual 
p r o b l e m s — a n  a p p r o a c h  that m a y  not b e  sufficient for facing the challenges o f  the real world. A c c o r d ­
ingly, there s h o u l d  b e  m o r e  e m p h a s i s  o n  cognitive a n d  co n c e p t u a l  issues in a c c o u n t i n g  education.
• A u d i t o r s  require technical skills in addition to those required for p r o p e r  accounting. A u d i t o r s  m u s t  b e  
c o n v e r s a n t  w i t h  the principles o f  logic, they m u s t  b e  ade pt at gathering information, a n d  they m u s t  b e  
s h r e w d  evaluators o f  risk. A c q u i r i n g  these skills requires a b r o a d  educational experience.
• T h e  results o f  a s u r v e y  o f  a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  auditing t ex tboo ks indicate that c o v e r a g e  o f  fraudulent financial 
reporting is m i n i m a l  to nonexistent.
• T h e  treatment o f  ethics is usually limited to a p r o c e d u r e - b a s e d  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  the A I C P A ' s  R u l e s  of 
C o n d u c t  d u r i n g  the auditing course.
• C o v e r a g e  o f  fraudulent financial reporting a n d  ethics s h o u l d  b e  incl u d e d  t h r o u g h o u t  the a c c o u n t i n g  
curriculum. C o n f i n i n g  s u c h  c o v e r a g e  to a single c o u r s e  (e.g., auditing) implies that these areas are not 
imp o r t a n t  to other subject matter s u c h  as financial a n d  m a n a g e r i a l  accounting.
• F ac ulty m u s t  b e  e x p o s e d  to fraudulent financial reporting a n d  ethical r e a s o n i n g  in P h . D .  a n d  post­
doctoral training. Faculty c a n n o t  b e  e x p e c t e d  to teach w h a t  they h a v e  not learned.
• A  robust case literature is critical to bringing the c o m p l e x i t y ,  challenge, a n d  realism o f  fraudulent 
financial reporting a n d  ethical issues into the c la ssro om.
• I m p r o v e m e n t s  in the a c c o u n t i n g  c u r r i c u l u m  d e p e n d  heavily o n  the c o o pera tion a n d  support o f  the public 
a c c o u n t i n g  firms a n d  business corporations that hire graduates as well as the professional organizations 
that administer the u n i f o r m  certified public a c c o u n t a n t  a n d  other professional certification exa mina tion s.
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T h e  P u b l i c  C o m p a n y
F r a u d  R i s k  A s s e s s m e n t
T h i s  research s tu dy s u m m a r i z e s  risk factors that m a y  contribute to fraudulent financial reporting. In addition 
to risk factors identified b y  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  other research activities, this s u m m a r y  d r a w s  o n  the following 
sources:
• A  s u r v e y  o f  the risk a s s e s s m e n t  a n d  client a c c e p t a n c e  a n d  retention policies o f  1 0  o f  the 14  largest public 
a c c o u n t i n g  firms in the U n i t e d  States
• T h e  A I C P A ' s  " W a r n i n g  Signals o f  the Possible E x i sten ce of  F r a u d , "  p u b l i s h e d  in the M a r c h  12, 197 9, 
C P A  Letter
• T h e  fol l o w i n g  b o o k s  o n  business fraud:
—  C o r p o r a t e  F r a u d ,  2 n d  ed., b y  M i c h a e l  J. C o m m e r  [ M c G r a w - H i l l  ( U n i t e d  K i n g d o m ) ,  198 5]
—  H o w  to D e t e c t  a n d  P r e v e n t  B u s i n e s s  F r a u d ,  b y  W .  S t e v e  Albrecht, M a r s h a l l  B .  R o m n e y ,  D a v i d  
J. Cherrington, I. R e e d  P a y n e ,  a n d  A l l a n  V .  R o e  (Prentice-Hall, 1 9 8 2 )
—  M a n a g e m e n t  F r a u d :  D e t e c t i o n  a n d  D e t e r r e n c e ,  b y  R o b e r t  K .  Elliott a n d  J o h n  J. W i l l i n g h a m  
(Petrocelli B o o k s ,  1 9 8 0 )
—  C o r p o r a t e  F r a u d :  T h e  B a s i s  o f  P r e v e n t i o n  a n d  Detection, b y  J a c k  B o l o g n a  ( B u t ter wort h Pu b l i s h ­
ers, 1984).
T h e  results o f  this study are presented in A p p e n d i x  H  as G o o d  Practice G u i d e l i n e s  for A s s e s s i n g  the R i s k  
o f  F r a u d u l e n t  Financial Reporting.
M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  R e p o r t s
T h i s  study a nalyzes the positions t ak en b y  the S E C ,  the C o h e n  C o m m i s s i o n ,  a n d  the Financial E x e c u t i v e s  
Institute regarding m a n a g e m e n t  reports to b e  incl u d e d  in corporate a n n u a l  reports to stockholders. T h e  study 
also r e v i e w s  the contents o f  a limited n u m b e r  o f  actual m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  audit c o m m i t t e e  reports included 
in corporate a n n u a l  reports dur i n g  the last 5 years a n d  e x a m i n e s  S t a t e m e n t  o n  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  N o .  19, 
Client Representations. D r a w i n g  o n  these sources, illustrative m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  audit c o m m i t t e e  reports are 
d e v e l o p e d .
N e e d  f o r  U n i f o r m  A u t h o r i t a t i v e  I n t e r n a l  C o n t r o l  S t a n d a r d s
T h i s  briefing p a p e r  s u m m a r i z e s  the current internal control practices a n d  standards in the U n i t e d  States. T h e  
p a p e r  is b a s e d  primarily o n  current literature describing the nature o f  internal control practices, foc usin g 
particularly o n  t w o  research studies s p o n s o r e d  b y  the Financial E x e c u t i v e s  R e s e a r c h  F o u n d a t i o n :  Internal 
C o n t r o l  in U .S . C o r p o r a t i o n s :  T h e  State o f  the A r t  ( 1 9 8 0 )  a n d  Criteria f o r  M a n a g e m e n t  C o n t r o l  (1981). 
B o t h  b o o k s  w e r e  a u t h o r e d  b y  a research t e a m  f r o m  the University o f  M i c h i g a n  G r a d u a t e  S c h o o l  of  B u s i n e s s  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  u n d e r  the direction o f  Dr. R o b e r t  K .  M a u t z .
T h e  p a p e r  notes that m a n y  different groups, including C o n g r e s s ,  corporate m a n a g e m e n t ,  a n d  accountants, 
are b e c o m i n g  increasingly interested in the c o n c e p t s  o f  internal control a n d  accountability a n d  h o w  to 
i m p l e m e n t  these c o n c e p t s  effectively. T h e r e  is, h o w e v e r ,  diversity in internal control practices a m o n g  public 
c o m p a n i e s  a n d  in the definitions a n d  t e r m i n o l o g y  u s e d  to discuss internal control a m o n g  the various g r o u p s  
w h o  h a v e  studied it. A s  a result, m a n a g e m e n t ,  internal auditors, a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  public a ccountants often 
disagree as to w h e t h e r  a public c o m p a n y ' s  internal control is adequate. T h e  definition o f  internal a c c o u n t i n g  
control d e v e l o p e d  b y  i n d e p e n d e n t  public acc ount ants a n d  a d o p t e d  b y  the F o r e i g n  C o r r u p t  Practices A c t  is 
the m o s t  w i d e l y  used. S i n c e  this definition w a s  d e v e l o p e d  primarily to g u i d e  i n d e p e n d e n t  public acc ountants
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in c o n d u c t i n g  a n  audit, h o w e v e r ,  it is deliberately the m o s t  n a r r o w  a n d  m a y  not p r o v i d e  the best g u i d a n c e  
for other purposes.
O p i n i o n  S h o p p i n g
T h i s  briefing p a p e r  discusses the issues s u r r o u n d i n g  the practice of  " o p i n i o n  s h o p p i n g , "  the practice of  
consulting various i n d e p e n d e n t  public a c c ount ants to find o n e  that will accept a n  inappropriate or q u e s ­
tionable a c c o u n t i n g  treatment. T h e  p a p e r  s u m m a r i z e s  the existing g u i d a n c e  to i n d e p e n d e n t  public a c c o u n ­
tants c o n c e r n i n g  this issue, principally S t a t e m e n t  o n  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  ( S A S )  N o .  50, R e p o r t s  o n  the 
A p p lica tion o f  A c c o u n t i n g  Principles. It also s u m m a r i z e s  current disclosure r e q u i r e m e n t s  c o n c e r n i n g  
c h a n g e s  in i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants a n d  the S E C ' s  July 1, 1 9 8 5 ,  c o n c e p t  release requesting c o m m e n t s  
o n  o p i n i o n  s h o p p i n g  (Release N o .  3 3 - 6 5 9 4 ;  File N o .  S 7- 33-8 5), w h i c h  p r o p o s e s  several modifications to 
these requirements.
T h e  p a p e r  notes that differences o f  o p i n i o n  d o  arise in financial reporting, especially w h e n  c o m p l e x  or n o v e l  
transactions are involved. Consultation w i t h  a no ther i n d e p e n d e n t  public a c c o u n t a n t  often is a legitimate 
m e t h o d  o f  resolving these differences. O p i n i o n  s h o p p i n g  occ u r s  w h e n  m a n a g e m e n t  introduces c o m m e r c i a l  
pressure into the process of  resolving the financial reporting issue to obtain a n  o p i n i o n  b a s e d  o n  its desires 
rather t ha n s o u n d  reporting principles. T h e  briefing p a p e r  c o n c l u d e s  that neither S A S  N o .  5 0  n o r  current S E C  
regulations adequ a t e l y  addresses the p r o b l e m s  associated w i t h  o p i n i o n  s h o p p i n g  a n d  the p a p e r  presents s o m e  
additional p r o c e d u r e s  for consideration.
R e v i e w  o f  R e c e n t  S E C  C a s e s  I n v o l v i n g  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
T h i s  research study analyzes all a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  financial disclosure cases b r o u g h t  b y  the S E C  against public 
c o m p a n i e s ,  individuals associated w i t h  these c o m p a n i e s ,  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  public a ccountants b e t w e e n  July 
1, 198 1, a n d  A u g u s t  6, 1986. T h e  analysis w a s  c o n d u c t e d  b y  r e v i e w i n g  public d o c u m e n t s  for e a c h  case. 
After omitting duplications a n d  cases w i t h  insufficient information for analysis, 1 1 9  cases against public 
c o m p a n i e s  a n d  4 2  cases against i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants w e r e  analyzed.
T h e  f o l lowi ng are the m a j o r  findings:
• Forty-four percent o f  the cases against public c o m p a n i e s  o c c u r r e d  in industries that w e r e  experiencing, 
or a b o u t  to experience, a general e c o n o m i c  decline.
• E i g h t y - s e v e n  percent o f  the cases against public c o m p a n i e s  i n v o l v e d  m a n i p u l a t i o n  o f  the financial 
disclosures, as o p p o s e d  to misappropriation of  assets for personal gain (13 percent). F r e q u e n t l y  u s e d  
techniques w e r e  i m p r o p e r  r e v e n u e  recognition m e t h o d s  (47 percent), deliberate overst a t e m e n t s  o f  c o m ­
p a n y  assets (38 percent), a n d  i m p r o p e r  deferral o f  current period e x p e n s e s  ( 1 6  percent). In 2 7  percent 
o f  the cases against public c o m p a n i e s ,  the S E C  alleged that other i nformation d i s s e m i n a t e d  to the public 
w a s  inade q u a t e  or otherwise con t a i n e d  false a n d  m i s l e a d i n g  statements.
• In 4 5  percent of  the cases against public c o m p a n i e s ,  the S E C  alleged that the fraud o c c u r r e d  b e c a u s e  of  
a  b r e a k d o w n  o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal controls. In m a n y  o f  these instances, the c o m p a n y  h a d  a d e q u a t e  
internal a c c o u n t i n g  controls; these controls, h o w e v e r ,  w e r e  o v e r r i d d e n  b y  m a n a g e m e n t .
• In 17  percent o f  the cases against public c o m p a n i e s ,  misrepresentations w e r e  m a d e  to the c o m p a n y ' s  
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants.
• T h e  S E C  cited a m e m b e r  o f  upper-level corporate m a n a g e m e n t  (chief executive officer, president, or 
chief financial officer) as b e i n g  i n v o l v e d  in 6 6  percent o f  the cases against public c o m p a n i e s .  In 5 percent 
o f  the cases, n o n m a n a g e m e n t  p e r sonn el w e r e  cited b y  the S E C .  T h e  p e r s o n n e l  i n v o l v e d  c o u l d  not b e  
d e t e r m i n e d  in the r e m a i n i n g  2 9  percent o f  the cases.
• In contrast to S E C  a n d  professional studies s h o w i n g  that 8 5 - 9 0  percent o f  public c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  audit 
c o m m i t t e e s ,  in o n l y  6 9  percent o f  the cases against public c o m p a n i e s  w a s  a n  audit c o m m i t t e e  mai ntained. 
T h i s  p e r c e n t a g e  e x c l u d e s  3 9  cases w h e r e  the staff c o u l d  not d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  or not the c o m p a n y  h a d  
a n  audit c o m m i t t e e .  T h e  6 9  percent ap p e a r s  g e n e r o u s  b e c a u s e  it is likely the p e r c e n t a g e  w o u l d  d r o p  if
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the 3 9  u n k n o w n  cases w e r e  d e t e r m i n e d  since these c o m p a n i e s  w e r e  not listed o n  the N Y S E ,  filed n o  
p r o x y  material w i t h  the S E C ,  a n d  m a n y  w e r e  i n v o l v e d  in a n  initial public offering.
• In 6 7  percent o f  the cases against i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants, the auditor failed to obtain sufficient 
c o m p e t e n t  evidential matter.
• In 3 6  percent o f  the cases against i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants, the auditor failed to re c o g n i z e  or 
p u r s u e  w i t h  sufficient skepticism certain w a r n i n g  signs or " r e d  flags" that existed at the t i m e  the audit 
w a s  c o n d u c t e d .
• A l t h o u g h  8 4  percent o f  all public c o m p a n i e s  are audited b y  national public a c c o u n t i n g  firms, 7 4  percent 
o f  the actions b r o u g h t  against i n d e p e n d e n t  public a ccountants w e r e  against smaller, regional, or local 
firms or  sole practitioners. M o r e o v e r ,  6 4  percent o f  the actions w e r e  b r o u g h t  against firms that w e r e  not 
m e m b e r s  o f  the A I C P A ' s  S E C  Practice Section.
R e v i e w  o f  R e c e n t  C a s e s  I n v o l v i n g  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  b y  
N o n - S E C  R e p o r t i n g  O r g a n i z a t i o n s
T h i s  briefing p a p e r  s u m m a r i z e s  the c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n v o l v e d  in the fol l o w i n g  alleged cases o f  fraudulent 
financial reporting:
• E . S . M .  G o v e r n m e n t  Securities, Inc.
• H o m e  State S a v i n g s  a n d  L o a n  o f  O h i o
• A m e r i c a n  S a v i n g s  a n d  L o a n  A s s ocia tion o f  Florida
• P e n n  S q u a r e  B a n k
• Continental Illinois B a n k
• B e v e r l y  Hills S a v i n g s  a n d  L o a n  Ass ocia tion
• U n i t e d  A m e r i c a n  B a n k
• D r y s d a l e  G o v e r n m e n t  Securities.
W h i l e  these organizations are not u n d e r  the S E C ' s  jurisdiction, they w e r e  r e v i e w e d  b e c a u s e  they h a v e  b e e n  
cited in C o n g r e s s i o n a l  hearings as e x a m p l e s  o f  fraudulent financial reporting and/or audit failure.
T h e  material for the p a p e r  w a s  obta i n e d  primarily f r o m  the transcripts o f  the 1 9 8 5  a n d  1 9 8 6  hearings of  the 
O v e r s i g h t  a n d  Investigations S u b c o m m i t t e e  o f  the H o u s e  E n e r g y  a n d  C o m m e r c e  C o m m i t t e e ,  chaired b y  
C o n g r e s s m a n  J o h n  Dingell. Add itional material w a s  o b t aine d f r o m  business periodicals a n d  the transcripts 
o f  other C o n g r e s s i o n a l  hearings.
R o l e  o f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e — P r e v e n t i o n  a n d  D e t e c t i o n  o f  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
T h i s  research study analyzes the role o f  audit c o m m i t t e e s  in preventing a n d  detecting fraudulent financial 
reporting. T h e  study i n v o l v e d  r e v i e w i n g  pre viou s research o n  audit c o m m i t t e e s  a n d  b r o c h u r e s  discussing 
audit c o m m i t t e e  duties pu b l i s h e d  b y  public a c c o u n t i n g  firms.
T h e  study notes that o v e r  8 5  percent o f  all public c o m p a n i e s  m a i n t a i n e d  audit c o m m i t t e e s  dur i n g  1981. T h e  
w i d e  a d o p t i o n  o f  audit c o m m i t t e e s  ap p e a r s  to b e  d u e  to the N Y S E ' s  r e q u i r e m e n t  that its listed c o m p a n i e s  
h a v e  s u c h  c o m m i t t e e s ,  the S E C ' s  strong a d v o c a c y  o f  t h e m ,  recognition o f  the benefits o f  s u c h  bodies, a n d  
the liability to w h i c h  b o a r d  m e m b e r s  m a y  b e  e x p o s e d  if the b o a r d  h a s  n o  audit c o m m i t t e e .
T h e  stu dy also notes that there is general a g r e e m e n t  that a  k e y  ingredient in h a v i n g  a n  effective audit 
c o m m i t t e e  is the i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  its m e m b e r s .  V a r i o u s  bod i e s  hav e, h o w e v e r ,  different definitions o f  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  different r e q u i r e m e n t s  as to the n u m b e r  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  m e m b e r s .  S o m e  o f  these alter­
native definitions are contrasted w i t h  the N Y S E  definition o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e .
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T h e  study c o n c l u d e s  b y  describing c u s t o m a r y  audit c o m m i t t e e  functions a n d  alternative functions p r o p o s e d  
b y  several bodies. It also presents s u g g e s t e d  audit c o m m i t t e e  guidelines tailored to the pre vent ion a n d  
detection o f  fraudulent financial reporting. S o m e  o f  these guidelines are incorporated into C h a p t e r  T w o  in 
the discussion o f  audit c o m m i t t e e  functions w h i l e  others are i ncluded in A p p e n d i x  I.
W h i s t l e b l o w i n g
T h i s  briefing p a p e r  is b a s e d  o n  a  r e v i e w  o f  current cases, statutes, a n d  legal research o n  the subject of 
whistleblowing. T h e  p a p e r  discusses b o t h  internal w h i s t l e b l o w i n g  (within the structure o f  the public c o m ­
p a n y )  a n d  external w h i s t l e b l o w i n g  (to g o v e r n m e n t  authorities or other third parties).
A s  to internal whi stle blow ing, the p a p e r  notes that courts universally h a v e  f o u n d  a d u t y  o f  loyalty to b e  a n  
obligation o f  e m p l o y m e n t .  S u c h  d u t y  e x t e n d s  to the firm's operating rules a n d  p rocedures, its reputation, 
a n d  its c o m m e r c i a l  opportunities. T h e  d u t y  o f  loyalty also m e a n s  that a c o m p a n y  h a s  the right to k n o w  a b o u t  
its p r o b l e m s  first before a n y  disclosure to outsiders is m a d e .  If this proposition is to operate successfully, 
a c o m p a n y  m u s t  h a v e  a w i d e l y  k n o w n  a n d  accessible internal c o m p l a i n t  a n d  a p p e a l  m e c h a n i s m  for receiving 
complaints, c o n d u c t i n g  impartial investigations, a p p l y i n g  clearly defined standards o f  j u d g m e n t ,  and, if 
necessary, pro v i d i n g  a  fair hearing.
W h i l e  the d u t y  o f  loyalty suggests that a potential w h i s t l e b l o w e r  s h o u l d  e x h a u s t  all internal p r o c e d u r e s  
p r o v i d e d  to e n s u r e  the a c c u r a c y  a n d  appropriateness o f  his disclosure, there are r e c o g n i z e d  exceptions w h e r e  
external w h i s t l e b l o w i n g  is appropriate. O n c e  a n  e m p l o y e e  decides to g o  outside the c o m p a n y ,  h e  c a n  se e k  
protection against reprisal f r o m  three sources: c o m m o n  l a w  as interpreted b y  the courts, federal statutes, a n d  
state statutes. T h e  actual protection against reprisal afforded b y  the law, h o w e v e r ,  is often not predictable 
a n d  m a n y  tim es inadequate.
T h e  p a p e r  c o n c l u d e s  that, for the m o s t  part, those m a k i n g  disclosures o f  alleged w r o n g d o i n g  or illegality 
find little or n o  protection. W h i s t l e b l o w e r s  a l m o s t  inevitably p a y  a h e a v y  price. W i t h  f e w  exceptions, they 
are driven out o f  not o n l y  their jobs, but also their professions.
I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t s
A n a l y t i c a l  R e v i e w
T h i s  research study a nalyzes the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's u s e  o f  analytical r e v i e w  p r o c e d u r e s  a n d  
the effectiveness o f  these p r o c e d u r e s  in detecting fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  stu dy i ncluded re­
v i e w i n g  (1) authoritative auditing standards, (2) the auditing policies c o n c e r n i n g  analytical r e v i e w  o f  several 
o f  the larger public a c c o u n t i n g  firms, a n d  (3) several pub l i s h e d  a c a d e m i c  studies o n  the u s e  o f  analytical 
review. T h e  researcher also he l d  discussions o n  h o w  analytical r e v i e w  p r o c e d u r e s  c a n  b e  i m p r o v e d  w i t h  a 
limited g r o u p  o f  e x p e r i e n c e d  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants.
T h e  resulting briefing p a p e r  first analyzes the existing authoritative auditing g u i d a n c e  c o n c e r n i n g  the u s e  of  
analytical r e v i e w  p r o c e d u r e s  con t a i n e d  in S t a t e m e n t  o n  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  N o .  23, Analytical R e v i e w  
P r o c e d u r e s .  T h e  p a p e r  o b s e r v e s  that S A S  N o .  2 3  d o e s  not require the u s e  o f  analytical r e v i e w  p r o c e d u r e s  
in a n  audit a n d  includes little specific p ro cedu ral g u i d a n c e  o n  h o w  a n d  w h e n  analytical r e v i e w  p r o c e d u r e s  
c a n  b e  used, w h o  o n  the audit t e a m  s h o u l d  p e r f o r m  t h e m ,  a n d  w h y  specific analytical r e v i e w  p r o c e d u r e s  m a y  
p r o v e  m o r e  fruitful than others in specific circumstances.
T h e  p a p e r  o b s e r v e s  that there is considerable diversity in the u s e  o f  analytical r e v i e w  p r o c e d u r e s  a m o n g  the 
larger public a c c o u n t i n g  firms in the U n i t e d  States a n d  that there exists a  per ception that these p r o c e d u r e s  
h a v e  a relatively l o w  d e g r e e  o f  precision. It also notes that instead o f  b e i n g  u s e d  as a p l a n n i n g  tool, analytical 
r e v i e w  p r o c e d u r e s  are often m e c h a n i c a l l y  applied b y  less e x p e r i e n c e d  staff at the c o m p l e t i o n  o f  the e n g a g e m e n t .
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T h e  p a p e r  c o n c l u d e s  b y  discussing t w o  recent studies that d e m o n s t r a t e  the potential effectiveness of  
analytical r e v i e w  procedures. T h e  first, a n  empirical study of  financial sta tement errors c o n d u c t e d  b y  R o b e r t  
E. H y l a s  a n d  R o b e r t  H .  A s h t o n  a n d  entitled " A u d i t  D et ecti on o f  Financial S t a t e m e n t  E r r o r s "  (T h e  
A c c o u n t i n g  R e v i e w ,  O c t o b e r  1982), f o u n d  that m o r e  errors w e r e  initially signaled b y  analytical r e v i e w  
p r o c e d u r e s  than b y  a n y  other single c ategory o f  e v e n t  or procedure. T h e  se c o n d ,  a study of  several 
well-publicized cases o f  fraudulent financial reporting c o n d u c t e d  b y  F r a n k  Coglitore a n d  entitled " A n a ­
lytical R e v i e w :  A  D e f e n s i v e  N e c e s s i t y , "  points out h o w  timely application o f  analytical r e v i e w  p r o c e d u r e s  
c o u l d  h a v e  highlighted the materially m i s l e a d i n g  financial information.
C h a n g e s  in t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t ' s  Res p o n s i b i l i t i e s  C o n c e r n i n g  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s
T h i s  briefing p a p e r  s u m m a r i z e s  the p r o p o s e d  S t a t e m e n t  o n  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  entitled, C o m m u n i c a t i o n  
W i t h  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e s  o r  O t h e r s  W i t h  E q u i v a l e n t  Authority a n d  Responsibility. T h e  p a p e r  notes that current 
auditing standards require that i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants c o m m u n i c a t e  to m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  audit 
c o m m i t t e e s  o n l y  material w e a k n e s s e s  in internal a c c o u n t i n g  control a n d  i nformation relating to errors a n d  
possible irregularities. T h e  p r o p o s e d  standard requires i n d e p e n d e n t  public a ccountants to discuss w i t h  audit 
c o m m i t t e e s  m a n y  other items involving the audit or m a n a g e m e n t ,  including the following: significant 
a c c o u n t i n g  policies, m a n a g e m e n t ' s  j u d g m e n t  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  estimates, implications o f  audit adjustments, 
the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's responsibility u n d e r  G A A S ,  d i s a g r e e m e n t s  w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t ,  the 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's responsibility for other information in the financial statements, difficulties 
e n c o u n t e r e d  in p e r f o r m i n g  the audit, a n d  issues discussed w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t  prior to retention.
C h a n g e s  in t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t ' s  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to D e t e c t  a n d  R e p o r t  E r r o r s  a n d  
Irregularities
T h i s  briefing p a p e r  s u m m a r i z e s  the p r o p o s e d  S t a t e m e n t  o n  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  entitled, T h e  Auditor's 
Responsibility to D e t e c t  a n d  R e p o r t  E r r o r s  a n d  Irregularities. T h e  p r o p o s e d  standard w o u l d  sup e r s e d e  
S t a t e m e n t  o f  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  N o .  16, T h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  Aud itor's Responsibility f o r  the D e t e c t i o n  o f  
E r r o r s  a n d  Irregularities.
T h e  p a p e r  notes that the p r o p o s e d  standard includes (1) a n  explicit statement that the audit s h o u l d  b e  
d e s i g n e d  to detect material misstatements, (2) a list o f  specific factors that c o u l d  h e i g h t e n  or mitigate the 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's c o n c e r n  a b o u t  the risk o f  material irregularities, (3) a discussion o f  the 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's u s e  of  professional skepticism in p l a n n i n g  a n d  p e r f o r m i n g  the audit, a n d  
(4) a  description o f  the characteristics o f  errors a n d  irregularities that influence the i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
accountant's ability to detect s u c h  misstatements. T h e  p r o p o s e d  standard also includes a clearer a n d  m o r e  
c o m p r e h e n s i v e  discussion of  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's responsibility to report errors a n d  irreg­
ularities th a n  is i ncluded in current auditing literature.
C o m p a r i s o n  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d ' s  
F e b r u a r y  1 9 8 7  P r o p o s e d  S t a n d a r d s
O n  F e b r u a r y  14, 19 8 7 ,  the A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  ( A S B )  o f  the A m e r i c a n  Institute o f  Certified Public 
A c c o u n t a n t s  released for c o m m e n t  1 0  p r o p o s e d  statements o n  auditing standards. T h i s  briefing p a p e r  
c o m p a r e s  these standards w i t h  the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  in the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  April 1 9 8 7  E x p o s u r e  Draft, a n d  
identifies the differences a n d  similarities. T h e  p a p e r  points out that the majority o f  the similarities exists in 
the fol l o w i n g  A S B  p r o p o s e d  standards: (1) the auditor's responsibility to detect a n d  report errors a n d  
irregularities a n d  (2) the auditor's responsibility for assessing control risk. T h e  p a p e r  notes that m o s t  o f  the 
differences are not generally contrary to the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  S o m e  o f  the differences are 
a  result o f  issues the A S B  a d d r e s s e d  in a different m a n n e r  than the C o m m i s s i o n  did (e.g., c o m m u n i c a t i o n  
w i t h  audit c o m m i t t e e s  or others w i t h  equivalent authority a n d  responsibility). O t h e r  differences are a result 
o f  issues the A S B  a d d r e s s e d  that the C o m m i s s i o n  c o n s i d e r e d  b e y o n d  its scope, for e x a m p l e ,  (1) illegal acts 
b y  clients a n d  (2) the auditor's consideration o f  a n  entity's ability to c ontinue in existence.
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C o m p a r i s o n  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t o r ' s  a n d  t h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d ' s  D e f i n i t i o n  a n d  C o n c e p t  
o f  C o n t r o l
T h i s  briefing p a p e r  contrasts (1) the definitions o f  internal control, (2) the control objectives analyzed, a n d  
(3) the required control a s s e s s m e n t s  that are d e v e l o p e d  in the research study, " C o n t r o l  a n d  Internal 
A u d i t i n g , "  p r e p a r e d  for the C o m m i s s i o n  (see A p p e n d i x  B )  u n d e r  the spon s o r s h i p  o f  the Institute o f  Internal 
A u d i t o r s  (IIA) w i t h  those d e v e l o p e d  in the A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d ' s  ( A S B )  p r o p o s e d  S t a t e m e n t  o n  
A u d i t i n g  Standards, T h e  Auditor's Responsibility f o r  A s s e s s i n g  C o n t r o l  Risk.
T h e  briefing p a p e r  notes that the I I A  paper's definition o f  control a n d  control objectives is b r o a d e r  than that 
o f  the A S B ' s .  T h e  former's definition includes the c o m p a n y ' s  business pl a n  a n d  the w a y  in w h i c h  the 
c o m p a n y  plans to c o n d u c t  business a n d  relates to b o t h  the corporate entity a n d  the individuals within the 
corporation. T h e  A S B ' s  definition centers o n  the financial reporting processes a n d  activities a n d  relates m o r e  
to the corporation as a reporting entity a n d  less to individuals within the c o m p a n y .
T h e  I I A  paper's control a s s e s s m e n t  also is broader. W h i l e  the A S B ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  is c o n c e r n e d  primarily w i t h  
testing controls that indicate that the c o m p a n y  c a n  adequ a t e l y  a n d  effectively p re pare reliable financial 
reports, the I I A  paper's a s s e s s m e n t  is c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  the c o m p a n y ' s  controls in b o t h  operational a n d  
financial areas.
I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t ' s  S t a n d a r d  R e p o r t
T h i s  briefing p a p e r  discusses the history o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's standard report a n d  recent 
attempts to c h a n g e  it. T h e  p a p e r  notes that the current i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's standard report h a s  
r e m a i n e d  substantially the s a m e  since 1948. T h i s  version of  the report h a s  b e e n  criticized as b e i n g  h a r d  to 
u n d e r s t a n d  a n d  defensive. T w o  attempts b y  the public a c c o u n t i n g  profession to revise the report failed 
largely b e c a u s e  o f  c o n c e r n s  that a report that better describes the audit process w o u l d  b e  s e e n  as a n  attempt 
to dilute the profession's responsibilities.
T h e  p a p e r  c o n c l u d e s  b y  discussing the costs a n d  benefits o f  potential c h a n g e s  to the auditor's standard report 
that the A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  a n d  other parties h a v e  suggested. T h e s e  c h a n g e s  fall into t w o  general 
categories: (1) those that involve a better description o f  the audit process a n d  its limitations b u t  d o  not involve 
a n y  c h a n g e  in the s c o p e  o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's w o r k  or in the extent o f  his responsibilities, 
a n d  (2) those that w o u l d  result in a  c h a n g e  in the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's responsibilities a n d  a 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  c h a n g e  to the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's report to c o m m u n i c a t e  s u c h  n e w  responsi­
bilities.
I n d i v i d u a l  a n d  S i t u a t i o n a l  F o r c e s  a n d  P r e s s u r e s  W i t h i n  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t i n g  F i r m s
T h i s  research stu dy e x p l o r e d  s o m e  of  the individual a n d  situational forces a n d  pressures that c a n  affect 
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants. A  r e v i e w  o f  the literature dealing w i t h  this subject w a s  c o n d u c t e d  a n d  
i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants f r o m  a national public a c c o u n t i n g  firm w e r e  interviewed.
T h e  study identifies the f o l lowi ng external factors that c a n  affect audit quality:
• T h e  a m b i g u i t y  o f  G e n e r a l l y  A c c e p t e d  A c c o u n t i n g  Principles ( G A A P )  a n d  G e n e r a l l y  A c c e p t e d  A u d i t i n g  
S t a n d a r d s  ( G A A S ) ,  to w h i c h  m a n a g e m e n t  c a n  app e a l  in attempts to influence the i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
accountant's interpretation o f  G A A P  a n d  G A A S
• T h e  intense level o f  c o m p e t i t i o n  a m o n g  public a c c o u n t i n g  firms w h i c h  m a y  lead to audit b u d g e t  pressure, 
r e d u c e d  audit scopes, a n d  increased leveraging o f  partner a n d  m a n a g e r  t i m e  o n  individual audits
• Client desires to release earnings shortly after year-end, w h i c h  increases pressure to rely m o r e  heavily 
o n  interim w o r k  a n d  decreases t i m e  to c o m p l e t e  the y e a r - e n d  e x a m i n a t i o n
• T h e  increasing c o m p l e x i t y  o f  the business e n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  i nformation tech n o l o g y ,  w h i c h  require 
greater training, technical expertise, a n d  e x p e r i e n c e  a n d  m a y  present difficulties for smaller firms w i t h  
limited resources
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• Public c o n c e r n  o v e r  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's responsibility to detect fraud a n d  the resulting 
increased e x p o s u r e  to litigation, w h i c h  c a n  e n c o u r a g e  i m p r o v e d  audit quality, but also c a n  result in 
decisions b a s e d  o n  potential liability rather than o n  appropriate a c c o u n t i n g  or auditing principles.
T h e  research study also identifies the f o l lowi ng forces, internal to public a c c o u n t i n g  firms, that potentially 
c a n  affect audit quality:
• Staff c o m p e t e n c e ,  w h i c h  is influenced by, a m o n g  other things, a firm's hiring practices a n d  the quality 
o f  e xp erie nce a n d  training received b y  its staff
• Individual motivation, w h i c h  is influenced b y  c o m p e n s a t i o n  levels, other organizational incentives, a n d  
o v e r t i m e  levels
• T i m e  b u d g e t  pressure, w h i c h  c a n  e n c o u r a g e  i n d e p e n d e n t  public a ccountants to substitute l o w e r  quality 
audit e v i d e n c e  or to o m i t  specific auditing procedures.
N o n a u d i t  S e r v i c e s  a n d  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t ' s  I n d e p e n d e n c e
T h i s  briefing p a p e r  s u m m a r i z e s  the historical d e b a t e  c o n c e r n i n g  n o n a u d i t  services p r o v i d e d  b y  a public 
c o m p a n y ' s  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant. In d o i n g  so, the p a p e r  presents the a r g u m e n t s  m a d e  d u r ing the 
late 1 9 7 0 s  c o n c e r n i n g  the desirability o f  public disclosure o f  n o n a u d i t  services. It discusses S E C  A c c o u n t i n g  
Series R e l e a s e  N o .  2 5 0 ,  w h i c h  required disclosure of  n o n a u d i t  services p e r f o r m e d  b y  a public c o m p a n y ' s  
auditor, a n d  N o .  2 6 3 ,  w h i c h  discussed the factors the S E C  believed relevant to a n  audit c o m m i t t e e ' s  
evaluation o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's i n d e p e n d e n c e .  T h e  p a p e r  also s u m m a r i z e s  the factors that 
led the S E C  to rescind b o t h  releases.
T h e  p a p e r  c o n c l u d e s  b y  s u m m a r i z i n g  the results o f  t w o  recent s ur veys that deal w i t h  this issue: (1) " A  
S u r v e y  o f  Perceptions, K n o w l e d g e ,  a n d  Attitudes T o w a r d  C P A s  a n d  the A c c o u n t i n g  P r o f ess ion, " c o n ­
d u c t e d  o n  behalf o f  the A I C P A  b y  L o u i s  Harris a n d  Associates, Inc. (released O c t o b e r  1 9 8 6 )  a n d  (2) " P u b l i c  
Perceptions of  M a n a g e m e n t  A d v i s o r y  Services P e r f o r m e d  b y  C P A  F i r m s  for A u d i t  Clients," c o n d u c t e d  for 
the Public O v e r s i g h t  B o a r d  b y  A u d i t s  a n d  S u r v e y s ,  Inc. (released N o v e m b e r  1986).
P u b l i c  A c c o u n t i n g  P r o f e s s i o n ' s  S e l f - R e g u l a t o r y  P r o g r a m s
T h i s  briefing p a p e r  s u m m a r i z e s  the current self-regulatory p r o g r a m s  o f  the public a c c o u n t i n g  profession. T h e  
paper, w h i c h  d r e w  its information f r o m  current literature a n d  A I C P A  m a n u a l s ,  discusses several k e y  
c o m p o n e n t s  o f  the profession's s y s t e m  o f  self-regulation. T h e s e  include the A I C P A  D i v i s i o n  for C P A  Fir m s ,  
consisting of  the S E C  Practice Section a n d  the Private C o m p a n i e s  Practice Section, the Public O v e r s i g h t  
B o a r d ,  the p e e r  r e v i e w  process, co n c u r r i n g  or s e c o n d  partner reviews, the Special Investigations C o m m i t t e e  
a n d  quality control standards. In c o n junc tion w i t h  the discussion o f  the p e e r  r e v i e w  process, the briefing 
p a p e r  s u m m a r i z e s  the p ee r r e v i e w  results d u r i n g  the last 3 years for the 1 4  largest public a c c o u n t i n g  firms.
R e p o r t s  o n  I n t e r n a l  C o n t r o l  b y  I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t s
T h i s  briefing p a p e r  s u m m a r i z e s  current auditing standards as they relate to the i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
accountant's evaluation o f  internal control a n d  his reports to m a n a g e m e n t .  T h e s e  standards include State­
m e n t s  o n  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  N o .  1, Section 3 2 0 ,  T h e  Auditor's S t u d y  a n d  E v a l u a t i o n  o f  Internal Control; 
N o .  20, R e q u i r e d  C o m m u n i c a t i o n  o f  M a t e r i a l  W e a k n e s s e s  in Internal A c c o u n t i n g  C ontrol; a n d  N o .  30, 
R e p o r t i n g  o n  Internal A c c o u n t i n g  Control. A m o n g  other things, these standards require the i n d e p e n d e n t  
public a c c o u n t a n t  to i n f o r m  the c o m p a n y ' s  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  audit c o m m i t t e e  or b o a r d  o f  directors of  
material w e a k n e s s e s  in the c o m p a n y ' s  s y s t e m  o f  internal a c c o u n t i n g  control n o t e d  d u r i n g  the audit.
T h e  p a p e r  presents five alternatives to the current professional g u i d a n c e  a n d  discusses the costs a n d  benefits 
o f  e a c h  alternative. T h e  p a p e r  c o n c l u d e s  b y  s u m m a r i z i n g  the significant c h a n g e s  in auditing standards 
c o n t e m p l a t e d  in the p r o p o s e d  S t a t e m e n t  o n  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  entitled T h e  Auditor's Responsibility f o r
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A s s e s s i n g  C o n t r o l  Risk, a n d  T h e  C o m m u n i c a t i o n  o f  Control-Structure R e l a t e d  M a t t e r s  N o t e d  in a n  Audit. 
T h e s e  pro posals are i ntended to clarify a n d  b r o a d e n  the types o f  controls a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accou n t a n t  
considers d u r i n g  the c o u r s e  o f  his audit, e x t e n d  the m i n i m u m  level o f  internal control r e v iew, a n d  clarify 
the types o f  situations reg arding the c o m p a n y ' s  internal controls that s h o u l d  b e  c o m m u n i c a t e d  to m a n a g e ­
m e n t  a n d  the audit c o m m i t t e e .  If adopted, these proposals w o u l d  replace S A S  N o .  1, Section 3 20 , a n d  S A S  
N o .  20.
S e c o n d  P a r t n e r  R e v i e w
T h i s  briefing p a p e r  s u m m a r i z e s  the e m e r g e n c e  o f  s e c o n d  partner reviews, e n u m e r a t e s  the current S E C P S  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  c o n c e r n i n g  these reviews, a n d  describes the policies that a g r o u p  o f  national public a c c o u n t i n g  
firms h a v e  for i m p l e m e n t i n g  s e c o n d  partner review. T h e  p a p e r  notes that the firms' s e c o n d  partner r e v i e w  
policies v a r y  f r o m  general guidelines to m o r e  detailed instructions.
S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d
T h i s  briefing p a p e r  contrasts the organizational structure o f  the A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  ( A S B ) ,  the b o d y  
responsible for establishing generally a c c e p t e d  auditing standards, a n d  the Financial A c c o u n t i n g  Sta n d a r d s  
B o a r d  ( F A S B ) ,  the b o d y  responsible for establishing generally a c c e p t e d  a c c o u n t i n g  principles. T h e  briefing 
p a p e r  also s u m m a r i z e s  the C o h e n  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  ( 1 9 7 8 )  c o n c e r n i n g  the auditing standard- 
setting process a n d  presents a n u m b e r  o f  potential c h a n g e s  to the A S B .  T h e  p a p e r  c o n c l u d e s  b y  discussing 
the anticipated benefits a n d  costs o f  t w o  possible modifications of  the A S B :  (1) m o v i n g  to a smaller, full-time 
b o d y ,  a n d  (2) including a  larger n u m b e r  o f  representatives o n  the A S B  f r o m  outside the public a c c o u n t i n g  
profession.
R e g u l a t o r y  a n d  L e g a l  E n v i r o n m e n t
C r i m i n a l  L a w  E n f o r c e m e n t  S u r v e y
T h i s  research s u r v e y  a s k e d  the 7 1  m e m b e r s  o f  the W h i t e  Collar C r i m e  C o m m i t t e e  o f  the A m e r i c a n  B a r  
Association's C r i m i n a l  Justice Section w h e t h e r  the regulatory a n d  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  e n v i r o n m e n t  m a y  h a v e  
tolerated unwittingly or contributed to the inc idence o f  fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  m a j o r  conclusions 
d r a w n  f r o m  the 2 0  r e s p o n d e n t s  were:
• O v e r  7 5  percent c o n s i d e r e d  fraudulent financial reporting to b e  as i m p o r t a n t  a  p r o b l e m  as insider trading 
a n d  c o m m o d i t i e s  fraud.
• M o r e  than 5 0  percent believed that increased sanctions (jail t e r m s  a n d  fines) against c o n v i c t e d  offenders 
w o u l d  b e  highly effective in deterring or pre vent ing fraudulent financial reporting.
• M o r e  than two-thirds a g r e e d  to s o m e  d e g r e e  that the current level o f  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  resources directed 
to fraudulent financial reporting is deficient a n d  s h o u l d  b e  increased.
• E i g hty- nine percent c o n s i d e r e d  the public c o m p a n y ' s  shareholders to b e  the cate g o r y  o f  p e r s o n s  m o s t  
adversely affected b y  fraudulent financial reporting.
L e g i s l a t i v e  Initiatives R e l a t i n g  to F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
T h i s  briefing p a p e r  s u m m a r i z e s  the potential i m p a c t  o n  financial reporting o f  several bills introduced during 
the 9 9 t h  C o n g r e s s .  T h e s e  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  initiatives include a provision in the T a x  R e f o r m  A c t  o f  1 9 8 6  that 
treats one -hal f o f  a corporation's adjusted net b o o k  i n c o m e  in e x c ess o f  the alternative m i n i m u m  taxable 
i n c o m e  as a tax preference. T h i s  provision d r e w  the attention o f  the F A S B  b e c a u s e  o f  c o n c e r n s  (1) that 
linking financial reporting a n d  tax regulations c o u l d  h a v e  a n  ad v e r s e  i m p a c t  o n  financial a c c o u n t i n g  
standard-setting, a n d  (2) that the provision m a y  p r o v i d e  public c o m p a n i e s  w i t h  a  n e w  incentive for fraud­
1 1 8
ulent financial reporting— r e d u c i n g  their federal taxes. O t h e r  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  initiatives ( n o n e  o f  w h i c h  w a s  
e n a c t e d  into l aw ) p r o p o s e d  a m e n d m e n t s  to the bribery a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  provisions of  the F o r e i g n  C o r r u p t  
Practices A c t  o f  1977.
O v e r v i e w  o f  D i s c l o s u r e  R e q u i r e m e n t s  a n d  E n f o r c e m e n t  U n d e r  F e d e r a l  a n d  S t a t e  S e c u r i t i e s  L a w s
T h i s  briefing p a p e r  s u m m a r i z e s  the portions o f  the federal a n d  state securities l a w s  that are relevant to the 
C o m m i s s i o n ' s  study o f  fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  m a j o r  topics incl u d e d  are the p u r p o s e  a n d  
disclosure r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  the Securities A c t  o f  1 9 3 3  a n d  the Securities E x c h a n g e  A c t  o f  19 3 4 ,  a d m i n i s ­
trative a n d  civil injunctive e n f o r c e m e n t  provisions o f  the federal securities laws, criminal penalties for 
violations o f  the federal securities laws, private c a u ses of  action u n d e r  the federal securities laws, state l a w  
actions, a n d  p r i m a r y  a n d  s e c o n d a r y  liability for securities l a w s  violations.
P u b l i c - P r i v a t e  D e b a t e  o n  R u l e  2(e) P r o c e e d i n g s
T h i s  briefing p a p e r  s u m m a r i z e s  the issues c o n c e r n i n g  p r o p o s e d  a m e n d m e n t s  to o n e  o f  the S E C ' s  rules o f  
practice, R u l e  2(e). T h a t  rule gives the S E C  the p o w e r  to d e n y  a n  individual the right to practice before it 
tem porarily or p e r m a n e n t l y .  S u b p a r t  (7) o f  the rule p rovides that all hearings "shall b e  n o n p u b l i c  unless the 
S E C  o n  its o w n  m o t i o n  or the request o f  a n o ther party o t h erwi se directs."
T h e  p a p e r  notes that o n  S e p t e m b e r  29, 19 8 6 ,  the S E C  p u b l i s h e d  for c o m m e n t  alternative a m e n d m e n t s  to 
R u l e  2(e)(7) that w o u l d  p r o v i d e  for (1) public R u l e  2(e) proceedings, (2) public p r o c e e d i n g s  o n l y  in certain 
circumstances, or (3) a  r e q u i r e m e n t  that the S E C  d e t e r m i n e  o n  a case-by-case basis w h e t h e r  the h ea ring shall 
b e  public or non public. T h e  p a p e r  s u m m a r i z e s  the a r g u m e n t s  for altering R u l e  2(e)(7) that the S E C  included 
in the S e p t e m b e r  29, 1 9 8 6 ,  request for c o m m e n t s ,  a n d  the a r g u m e n t s  against public R u l e  2(e) p r o c e e d i n g s  
incl u d e d  in the public r e s p o n s e  to a similar p roposal the S E C  m a d e  in 1974.
G e n e r a l
A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  P r o p o s e d  F i n a n c i a l  F r a u d  D e t e c t i o n  a n d  D i s c l o s u r e  A c t  o f  1 9 8 6
T h i s  briefing p a p e r  includes a section-by-section s u m m a r y  o f  the provisions o f  the original Financial F r a u d  
D e t e c t i o n  a n d  Dis closure A c t  o f  1 9 8 6  ( H . R .  4 8 8 6 ) ,  introduced o n  M a y  22, 1 9 8 6 ,  a n d  the revised bill ( H . R .  
543 9 ) ,  introduced o n  A u g u s t  15, 1986. T h e  bill is a n  o u t g r o w t h  o f  the H o u s e  E n e r g y  a n d  C o m m e r c e  
C o m m i t t e e ,  O v e r s i g h t  a n d  Investigations S u b c o m m i t t e e ,  hearings o n  the public a c c o u n t i n g  profession, 
financial reporting b y  public c o m p a n i e s ,  a n d  the S E C ' s  oversight a n d  e n f o r c e m e n t  activities.
A n a l y s i s  o f  R e l a t e d  S t u d i e s  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
T h i s  report s u m m a r i z e s  the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  related to fraudulent financial reporting that w e r e  i ncluded in 
the fol l o w i n g  13 studies:
• I m p r o v i n g  the Accountability o f  Publicly O w n e d  C o r p o r a t i o n s  a n d  T h e i r  A u d i t o r s , S e n a t e  S u b c o m m i t t e e  
o n  Reports, A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t ,  L e e  Metcalf, C h a i r m a n ,  1977.
• F e d e r a l  R e g u l a t i o n  a n d  R e g u l a t o r y  R e f o r m ,  H o u s e  S u b c o m m i t t e e  o n  O v e r s i g h t  a n d  Investigations, J o h n  
E. M o s s ,  C h a i r m a n ,  1976.
• T h e  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t i n g  R e g u l a t o r y  Act, H . R .  1 3 1 7 5 ,  J u n e  16, 197 8, I n t r o d u c e d  b y  C o n g r e s s m a n  J o h n  
M o s s .
• T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  Auditors' Responsibilities: Report, C o n c l u s i o n s  a n d  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  A I C P A ,  
M a n u e l  F. C o h e n ,  C h a i r m a n ,  1978.
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R e s truc turi ng Professional S t a n d a r d s  to A c h i e v e  Professional E x c e l l e n c e  in a  C h a n g i n g  E n v i r o n m e n t ,  
A I C P A ,  G e o r g e  D .  A n d e r s o n ,  C h a i r m a n ,  April 16, 1986.
T h e  F u t u r e  R e l e v a n c e ,  Reliability, a n d  Credibility o f  F i n a n c i a l  Information, ( R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  to the 
A I C P A  B o a r d  o f  Directors) b y  A r t h u r  A n d e r s e n  &  C o . ,  A r t h u r  Y o u n g ,  C o o p e r s  &  L y b r a n d ,  Deloitte 
H a s k i n s  +  Sells, Ernst &  W h i n n e y ,  Peat, M a r w i c k ,  Mitchell &  C o . ,  a n d  T o u c h e  R o s s  &  C o . ,  April 
1986.
C h a l l e n g e  a n d  O p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  the A c c o u n t i n g  Profession: S t r e n g t h e n i n g  the Public's Conf i d e n c e ,  Price 
W a t e r h o u s e ,  D e c e m b e r  1985.
A  Q u e s t  f o r  Excellence, F i n a l  R e p o r t  to the President, President's B l u e  R i b b o n  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  D e f e n s e  
M a n a g e m e n t ,  D a v i d  P a c k a r d ,  C h a i r m a n ,  J u n e  1986.
P r e p a r i n g  f o r  S p e cial E x a m i n a t i o n s  o f  F e d e r a l  C r o w n  C o r p o r a t i o n s :  A  Status R ep ort, C a n a d i a n  C o m ­
p r e h e n s i v e  A u d i t i n g  F o u n d a t i o n ,  S e p t e m b e r  1985.
T h e  E x t r a  M i l e — A  C o m m i t m e n t  to S o u n d n e s s  a n d  Service in B a n k i n g ,  A m e r i c a n  B a n k e r s  Association, 
July 1986.
R e p o r t  o f  the W o r k i n g  P a r t y  o n  F r a u d  S u b m i t t e d  to the G e n e r a l  P u r p o s e s  a n d  F i n a n c e  C o m m i t t e e  o f  the 
Institute o f  C h a r t e r e d  A c c o u n t a n t s  in E n g l a n d  a n d  W a l e s ,  July 1985.
T h e  R e p o r t  o f  the Special C o m m i t t e e  to E x a m i n e  the R o l e  o f  the Auditor, C a n a d i a n  Institute o f  C h a r t e r e d  
A c c o u n t a n t s ,  197 8.
S u b s t a n d a r d  C P A  A u d i t s  o f  F e d e r a l  F i n a n c i a l  Assis t a n c e  F u n d s — T h e  A c c o u n t i n g  Pr o f e s s i o n  is Failing 
the T a x p a y e r s ,  H . R .  9 9 - 9 7 0 ,  T h e  H o u s e  C o m m i t t e e  o n  G o v e r n m e n t  Operations, J a c k  B r o o k s ,  C h a i r ­
m a n ,  O c t o b e r  7, 1986.
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A p p e n d i x  E
C O M P O S I T E  C A S E  S T U D I E S  I N  
F R A U D U L E N T  F I N A N C I A L  R E P O R T I N G ,  
H A R V A R D  B U S I N E S S  S C H O O L
D i s c t e c h  Inc.
O n  a g r e y  D e c e m b e r  d a y  in 1 9 8 5  M r .  W i l l i a m  W i n s l o w ,  the n e w l y  a p p o i n t e d  president o f  D i s c t e c h  Inc., 
sat at his d e s k  c o n t e m p l a t i n g  the future o f  the c o m p a n y .  D i s c t e c h  h a d  b e e n  the rising star o f  the c o m p u t e r  
disk m e m o r y  industry. After g o i n g  public in 1 9 7 9 ,  sales h a d  g r o w n  at a c o m p o u n d  rate o f  3 3 %  a n d  earnings 
h a d  g r o w n  at 4 7 % .  E a r n i n g s  per share ( E P S )  h a d  risen e v e r y  quarter, a n d  the stock price h a d  increased f r o m  
$ 3 . 0 0  a  share in 1 9 7 9  to $ 6 7 . 5 0  a  share in O c t o b e r  198 5. ( S e e  Exhibits 1 a n d  2  for financial data.)
In just the last w e e k  the entire fortune o f  the c o m p a n y  c h a n g e d  for the w o r s e  as the c o m p a n y  w a s  r o c k e d  
b y  reports o f  fraudulent sales, inflated inventory values, a n d  possible insider stock trading. T h e  b o a r d  of 
directors h a d  s t e p p e d  in a n d  a s k e d  the chief exe cutive officer ( C E O ) ,  chief financial officer ( C F O ) ,  a n d  the 
executive vice president for sales a n d  m a r k e t i n g  to take leave w i t h o u t  p a y  until their investigation o f  the 
mat t e r  w a s  c o m p l e t e ,  a n d  they abruptly resigned. T h e  b o a r d  also selected a  n e w  p r e s i d e n t / C E O ,  M r .  
W i n s l o w ,  a n d  retained a n  outside l a w  firm to c o n d u c t  a n  investigation o f  possible improprieties.
Bill W i n s l o w  v i e w e d  his j o b  for the n ex t f e w  m o n t h s  as reorganizing the c o m p a n y  to get it t h r o u g h  this 
difficult period. T h i s  w o u l d  require identifying a n d  relieving the stresses that h a d  b r o u g h t  o n  this crisis a n d  
restoring e m p l o y e e ,  c o n s u m e r  a n d  investor c o n f i d e n c e  in the c o m p a n y .
T h e  H a r d  D i s k  I n d u s t r y
D i s c t e c h  m a n u f a c t u r e d  a n d  sold disk drives. D i s k s  are circular platters c o v e r e d  w i t h  m a g n e t i c  material o n  
w h i c h  data are r e c o r d e d  in concentric circles. D i s k s  access data m o r e  s l o w l y  t ha n true r a n d o m  access devices 
like s e m i c o n d u c t o r s  or m a g n e t i c  cores b u t  faster than m a g n e t i c  tape. S i n c e  the m i d - 1 9 6 0 s ,  disks h a d  
d o m i n a t e d  the rapid access portion of  the data storage market.
A l t h o u g h  disk t e c h n o l o g y  w a s  well-established, the m a r k e t  w a s  fast-growing a n d  d y n a m i c .  D a t a  capacity 
w a s  d o u b l i n g  e v e r y  three years, a n d  this trend w a s  e x p e c t e d  to continue. M a r k e t  positions c h a n g e d  rapidly, 
a n d  disk drive m a n u f a c t u r e r s  h a d  to k e e p  u p  w i t h  technological a d v a n c e s  in ord er to survive.
T h e  m a r k e t  for disk drives c a n  b e  divided into t w o  distinct sub m a r k e t s :  o n e  for disks installed as part o f  large 
c o m p u t e r  s y s t e m s  a n d  o n e  for those installed as part o f  m i n i c o m p u t e r  systems. T h e  m a r k e t  for large 
c o m p u t e r  disk drives w a s  d o m i n a t e d  b y  I B M ,  a l t h o u g h  other large m a i n f r a m e  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  s u c h  as S p e r r y  
a n d  C o n t r o l  D a t a  also m a d e  disk drives for their o w n  use. I n d e p e n d e n t  disk drive m a n u f a c t u r e r s  s e r ved this 
m a r k e t  b y  s u p p l y i n g  I B M  p l u g - c o m p a t i b l e  s y s t e m s  directly to e n d  users. I n d e p e n d e n t  disk drive m a n u f a c ­
turers concentrated o n  replacing I B M  drives b e c a u s e  the sales v o l u m e  for n o n - I B M  m o d e l s  w a s  c o n s i d e r e d  
too small. T h e  m a i n f r a m e  disk drive m a r k e t  w a s  e x p e c t e d  to g r o w  at a b o u t  5 %  p e r  year.
T h e  m a r k e t  for m i n i c o m p u t e r  disk drives, in w h i c h  D i s c t e c h  participated, w a s  highly competitive. S o m e  
leading m i n i c o m p u t e r  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  m a d e  s o m e  o f  their o w n  disk drives, b u t  m o s t  m i n i c o m p u t e r  m a n u -
C o p y r i g h t  ©  1 9 8 6  b y  the P r esident a n d  F e l l o w s  o f  H a r v a r d  C ol le ge .  H a r v a r d  B u s i n e s s  S c h o o l  c a s e  9 - 1 8 7 - 0 6 6 .  
T h i s  c a s e  w a s  p r e p a r e d  b y  J o s e p h  P. M u l l o y  u n d e r  the direction o f  K e n n e t h  A .  M e r c h a n t  as the basis for class dis cu ss i on  rather t ha n  
to illustrate either effective o r  ineffective h a n d l i n g  o f  a n  administrative situation. T h e  c a s e  is b a s e d  o n  k n o w l e d g e  o f  actual c o m p a n y  
situations, b u t  the facts h a v e  b e e n  disguised, a n d  a n y  r e s e m b l a n c e  to actual p e o p l e  o r  e v e n t s  is unintentional. R e p r i n t e d  b y  p e r m i s s i o n  
o f  the H a r v a r d  B u s i n e s s  S c h o o l .
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facturers w e r e  part o f  the Original E q u i p m e n t  M a n u f a c t u r e r  ( O E M )  m a r k e t  serviced b y  a large n u m b e r  of  
small i n d e p e n d e n t  disk drive man ufacturers. T h i s  m a r k e t  w a s  e x p e c t e d  to g r o w  2 5 - 3 0 %  p e r  year.
D i s c t e c h
D i s c t e c h  w a s  f o u n d e d  in 1 9 7 7  b y  M r .  J o h n  G a r v e y ,  a n  exe cutive w h o  h a d  left his j o b  w i t h  a large 
m a n u f a c t u r e r  o f  m i n i c o m p u t e r s  a n d  c o m p u t e r  disk m e m o r i e s .  J o h n  w a s  a n  electrical e n g i n e e r  b y  training, 
but w a s  better k n o w n  for his interest in a n d  talent for organizing. J o h n  h a d  felt constrained b y  the staid 
corporate e n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  w a n t e d  to venture out o n  his o w n .  H e  felt that w i t h  a g o o d  product, g o o d  
marke t i n g ,  a n d  the right pitch to the capital m a r k e t s  a "killing c o u l d  b e  m a d e . "  T h r e e  other talented 
executives left the large c o m p a n y  to join w i t h  J o h n  in his n e w  end e a v o r :  E d  St e i n b o r n  (controller for the 
large m a n u f a c t u r e r )  b e c a m e  Disctech's chief financial officer, Peter Farrell (director o f  m a n u f a c t u r i n g )  
b e c a m e  the vice president for D e s i g n  a n d  Operations, a n d  M a r y  F o l e y  ( m a n a g e r  o f  M i n i c o m p u t e r  M a r ­
keting) b e c a m e  the executive vice president for Sales a n d  M a r k e t i n g .  (S e e  Exhibit 3  for a n  organization 
chart.)
T h e  period 1 9 7 7 - 7 8  w a s  spent organizing the corporation a n d  building prototypes o f  the a d v a n c e d  14- a n d  
8-inch disk drives that the c o m p a n y  w o u l d  m ar ket. E a r l y  in 1 9 7 9  the corporation w e n t  public w i t h  3.3 
million shares offered at $ 3 . 0 0  a share. A t  a  large party for shareholders a n d  analysts, J o h n  a n n o u n c e d  that 
the corporation already h a d  significant a m o u n t s  o f  g u a r a n t e e d  sales for its n e w  drives a n d  that h e  e x p e c t e d  
D i s c t e c h  prod u c t s  to b e c o m e  a n  industry standard. J o h n  also stated that the c o m p a n y  e x p e c t e d  to increase 
r e v e n u e s  a n d  earnings p e r  share ( E P S )  b y  a  m i n i m u m  o f  3 0 %  p e r  year.
S i n c e  the inception o f  the c o m p a n y ,  the p l a n n i n g  cycle h a d  b e e n  a  v e r y  simple, t o p - d o w n  process. D u r i n g  
the s u m m e r  o f  e a c h  year, J o h n  m e t  w i t h  M a r y  a n d  E d  a n d  set sales g r o w t h  for the ne x t  year. T h i s  sales figure 
w o u l d  th e n  b e  rolled to the b o t t o m  line usi ng e x p e c t e d  m a r g i n s  a n d  estimates of  fixed e x p e n s e s  to get a net 
i n c o m e  figure a n d  a tentative E P S .  Prior to the b e g i n n i n g  o f  the fiscal y ea r in O c t o b e r ,  these goals for net 
i n c o m e  a n d  E P S  w o u l d  then b e  p a s s e d  d o w n  t h r o u g h  the F i n a n c e  a n d  M a r k e t i n g  organizations w h e r e  they 
b e c a m e  " l a w . "  T h e  D e s i g n  a n d  O p e r a t i o n s  division p l a n n e d  pr o d u c t i o n  f r o m  the e x p e c t e d  r e v e n u e  a n d  
gross m a r g i n  figures, w h i l e  the R & D  b u d g e t  w a s  negotiated separately b e t w e e n  J o h n  a n d  Peter.
Strategies to r e a c h  the a n n u a l  plan w e r e  c o n c e i v e d  a n d  i m p l e m e n t e d  at regularly s c h e d u l e d  " r e v e n u e  
m e e t i n g s . '' A t t e n d e e s  i ncluded Jo h n ,  E d ,  M a r y ,  a n d  the senior p e o p l e  of  the m a r k e t i n g  a n d  sales staff. T h e s e  
m e e t i n g s  primarily s o u g h t  the m e a n s  o f  identifying a n d  generating potential revenues.
R e v e n u e s  for D i s c t e c h  w e r e  d er ived f r o m  the sale a n d  service o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  e q u i p m e n t .  R e v e n u e s  w e r e  
r e c o r d e d  at the t i m e  o f  s h i p m e n t  o f  p roducts or p e r f o r m a n c e  of  services. C u s t o m e r  orders w e r e  initiated b y  
Disctech's receipt o f  a n  E q u i p m e n t  O r d e r  F o r m  ( E O F ) ;  this w a s  either c o m p l e t e d  b y  the c u s t o m e r ,  or 
p r e p a r e d  b y  D i s c t e c h  per s o n n e l  purs u a n t  to a M a s t e r  Sales A g r e e m e n t  sig n e d  b y  the c u s t o m e r .  T h e  E O F  
included a  description o f  the e q u i p m e n t ,  the price o f  the e q u i p m e n t ,  a n d  the earliest e q u i p m e n t  delivery date 
that w a s  acceptable to the c u s tome r.
B o a r d  o f  Di r e c t o r s  a n d  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e .  S i n c e  the c o m p a n y ' s  inception, Disctech's b o a r d  of  directors h a d  
consisted o f  s e v e n  m e m b e r s :  t w o  inside directors (the C E O  a n d  the C F O )  a n d  five outside directors. T h e  
b o a r d  usually m e t  four tim es a  y e a r  to r e v i e w  the corporation's progress a n d  plans for the future. T h e  
m e e t i n g s  w e r e  generally short a n d  standardized, w i t h  J o h n  in control o f  the a g e n d a .  T h e  outside directors 
w e r e  all i m p r e s s e d  w i t h  the c o m p a n y ' s  p e r f o r m a n c e  a n d  the dedication displayed b y  the top officers.
T h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  o f  the b o a r d  consisted o f  three outside directors. T h e  m e m b e r s  of  the A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  
s e r ved three-year t e r m s  o n  a rotating basis, a l t h o u g h  the c h a i r m a n  o f  the c o m m i t t e e  usually s e r ved for a 
lon g e r  period. T h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  generally m e t  twi ce a year, before a n d  after the a n n u a l  audit.
A  n u m b e r  o f  c h a n g e s  c a m e  a b o u t  in 1 9 8 2  after R i c h a r d  (Rich) O ' D o n n e l l ,  a n  outside director, w a s  n a m e d  
as c h a i r m a n  o f  the A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e .  R i c h  firmly believed that a n  audit c o m m i t t e e  " c o u l d  not b e  effective 
w i t h o u t  b e i n g  active." H e  increased the c o m m i t t e e ' s  s c h e d u l e  to at least four m e e t i n g s  a  y ea r a n d  set u p  
private m e e t i n g s  b e t w e e n  the c o m m i t t e e  a n d  the outside auditors. R i c h  tried to get the c o m m i t t e e  to l o o k
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at the c o m p a n y ' s  e x p o s u r e s  a n d  to question discretionary ite ms in the financial statements. H e  s u g g e s t e d  that 
the inside a n d  outside auditors m a k e  s o m e  u n a n n o u n c e d  inspections a n d  audits, a n d  h e  w a n t e d  to strengthen 
the internal audit function, s u c h  as t h r o u g h  training a n d  i m p r o v e d  hiring practices.
R i c h  a d m i t t e d  in 1 9 8 3  that h e  h a d  s o m e  c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  serving o n  a  b o a r d  o f  directors and, particularly, 
o n  a n  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e .
A  m e m b e r  of  a n  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  is a l w a y s  a potential victim o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the outside auditors 
since y o u  d e p e n d  o n  t h e m  so m u c h .  T o  a great extent y o u  h a v e  to trust t h e m .  H o w e v e r ,  I try to set 
a tone o f  w a t c hfu lnes s b y  ask i n g  a lot o f  questions at all o f  o u r  m e e ting s; but I n e e d  to get other b o a r d  
m e m b e r s  to d o  it or I will just l o o k  like a n  old crank.
P e r h a p s  m y  c o n c e r n s  are just excessive caution, h o w e v e r ,  b e c a u s e  it a p p e a r s  that the top officers are 
v e r y  talented, a n d  J o h n  G a r v e y  is v e r y  dedicated to the c o m p a n y .  H e  w a n t s  to m a k e  g o o d  disk drives 
a n d  sell a lot o f  t h e m .
Internal a n d  E x t e r n a l  A u d i t . T h e  Internal A u d i t  division, consisting o f  the h e a d  auditor, D o u g  M c A n e n y ,  
a n d  t w o  staff m e m b e r s ,  reported to E d  S t e inbo rn ( C F O ) .  T h e  p r i m a r y  roles o f  Internal A u d i t  w e r e  to ens u r e  
that corporate a c c o u n t i n g  policies w e r e  f o l l o w e d  a n d  that safeguards existed to e n s u r e  that the c o m p a n y ' s  
assets w e r e  protected. A  s e c o n d a r y  role w a s  to b e  alert to opportunities for cost-cutting a n d  efficiency.
A t  the request of  R i c h  O ' D o n n e l l ,  D o u g  M c A n e n y  h a d  attended s o m e  m e e t i n g s  of  the A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e .  
R i c h  tried to establish a rapport w i t h  D o u g  a n d  assured h i m  that a n y  m i s g i v i n g s  that h e  h a d  a b o u t  anything, 
or a n y o n e ,  in the c o m p a n y  w o u l d  b e  b r o u g h t  to the attention of  the A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e .
Disctech's external audit firm w a s  T o u c h e ,  Y o u n g  a n d  A n d e r s e n  ( T Y A ) ,  a B i g  E i g h t  firm. E a c h  ye a r  in July, 
the auditors m e t  w i t h  top m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  to lay out the s c h e d u l e  o f  the an n u a l  audit 
a n d  to r e v i e w  c h a n g e s  in the c o m p a n y  since the pre viou s year.
1 9 7 9 - 8 2
T h e  years 1 9 7 9 - 8 2  w e r e  v e r y  exciting at Disctech; sales r e v e n u e s  g r e w  at a c o m p o u n d  rate o f  3 9 % .  E v e r y  
quarter the c o m p a n y  a n n o u n c e d  record earnings, a n d  the stock m a r k e t  reacted as J o h n  predicted, w i t h  the 
trading price continually r eaching n e w  highs. J o h n  m a d e  regular a n n o u n c e m e n t s  a b o u t  the c o m p a n y ,  stating 
h o w  earnings w e r e  g o i n g  to c ontinue to g r o w  at a b o v e  industry rates. T h e  total m a r k e t  in 1 9 7 9  for 
m i n i c o m p u t e r  disk m e m o r i e s  at O E M  prices w a s  $2.1 billion, so there w a s  plenty o f  r o o m  for D i s c t e c h  to 
g r o w .
D i s c t e c h  h a d  c o n t i n u e d  to m a k e  m o d e s t  R & D  expenditures, but b y  the m i d d l e  o f  1 9 8 2  its o n c e  " h e a d  o f  
the p a c k "  p roducts w e r e  b e g i n n i n g  to fall b e h i n d  the latest technology. In response, J o h n  applied pressure 
to the P r o d u c t  D e s i g n  division to c o m e  out w i t h  n e w  products, e v e n  if they w e r e  o n l y  slight i m p r o v e m e n t s  
o n  existing products.
1 9 8 3
T h e  sales pattern in 1 9 8 3  p r o v e d  to b e  a little erratic. J o h n  G a r v e y  a n d  M a r y  F o l e y  (Exec u t i v e  V i c e  
President-Sales a n d  M a r k e t i n g )  a g r e e d  that quarterly sales ( a n d  earnings) h a d  to cont i n u e  to g r o w  to k e e p  
the g l o w i n g  i m a g e  o f  D i s c t e c h  alive. T o  m a i n t a i n  this g r o w t h  record, they s o m e t i m e s  f o u n d  it n e c essa ry to 
h a v e  the shipping d e p a r t m e n t  w o r k  round-the-clock d u r ing the last f e w  d a y s  o f  e a c h  quarter in order to p u s h  
as m a n y  orders as possible out the d o o r  so as to r e c o g n i z e  the r e v e n u e  for those transactions.
M a r y  also d e c i d e d  to take a d v a n t a g e  o f  the w a y  s o m e  O E M s  o r d e r e d  disk drives. M a n y  O E M s  w o u l d  place 
a large order for 1 0 0 - 2 0 0  disks, get a discount, a n d  t he n a s k  for delivery at a date 2  to 3 m o n t h s  in the future. 
T h i s  assured t h e m  o f  a s u p p l y  o f  the disks a n d  a delivery date that s u p p o r t e d  their c o m p u t e r  construction 
a n d  s h i p m e n t  schedules. M a n y  tim es a n  order p l a c e d  in o n e  quarter w o u l d  not b e  s c h e d u l e d  for delivery until 
the next quarter. T o  r e c ogni ze these sales in the present period, M a r y  directed that as m a n y  orders as possible
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receive early s h i p m e n t  to the O E M ,  wi t h  the u n d e r s t a n d i n g  that the O E M s  w o u l d  not b e  liable for p a y m e n t  
until the previously a g r e e d - u p o n  delivery dates.
T h e  auditors f r o m  T Y A  q u e s t i o n e d  this early s h i p m e n t  p r o g r a m  but E d  Steinborn w a s  able to c o n v i n c e  t h e m  
that the sales m e t  the r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  " s a l e s "  as defined u n d e r  generally a c c e p t e d  a c c o u n t i n g  principles: 
Title to the disks did transfer to the O E M  u p o n  s h i p m e n t ;  u n d e r  the contract the O E M  w a s  o b l iged to p a y  
D i s c t e c h  for the disks; a n d  D i s c t e c h  did contact the O E M  prior to s h i p m e n t  to get their authorization. W h a t  
w a s  not clear at the t i m e  w a s  that s o m e  o f  these authorizations w e r e  verbal: the salesperson responsible for 
a n  a c c o u n t  w o u l d  get the authorization a n d  call it b a c k  to the h o m e  office.
T h i s  early s h i p m e n t  policy w a s  fine w it h s o m e  O E M s ,  but m a n y  other O E M s  did not h a v e  extra storage r o o m  
a n d  w o u l d  not accept early delivery. T h e  salespeople w e r e  told to " u s e  their i m a g i n a t i o n s "  a n d  find storage 
at the local D i s c t e c h  distributor or another c o n v e n i e n t  location. T h e  c o m p a n y  n e e d e d  the sales a n d  the 
salespeople w e r e  told to " g e t  as m a n y  authorizations as possible."
T h e  net result o f  these t w o  policies w a s  that b y  the e n d  o f  1 9 8 3  r e v e n u e s  h a d  g r o w n  f r o m  $ 8 1 . 1  million to 
$ 1 0 7 . 1  million, b u t  $ 5 . 9  million o f  the 1 9 8 3  sales w e r e  for disks originally s c h e d u l e d  for delivery in 1984. 
( O f  the $ 5 . 9  million, $ 3 . 7  million w e r e  s h i p p e d  w i t h o u t  a valid authorization.)
1 9 8 4
T h e  o n l y  m a j o r  c h a n g e  at D i s c t e c h  in 1 9 8 4  w a s  in m a r k e t i n g  policy. J o h n  G a r v e y  h a d  l o n g  t h o u g h t  that the 
m i n i c o m p u t e r  m e m o r y  industry w o u l d  s l o w l y  e v o l v e  to b e c o m e  m o r e  like the m a i n f r a m e  business, with 
f e w e r  sales to c o m p u t e r  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  a n d  m o r e  sales directly to e n d  users. T h i s  evolution w a s  accelerated 
as the e c o n o m y  s l o w e d ,  as m a n y  c o m p a n i e s  held o n t o  the s y s t e m s  they already h a d  installed. J o h n  believed 
that a truism o f  c o m p u t e r s — " i n f o r m a t i o n  to b e  stored, quickly g r o w s  to fill all available m e m o r y " — w o u l d  
b e  the salvation o f  Disctech. M o r e  salespeople w e r e  hired, a n d  the sales force w a s  directed to start 
a p p r o a c h i n g  all current users of  m i n i c o m p u t e r s  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  D i s c t e c h  disk m e m o r i e s  to attempt to 
generate sales in this potentially large market.
After the results o f  the s e c o n d  quarter w e r e  a n n o u n c e d  (another record high), J o h n  called M a r y ,  E d ,  a n d  
Peter together for a private meet i n g .  J o h n  indicated that h e  w a s  v e r y  p r o u d  of  their results a n d  that h e  k n e w  
they w o u l d  cont i n u e  to o u t p e r f o r m  the industry. H e  p o i nted out, h o w e v e r ,  that e a c h  quarter's goals h a d  b e e n  
h a r der a n d  har d e r  to reach, a n d  that delays in the c o m p l e t i o n  o f  n e w  disk designs a n d  pro totype construction 
a n d  the g r o w i n g  o b s o l e s c e n c e  o f  their inventory m i g h t  level or e v e n  d ecrease the c o m p a n y ' s  short-term 
earnings.
J o h n  w e n t  o n  to say that w i t h  his children nearing college a g e  h e  n e e d e d  a lot o f  m o n e y  set aside that w a s  
not tied u p  in risky investments. A s  a  result h e  h a d  b e g u n  quietly to sell s o m e  o f  his D i s c t e c h  stock, w h i c h  
h a d  appreciated so  m u c h  since 1979. H e  told t h e m  h e  w a s  still optimistic a b o u t  the c o m p a n y ' s  future but 
that it m i g h t  b e  w i s e  for t h e m  to l o o k  carefully at their o w n  financial needs. If they w e r e  g o i n g  to sell stock, 
h e  r e m i n d e d  t h e m  that they w o u l d  h a v e  to i n f o r m  the Securities a n d  E x c h a n g e  C o m m i s s i o n  o f  the sales, but 
h e  u r g e d  t h e m  to b e  discreet a b o u t  the sales in all other w a y s .
T h e  m a r k e t i n g  shift t o w a r d  m e m o r y  e n d  users w a s  a big success a n d  significantly contributed to another 
record year, a n d  early s h i p m e n t s  c o n t i n u e d  to increase as the m a r k e t i n g  d e p a r t m e n t  pressured O E M s  a n d  
salespeople for early authorization. Total sales for the y e a r  w e r e  $ 1 3 4 . 9  million. E a r l y - s h i p m e n t  r e v e n u e s  
w e r e  $ 1 2 . 4  million o f  w h i c h  $ 9 . 8  million w a s  s h i p p e d  w i t h o u t  a valid authorization.
I n v e n t o r y  C o n t r o l  a n d  R e s e r v e s  f o r  O b s o l e s c e n c e
I n v ento ry at D i s c t e c h  w a s  b r o k e n  d o w n  into three categories: r a w  materials, w o r k  in process ( W I P )  a n d  
finished g o o d s  inventory (FGI). In 1 9 8 1 ,  o v e r  8 5 %  of  total inventory w a s  in F G I ,  a n d  this perce n t a g e  
increased in later years. T h i s  u n u s u a l  inventory m i x  w a s  the result o f  a general shortage o f  r a w  materials 
in the industry, a n d  D i s c t e c h  a n d  other m a n u f a c t u r e r s  r e s p o n d e d  b y  s e n d i n g  r a w  materials directly to the
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p r o d u c t i o n  line. In addition, D i s c t e c h  w a n t e d  as little wo r k - i n - p r o c e s s  inventory as possible b e c a u s e  partially 
a s s e m b l e d  disk drives w e r e  highly susceptible to d a m a g e ;  e v e n  the slightest dirt or de n t  r e n d e r e d  the disk 
or its drive unit inoperable.
A s s e m b l e d  units w e r e  tested a n d  then stored until sale a n d  shi p m e n t .  T h e  c o m p a n y ' s  first-year produ c t i o n  
capacity w a s  v e r y  limited, so units w e r e  s h i p p e d  out as s o o n  as they w e r e  a s s e m b l e d .  Efforts to i m p r o v e  
efficiency a n d  cleanliness raised p r o d u c t i o n  yields, a n d  b y  1 9 8 0  p r o d u c t i o n  b e g a n  to p r o d u c e  drives for 
inventory.
In 1 9 8 2  the D e s i g n  Div isio n b e g a n  to m a k e  a large n u m b e r  o f  small i m p r o v e m e n t s  to the disk drives to ensure 
that the p r o d u c t  r e m a i n e d  competitive. T h i s  h a d  a large effect o n  inventory levels. D i s a s s e m b l i n g  the 
finished disk drive often c a u s e d  c o m p l e t e  disk failure, a n d  as a result v e r y  little r e w o r k  o n  F G I  drives w a s  
do n e .  Instead, n e w  drives in p r o d u c t i o n  w o u l d  b e  m o d i f i e d  a n d  then a s s e m b l e d .  T h u s  e a c h  c h a n g e  or 
alteration created another layer o f  F G I  slightly different f r o m  the last.
Disctech's policy for creating reserves for o b s o l e s c e n c e  o f  inv entory wa s :
• A n y  e q u i p m e n t  o v e r  t w o  years old w o u l d  b e  reserved at 5 %  per quarter for five years so that at the e n d  
o f  s e v e n  years there w o u l d  b e  a 1 0 0 %  reserve.
• A n y  e q u i p m e n t  declared u n m a r k e t a b l e  w o u l d  h a v e  a 1 0 0 %  reserve tak en against it.
T h e s e  rules resulted in small reserves. V e r y  little e q u i p m e n t  that w a s  technically obsolete w a s  actually ve r y  
old. M o r e o v e r ,  D i s c t e c h  h a d  n o  corporate standards or  guidelines for d e t e r m i n i n g  w h e n  disk drives b e c a m e  
u n m a r k e t a b l e .  T h i s  p r o b l e m  w a s  intensified b y  the corporate attitude that D i s c t e c h  e q u i p m e n t  w a s  not 
subject to obsolescence.
A t  the e n d  o f  1 9 8 2  a pr o d u c t i o n  controller f o r w a r d e d  a m e m o  via Peter Farrell to the C F O  a n d  the executive 
vice president for Sales a n d  M a r k e t i n g  that s u m m a r i z e d  a  study h e  h a d  d o n e  o n  the g r o w i n g  inventory 
p r o b l e m .  It listed three r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s :
1. A  study to p r o d u c e  a  n e w  reserve policy, since it a p p e a r e d  that the p r o d u c t  life cycle w a s  far shorter 
than five years.
2. A n  intensive effort b y  the M a r k e t i n g  d e p a r t m e n t  to sell the older inventory as s o o n  as possible.
3. A n  increase in the reserve for o b s o l e s c e n c e  f r o m  $ 8 0 0 , 0 0 0  to $ 1 . 4  million.
T h i s  m e m o  w a s  dis cussed b y  the senior corporate officers w h o  all felt that the p r o b l e m  w a s  not that serious; 
t he y w e r e  absolutely unwilling to increase the reserve b y  a n y  a m o u n t .  M a r k e t i n g ,  h o w e v e r ,  a t t e m p t e d  to 
stimulate sales o f  the older disk drives w i t h  various specials, discounts, a n d  p r o m o t i o n s .  T h e  C F O  also stated 
that h e  w o u l d  "closely w a t c h  the inventory p r o b l e m . "
In 1 9 8 3  the a m o u n t  o f  obsolete inventory g r e w  faster than the reserves, a n d  b y  the e n d  o f  the fiscal ye a r  the 
deficit w a s  est imated b y  the p r o d u c t i o n  controller to b e  a l m o s t  $ 2 . 4  million. T h e  outside auditors did not 
see the total extent o f  the p r o b l e m  but they did question the reserve policy in their m a n a g e m e n t  letter.
C o n t i n u a l  m o n i t o r i n g  o f  D i s c t e c h ' s  F G I  r e s e r v e  p o l i c y  is r e q u i r e d  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  s h o u l d  b e  i m p l e m e n t e d  to 
d e v e l o p  historical e x p e r i e n c e  to m e a s u r e  the p r o p r i e t y  o f  the f o r m u l a  a d o p t e d .  T h e  p o l i c y  s h o u l d  also b e  e x t e n d e d  
to r e c o g n i z e  o b s o l e s c e n c e  o f  p r o d u c t s  n o  l o n g e r  in p r o d u c t i o n  s o o n e r  t h a n  r e q u i r e d  b y  the p r e s e n t  f o r m u l a .
Disctech's m a n a g e m e n t  a c k n o w l e d g e d  the auditors' report but also i n f o r m e d  the A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  that they 
already h a d  d o n e  a n  internal study in 1 9 8 2  a n d  w e r e  w o r k i n g  actively to fix all p r o b l e m s  w i t h  inventory 
control.
D u r i n g  1 9 8 4 ,  D i s c t e c h  m a n a g e m e n t  w a s  a w a r e  that the e x p o s u r e  for F G I  o b s o l e s c e n c e  w a s  increasing, but 
little w a s  d o n e  other than con tinu ing the m a r k e t i n g  p r o m o t i o n s  a n d  taking reserves as calculated b y  the 
reserve formula. Disctech's m a n a g e m e n t  m a i n t a i n e d  that reserving for or writing off inventory m a d e  it less
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likely that it w o u l d  b e  sold. T h e y  stressed that they h a d  a n  obligation to the stockholders to find uses for 
the inventory rather t ha n write it off.
B y  the t i m e  o f  the 1 9 8 4  y e a r - e n d  audit, the auditors h a d  b e c o m e  m o r e  agitated b y  the inventory situation 
(in addition to the aggressive r e v e n u e  recognition practices) a n d  s o u g h t  written ass u r a n c e  f r o m  Disctech's 
m a n a g e m e n t  that a f o r m a l  p r o g r a m  existed to "significantly i m p a c t  the o b s o l e s c e n c e  e x p o s u r e . "  T h e  C F O ,  
E d  Steinborn, w r o t e  to the auditors:
O u r  r e s p o n s e  to the p r o b l e m s  in the i n v e n t o r y  a r e a  will b e  to outline the p r o g r a m s  w e  h a v e  u n d e r w a y  to r e d u c e  
i n v e n t o r y  levels. W e  will a g r e e  to s t u d y  p o l i c y  alternatives in the a r e a  o f  p r o v i d i n g  r e s e r v e s  for e x c e s s  e q u i p m e n t ;  
h o w e v e r ,  affordability c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  really p r e c l u d e  o u r  ability to m a k e  a n y  m e a n i n g f u l  c h a n g e  in this a r e a  this 
year.
M a n a g e m e n t  i n f o r m e d  the b o a r d  a n d  the A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  that a p r o b l e m  w i t h  inventory control still existed 
a n d  that efforts to rectify the situation w e r e  o n g o i n g .  T h e y  w e r e  also told that "reserves for o b s o l e s c e n c e  
m a y  h a v e  to b e  increased next y e a r  as the p r o d u c t  life cycle for disk m e m o r i e s  shortens." T h e y  w e r e  not 
g i v e n  a n  exhibit to the 1 9 8 4  auditors' m a n a g e m e n t  letter that c o n t a i n e d  the f o l l o w i n g  sentence:
T h i s  p o l i c y  results in full v a l u a t i o n  o f  e x c e s s  i n v e n t o r y ,  overstates i n v e n t o r y ,  a n d  m a y  l e a d  to serious future 
financial a d j u s t m e n t s .
T h e  b o a r d  w a s  not told that the e x p o s u r e  o n  F G I  h a d  g r o w n  to a n  estimated $ 3 . 9  million.
T h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  a s k e d  questions a b o u t  inv entory valuation, but J o h n  a n d  E d  h a d  q u i c k  a n s w e r s  a n d  
w e r e  confident that the inventory situation w o u l d  s o o n  b e  u n d e r  control. Nevertheless, the A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  
in a  private session w i t h  the outside auditors a d m i t t e d  that s o m e  things, including inventory obsolescence, 
h a d  b e g u n  to w o r r y  t h e m .  T h e y  also told the e n g a g e m e n t  partner that they inte n d e d  to m e e t  m o r e  often in 
1 9 8 5  a n d  they w a n t e d  a senior representative f r o m  the outside auditors a n d  D o u g  M c A n e n y ,  the h e a d  of 
internal auditing, at their meetings.
1 9 8 5
T h e  y e a r  1 9 8 5  w a s  difficult for Disctech, a n d  t r e m e n d o u s  pressure w a s  p l a c e d  o n  the sales force to a ch ieve 
the p l a n n e d  sales goal. A  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  a  soft m a r k e t  for the 14-inch disk drives a n d  u n e x p e c t e d  delays 
in p r o d u c t i o n  o f  the a d v a n c e d  8- a n d  the n e w  5 W i n c h  drives m a d e  sales difficult.
S o m e  salespeople c a m e  u p  w i t h  s o m e  ingenious ideas to stimulate sales that w e r e  often d e s i g n e d  to take 
a d v a n t a g e  o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  aggressive r e v e n u e  policies. F o r  e x a m p l e ,  o n e  s u c h  s c h e m e  c o u l d  o c c u r  w h e n  
a  c u s t o m e r  filled out a n  E O F  w i t h  a  delivery date far in the future a n d  s u b m i t t e d  it to D i s c t e c h  for processing. 
W i t h i n  a w e e k  or t w o  the responsible salesperson w o u l d  contact the M a r k e t i n g  d e p a r t m e n t  a n d  i n f o r m  t h e m  
that h e  h a d  c o n v i n c e d  the c u s t o m e r  to accept a n  early delivery in the current quarter— w i t h  the u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
that p a y m e n t  w o u l d  not b e  d u e  until the date o n  the E O F .  F r o m  the salesperson's v i e w  this m a d e  e v e r y o n e  
h a p p y :  D i s c t e c h  b o o k e d  a sale, the salesperson got a  c o m m i s s i o n ,  a n d  the c u s t o m e r  received a disk m e m o r y  
at a  re a s o n a b l e  price w i t h  d e l a y e d  p a y m e n t s  a n d  n o  finance charges.
A t  the s a m e  t i m e  sales w e r e  b e c o m i n g  m o r e  difficult, order cancellations w e r e  b e c o m i n g  a p r o b l e m .  A s  
Disctech's c o m peti tors c a m e  out w i t h  n e w  products, m a n y  O E M s  s w i t c h e d  disk m e m o r y  suppliers; direct 
e n d - u s e r  sales w e r e  also affected b e c a u s e  p e o p l e  w a n t e d  m o r e  m e m o r y  a n d  shorter access t i m e  for their 
dollars.
N e a r  the e n d  o f  the first quarter o f  198 5, a  M a r k e t i n g  d e p a r t m e n t  m e e t i n g  w a s  held to discuss the order 
cancellation p r o b l e m .  M a r y  c h o s e  this opp ortunity to a n n o u n c e  a n e w  policy: a n y  order cancelled within six 
w e e k s  o f  e x p e c t e d  delivery w o u l d  still b e  s h i p p e d  a n d  the r e v e n u e  recorded. H e r  staff told her that m o s t  
c u s t o m e r s  w o u l d  just refuse to accept delivery. S h e  r e s p o n d e d  that o n  e a c h  o f  these deliveries the responsible 
salesperson w o u l d  g o  a l o n g  a n d  ens u r e  that " t h e  sale s t u ck." All o f  these p r o b l e m s  c a u s e d  a  lot of
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consternation in the sales force but they all k n e w  better t ha n to a r g u e  w i t h  M a r y  w h e n  her m i n d  w a s  
m a d e  up.
A  M i d y e a r  M e e t i n g .  A t  m i d y e a r  J o h n  G a r v e y  called a  m e e t i n g  o f  the top officers to r e v i e w  s o m e  pressing 
p r o b l e m s .  T h e  first p r o b l e m  w a s  financing. A s  receivables h a d  g r o w n ,  c a s h  w a s  getting short. C o n s e q u e n t l y  
$ 1 0  million in b o n d s  w o u l d  b e  issued for public sale early in the fourth quarter; $ 4  million of  the c a s h  raised 
w o u l d  b e  u s e d  to retire the b o n d s  currently outstanding, a n d  the rest o f  the p r o c e e d s  w o u l d  g o  to operations.
S e c o n d ,  inventory p r o b l e m s  w e r e  getting w o r s e .  A n  internally g e n erat ed estimate o f  the current ob s o l e s ­
c e n c e  e x p o s u r e  w a s  $ 6 . 8  million, a n d  this w a s  e x p e c t e d  to g r o w  to o v e r  $ 8  million b y  the e n d  o f  the year. 
T h e  outside auditors w e r e  v e r y  w o r r i e d  a b o u t  the o b s o l e s c e n c e  ex p o s u r e ,  but J o h n  e x p l a i n e d  h e  h a d  placated 
t h e m  b y  i n f o r m i n g  t h e m  that the c o m p a n y  w a s  currently d o i n g  a n o ther internal study o f  o b s o l e s c e n c e  
policies a n d  that h e  e x p e c t e d  a significant w r i t e d o w n  p r o b a b l y  as early as the first quarter o f  1986.
Third, the n e w  disk m e m o r y  designs still h a d  d e v e l o p m e n t  p r o b l e m s  but J o h n  e x p e c t e d  t h e m  to b e  available 
b e f ore the e n d  o f  the calendar year. Finally, there w a s  a g r o w i n g  p r o b l e m  w i t h  returned e q u i p m e n t .  T h i s  
w o u l d  p r o b a b l y  c a u s e  a significant reversal in r e v e n u e s  in future periods.
Putting these all together, J o h n  a d m i t t e d  that the record string o f  g r o w t h  a n d  profits w o u l d  p r o b a b l y  b e  
br o k e n .  J o h n  w a n t e d  the c o m p a n y  to take all its " l u m p s "  in the first quarter of  19 8 6 ,  a n d  h e  w a n t e d  to take 
the inv entory w r i t e d o w n  at the s a m e  t i m e  as the n e w  p r o d u c t  a n n o u n c e m e n t .  H e  also stated that strong 
quarterly a n d  a n n u a l  results in 1 9 8 5  w o u l d  help the b o n d  issue a n d  w o u l d  likely mitigate the i m p a c t  o f  a 
loss in the first quarter o f  1986. E v e r y o n e  c a m e  a w a y  f r o m  the m e e t i n g  clearly u n d e r s t a n d i n g  that they h a d  
to m a k e  the 1 9 8 5  b u d g e t — n o  matter w h a t  they h a d  to do.
D e s p i t e  heroic efforts b y  the sales force, fourth quarter predictions indicated that w i t h o u t  further action 
D i s c t e c h  w o u l d  c o m e  u p  short o f  the 1 9 8 5  budget. A  plan w a s  w o r k e d  out in the M a r k e t i n g  d e p a r t m e n t  to 
m a k e  a large s h i p m e n t  to a  w a r e h o u s e  rented b y  D i s c t e c h  u n d e r  a n o ther n a m e ;  this s h i p m e n t  (for $ 4 . 2  
million) w a s  b o o k e d  as r e v e n u e  in 1985. Pla ns w e r e  to use the e q u i p m e n t  to help fill early 1 9 8 6  orders.
In the en d ,  the 1 9 8 5  goal o f  $ 1 6 2  million in sales w a s  achieved; total a n n u a l  sales w e r e  $ 1 6 4 . 6  million. Ear ly 
s h i p m e n t  r e v e n u e s  totaled $ 1 5 . 8  million, o f  w h i c h  $ 1 0 . 6  million w a s  e q u i p m e n t  s h i p p e d  w i t h o u t  authori­
zation. T h i s  $ 1 5 . 8  million did not include the $ 4 . 2  million s h i p p e d  to the n e w  w a r e h o u s e .
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T h e  b o a r d  of  directors m e t  in late O c t o b e r  to r e v i e w  the results of 198 5. J o h n  first w e n t  o v e r  the h i g h  points 
o f  the y e a r  a n d  the records achieved. H e  n ex t turned to the inventory p r o b l e m  a n d  g a v e  a q u i c k  s u m m a r y  
o f  the events o f  the last f e w  years. J o h n  th e n  told t h e m  that to bring inventory b a c k  in line, a  o n e - t i m e  
w r i t e d o w n  o f  $ 8 . 2  million w o u l d  b e  required.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y  for Joh n, this did not take the outside directors b y  surprise. P r o m p t e d  b y  k n o w l e d g e  o f  a large 
n u m b e r  o f  c u s t o m e r  complaints, increasing levels o f  returned e q u i p m e n t ,  a n d  the possible inventory 
o b s o l e s c e n c e  p r o b l e m ,  they h a d  a s k e d  the external a n d  internal auditors to c o n d u c t  s o m e  additional inves­
tigations in the last t w o  quarters. T h e  outside directors p r o c e e d e d  to a s k  J o h n  s o m e  difficult questions a b o u t  
the c o m p a n y ' s  policies a n d  practices a n d  also q u e s t i o n e d  h i m  o n  his personal finances a n d  his recent stock 
dealings.
R e c e i v i n g  n o t h i n g  b u t  evasive a n s w e r s ,  they told J o h n  they w e r e  retaining a n  outside l a w  firm to c o n d u c t  
a n  investigation to b e  reported directly to the A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e .  T h e  b o a r d  also i n f o r m e d  J o h n  that it w o u l d  
b e  best if he, E d ,  a n d  M a r y  w e r e  to g o  o n  leave until the investigation w a s  c o m p l e t e .
W i t h  feelings o f  a n g e r  a n d  humiliation, all three resigned i m m e d i a t e l y  rather than accept the forced leave 
of  absence. D i s c t e c h  hired a n  interim president, Bill W i n s l o w ,  a n d  the S E C  w a s  i n f o r m e d  that a n  internal 
investigation w a s  b e i n g  started that c o u l d  i m p a c t  their reported financial statements for the last three years.
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E X H I B I T  1
D I S C T E C H ,  I N C .
I n c o m e  S t a t e m e n t s  f o r  F i s c a l  Y e a r s  E n d i n g  S e p t e m b e r  3 0  
( 0 0 0 s  omitted)
1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5
R e v e n u e $ 5 , 9 9 7 $ 3 0 , 0 0 3 $ 4 2 , 0 0 4 $ 5 9 , 6 4 6 $ 8 1 , 1 1 9 $ 1 0 7 , 0 7 6 $ 1 3 4 , 9 1 6 $ 1 6 4 , 5 9 8
C o s t  o f  Sales 6 , 5 3 1 2 1 , 2 8 8 2 9 , 4 0 3 4 1 , 7 5 2 5 5 , 1 6 1 7 2 , 8 1 2 9 1 , 7 4 3 1 1 1 , 9 2 7
G r o s s  M a r g i n (534) 8 , 7 1 5 1 2 , 6 0 1 1 7 , 8 9 4 2 5 , 9 5 8 3 4 , 2 6 4 4 3 , 1 7 3 5 2 , 6 7 1
R & D  E x p e n s e 1 , 3 5 4 2 , 5 2 8 3 , 7 6 0 3 , 7 7 2 4 , 0 5 6 4 , 2 8 3 4 , 7 2 2 4 , 9 3 8
S G & A  E x p e n s e 1 , 9 9 0 4 , 1 3 8 5 , 2 2 0 6 , 5 6 1 1 0 , 5 4 5 1 3 , 9 2 0 1 7 , 5 3 9 2 1 , 3 9 8
O p e r a t i n g  Profit (3,878) 2 , 0 4 9 3 , 6 2 1 7 , 5 6 1 1 1 , 3 5 7 1 6 , 0 6 1 2 0 , 9 1 2 2 6 , 3 3 5
Interest I n c o m e 131 (517) 8 4 1 1 9 1 6 2 2 1 4 (104) (541)
Profit bef o r e  T a x (3,747) 1 , 5 3 2 3 , 7 0 5 7 , 6 8 0 1 1 , 5 1 9 1 6 , 2 7 5 2 0 , 8 0 8 2 5 , 7 9 4
I n c o m e  T a x 0 7 6 7 1 , 7 0 4 3 , 5 3 3 5 , 2 9 9 7 , 4 8 7 9 , 5 7 2 1 1 , 8 6 6
Profit after T a x $(3 ,747 ) $  7 6 5 $  2 , 0 0 0 $  4 , 1 4 7 $  6 , 2 2 0 $  8 , 7 8 8 $  1 1 , 2 3 6 $  1 3 , 9 2 8
T a x  L o s s
F o r w a r d 0 6 8 5 1 , 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N e t  I n c o m e $(3,747) $  1 , 4 5 0 $  3 , 4 0 1 $  4 , 1 4 7 $  6 , 2 2 0 $  8 , 7 8 8 $  1 1 , 2 3 6 $  1 3 , 9 2 8
E a r n i n g s  p e r
S h a r e $  (1.06) $  0 .2 1 $  0 . 5 0 $  0 . 6 0 $  0 . 9 0 $  1.27 $  1.61 $  1.99
S o u r c e :  A n n u a l  reports.
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E X H I B I T  2
D I S C T E C H ,  I N C .
C o n s o l i d a t e d  B a l a n c e  S h e e t s  at S e p t e m b e r  3 0  
( 0 0 0 s  omitted)
1 9 7 9  1 9 8 0  1 9 8 1  1 9 8 2  1 9 8 3  1 9 8 4  1 9 8 5
Assets
C a s h  a n d  M a r k e t a b l e
Securities 
A c c o u n t s  R e c e i v a b l e  (net) 
Inventories (net) 
P r e p a i d  E x p e n s e s
$ 1 0 , 0 2 0  
8 , 7 5 2  
12, 2 2 1  
1 4 2
$  3 , 6 5 4  
9 , 8 0 1  
8 , 6 0 1  
3 7 5
$  3 , 7 7 8  
1 1 , 9 2 1  
1 1 , 2 4 1  
5 2 5
$  3 , 2 7 3  
1 5 , 5 0 8  
1 5 , 1 2 2  
7 4 6
$  2 , 9 4 7  
2 2 , 0 9 1  
2 2 , 0 4 6  
7 3 0
$  2 , 8 0 8  
3 0 , 8 4 3  
2 7 , 5 5 7  
7 5 0
$  3 , 9 2 0  
3 9 , 3 0 0  
3 6 , 6 8 2  
8 0 9
Total C u r r e n t  Assets 3 1 , 1 3 5 2 2 , 4 3 1 2 7 , 4 6 5 3 4 , 6 4 9 4 7 , 8 1 4 6 3 , 9 5 8 8 0 , 7 1 1
Property, Plant
a n d  E q u i p m e n t  (net) 
O t h e r
2 , 1 1 0  
9 2 9
6 , 9 0 1  
1 2 0
9 , 6 6 1  
1 6 9
1 3 , 7 1 9  
2 3 9
1 8 , 6 5 7  
2 8 4
2 4 , 6 2 8  
3 2 1
3 1 , 0 3 1  
3 6 4
Total Ass e t s $ 3 4 , 1 7 4 $ 2 9 , 4 5 2 $ 3 7 , 2 9 5 $ 4 8 , 6 0 7 $ 6 6 , 7 5 5 $ 8 6 , 9 0 7 $ 1 1 2 , 1 0 6
Liabilities
N o t e s  P a y a b l e  
A c c o u n t s  P a y a b l e  
A c c r u e d  Liabilities
$  4 , 0 5 0  
5 , 6 6 4  
1 , 1 7 9
$  0  
3 , 6 0 0  
1 , 5 0 0
$  0  
5 , 0 4 1  
2 , 1 0 0
$  0  
9 , 1 5 8  
2 , 9 8 2
$  0  
1 2 , 7 3 4  
4 , 0 5 6
$  0  
1 6 , 8 4 9  
5 , 3 5 4
$  0  
2 3 , 1 9 0  
6 , 7 4 6
Total C u r r e n t  Liabilities $ 1 0 , 8 9 3 $  5 , 1 0 0 $  7 , 1 4 1 $ 1 2 , 1 4 0 $ 1 6 , 7 9 0 $ 1 8 , 2 0 3 $  2 9 , 9 3 6
B a n k  D e b t  
Capital L e a s e s  
B o n d s
0
1 ,3 63 
3 , 5 7 0
0
4 , 4 8 5  
0
0
6 , 8 2 0  
0
0
8 , 9 1 7  
0
0
1 2 , 1 2 7  
4 , 0 0 0
2 , 0 0 0  
1 6 , 0 0 8  
4 , 0 0 0
0
1 8 , 1 7 0  
1 0 , 0 0 0
E q u i t y
C o m m o n  S t o c k  
O t h e r  Capital 
R e t a i n e d  E a r n i n g s
3 , 6 5 1  
2 0 , 9 7 8  
(6,281)
3 , 6 7 7  
2 1 , 0 2 0  
(4,831)
3 , 7 0 3  
2 1 , 0 6 2  
(1,431)
3 , 7 2 9  
2 1 , 1 0 4  
2 , 7 1 7
3 , 7 5 5  
2 1 , 1 4 6  
8 , 9 3 7
3 , 7 8 2  
2 1 , 1 8 8  
1 7 , 7 2 6
3 , 8 0 7  
2 1 , 2 3 1  
2 8 , 9 6 2
Total Liabilities 
a n d  Equities $ 3 4 , 1 7 4 $ 2 9 , 4 5 2 $ 3 7 , 2 9 5 $ 4 8 , 6 0 7 $ 6 6 , 7 5 5 $ 8 6 , 9 0 7 $ 1 1 2 , 1 0 6































































































































































































































G r a v e s  Industries Inc. (A)
A t  the a n n u a l  stockholders' m e e t i n g  in April 1 9 8 1 ,  H e n r y  G r a v e s ,  c h a i r m a n ,  C E O ,  a n d  president o f  G r a v e s  
Industries, a n n o u n c e d  the creation o f  a n e w  division o f  G r a v e s  Industries Inc.:
E v e r  since the f o u n d i n g  o f  G r a v e s  Industries w e  h a v e  w o r k e d  to b e  o n  the leading e d g e  of  technology, 
a l w a y s  s e e king to create m a c h i n e s  for the factory of  the future. T o d a y ,  w e  are taking a large step into 
that future w i t h  the f o u n d i n g  o f  the Flexible M a n u f a c t u r i n g  S y s t e m s  division. T h e  w o r l d  o f  c o m p u t e r -  
integrated m a n u f a c t u r i n g  h a s  b e c o m e  so c o m p l e x  that w e  h a v e  created a n e w  division dedicated to that 
industry. B i g  steps like this don't c o m e  cheaply. In the next four years w e  will s p e n d  o v e r  $ 1 0 0  million 
in research a n d  d e v e l o p m e n t  alone, for this division. Y o u  say this is a large risk, a n d  I agr ee w i t h  y ou , 
but the potential p a y o f f  is tremendous....
T h i s  n e w  division f u n d a m e n t a l l y  alters the w a y  w e  l o o k  at the corporation a n d  w h a t  w e  v i e w  as o u r  
p r i m a r y  business. I h a v e  authorized a n u m b e r  o f  n e w  p r o g r a m s  d e s i g n e d  to cut costs t h r o u g h o u t  the 
corporation a n d  i m p r o v e  o u r  profitability. W e  will c ontinue to b e  the standard o f  excellence in o u r  other 
businesses, but clearly o u r  focus is o n  the future.
T h i s  case pro vide s b a c k g r o u n d  information o n  G r a v e s  Industries Inc. for u s e  w i t h  the (B) case f o c u s e d  o n  
G r a v e s '  M a r i n e  H a r d w a r e  division and/or the (C) case f o c u s e d  o n  the C o n s u m e r  H a r d w a r e  division.
C o m p a n y  H i s t o r y
G r a v e s  Industries w a s  f o u n d e d  in the early 1 9 2 0 s  as a m a n u f a c t u r e r  o f  industrial h a r d w a r e  a n d  tooling. T h e  
c o m p a n y  w e n t  public in 1 9 2 6  a n d  w a s  listed o n  the N e w  Y o r k  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e .  T h e  c o m p a n y  w a s  small 
a n d  e x p e r i e n c e d  o n l y  m o d e s t  g r o w t h  until 1941. T h e n ,  capitalizing o n  the rapid g r o w t h  o f  industry dur i n g  
the w a r ,  G r a v e s  Industries g r e w  t r e m e n d o u s l y .  R e v e n u e s  c l i m b e d  f r o m  $ 8 . 2  million in 1 9 4 1  to $ 4 1 . 5  million 
in 1945.
F r o m  1 9 4 6  until 1 9 8 1  the corporation c h a n g e d  little e x c e p t  to b r a n c h  out into other areas o f  h a r d w a r e  a n d  
tooling. In 19 4 6 ,  G r a v e s  started a small c o n s u m e r  pro duct s division to p r o d u c e  a n d  sell tools a n d  h a r d w a r e  
to h a r d w a r e  distribution chains. T h e  C o n s u m e r  P r o d u c t s  division w a s  v e r y  successful, a n d  b y  1 9 8 1  sales 
h a d  risen to $ 1 2 2  million. In 195 8, a separate a u t o m o t i v e  division w a s  f o u n d e d  b y  splitting out the 
a u t o m o t i v e  sections o f  the C o n s u m e r  a n d  Industrial divisions. In 196 3, the corporation m o v e d  into m a r i n e  
h a r d w a r e  b y  acquiring the L o h n e s  M a r i n e  H a r d w a r e  C o m p a n y  of  P o r t s m o u t h ,  N . H .
In the 1970s, H e n r y  G r a v e s ,  n o w  the c h a i r m a n  a n d  C E O ,  r e c o g n i z e d  that flexible m a n u f a c t u r i n g  w a s  the 
w a v e  o f  the future a n d  that to b e  part o f  it G r a v e s  Industries w o u l d  h a v e  to m a k e  s o m e  large investments. 
T h e  c o m p a n y  started b y  building n u m e r i c a l l y  controlled ( N C )  tools in the Industrial division. T h i s  field w a s  
so c o m p l e x ,  h o w e v e r ,  a n d  the potential m a r k e t  w a s  so large ( $ 2 6  billion in 1 9 8 2 )  that in 1 9 8 1  a n e w  division 
w a s  f o r m e d .  (Exhibit 1 presents a financial s u m m a r y  o f  recent fiscal years.)
O r g a n i z a t i o n
G r a v e s  Industries u s e d  a divisionalized organization structure. T h e  corporate headquarters, located in 
G r o t o n ,  Connecticut, consisted o f  the principal corporate officers a n d  their relatively small staffs. T h e  
operating divisions w e r e  relatively a u t o n o m o u s ;  operating c o m p a n i e s  (see Exhibit 2) a n d  division m a n a g e r s  
w e r e  directly responsible for the division's p roducts a n d  services. T h e y  also o perated their o w n  research a n d  
d e v e l o p m e n t ,  m a n u f a c t u r i n g ,  a n d  m a r k e t i n g  facilities. D ivision staff reported directly to division m a n a g e r s  
a n d  h a d  relatively w e a k ,  " d o t t e d  line" relationships w i t h  corporate staff.
C o p y r i g h t  ©  1 9 8 6  b y  the President a n d  F e l l o w s  o f  H a r v a r d  C ol le ge .  H a r v a r d  B u s i n e s s  S c h o o l  c a s e  9 - 1 8 7 - 0 4 5 .  
T h i s  c a s e  w a s  p r e p a r e d  b y  J o s e p h  P . M u l l o y  u n d e r  the direction o f  K e n n e t h  A .  M e r c h a n t  as the basis for class d is cu ss i on  rather tha n  
to illustrate either effective or ineffective h a n d l i n g  o f  a n  administrative situation. T h e  c a s e  is b a s e d  o n  k n o w l e d g e  o f  actual c o m p a n y  
situations, b u t  the facts h a v e  b e e n  disguised, a n d  a n y  r e s e m b l a n c e  to actual p e o p l e  o r  e v e n t s  is unintentional. R e p r i n t e d  b y  p e r m i s s i o n  
o f  the H a r v a r d  B u s i n e s s  S c h o o l .
1 3 5
H e a d q u a r t e r s  controlled divisional p e r f o r m a n c e  b y  r e v i e w i n g  plans a n d  b u d g e t s  a n d  b y  m o n i t o r i n g  financial 
reports. If p e r f o r m a n c e  w a s  in line w i t h  corporate financial goals, f e w  inquiries w e r e  m a d e  into divisional 
operations, but if negative variances resulted, headquarters g a v e  divisions a great deal o f  attention, a n d  
pressure w a s  applied to i m p r o v e  results. F o r m a l  r e v i e w s  w e r e  held quarterly to discuss the actual results a n d  
the forecast for the year.
H e n r y  G r a v e s  felt that it w a s  v e r y  imp o r t a n t  for the corporation, a n d  thus the divisions, to m a i n t a i n  a steady 
pattern o f  g r o w t h  b e c a u s e  "that is w h a t  the stock m a r k e t  v a l u e s . "  T h u s ,  consistency a n d  predictability w e r e  
the w a t c h w o r d s ;  surprises w e r e  to b e  avoided. O n e  division president n o t e d  that, " T h e r e  are o n l y  t w o  things 
imp o r t a n t  in this c o m p a n y :  profit, a n d  turning it in in a  predictable fashion."
Profit P l a n n i n g
Profit p l a n n i n g  w a s  d o n e  in t w o  distinct cycles: strategic p l a n n i n g  a n d  bud geting. Strategic p l a n n i n g  
i n v o l v e d  creative thinking a b o u t  corporate strengths, w e a k n e s s e s ,  opportunities, a n d  threats in the next 
three-year period. T h e  division m a n a g e r s  w e r e  required to s u b m i t  a narrative analysis o f  their businesses a n d  
plans, s u p p o r t e d  b y  s u m m a r y  n u m e r i c a l  schedules. Presentations o f  the strategic plans w e r e  m a d e  to top 
m a n a g e m e n t  in A u g u s t  a n d  S e p t e m b e r .
After the strategic plans w e r e  a p p r o v e d ,  the divisions b e g a n  w o r k i n g  o n  their budgets. T h e  b u d g e t s  w e r e  
e x p r e s s e d  in t e r m s  o f  m o n t h l y  i n c o m e  statements a n d  b a l a n c e  sheets for the c o m i n g  year. T h e y  w e r e  
r e v i e w e d  b y  top m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the b o a r d  o f  directors in N o v e m b e r  a n d  D e c e m b e r .  T h e  b u d g e t s  w e r e  
c o n s i d e r e d  a c o m m i t m e n t  o f  earnings a n d  return o n  net assets ( R O N A )  f r o m  division m a n a g e r s  to the 
corporation a n d  f r o m  the corporation to the b o a r d  o f  directors.
W h i l e  the intent o f  the profit p l a n n i n g  process w a s  " b o t t o m - u p , "  it w a s  typical for the division m a n a g e r s  
to h a v e  to adjust their targets after the r e v i e w  meetings. H e n r y  G r a v e s  liked his m a n a g e r s  to h a v e  aggressive 
budgets, a n d  it w a s  often said that " H e n r y  a l w a y s  w a n t s  to take s o m e t h i n g  f r o m  e a c h  division w h e n  h e  
leaves the table."
M a n a g e m e n t  I n c e n t i v e  P l a n
G r a v e s  offered its m a n a g e m e n t  personnel a  b a s e  salary that w a s  slightly b e l o w  that o f  its competitors, a n d  
it relied o n  a M a n a g e m e n t  Incentive P l a n  ( M I P )  to help m o t i v a t e  a n d  retain its k e y  personnel. T h e  M I P  
offered a n n u a l  c a s h  a w a r d s  b a s e d  o n  the actual vs. b u d g e t e d  levels o f  R O N A  a c h i e v e d  b y  the entity to w h i c h  
the individual w a s  a ssigned (division or above).
A b o u t  6 0  e m p l o y e e s  w e r e  enrolled in the M I P ,  including m o s t  m a n a g e r s  d o w n  to o n e  level b e l o w  division 
m a n a g e r .  T h e  p a y o u t s  in the pl a n  w e r e  potentially lucrative. F o r  e x a m p l e ,  the p a y o u t s  for a division m a n a g e r  
r a n g e d  u p  to 1 0 0 %  o f  salary, as s h o w n  in F i g u r e  1.
T h e  incentive p la n clearly attracted the attention o f  the m a n a g e r s .  In a s u r v e y  d o n e  several years after the 
p la n w a s  i m p l e m e n t e d ,  the m a n a g e r s  all reported that they u n d e r s t o o d  h o w  the p la n w o r k e d  a n d  that it 
affected their decision m a k i n g .
B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s
T h e  b o a r d  o f  directors consisted o f  five m e m b e r s ,  t w o  inside directors ( H e n r y  a n d  the president o f  the 
Industrial Division, S t e v e  Sinko), a n d  three outside directors. T h e  outside directors w e r e  all either active 
or retired executives w h o  w e r e  long-time a c q uain tanc es o f  H e n r y  G r a v e s .  T h e  b o a r d  usually m e t  four tim es 
a  y ea r to r e v i e w  the corporation's progress a n d  plans for the future.
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MANAGEMENT INCENTIVE PLAN PAYOUT FOR DIVISIONAL PRESIDENT
F I G U R E  1
Payout 
( %  of Base Salary)
Actual R O N A  ( %  of Budget)
T h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  consisted o f  the three outside directors. T h i s  c o m m i t t e e  w a s  created in 1 9 7 3  in 
r e s p o n s e  to the e n d o r s e m e n t  o f  the Securities a n d  E x c h a n g e  C o m m i s s i o n  a n d  the N e w  Y o r k  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e  
for all publicly h el d c o m p a n i e s  to establish audit c o m m i t t e e s .
I n t e r n a l  A u d i t
T h e  Internal A u d i t  staff consisted o f  the h e a d  auditor a n d  three staff m e m b e r s .  T h e  Internal A u d i t  g r o u p  
e n s u r e d  that corporate a c c o u n t i n g  policies w e r e  f o l l o w e d  a n d  verified that safeguards existed to protect the 
c o m p a n y ' s  assets. T h e i r  w o r k l o a d  w a s  h e a v y  a n d  e v e n  t h o u g h  they w e r e  s c h e d u l e d  to visit e a c h  division 
e a c h  year, s o m e t i m e s  they w e r e  able to p e r f o r m  audits o n l y  o n  alternate years.
O u t s i d e  A u d i t o r s
S i n c e  1 9 7 1  G r a v e s  h a d  u s e d  a  B i g  Ei g h t  a c c o u n t i n g  firm, Ernst, Mitchell a n d  Sells ( E M S ) .  H a r v e y  K r a n t z  
h a d  b e e n  the E M S  partner o n  the G r a v e s  a c c o u n t  for the last three years, a n d  d u r i n g  that period H a r v e y  a n d  
H e n r y  G r a v e s  h a d  d e v e l o p e d  a n  excellent w o r k i n g  relationship. Socially, they w e r e  i n v o l v e d  in m a n y  o f  the 
s a m e  activities, w e r e  m e m b e r s  o f  the s a m e  c o u n t r y  club, a n d  occasionally p l a y e d  golf together.
In the last t w o  years, h o w e v e r ,  the relationship h a d  b e e n  strained as G r a v e s  applied pressure to r e d u c e  the 
audit fees. T h e  g r o w t h  o f  the F M S  division, as described in the o p e n i n g  c o m m e n t  of  this case, created a 
n e e d  to free u p  capital t h r o u g h  cost cutting a n d  other m e a s u r e s .
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E X H I B I T  1
G R A V E S  I N D U S T R I E S  I N C .  (A)
C o n s o l i d a t e d  I n c o m e  S t a t e m e n t s  
f o r  Y e a r s  E n d i n g  D e c e m b e r  3 1  
($ millions)
1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5
R e v e n u e $ 4 7 6 . 3 $ 5 2 4 . 9 $ 5 8 0 . 0 $ 6 4 0 . 9 $ 7 0 8 . 2
C o s t  o f  Sales 3 1 9 . 1 3 5 1 . 7 3 8 8 . 6 4 2 9 . 4 4 6 0 . 3
G r o s s  M a r g i n $ 1 5 7 . 2 $ 1 7 3 . 2 $ 1 9 1 . 4 $ 2 1 1 . 5 $ 2 4 7 . 9
R & D  E x p e n s e 2 0 . 2 3 1 . 0 3 6 . 0 4 4 . 0 5 8 . 3
S G & A  E x p e n s e 5 6 . 6 6 2 . 0 6 8 . 2 7 4 . 8 8 2 . 2
O p e r a t i n g  Profit $  8 0 . 4 $  8 0 . 2 $  8 7 . 2 $  9 2 . 7 $ 1 0 7 . 4
C o r p o r a t e  E x p e n s e 11.9 13.1 14.5 16.0 17.7
Interest E x p e n s e 7.0 7.0 9.0 9 . 0 9.0
Profit before T a x $  6 1 . 5 $  60.1 $  6 3 . 7 $  6 7 . 7 $  8 0 . 7
I n c o m e  T a x 2 8. 3 2 7 . 6 2 9 . 3 31.1 37.1
N e t  I n c o m e $  3 3 . 2 $  3 2 . 5 $  3 4 . 4 $  3 6 . 6 $  4 3 . 6










































































































































































































































































































G r a v e s  Industries Inc. (B) 
L o h n e s  M a r i n e  H a r d w a r e  D i v i s i o n
In J a n u a r y  1 9 8 6 ,  D o n  O ' G r a d y ,  controller a n d  financial officer o f  the L o h n e s  M a r i n e  H a r d w a r e  Division 
of  G r a v e s  Industries Inc., r e v i e w e d  the financial results for 1985. It w a s  another record y e a r  for the L o h n e s  
division: sales w e r e  u p  1 2 %  a n d  operating profits h a d  increased 1 3 %  (see Exhibit 1). D o n  k n e w  that the 
division president, P a u l  L o h n e s ,  w o u l d  b e  v e r y  h a p p y  to see that the final figures w e r e  a c o u p l e  o f  million 
dollars a b o v e  budget. T h e  c o m p a n y  w a s  also well positioned for a big j u m p  o n  1 9 8 6 ' s  b u d g e t e d  goals.
In contrast to 198 4, the fourth quarter o f  1 9 8 5  h a d  b e e n  relatively relaxed. Sales w e r e  strong t h r o u g h o u t  the 
year, a n d  b y  the b e g i n n i n g  o f  the last quarter the division h a d  already a c h i e v e d  a l m o s t  9 0 %  o f  b u d g e t e d  
profits a n d  sales. In 1 9 8 4 ,  the division h a d  o n l y  6 8 %  o f  b u d g e t e d  goals g o i n g  into O c t o b e r ,  a n d  it h a d  taken 
a large effort b y  all e m p l o y e e s  to m a k e  sure the division finished o n  budget.
T h e  distress o f  last y ea r reinforced in D o n ' s  m i n d  the advice h e  h a d  received o n  his first j o b  out of  school. 
T h e  controller of  that c o m p a n y  h a d  told h i m  ( w h e n  discussing the a c c o u n t i n g  policies o f  his n e w  e m p l o y e r )  
t h a t ' 'only a  fool d o e s  not h a v e  reserves salted a w a y  for rainy d a y s . '' T h e  reserves the L o h n e s  division built 
u p  h a d  b e e n  ve r y  imp o r t a n t  in 1984. B u t  n o w  D o n  w o n d e r e d  if the division reserves w e n t  b e y o n d  the b o u n d s  
of  reasonableness.
T h e  D i v i s i o n
L o h n e s  M a r i n e  H a r d w a r e  w a s  f o u n d e d  in 1 9 5 4  b y  P a u l  L o h n e s .  Pa u l  w a s  a n  avid sailboat builder in the 
P o r t s m o u t h ,  N . H . ,  area w h o  b e c a m e  frustrated b y  the p o o r  support existing m a r i n e  h a r d w a r e  c o m p a n i e s  
w e r e  giving sailboat builders a n d  o w n e r s .  P a u l  r e a s o n e d  that a  full-service m a r i n e  h a r d w a r e  a n d  tooling 
business that p r o v i d e d  special services for sailboaters c o u l d  b e  v e r y  successful. H e  also felt that as disposable 
i n c o m e  increased in the U n i t e d  States, boating w o u l d  b e c o m e  increasingly popular, a n d  the m a r k e t  w o u l d  
g r o w  rapidly.
T h e  n e w  L o h n e s  C o m p a n y  did v er y well; b y  1 9 6 3  the c o m p a n y  w a s  well-established in N e w  E n g l a n d ,  a n d  
P a u l  w a s  lo o k i n g  at e x p a n d i n g  into other regions. A n  im p o r t a n t  part o f  this success w a s  the tools a n d  m a r i n e  
rigging that P a u l  h a d  originally d e s i g n e d  a n d  built for his o w n  u s e  that w e r e  n o w  m a r k e t e d  b y  his c o m p a n y .  
T h e  b o a ting m a r k e t  w a s  still y o u n g  a n d  g r o w i n g ,  a n d  Pa u l  figured that if h e  c o u l d  e x p a n d  quickly a n d  get 
a toehold across the country, h e  w o u l d  b e  in g o o d  position to take his share o f  the m ar ket. P a u l  h a d  the 
k n o w l e d g e ,  but l a c k e d  the financial resources to support a large expansion.
D u r i n g  the s u m m e r  o f  1 9 6 3  P a u l  w a s  a p p r o a c h e d  b y  H e n r y  G r a v e s ,  exe cutive vice president o f  G r a v e s  
Industries Inc., a large p r o d u c e r  a n d  distributor o f  industrial a n d  c o m m e r c i a l  h a r d w a r e  a n d  tooling. T h e  
G r a v e s  w a n t e d  to e x p a n d  into m a r i n e  h a r d w a r e ,  but they did not h a v e  a n y  ex p e r i e n c e  in this specialized area 
a n d  w e r e  l o o k i n g  to m a k e  a n  acquisition.
A t  first P au l rejected the G r a v e s '  offers, but in the fall o f  1 9 6 3  h e  reconsidered, a n d  a  deal w a s  quickly 
h a m m e r e d  out. F o r  a n  u n d iscl osed s u m  ( r u m o r e d  to b e  quite sizeable), 1 0 0 %  interest in L o h n e s  M a r i n e  
H a r d w a r e  w a s  transferred to G r a v e s  Industries Inc. T h i s  transfer i ncluded the n a m e  o f  the c o m p a n y ,  L o h n e s  
M a r i n e  H a r d w a r e  C o m p a n y ,  a n d  all the proprietary p roducts m a n u f a c t u r e d  b y  the c o m p a n y .  A s  part o f  the 
a g r e e m e n t  P a u l  w a s  to r e m a i n  as president o f  the n e w  m a r i n e  division.
O n e  o f  the m a j o r  reasons P a u l  a g r e e d  to the acquisition w a s  the G r a v e s '  decentralized m a n a g e m e n t  
philosophy; the c o m p a n y  w o u l d  leave h i m  in control o f  the L o h n e s  division w i t h  a l m o s t  n o  corporate 
interference as l o n g  as results w e r e  at or a b o v e  the corporation's l o n g - t e r m  g r o w t h  targets o f  8 %  in sales
C o p y r i g h t  ©  1 9 8 6  b y  the President a n d  F e l l o w s  o f  H a r v a r d  C ol le ge .  H a r v a r d  B u s i n e s s  S c h o o l  c a s e  9 - 1 8 7 - 0 4 6 .  
T h i s  c a s e  w a s  p r e p a r e d  b y  J o s e p h  P. M u l l o y  u n d e r  the direction o f  K e n n e t h  A .  M e r c h a n t  as the basis for class dis cu ss i on  rather t ha n  
to illustrate either effective o r  ineffective h a n d l i n g  o f  a n  administrative situation. T h e  c a s e  is b a s e d  o n  k n o w l e d g e  o f  actual c o m p a n y  
situations, b u t  the facts h a v e  b e e n  disguised, a n d  a n y  r e s e m b l a n c e  to actual p e o p l e  or e v e n t s  is unintentional. R e p r i n t e d  b y  p e r m i s s i o n  
o f  the H a r v a r d  B u s i n e s s  S c h o o l .
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a n d  profits, a n d  b u d g e t s  w e r e  consistently achieved. L o h n e s '  organization, per s o n n e l  policies, a n d  a c ­
c o u n t i n g  s y s t e m s  w o u l d  r e m a i n  as they w e r e  before the acquisition. (S e e  organization chart in Exhibit 2.) 
T h e  o n l y  additional p r o c e d u r e s  required w e r e  a f o r m a l  capital appropriation request a n d  a m o n t h l y  reporting 
o f  financial results to headquarters for consolidation. C o r p o r a t e  staff m o n i t o r e d  division results (primarily 
sales, profits, c a s h  a n d  asset control), a n d  occasionally the division president or controller w a s  a s k e d  for 
explanations o f  variances f r o m  budget.
T h e  infusion o f  capital w a s  just w h a t  the L o h n e s  M a r i n e  division n e e d e d ,  a n d  sales g r e w  f r o m  $4.1 million 
in 1 9 6 3  to $ 8 8 . 4  million in 1 9 8 2 — a c o m p o u n d  g r o w t h  rate o f  1 7 . 5 % .  T h e  division a l m o s t  a l w a y s  m e t  its 
b u d g e t  targets. T h e  toughest years w e r e  d u r i n g  the e n e r g y  crisis o f  1 9 7 4 - 7 5 ,  w h i c h  r o c k e d  the p o w e r  boat 
industry. W h i l e  the m a r i n e  division did not m a k e  b u d g e t  those years, it still r e m a i n e d  v e r y  profitable d u e  
to its strength in the sailboat s e g m e n t  o f  the market.
D u r i n g  his tenure w i t h  G r a v e s  Industries, P a u l  realized that g o o d  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  a l t h o u g h  well r e w a r d e d ,  w a s  
s o o n  forgotten dur i n g  the next fiscal year. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  b e c a u s e  of  the w a y  the b u d g e t  cycle a n d  b o n u s  
p r o g r a m  w o r k e d ,  a n  excellent y ea r this y e a r  t e n d e d  to m a k e  next year's goals e v e n  higher. T h i s  w a s  not 
really m u c h  o f  a p r o b l e m  for the M a r i n e  division, h o w e v e r ,  as e x p a n d e d  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  a b o o m i n g  boat 
m a r k e t  c a u s e d  it to b e  consistently a m o n g  G r a v e s '  b es t-pe rfor ming divisions.
In the early 1 9 8 0 s  the situation in G r a v e s  c h a n g e d  b e c a u s e  o f  the f o r m a t i o n  o f  the Flexible M a n u f a c t u r i n g  
S y s t e m s  ( F M S )  division within G r a v e s  Industries. T h e  F M S  division h a d  a R & D  b u d g e t  of  $ 1 4  million in 
19 8 2 ,  a n d  this g r e w  to $ 4 6  million in 198 5, a n d  the corporation w a s  trying to f u n d  this division internally 
b y  raising g r o w t h  goals for the operating divisions a n d  b y  instituting cost-cutting p r o g r a m s .  T h e  n e w ,  m o r e  
aggressive goals m a d e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  the L o h n e s  division ve r y  difficult b e c a u s e  the boating industry w a s  
hit h a r d  b y  the s e c o n d  oil crisis in 1 9 7 9  a n d  a  business d o w n t u r n  in 1984.
1 9 8 3
In late J a n u a r y  198 3, P a u l  m e t  w i t h  his n e w  controller/financial officer, D o n  O ' G r a d y ,  to g o  o v e r  the 
division's financial condition a n d  to consider plans for the future. D o n  p oi nted out that 1 9 8 2  h a d  b e e n  a 
relatively g o o d  year; sales h a d  r e a c h e d  $ 8 8 . 4  million, slightly in exc e s s  of  the division's goal o f  $ 8 5  million. 
In addition the division h a d  b e e n  able to m a i n t a i n  relatively large reserves w h e r e  " a  f e w  nuts w e r e  stored 
a w a y  for a b a d  winter.''
P a u l  said that w a s  all well a n d  g o o d ,  but that h e  w a s  w o r r i e d  a b o u t  future prospects, a n d  h e  w a n t e d  to h a v e  
m o r e  control o v e r  his reported sales a n d  profits. H e  s u g g e s t e d  a n u m b e r  o f  w a y s  the increased control c o u l d  
b e  b r o u g h t  about. H e  told D o n  that w h e n  the division w a s  h a v i n g  a g o o d  period h e  w a n t e d  to m e e t  the 
a ssigned goals a n d  then b e  v e r y  conservative in the a c c o u n t i n g  so as to h a v e  a g o o d  start o n  m a k i n g  the goals 
for the n ex t period. F o r  e x a m p l e ,  if the division w a s  n e a r  its quarterly target, it w o u l d  b e  g o o d  to declare 
a shipping m o r a t o r i u m  for the last w e e k  or t w o  o f  the quarter to shift s o m e  sales to the n ex t quarter. H e  also 
s u g g e s t e d  increasing the reserves t a k e n  against inventory, a c c o u n t s  receivable, a n d  potential liabilities.
P a u l  said D o n  s h o u l d  m e e t  w i t h  Patti A l l e n  o f  Sales a n d  J a c k  N e l a n  o f  P r o d u c t i o n  a n d  P u r c h a s i n g  to d o  s o m e  
b r a i n s t o r m i n g  for m o r e  ideas. H e  also told D o n  that the discussions s h o u l d  b e  discreet. E v e n  t h o u g h  n o n e  
o f  this w a s  illegal, h e  did not w a n t  to c a u s e  w a v e s  at headquarters. D o n  indicated that h e  und erstood.
T h e  y ea r 1 9 8 3  p r o v e d  to b e  surprisingly g o o d ,  a n d  b y  m i d - M a r c h  the division h a d  e x c e e d e d  its quarterly 
sales goal. Patti A l l e n  i m p o s e d  a shipping m o r a t o r i u m  for the last ten d a y s  o f  M a r c h ,  a n d  $ 3 . 8  million in 
finished g o o d s  w e r e  held until the first d a y s  o f  April. E v e n  t h o u g h  she a g r e e d  w i t h  trying to s m o o t h  earnings, 
Patti did c o m p l a i n  to D o n  a n d  Pa u l  that c o m p l e t e  halts in shipping c a u s e d  p r o b l e m s  w i t h  w o r k l o a d  
scheduling, p r o d u c t  d a m a g e ,  a n d  d e l a y e d  deliveries to cus tome rs. P a u l  a g r e e d  there w e r e  costs associated 
w i t h  this s h i p m e n t  policy, but h e  felt they c o u l d  b e  m i n i m i z e d .
Patti said that she w o u l d  like to b e  able to d o  s o m e  shipping to their large c u s t o m e r s .  S h e  s u g g e s t e d  that 
s h e  c o u l d  ship s o m e  large orders in the current quarter b u t  ens u r e  that they w e r e  not entered in the shipping 
log. S h e  w o u l d  date the invoices a n d  the bills of  lading for the b e g i n n i n g  o f  the ne x t  quarter a n d  h o l d  t h e m  
o n  h e r  d e s k  until the s e c o n d  w e e k  o f  the n e w  quarter. S h e  w o u l d  then s u b m i t  the invoices to the a c c o u n t i n g
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d e p a r t m e n t  for processing as a n e w - q u a r t e r  sale, a n d  m a k e  the entries to the shipping log. In case a n y  
auditors a s k e d  w h y  the invoices w e r e  out of  order, she p l a n n e d  to tell t h e m  that the s h i p m e n t s  h a d  b e e n  held 
u p  for a  brief t i m e  at the last minute.
In 1 9 8 3  sales c o n t i n u e d  strong, a n d  Patti's invoice-dating p r o g r a m  a l l o w e d  for s m o o t h  g r o w t h  in quarterly 
earnings. O n  D e c e m b e r  31, Patti held invoices for $ 7 . 4  million in g o o d s  to b e  " s h i p p e d "  in the first w e e k  
o f  January.
O t h e r  c o m p a n y  efforts to prepare for the u n k n o w n  future i ncluded a b u i l d u p  o f  obs oles cenc e, liability, a n d  
b a d  d eb t reserves (a total o f  $ 9 0 0 , 0 0 0 )  a n d  a n e w  m a r k e t i n g - e x p e n s e  p r o g r a m .  T h i s  latter p r o g r a m ,  w o r k e d  
out b e t w e e n  the Sales &  M a r k e t i n g  d e p a r t m e n t  a n d  the M a r i n e  division's advertising firm, a l l o w e d  for the 
p r e p a y m e n t  o f  part o f  the next year's m a r k e t i n g  e x p ense s. R a t h e r  than b e i n g  b o o k e d  as a  pr e p a i d  e x p e n s e ,  
h o w e v e r ,  these e x p e n s e s  w o u l d  a p p e a r  o n  a bill f r o m  the a d  a g e n c y  w h i c h  listed t h e m  as services for the 
current year; a n d  the division w o u l d  then b o o k  t h e m  as a n  e x p e n s e  o f  the current period. T h e  Sales a n d  
M a r k e t i n g  d e p a r t m e n t  k e p t  a separate ledger to k e e p  track o f  these expenditures to ens u r e  that the paid-for 
services w e r e  received. A  total o f  $ 6 0 0 , 0 0 0  o f  1 9 8 4  advertising expenditures w a s  paid for in 1983.
1 9 8 4
T h e  long-anticipated d o w n t u r n  c a m e  in 198 4; sales w e r e  v e r y  sluggish for the first t w o  quarters. P a u l  a n d  
D o n  w e r e  s o m e w h a t  w o r r i e d  but t o o k  n o  action other than m a i n t a i n i n g  their pressure o n  Sales a n d  M a r ­
keting. W h e n  the third quarter c o n t i n u e d  the s l o w  trend, D o n  started to liquidate s o m e  o f  the reserves, a n d  
b y  the e n d  o f  1 9 8 4 ,  reserves w e r e  r e d u c e d  b y  $ 1 . 8  million. T h e  auditors q u e s t i o n e d  these c h a n g e s  in 
reserves, but D o n  a n d  P a u l  g a v e  t h e m  a n  exp lanation b a s e d  o n  a n  analysis of  c h a n g e s  in inventory 
c o m p o s i t i o n  a n d  estimates of  f o r t h c o m i n g  b a d  debt losses a n d  expenses. T h e  auditors w e r e  skeptical, but 
they eventually c o n c u r r e d  w it h the changes.
A n o t h e r  big step t ak en b y  the division w a s  the establishment of  the E a r l y  O r d e r  P r o g r a m  for distributors a n d  
larger bo a t  builders. T h o s e  w h o  o r d e r e d  early (e.g., the e n d  of  1 9 8 4  instead of  early 1 9 8 5 )  received large 
discounts. T h i s  p r o g r a m  also p r o v i d e d  liberal credit terms; n o  p a y m e n t s  w e r e  d u e  for 9 0  days, a n d  n o  
l a t e - p a y m e n t  penalties w e r e  assessed until at least 1 2 0  d a y s  after receipt of  the sh i p m e n t .  S o m e  o f  the m o r e  
aggressive salespeople told their clients to " o r d e r  the stuff n o w  a n d  don't w o r r y  a b o u t  a n y  p a y m e n t  dates; 
just p a y  us w h e n  y o u  sell it, a n d  y o u  get to p o c k e t  the extra m a r g i n . "  A l t h o u g h  this w a s  n e v e r  formally 
sanctioned, a  flurry o f  fourth quarter sales b r o u g h t  the y e a r - e n d  results just a b o v e  the b u d g e t e d  goal o f  
$ 1 0 8  million.
1 9 8 5
T h e  first quarter o f  1 9 8 5  w a s  s l o w  d u e  to all o f  the E ar ly O r d e r s  that w e r e  p l a c e d  in 1984. B u t  b y  the m i d d l e  
o f  the s e c o n d  quarter, sales h a d  p i c k e d  u p  a n d  w e r e  s o o n  roaring along. In fact, third quarter results w e r e  
so g o o d  that $ 4 . 7  million h a d  to b e  "transferred" to the fourth quarter, a n d  the E a r l y  O r d e r  P r o g r a m  o f  1 9 8 4  
w a s  s u s p e n d e d .
B y  the e n d  o f  1 9 8 5  the c o m p a n y  h a d  not o n l y  p a s s e d  all required goals, but also h a d  a $ 1 0 . 4  million start 
o n  1 9 8 6  revenues, h a d  restored $ 2 . 2  million in reserves, a n d  h a d  pa i d  for $ 0 . 8  million o f  198 6 ' s  advertising. 
O n c e  aga in the c h a n g i n g  o f  the reserves w a s  questioned, but the auditors a c c e p t e d  D o n ' s  explanation of  
" w a n t i n g  to b e  conservative."
1 9 8 6
D o n  k n e w  the L o h n e s  division w a s  well positioned for the n e w  ye a r  but h e  w o r r i e d  w h e r e  all this 
m a n a g e m e n t  o f  earnings w o u l d  lead. H e  h a d  h o p e d  it w o u l d  not continue, but the financial drains o f  the F M S  
division w e r e  g r o w i n g ,  a n d  h e  e x p e c t e d  the corporation to start pressing all o f  the other divisions e v e n  m o r e .  
H e  also k n e w  that Pa u l  a n d  Patti w e r e  already discussing n e w  w a y s  to s m o o t h  i n c o m e ,  a n d  D o n  w o n d e r e d  
w h a t  h e  s h o u l d  d o  a n d  w h o m  h e  c o u l d  s p e a k  to a b o u t  this sensitive matter.
1 4 2
E X H I B I T  1
G R A V E S  I N D U S T R I E S  I N C .  (B)
L o h n e s  M a r i n e  H a r d w a r e  D i v i s i o n  
Divis i o n a l  I n c o m e  a n d  B u d g e t  S t a t e m e n t s  
f o r  F i s c a l  Y e a r s  E n d i n g  3 1  D e c e m b e r  
($ millions)
1 9 8 2  1 9 8 3  1 9 8 4  1 9 8 5
B u d g e t A c t u a l B u d g e t A c t u a l B u d g e t A c t u a l B u d g e t A c t u a l
R e v e n u e $ 8 5 . 0 $ 8 8 . 4 $ 9 6 . 0 $ 9 9 . 1 $ 1 0 8 . 0 $ 1 0 9 . 2 $ 1 1 9 . 0 $ 1 2 2 . 2
C o s t  o f  Sales 5 5 . 7 5 7. 5 6 2 . 4 6 4 . 4 7 1 . 8 7 2 . 9 7 7 . 4 7 9 . 4
G r o s s  M a r g i n $ 2 9 . 3 $ 3 0 . 9 $ 3 3 . 6 $ 3 4 . 7 $  3 6 . 2 $  36 . 3 $  4 1 . 6 $  4 2 . 8
R & D  E x p e n s e 0 . 6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
S G & A  E x p e n s e 10.8 10.9 11.2 12.1 11.8 11.3 14.0 14.8
O p e r a t i n g  Profit $ 1 7 . 9 $ 1 9 . 4 $ 2 1 . 6 $ 2 1 . 8 $  2 3 . 6 $  2 4 . 2 $  2 6 . 8 $  2 7 . 2



















































































































































































G r a v e s  Industries Inc. (C) 
C o n s u m e r  H a r d w a r e  D i v i s i o n
It w a s  o n e  w e e k  before C h r i s t m a s  in 1 9 8 4  a n d  L e o  G l a d u e ,  the president o f  the G r a v e s  Industries' C o n s u m e r  
H a r d w a r e  division, h a d  just returned to his offices after a  l o n g  a n d  difficult b u d g e t  m e e t i n g  w i t h  H e n r y  
G r a v e s ,  the c h a i r m a n  a n d  C E O  o f  G r a v e s  Industries Inc. It h a d  b e e n  a  t o u g h  y e a r  for the C o n s u m e r  division, 
a n d  t he y h a d  just barely m a d e  budget. L e o  h a d  a r g u e d  that w i t h  a  s l o w  e c o n o m y  the division c o u l d  o n l y  
e x p e c t  g r o w t h  o f  3 - 4 %  in 198 5, but H e n r y  insisted that g r o w t h  o f  at least 8 %  w a s  possible. L e o  resisted, 
but h e  g a v e  in w h e n  H e n r y  c h i d e d  h i m  for his lack o f  aspiration a n d  q u e s t i o n e d  w h e t h e r  h e  h a d  the vision 
nec e s s a r y  to m a n a g e  the business. ( S e e  Exhibit 1 for financial results a n d  b u d g e t s  for 198 2 - 8 5 . )
A s  h e  sat in his office, L e o  k n e w  that possibly a  lot m o r e  than just his b o n u s  w a s  riding o n  m a k i n g  the 
division's a ssigned goals for 1985. T h e  g r o w t h  o f  the n e w  Flexible M a n u f a c t u r i n g  S y s t e m s  ( F M S )  division 
w a s  affecting the w h o l e  corporation; the other divisions w e r e  b e i n g  s q u e e z e d  h a r d  for profits so as to f u n d  
this F M S  g r o w t h .  L e o  w o n d e r e d  if they w e r e  b e i n g  s q u e e z e d  too m u c h .
D i v i s i o n  H i s t o r y
T h e  C o n s u m e r  division w a s  f o u n d e d  in 1 9 4 6  to a l l o w  the c o m p a n y  to b r a n c h  out a n d  u s e  its large, w a r t i m e  
p r o d u c t i o n  capacity effectively. T h e  division started out p r o d u c i n g  s i m p l e  h o m e  tools that w e r e  sold t h r o u g h  
distributors. Rea lizing the G r a v e s  n a m e  c o u l d  b e  a  distinct a d v a n t a g e ,  the division's m a n a g e r s  m o v e d  into 
p r o d u c i n g  a w i d e  variety o f  high-quality tools a n d  h a r d w a r e .  T h e  division d e v e l o p e d  a  b r a n d - n a m e  i m a g e  
a n d  sold o n l y  t h r o u g h  distributors to selected h a r d w a r e  chains.
T h e  C o n s u m e r  H a r d w a r e  division e x p e r i e n c e d  slow, steady g r o w t h  until the m i d - 1 9 5 0 s ,  w h e n  H e n r y  G r a v e s  
t o o k  o v e r  as divisional president. H e n r y  h a d  just returned f r o m  serving w i t h  the N a v y  d u r i n g  the K o r e a n  
W a r ,  a n d  h e  h a d  s o m e  n e w  ideas. H e  p r o m o t e d  the idea o f  "professional tools for the h o m e  m e c h a n i c "  a n d  
p u s h e d  the safety a n d  reliability o f  G r a v e s  products. H e  also e x p a n d e d  the p r o d u c t  line a n d  the distribution 
s y s t e m  in search of  faster g r o w t h .  H e  c o n t i n u e d  to find w a y s  to g r o w ,  a n d  for the ne x t  12 years the division 
e n j o y e d  r e v e n u e  g r o w t h  at a  c o m p o u n d  a n n u a l  rate o f  1 1 % .
In 19 6 8 ,  H e n r y  w a s  p r o m o t e d  to C E O ;  his father retained the c h a i r m a n s h i p  until 197 2. L e o  G l a d u e ,  w h o  
h a d  w o r k e d  for the G r a v e s  for 2 2  years in the Industrial a n d  the C o n s u m e r  H a r d w a r e  divisions, w a s  
a p p o i n t e d  as the n ex t president o f  the C o n s u m e r  division. L e o  w a s  well r e g a r d e d  for his technical k n o w l e d g e  
a n d  his ability to get a l o n g  w i t h  the distributors, but his k n o w l e d g e  of  finance a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  w a s  c o n s i d e r e d  
relatively w e a k .
In the late 1 9 7 0 s  a n d  early 1 9 8 2 ,  the division's g r o w t h  b e g a n  to slow. Sales targets w e r e  getting har d e r  to 
reach, a n d  the startup o f  the F M S  division o n l y  c o m p o u n d e d  the p r o b l e m  as the C o n s u m e r  H a r d w a r e  division 
w a s  e x p e c t e d  to cont i n u e  to ac h i e v e  G r a v e s '  l o n g - t e r m  g r o w t h  target o f  8 %  per year.
R e v e n u e  R e c o g n i t i o n
T h e  C o n s u m e r  H a r d w a r e  division sold its g o o d s  to distributors w h o  t o o k  title as s o o n  as the orders w e r e  
shipped. N o  g o o d s  w e r e  put o n  c o n s i g n m e n t ,  so sales r e v e n u e  w a s  r e c o g n i z e d  as s o o n  as the g o o d s  w e r e  
l o a d e d  o n  a truck. A s  w a s  the industry standard, G r a v e s  C o n s u m e r  division did offer large discounts for 
distributors w h o  p l a c e d  large orders early a n d  u s e d  a w i d e  variety o f  seasonal p r o m o t i o n s  as n e e d e d  to 
stimulate sales.
C o p y r i g h t  ©  1 9 8 6  b y  the P r esident a n d  F e l l o w s  o f  H a r v a r d  C o l l e g e .  H a r v a r d  B u s i n e s s  S c h o o l  c a s e  9 - 1 8 7 - 0 4 7 .  
T h i s  c a s e  w a s  p r e p a r e d  b y  J o s e p h  P. M u l l o y  u n d e r  the direction o f  K e n n e t h  A .  M e r c h a n t  as the basis for class di s c u s s i o n  rather than  
to illustrate either effective or ineffective h a n d l i n g  o f  a n  administrative situation. T h e  c a s e  is b a s e d  o n  k n o w l e d g e  o f  actual c o m p a n y  
situations, b u t  the facts h a v e  b e e n  disguised, a n d  a n y  r e s e m b l a n c e  to actual p e o p l e  or e v e n t s  is unintentional. R e p r i n t e d  b y  p e r m i s s i o n  
o f  the H a r v a r d  B u s i n e s s  S c h o o l .
1 4 5
E v e r y  n o w  a n d  then the C o n s u m e r  H a r d w a r e  division h a d  b e e n  k n o w n  to load s o m e  o f  the trucks in their 
fleet at the e n d  o f  a fiscal period to generate "sales in place.'' T h e  l o a d e d  trucks w o u l d  m o v e  a short distance 
a w a y  f r o m  the loading d o c k  a n d  p a r k  until it w a s  t i m e  to m a k e  their deliveries.
1 9 8 4
T h e  y e a r  1 9 8 4  w a s  difficult for the C o n s u m e r  H a r d w a r e  division; the e c o n o m y  w a s  s l o w  a n d  interest rates 
w e r e  h i g h — the w o r s t  c o m b i n a t i o n  for a  h a r d w a r e  a n d  tool business. A s  m i d y e a r  a p p r o a c h e d  a n d  predictions 
for the a n n u a l  totals did not l o o k  g o o d ,  L e o  applied additional pressure to the Sales a n d  M a r k e t i n g  
d e p a r t m e n t  to " g e t  m o r e  o rders." Sales a n d  M a r k e t i n g  r e s p o n d e d  w i t h  a p la n that they i m p l e m e n t e d  but 
k e p t  secret for a l o n g  time. T i m  B o n s a i n t  a n d  J o h n  A h e r n  w e r e  the o n l y  senior m a n a g e r s  to k n o w  a b o u t  the 
plan in 198 4. ( S e e  Exhibit 2  for a recent organizational chart.)
T h e  C o n s u m e r  division u s e d  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  3 0  distributors, but eight o f  t h e m  g e n e r a t e d  7 5 %  o f  G r a v e s '  
business. T i m  a n d  J o h n ' s  pl a n  w a s  to ship additional, u n o r d e r e d  p roducts to the large distributors; these 
u n o r d e r e d  s h i p m e n t s  w o u l d  b e  rotated a m o n g  the large distributors a n d  sent out a l o n g  w i t h  their regular 
orders n ea r the e n d  o f  the m o n t h .  T h e s e  extra s h i p m e n t s  w o u l d  th e n  b e  r e c o r d e d  as revenues. F o u r  m e t h o d s  
w e r e  u s e d  to c a u s e  the u n o r d e r e d  p r o d u c t  to b e  s h i p p e d  including: (1) reentering a  pre viously entered order; 
(2) doubling, tripling, or oth e r w i s e  increasing the a m o u n t  o f  p r o d u c t  actually ordered; (3) creating fictitious 
orders o n  beh a l f  o f  the distributors; a n d  (4) s hipping a n  u n o r d e r e d  p r o d u c t  w h e n  the p r o d u c t  o r d e r e d  w a s  
not in stock.
O n c e  the u n o r d e r e d  s h i p m e n t s  w e r e  delivered, steps w e r e  t a k e n  to k e e p  the g o o d s  f r o m  b e i n g  returned or 
at least to d el ay their return. O v e r s h i p m e n t s  w e r e  b l a m e d  o n  administrative a n d  c o m p u t e r  errors, a n d  
salespeople w e r e  directed to " m a k e  the sales stick" b y  (1) offering special prices for credit terms, 
(2) e x c h a n g i n g  the g o o d s  for other C o n s u m e r  division g o o d s ,  (3) storing the g o o d s  (at G r a v e s '  e x p e n s e )  until 
n e e d e d ,  (4) arranging trades b e t w e e n  distributors, a n d  (5) ignoring the distributors' attempts to return the 
g o o d s  until the distributor h a d  t i m e  to " d i g e s t "  the shipment.
T h i s  plan w o r k e d  rather well; e v e n  t h o u g h  the a m o u n t  o f  " r e t u r n e d  g o o d s "  increased, the net effect w a s  
to increase r e v e n u e s  b y  $ 2 . 8  million a n d  operating profit b y  $ 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 .
A  P l a n n i n g  M e e t i n g
L e o  G l a d u e ,  u n a w a r e  o f  T i m  a n d  J o h n ' s  s c h e m e ,  s c h e d u l e d  a m e e t i n g  for the s e c o n d  w e e k  in J a n u a r y  1985. 
H e  w a n t e d  his m a n a g e m e n t  t e a m  to r e v i e w  1 9 8 4  a n d  start p l a n n i n g  o n  w h e r e  to c o m e  u p  w i t h  the additional 
sales required u n d e r  the n e w  budget.
T h e  m e e t i n g  w a s  he l d  o n  J a n u a r y  10, 1985. T h e  first i t e m  o n  the a g e n d a  w a s  a  r e v i e w  o f  the 1 9 8 4  final 
results. T h e  financial officer, J o h n  A h e r n ,  reported that the level o f  sales h a d  just c o m e  in o v e r  budget. 
O p e r a t i n g  profits w e r e  close to budget, a n d  after a f e w  journal entries w e r e  m a d e  to r e d u c e  J u n e  reserves 
h el d against inventories a n d  receivables, the operating profit a n d  R O N A  targets w o u l d  b e  met.
T h e  ne x t  i t e m  w a s  the m o s t  i m p orta nt one: identifying n e w  sources o f  r e v e n u e s  a n d  other areas o f  cost 
savings that w o u l d  b e  ne c e s s a r y  for m e e t i n g  the n e w  budget. T h e  discussion w e n t  o n  for hours, but there 
w e r e  n o  clear solutions. W h e n  the m e e t i n g  adjourned, L e o  G l a d u e  instructed all d e p a r t m e n t  h e a d s  to 
c o m m e n c e  internal studies to identify potential r e v e n u e  sources a n d  cost savings.
S a l e s  a n d  M a r k e t i n g
In the fol l o w i n g  w e e k ,  the Sales a n d  M a r k e t i n g  d e p a r t m e n t  d e c i d e d  to e x p a n d  the o v e r s h i p m e n t  p r o g r a m  
started at the e n d  o f  1 9 8 4 ,  a n d  they d e c i d e d  not to tell L e o  a b o u t  the specifics o f  the p r o g r a m .  T i m  Bonsaint, 
the h e a d  o f  Sales a n d  M a r k e t i n g ,  just p r o m i s e d  L e o  that t h r o u g h  "selective discounts a n d  p r o m o t i o n s  w e  
will increase the a v e r a g e  order size o f  o u r  largest distributors." T h e  actual size o f  the o v e r s h i p m e n t s  w a s  
to b e  carefully controlled b y  T i m ,  usi ng forecasts o f  actual quarterly a n d  a n n u a l  sales.
1 4 6
P r o d u c t i o n  a n d  P u r c h a s i n g
T h e  P r o d u c t i o n  a n d  P u r c h a s i n g  d e p a r t m e n t  c o u l d  d o  little to help w i t h  n e w  revenues, but its m a n a g e r ,  
K i m b e r l y  C o l s o n ,  k n e w  she c o u l d  h a v e  a  large i m p a c t  o n  controlling the e x p e n s e s  o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  
contracts w i t h  its suppliers. S o m e  o f  G r a v e s '  suppliers sold b o t h  m a c h i n e s  a n d  parts to the division, a n d  it 
w a s  possible to alter contracts to adjust the a m o u n t  o f  the exp endi ture to b e  capitalized. F o r  e x a m p l e ,  G r a v e s  
h a d  a contract w i t h  the Ril ey M a c h i n e  C o m p a n y  for $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 ;  $ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  o f  this a m o u n t  w a s  for t w o  n e w  
ratchet m a c h i n e s ,  a n d  the rest o f  the m o n e y  w a s  for 5 0 , 0 0 0  ratchet assemblies. B y  h a v i n g  R i l e y  c h a n g e  the 
invoices to indicate that $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0  w a s  for the t w o  m a c h i n e s ,  the price o f  the individual ratchet assemblies 
w o u l d  d r o p  b y  3 3 % .  T h e  extra $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  c o u l d  b e  capitalized ( a n d  e x p e n s e d  o v e r  the life o f  the m a c h i n e s ) ,  
a n d  the i m m e d i a t e  effect w a s  a n  increase in profit.
K i m  k n e w  m a n y  variations o n  this s c h e m e ,  s u c h  as a d d i n g  a special " tooling c h a r g e "  to the r e d u c e d  b a s e  
price o f  the ratchet. T h i s  tooling c h a r g e  c o u l d  b e  capitalized b y  the C o n s u m e r  division, the price o f  the 
m a c h i n e s  w o u l d  not h a v e  to b e  c h a n g e d ,  a n d  G r a v e s  w o u l d  still get the ratchets at the r e d u c e d  price. A n d  
b y  m i x i n g  m e t h o d s ,  n o  clear pattern w o u l d  e m e r g e .  S u c h  a  s y s t e m  c o u l d  easily b e  r u n  b y  K i m  a n d  a f e w  
o f  h e r  p u r c h a s i n g  people, so she o n l y  told L e o  that b y  putting pressure o n  suppliers, she h a d  negotiated s o m e  
price reductions o n  c o m p o n e n t s .
1 9 8 5  R e s u l t s
T h e  y e a r  1 9 8 5  w a s  slow, a n d  the C o n s u m e r  H a r d w a r e  division struggled; but w i t h  the assistance o f  the t w o  
special p r o g r a m s ,  it w a s  able to m e e t  budget. B y  the e n d  o f  the y ea r the Sales a n d  M a r k e t i n g  d e p a r t m e n t  
h a d  " o v e r s h i p p e d "  (after returns) a  total o f  $ 8 . 9  million in g o o d s  that increased operating profits b y  $ 1 . 8  
million, a n d  P r o d u c t i o n  a n d  P u r c h a s i n g  h a d  negotiated contracts that r e d u c e d  current e x p e n s e s  b y  $ 2 . 7  
million ($2.2 million after depreciation). N o t  all o f  this w e n t  c o m p l e t e l y  unnoticed, h o w e v e r ,  a n d  b y  the 
e n d  o f  the y e a r  L e o  h a d  started to a s k  questions a b o u t  the h i g h e r - t h a n - n o r m a l  level o f  returns, c o m p l a i n t s  
f r o m  distributors a n d  capital expenditures.
T h e  A u d i t o r s
In the first w e e k  o f  D e c e m b e r ,  R o g e r  S e x a u e r ,  the m a n a g e r  a ssigned to the G r a v e s  Industries audit, w a s  
sitting in his office at Ernst, Mitchell &  Sells w h e n  h e  received a p h o n e  call f r o m  D o n  H u b b a r d ,  the senior 
assi g n e d  to the audit o f  the C o n s u m e r  H a r d w a r e  a n d  A u t o m o t i v e  divisions o f  G r a v e s  Industries. T h e  
conversation w e n t  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  as follows:
R o g e r :  H e l l o  D o n ,  w h a t  c a n  I d o  for y o u ?
D o n :  I a m  calling in regard to the C o n s u m e r  H a r d w a r e  division audit. I h a v e  c o m e  across s o m e
u n u s u a l  transactions a n d  I can't s e e m  to get a n y  rea sona ble a n s w e r s  f r o m  the c o m p a n y  staff.
R o g e r :  W h a t ' s  the p r o b l e m ?
D o n :  O n e  o f  m y  staff acc ountants w a s  p e r f o r m i n g  a  r e v i e w  o f  capital expenditures for this past year
a n d  f o u n d  s o m e  things that didn't s e e m  right.
R o g e r :  L i k e  w h a t ?
D o n :  L a r g e  price hikes in w h a t  ap p e a r s  to b e  standard e q u i p m e n t  for this division a n d  a n  u n u sual ly
large total of  " tooling c h a r g e s "  a n d  "tooling p r e m i u m s . "
R o g e r :  H a v e  y o u  investigated the r e a s o n ?  P e r h a p s  the e q u i p m e n t  h a s  b e e n  specially m o d i f i e d  and,
as a result, costs m o r e .  A ls o, this division has a l w a y s  h a d  ''tooling c h a r g e s . '' F o r  a n y  special 
p r o d u c t  they w a n t  p r o d u c e d  t he y h el p the supplier p a y  for the modifications to his e q u i p m e n t .  
S i n c e  this is a capital i m p r o v e m e n t  they c a n  capitalize the portion that they p a y  for.
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D o n :  I k n o w  that, but I h a v e  c h e c k e d  a  lot o f  this e q u i p m e n t  m y s e l f  a n d  it all l oo ks to b e  the s a m e
as the o n e s  b o u g h t  previously. W h e n  I a s k  p e o p l e  in P urchasing, they don't h a v e  a g o o d  
a n s w e r .  T h e y  say the differences are c a u s e d  b y  inflation or s o m e  k i n d  of  internal m o d i f i ­
cation. N o w ,  as to the tooling charges, in 1 9 8 4  they totaled $ 1 4 7 , 0 0 0 .  T h i s  year, t h r o u g h  
N o v e m b e r ,  they total o v e r  $ 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 .
R o g e r :  T h a t  is a sharp increase. P e r h a p s  they h a v e  m a d e  modifications to the parts in question a n d
the supplier has billed t h e m  to c o v e r  his fixed investment.
D o n :  I don't think so b e c a u s e  the parts d o  not l o o k  like they h a v e  c h a n g e d .  H o w e v e r ,  this leads
m e  to w h a t  I think is the heart o f  the matter. D o  y o u  r e m e m b e r  w h e n  w e  a s k e d  K i m  C o l s o n  
a b o u t  the d ecrease in price o n  s o m e  o f  the parts they w e r e  p u r c h a s i n g ?
R o g e r :  Y e s  I do, a n d  if I r e m e m b e r  correctly, she said that since G r a v e s  h a d  b e c o m e  s u c h  a large
b u y e r  for the output of  s o m e  o f  their suppliers she w a s  able to negotiate large discounts. Als o, 
s h e  said s o m e t h i n g  to the effect that the suppliers h a d  m a d e  so m a n y  of  the ite ms that their 
cost o f  p r o d u c t i o n  per i t e m  h a d  g o n e  d o w n  significantly.
D o n :  That's right. B u t  w h e n  y o u  stand b a c k  a n d  l o o k  at the w h o l e  situation, the suppliers that g a v e
t h e m  the large discounts o n  parts are the s a m e  o n e s  that either raised their prices o n  capital 
e q u i p m e n t  a n d /or are c h a r g i n g  t h e m  for tooling charges.
R o g e r :  N o w  I see the picture. T h i s  is either a n  incredible c o i n c i d e n c e  or there is a  systematic plan
to capitalize current e x p e n s e s  a n d  overstate profits.
D o n :  Right! N o w  c o m e s  the h a r d  question— w h a t  d o  I d o  n o w ?  S h o u l d  I talk to the division's
president n o w  or wait for y o u  to get here?
R o g e r :  N o ,  no! K e e p  o n  g o i n g  wi t h  the audit, but b e  extra careful. If there is o n e  p r o b l e m  like this
there m a y  b e  others. T h i s  division is u n d e r  a  lot of  pressure to increase operating profits. W h a t  
is the total i m p a c t  o f  this o n  their b o t t o m  line?
D o n :  W e  are still w o r k i n g  o n  this b u t  it looks like a b o u t  $ 1 . 7  million to $ 1 . 9  million for 19 8 5 ,  a n d
it c o u l d  b e  higher.
R o g e r :  W e l l  that s h o u l d  o n l y  b e  a b o u t  4 - 5 %  of  the division's operating profit a n d  corporate net
i n c o m e .  R i g h t ?
D o n :  A s  o f  right n o w  that's correct, but if w e  find a n y t h i n g  else it c o u l d  g o  higher, especially if
this h a s  b e e n  g o i n g  o n  for a c o u p l e  o f  years.
R o g e r :  That's true. W e l l ,  y o u  p u s h  o n  there. I will talk to H a r v e y 1 a n d  let h i m  k n o w  w h a t  y o u  h a v e
found. T h e n  I'll m e e t  y o u  a n d  l o o k  o v e r  w h a t  y o u  h a v e  found. In the m e a n t i m e  don't say 
a n y t h i n g  to a n y o n e  at the c o m p a n y  till I get b a c k  to you.
R o g e r  sat at his d e s k  a n d  t h o u g h t  a b o u t  w h a t  H a r v e y  w o u l d  d o  if his suspicions w e r e  correct. T h e  a m o u n t  
o f  m o n e y  i n v o l v e d  so far w a s  large for the division, b u t  p e r h a p s  i m m a t e r i a l  f r o m  the standpoint o f  the entire 
corporation.
' H a r v e y  K r a n t z ,  the partner a s s i g n e d  to the G r a v e s  audit.
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D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 5
In the m i d d l e  o f  D e c e m b e r ,  T i m  a n d  J o h n ,  finding it increasingly difficult to k e e p  their s c h e m e  g o i n g  a n d  
virtually impos s i b l e  to m e e t  their 1 9 8 5  targets, d e c i d e d  they h a d  better b e  h o n e s t  w i t h  L e o .  T h e y  w e r e  sure 
that w i t h  his support they c o u l d  lay out a c o n v i n c i n g  story for the events o f  1 9 8 5  a n d  get the auditors off 
their backs.
A s  they told the w h o l e  story, L e o  sat d u m b f o u n d e d .  Shortly thereafter, K i m  e x p l a i n e d  w h a t  she h a d  b e e n  
doing. L e o  felt h e  h a d  n o  c h o ice but to i n f o r m  corporate headquarters a n d  the external auditors i m m e d i a t e l y .
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E X H I B I T  1
G R A V E S  I N D U S T R I E S  I N C .  (C)
D i v isional I n c o m e  a n d  B u d g e t  S t a t e m e n t s  
3 1  D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 5  
($ millions)
1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5
B u d g e t A c t u a l B u d g e t A c t u a l B u d g e t A c t u a l B u d g e t
R e v e n u e $ 1 2 5 . 0 $ 1 2 7 . 5 $ 1 3 9 . 0 $ 1 4 0 . 3 $ 1 5 3 . 5 $ 1 5 4 . 3 $ 1 6 8 . 0
C o s t  o f  Sales 8 0 . 0 8 1 . 6 8 9 . 0 8 9 . 2 9 8 . 2 9 8 . 3 1 0 7 . 5
G r o s s  M a r g i n $  4 5 . 0 $  4 5 . 9 $  5 0 . 0 $  51.1 $  5 5 . 3 $  5 6 . 0 $  6 0 . 5
R & D  E x p e n s e 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5
S G & A  E x p e n s e 15.2 15.1 16.4 16.2 17.9 18.5 2 0 . 6
O p e r a t i n g  Profit $  2 8 . 7 $  2 9 . 6 $  3 2. 3 $  3 3 . 6 $  3 6 . 0 $  36.1 $  3 8 . 4
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G o o d  Practice G u i d e l i n e s  for A s s e s s i n g  
the R i s k  of  F r a u d u l e n t  Fin a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
I. I n t r o d u c t i o n
M a n y  different incentives a n d  opportunities c a n  contribute to fraudulent financial reporting. Effectively 
preventing a n d  detecting fraudulent financial reporting requires u n d e r s t a n d i n g  these incentives a n d  o p p o r ­
tunities, a n d  assessing the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting that these factors c a n  create in a c o m p a n y .
T h e s e  guidelines describe s u c h  incentives a n d  opportunities. B e c a u s e  these incentives a n d  opportunities are 
present to s o m e  d e g r e e  in e v e r y  public c o m p a n y ,  the guidelines are not necessarily predictive or diagnostic. 
T h a t  is, they are not i ntended to b e  u s e d  as a m e a n s  for reliably predicting specific c o m p a n i e s  w h e r e  
fraudulent financial reporting will occur. Rather, t he y are i ntended to help sensitize the participants in the 
financial reporting process to the b r o a d  r a n g e  o f  factors that c a n  h a v e  implications for the risk o f  fraudulent 
financial reporting. T h e  inescapable fact is that d o i n g  business inherently introduces forces that c a n  lead to 
fraudulent financial reporting, a n d  the starting point for c h e c k i n g  a n d  controlling these risks is aw a r e n e s s .
All the participants in the financial reporting process—  m a n a g e m e n t ,  the audit c o m m i t t e e ,  internal auditors, 
a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  public a ccountants— s h o u l d  assess the risks o f  fraudulent financial reporting present in the 
c o m p a n y ' s  financial reporting e n v i r o n m e n t .  R a t h e r  than entailing a separate effort or project, this process 
entails bringing to regular m a n a g e m e n t  activities a  h e i g h t e n e d  a w a r e n e s s  o f  a n d  sensitivity to the potential 
for fraudulent financial reporting. A c c o r d i n g l y ,  it is not i ntended that this process involve costly d o c u m e n ­
tation, s u c h  as that w h i c h  m a n y  c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  u n d e r t a k e n  in r e s p o n s e  to the F o r e i g n  C o r r u p t  Practices A c t  
of  1977.
F o r  corporate m a n a g e m e n t ,  the factors des cribed in these guidelines are frequently the s a m e  as those dealt 
w i t h  in c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  a w i d e  variety o f  business operating a n d  administrative decisions. F o r  e x a m p l e ,  
m a n y  incentives a n d  opportunities result f r o m  perfectly valid m a n a g e m e n t  techniques, s u c h  as m a n a g e m e n t  
b y  objective a n d  decentralized operations. S o  assessing the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting d o e s  not 
necessitate a separate effort but o n l y  a h e i g h t e n e d  a w a r e n e s s  a n d  sensitivity to the implications o f  these 
factors for fraudulent financial reporting. T h i s  sensitivity enables the c o m p a n y  to d e s i g n  a n d  i m p l e m e n t  
internal controls to m i n i m i z e  the risks it identifies. A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  also s h o u l d  b e  sensitive to the potential 
risks these factors m a y  create a n d  to the n e e d  for m a n a g e m e n t  aware n e s s .
Similarly, these guidelines s h o u l d  not suggest a separate effort b y  internal auditors. Internal auditors w o u l d  
consider the factors dis cussed herein w h e n  p l a n n i n g  their financial audits. T h e  guidelines p r o v i d e  internal 
auditors w i t h  a n  appreciation for the potential financial sta tement effect of  the results o f  their operational 
audits.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  in C h a p t e r  T h r e e  that i n d e p e n d e n t  public a ccountants b e  required to assess 
the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting w h e n  p l a n n i n g  a n d  c o n d u c t i n g  e a c h  audit. T h e s e  guidelines m a y  
p r o v i d e  insight into the cau s e s  o f  fraudulent financial reporting; therefore sensitivity to the factors in these 
guidelines m a y  assist a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  public a c c o u n t a n t  in c o m p l e t i n g  audit p l a n n i n g  a n d  risk assessment.
Sensitivity to the factors in these guidelines not o n l y  helps to detect a n d  p re vent fraudulent financial reporting 
but it is g o o d  business practice for corporate m a n a g e m e n t ,  the audit c o m m i t t e e ,  a n d  auditors. Public 
c o m p a n i e s  c a n  benefit f r o m  s u c h  sensitivity t h r o u g h  r e d u c e d  probability of  inadvertent financial statement 
errors a n d  t h r o u g h  e n h a n c e d  internal controls that i m p r o v e  profitability a n d  efficiency. Similarly, auditors 
will benefit t h r o u g h  i m p r o v e m e n t s  in b o t h  audit efficiency a n d  effectiveness that inevitably result f r o m  a 
better-focused e x a m i n a t i o n .
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T h e  factors discussed in these guidelines w e r e  d r a w n  f r o m  various sources, including the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
study o f  S E C  e n f o r c e m e n t  actions, a  r e v i e w  o f  the auditing policies a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  o f  1 0  o f  the 14  largest 
public a c c o u n t i n g  firms in the U n i t e d  States, a n d  a r e v i e w  o f  pub l i s h e d  a c a d e m i c  a n d  professional literature 
that relates to fraudulent financial reporting.
T h e s e  guidelines d o  not constitute a " c o o k b o o k "  a p p r o a c h  m e a n t  to b e  applied m e c h a n i c a l l y ,  but present 
a  f r a m e  o f  reference for u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a n d  assessing the types o f  factors that m a y  contribute to the risk of  
fraudulent financial reporting. T h e s e  guidelines are not all-inclusive; they capture the b r o a d e r  points a n d  
subjects applicable to m o s t  public c o m p a n i e s  a n d  illustrate the types o f  factors that c a n  b e  imp o r t a n t  in 
assessing the risk o f  financial reporting fraud. J u d g m e n t  a n d  creativity applied to this starting point will 
generate additional ideas a b o u t  matters relevant to particular circumstances.
II. T h e  Effect of  the E n v i r o n m e n t  o n  th e R i s k  o f  F r a u d u l e n t  Fin a n c i a l  
R e p o r t i n g
A .  W h y  t h e  E n v i r o n m e n t  Is A s s e s s e d
T h e  c o m p a n y ' s  internal a n d  external e n v i r o n m e n t s  influence the inherent risk o f  fraudulent financial re­
porting. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  studies o f  the financial reporting s y s t e m  revealed that the env i r o n m e n t a l ,  
institutional, a n d  individual forces a n d  pressures that c a n  lead to fraudulent financial reporting are present 
to s o m e  d e g r e e  in e v e r y  public c o m p a n y .  T h e s e  forces a n d  pressures p r o v i d e  incentives a n d  opportunities 
for individuals a n d  c o m p a n i e s  to e n g a g e  in fraudulent financial reporting.
A s s e s s i n g  the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting involves (1) a n a lyzi ng the c o m p a n y ' s  internal a n d  
external e n v i r o n m e n t  to identify the u n i q u e  incentives a n d  opportunities present in the c o m p a n y  a n d  (2) 
assessing h o w  these incentives a n d  opportunities affect the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting. C h a p t e r  
O n e  of the report discusses the general types o f  incentives a n d  opportunities n o t e d  in the r e v i e w  o f  alleged 
instances o f  fraudulent financial reporting a n d  h o w  the p r e s e n c e  o f  these factors contributes to fraudulent 
financial reporting.
T h e s e  guidelines present e n v i r o n m e n t a l  considerations as neutrally as possible, b e c a u s e  not all e n v i r o n ­
m e n t a l  considerations increase the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting; s o m e  decr e a s e  the risk. A s s e s s i n g  
h o w  a risk factor affects a n  individual c o m p a n y  requires j u d g m e n t ,  experience, a n d  k n o w l e d g e  o f  the 
particular circumstances. F o r  e x a m p l e ,  o n e  consideration discussed here is the i m p a c t  o f  n e w  a c c o u n t i n g  
p r o n o u n c e m e n t s  affecting the industry. S u c h  a n  e v e n t  c a n  d ecrease the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting 
b y  p r o v i d i n g  clearer a c c o u n t i n g  g u i d a n c e  in a n  e v o l v i n g  area, eliminating a  potential opp ortunity for 
fraudulent financial reporting. O n  the other h a n d ,  a n e w  a c c o u n t i n g  p r o n o u n c e m e n t  c o u l d  h a v e  a  material 
a d v e r s e  i m p a c t  o n  a c o m p a n y ' s  financial position, resulting in a n  incentive to fraudulently m a n i p u l a t e  other 
portions o f  the financial statements. W h i l e  the objective w a s  a neutral discussion, fraudulent financial 
reporting generally takes the f o r m  o f  overstated i n c o m e  a n d  assets. A c c o r d i n g l y ,  m a n y  e x a m p l e s  discuss 
these conditions.
B .  T h e  I n t e r a c t i o n  o f  I n c e n t i v e s  a n d  O p p o r t u n i t i e s
W h i l e  o n e  or m o r e  incentives a n d  opportunities are present in m o s t  instances o f  fraudulent financial 
reporting, the p r e s e n c e  o f  o n e  or m o r e  incentives or opportunities d o e s  not automatically m e a n  fraudulent 
financial reporting h a s  o c c u r r e d  or is likely to occur. M o s t  c o m p a n i e s  a n d  m a n a g e r s  at o n e  t i m e  or another 
e x p e r i e n c e  intense incentives a n d  are e x p o s e d  to inviting opportunities w i t h o u t  s u c c u m b i n g  to fraudulent 
financial reporting. S o  identifying a n y  certain n u m b e r  o f  risk factors is not a n  accurate predictor o f  fraudulent 
financial reporting.
T h e  interaction o f  several different incentives a n d  opportunities p r o d u c e s  the c o m b u s t i b l e  m i x t u r e  that 
elevates the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting. F o r  e x a m p l e ,  the c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  declining profits d u e  to
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p r o d u c t  o b s oles cenc e, a w e a k  control e n v i r o n m e n t ,  a  risk-taking m a n a g e m e n t ,  a n d  the u s e  o f  aggressive 
a c c o u n t i n g  principles presents a m u c h  greater risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting than the s u m  o f  the risks 
presented individually b y  these factors.
Finally, e a c h  c o m p a n y  h a s  its o w n  u n i q u e  a n d  e v o l v i n g  culture a n d  c h e m i s t r y  that d e t e r m i n e  the relative 
risk o f  e a c h  factor. T h u s  the factors that p r o d u c e  this c o m b u s t i b l e  m i x t u r e  c h a n g e  f r o m  c o m p a n y  to c o m p a n y  
a n d  f r o m  y ea r to year. Effectively assessing the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting requires s e a s o n e d  
j u d g m e n t ,  experience, a n d  creativity to properly identify, understand, a n d  assess e a c h  c o m p a n y ' s  e n v i r o n ­
m e n t a l  risks.
III. F a c t o r s  to B e  C o n s i d e r e d
A .  T h e  I n t e r n a l  E n v i r o n m e n t
T h e  internal e n v i r o n m e n t  consists o f  the conditions, circumstances, a n d  influences affecting the c o m p a n y ' s  
operations subject to m a n a g e m e n t ' s  influence. Internal e n v i r o n m e n t a l  conditions include the c o m p a n y ' s  (1) 
internal controls, (2) financial characteristics, (3) operations, (4) individual m a n a g e m e n t  characteristics, a n d  
(5) a c c o u n t i n g  policies a n d  procedures.
1. I n t e r n a l  C o n t r o l s
C h a p t e r  T w o  discusses the i m p o r t a n c e  the C o m m i s s i o n  places o n  main t a i n i n g  internal controls that pr o v i d e  
rea sona ble ass u r a n c e  that fraudulent financial reporting will b e  p r e v e n t e d  or subject to early detection. T h i s  
chapter also notes that it refers to internal controls b r o a d e r  than the traditional definition o f  internal 
a c c o u n t i n g  control— it includes the control e n v i r o n m e n t .  B o t h  internal a c c o u n t i n g  controls a n d  the control 
e n v i r o n m e n t  are discussed here.
a. Internal A c c o u n t i n g  Controls
A  c o m p a n y ' s  internal a c c o u n t i n g  controls consist o f  its a c c o u n t i n g  s y s t e m  a n d  specific controls.
T h e  a c c o u n t i n g  s y s t e m  c o m p r i s e s  the m e t h o d s  a n d  records established to identify, a s s e m b l e ,  classify, 
analyze, record, a n d  report a n  entity's transactions, a n d  to m a i n t a i n  accountability for the related assets. A n  
effective a c c o u n t i n g  s y s t e m  h a s  b o t h  a d e q u a t e  physical d o c u m e n t s  a n d  records, a n d  a d e q u a t e  p r o c e d u r e s  to: 
(1) identify a n d  record all valid transactions, (2) describe the transactions in sufficient detail to p e r m i t  t h e m  
to b e  properly classified, (3) m e a s u r e  the v al ue o f  the transactions accurately, (4) e n s u r e  the transactions are 
r e c o r d e d  in the p r o p e r  a c c o u n t i n g  period, a n d  (5) present a n d  disclose the transactions properly in the 
financial statements.
Specific controls are the individual policies a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  pertaining to proce s s i n g  transactions that 
m a n a g e m e n t  establishes to pr o v i d e  a s s uran ce its objectives will b e  achieved. Effective specific controls help 
to ensure: (1) functions are ade quat ely segregated, (2) all transactions are e x e c u t e d  in a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  general or specific authorization, (3) a d e q u a t e  physical control is m a i n t a i n e d  o v e r  assets a n d  
a c c o u n t i n g  records, a n d  (4) regular, i n d e p e n d e n t  c h e c k s  o n  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  a n d  c o m p a r i s o n  a n d  reconciliation 
o f  assets to r e c o r d e d  accountability, are m a d e .
Specific control p r o c e d u r e s  include clerical checks, d o c u m e n t  c o m p a r i s o n s  a n d  cancellations, transaction 
approvals s u c h  as standard price lists or c u s t o m e r  credit limits, c o m p u t e r  c o m p a r i s o n  o f  r u n  to r u n  totals, 
reconciliations, r e v i e w s  o f  data u s e d  to p re pare m a n a g e m e n t  reports, i n d e p e n d e n t  asset counts, segregation 
o f  duties s u c h  as requiring that the b a n k  reconciliation b e  p e r f o r m e d  b y  individuals w i t h  n o  c a s h  receipts 
or d i s b u r s e m e n t s  responsibilities, a n d  control o v e r  access to a n d  use of  c o m p u t e r  p r o g r a m s  a n d  data files 
b y  p r o c e d u r e s  s u c h  as p a s s w o r d s  a n d  se c u r e d  facilities.
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T h e  a c c o u n t i n g  s y s t e m  a n d  specific controls a c o m p a n y  establishes are influenced b y  its size, c o m p l e x i t y ,  
o w n e r s h i p  characteristics, a n d  business nature. A  c o m p a n y  designs its a c c o u n t i n g  s y s t e m  a n d  specific 
controls to p r o v i d e  reliable financial statements. S o  internal a c c o u n t i n g  controls address m a n y  different types 
o f  situations. S o m e  portions of  the internal a c c o u n t i n g  controls, s u c h  as segregation o f  duties a n d  clerical 
c he cks, are d e s i g n e d  to pr e v e n t  or detect inadvertent errors or corporate frauds s u c h  as e m b e z z l e m e n t s .  
O t h e r  portions o f  the internal a c c o u n t i n g  controls, s u c h  as r e v i e w  of  m a n a g e m e n t  reports, are m o r e  closely 
associated w i t h  preventing a n d  detecting fraudulent financial reporting.
Descriptions o f  m e t h o d s  o f  i m p l e m e n t i n g  effective a c c o u n t i n g  s y s t e m s  a n d  specific controls a b o u n d  within 
the a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  auditing literature. A c c o r d i n g l y ,  this A p p e n d i x  d o e s  not include extensive discussions 
o f  the merits of  individual procedures. B e c a u s e  m a n y  portions of  a c o m p a n y ' s  internal ac c o u n t i n g  controls 
are imp o r t a n t  in pre vent ing a n d  detecting fraudulent financial reporting, h o w e v e r ,  they s h o u l d  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  
w h e n  assessing the risk o f  s u c h  fraud.
b. Control E n v i r o n m e n t
A s  C h a p t e r  T w o  m a k e s  clear, internal a c c o u n t i n g  controls are important, but a c o m p a n y  also m u s t  l o o k  to 
its control e n v i r o n m e n t  to p r e vent a n d  detect fraudulent financial reporting.
T h e  c o m p a n y ' s  control e n v i r o n m e n t  is the corporate a t m o s p h e r e  in w h i c h  the a c c o u n t i n g  controls exist a n d  
the financial statements are prepared. A  strong control e n v i r o n m e n t  reflects m a n a g e m e n t ' s  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  of  
a n d  c o m m i t m e n t  to a n  effective s y s t e m  o f  internal control. W h i l e  a strong control e n v i r o n m e n t  d o e s  not 
gu a r a n t e e  the a b s e n c e  o f  fraudulent financial reporting, it r e d u c e s  the c h a n c e  that m a n a g e m e n t  will override 
internal a c c o u n t i n g  controls. O n  the other h a n d ,  a w e a k  control e n v i r o n m e n t  u n d e r m i n e s  the effectiveness 
o f  a c o m p a n y ' s  internal a c c o u n t i n g  controls a n d  m a y  reflect a predisposition t o w a r d  misrepresentations in 
the financial statements.
A  c o m p a n y ' s  control e n v i r o n m e n t  consists o f  its organizational p h i l o s o p h y  a n d  operating style, o r g a n i z a ­
tional structure, m e t h o d s  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i n g  a n d  enforcing the a s s i g n m e n t  o f  authority a n d  responsibility, 
organizational control m e t h o d s ,  a n d  per s o n n e l  m a n a g e m e n t  m e t h o d s .  (This description of  the control 
e n v i r o n m e n t  is b a s e d  in large part o n  the discussion in the A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d ' s  p r o p o s e d  S t a t e m e n t  
o n  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  o n  Co n t r o l  Risk.)
A  c o m p a n y ' s  organizational p h i l o s o p h y  a n d  operating style e n c o m p a s s  a b r o a d  r a n g e  o f  characteristics, s u c h  
as (1) m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a n d  the b o a r d  o f  directors' attitudes a n d  actions t o w a r d  financial reporting, ethics, a n d  
business risks, (2) m a n a g e m e n t ' s  e m p h a s i s  o n  m e e t i n g  budget, profit, or other financial or operating goals, 
(3) m a n a g e m e n t ' s  preference for centralized or decentralized administration a n d  operations, a n d  (4) the 
extent to w h i c h  o n e  or a f e w  individuals d o m i n a t e  m a n a g e m e n t .  A  c o m p a n y ' s  p h i l o s o p h y  a n d  operating style 
are often the m o s t  im p o r t a n t  parts o f  the control e n v i r o n m e n t .
A n  effective organizational structure gives the c o m p a n y  a n  overall f r a m e w o r k  for planning, directing, a n d  
controlling its operations. It considers s u c h  matters as (1) the f o r m ,  nature, a n d  reporting relationships of 
a n  entity's organizational units a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  positions, a n d  (2) the a s s i g n m e n t  of  authority a n d  r e s p o n ­
sibility to these units a n d  positions a n d  the constraints established o v e r  their functioning. A  k e y  part o f  a n  
effective organizational structure is a vigilant, i n f o r m e d ,  a n d  effective audit c o m m i t t e e .
Effective m e t h o d s  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i n g  a n d  enf orcing the a s s i g n m e n t  of  authority a n d  responsibility clarify the 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of, a n d  i m p r o v e  c o m p l i a n c e  with, the organization's policies a n d  objectives. T h e s e  m e t h o d s  
consider s u c h  matters as: (1) the delegation o f  authority a n d  responsibility for matters s u c h  as organizational 
goals a n d  objectives, operating functions, a n d  regulatory requirements, (2) the policies regarding acceptable 
business practices a n d  conflicts of  interest, a n d  (3) e m p l o y e e  j o b  descriptions delineating specific duties, 
responsibilities, a n d  constraints. A  k e y  m e t h o d  of  c o m m u n i c a t i n g  e m p l o y e e  responsibility is t h r o u g h  a 
written c o d e  o f  corporate conduct.
Org anizational control m e t h o d s  affect the c o m p a n y ' s  ability to control a n d  supervise its e m p l o y e e s  a n d  
operations effectively. Effective organizational control m e t h o d s  consider s u c h  matters as: (1) establishing
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a d e q u a t e  planning, accounting, a n d  reporting s ystems, (2) requiring reports that c o m m u n i c a t e  to appropriate 
individuals exceptions f r o m  p l a n n e d  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  (3) establishing p r o c e d u r e s  to take appropriate corrective 
action w h e n  exc epti ons are identified, a n d  (4) m o n i t o r i n g  a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  control s y s t e m s  so they c a n  b e  
m o d i f i e d  w h e n  necessary. A n  effective internal audit function is often a  particularly i m p o r t a n t  organizational 
control m e t h o d .
P e r s o n n e l  m a n a g e m e n t  m e t h o d s  influence the c o m p a n y ' s  ability to e m p l o y  sufficient c o m p e t e n t  personnel. 
Effective p e r sonn el m a n a g e m e n t  m e t h o d s  con side r s u c h  matters as policies for hiring, training, evaluating, 
p r o m o t i n g ,  a n d  c o m p e n s a t i n g  e m p l o y e e s .
B e c a u s e  of  the subjective nature o f  a c o m p a n y ' s  control e n v i r o n m e n t ,  assessing its individual c o m p o n e n t s  
c a n  b e  difficult. T h e  overall strength o f  the control e n v i r o n m e n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  c a n  b e  assessed b y  a n  individual 
w i t h  sufficient w i s d o m ,  experience, a n d  j u d g m e n t  to consider s u c h  matters as:
• T h e  d e g r e e  o f  e m p h a s i s  p l a c e d  o n  a c h ievi ng earnings forecasts, m e e t i n g  b u d g e t e d  targets, a n d  m a i n ­
taining or m a n i p u l a t i n g  the m a r k e t  val ue o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  stock. M a n a g e m e n t  m a y  b e  u n d u l y  interested 
in the m a r k e t  price of  the c o m p a n y ' s  stock to assist the c o m p a n y  w i t h  future financing, to p re vent s ec ured 
loans f r o m  b e i n g  called, or to m a k e  stock options a n d  other stock c o m p e n s a t i o n  m o r e  valuable.
• T u r n o v e r  in k e y  personnel, w i t h  special consideration g i v e n  to u n u s u a l  retirements or r e p l a c e m e n t s  o f  
in-house counsel, internal auditors, or k e y  individuals in the a c c o u n t i n g  depa r t m e n t .
• M a n a g e m e n t ' s  c o m p e n s a t i o n  plans. Plans featuring significant b o n u s e s  tied to reported earnings or other 
quantified targets w a r r a n t  special attention, as d o  situations w h e r e  a significant part o f  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  
c o m p e n s a t i o n  results f r o m  stock options.
• T h e  c o m p a n y ' s  relationships w i t h  outside parties. T h i s  analysis considers, for e x a m p l e ,  h o w  often the 
c o m p a n y  c h a n g e s  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants, legal counsel, a n d  bankers.
• T h e  c o m p a n y ' s  organizational structure. A n  unnecessarily c o m p l e x  organizational structure c a n  b e  u s e d  
to co n c e a l  fraudulent activities.
• M a n a g e m e n t ' s  attitude t o w a r d  financial reporting, particularly t o w a r d  the selection a n d  application of 
a c c o u n t i n g  policies.
• T h e  c o m p a n y ' s  delegation o f  authority a n d  responsibility. T h i s  analysis considers w h e t h e r  operating unit 
m a n a g e m e n t  h a s  a d e q u a t e  authority to m a n a g e  the unit's operations, or w h e t h e r  o n e  or a f e w  individuals 
d o m i n a t e  the c o m p a n y ' s  financial a n d  operating decisions. Special consideration is g i v e n  to w h e t h e r  
m a n a g e m e n t  is so d o m i n a n t  that it impairs the ability o f  the b o a r d  o f  directors a n d  audit c o m m i t t e e  to 
exercise their oversight responsibility.
• T h e  capabilities o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  a c c o u n t i n g  d e p a r t m e n t .  T h i s  analysis considers the training a n d  the 
ex p e r i e n c e  of  the k e y  a c c o u n t i n g  personnel, a n d  the a d e q u a c y  o f  overall staffing levels for h a n d l i n g  the 
d e p a r t m e n t ' s  d a y - t o - d a y  activities.
• T h e  effectiveness o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal audit d e p a r t m e n t .  T h i s  analysis considers s u c h  matters as 
w h e t h e r  the internal auditors h a v e  i n d e p e n d e n t  access to the audit c o m m i t t e e  a n d  the C E O ,  w h e t h e r  the 
auditors h a v e  b e e n  adequ a t e l y  trained, a n d  w h e t h e r  they h a v e  h a d  sufficient experience. In large entities 
w it h decentralized operations, this analysis also c a n  consider the foc us a n d  findings o f  recent internal 
audit e x a m i n a t i o n s ,  a n d  the operation's r e s p o n s e  to the audit findings.
• M a n a g e m e n t ' s  c o n c e r n  for possible or existing w e a k n e s s e s  in the internal control sy s t e m ,  a n d  its 
r e sponsiveness to k n o w n  w e a k n e s s e s  in the system.
• T h e  a d e q u a c y  o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal reporting system. T h i s  analysis considers s u c h  factors as the 
quality a n d  the historical a c c u r a c y  o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  budgets, w h e t h e r  b u d g e t e d  a n d  actual a m o u n t s  are 
regularly c o m p a r e d ,  a n d  w h e t h e r  the responsible parties p r o m p t l y  p u r s u e  the resolution o f  a n y  identified 
differences.
• T h e  c o m p a n y ' s  per s o n n e l  policies a n d  practices. T h i s  analysis considers, for e x a m p l e ,  w h e t h e r  b a c k ­
g r o u n d  c h e c k s  are m a d e  before hiring n e w  e m p l o y e e s ,  w h e t h e r  the c o m p a n y ' s  p r o m o t i o n  criteria are fair
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a n d  adequate, a n d  w h a t  the c o m p a n y ' s  policies are for disciplining e m p l o y e e s  w h o  violate c o m p a n y  
policies.
• T h e  c o m p a n y ' s  written c o d e  o f  corporate cond u c t ,  if o n e  exists. T h i s  analysis also considers top 
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  attitudes t o w a r d  the written (or unwritten) c o d e  o f  corporate c o n d u c t — the k e y  factor 
d e t e r m i n i n g  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  the code.
• M a n a g e m e n t ' s  attitudes t o w a r d  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  l a w s  a n d  regulations affecting the c o m p a n y .  T hi s 
analysis m i g h t  consider, for e x a m p l e ,  w h e t h e r  m a n a g e m e n t  strives to c o m p l y  w i t h  the full spirit a n d  the 
intent o f  regulations or attempts to m e e t  o n l y  the m i n i m u m  standards required.
• W h e t h e r  the c o m p a n y  maintains a n  established m e c h a n i s m  to report to u p p e r  m a n a g e m e n t  apparent 
violations o f  c o m p a n y  policy. M e t h o d s  frequently u s e d  to a c c o m p l i s h  this objective include hotlines a n d  
o m b u d s m e n .  T h i s  analysis also considers h o w  the c o m p a n y  protects e m p l o y e e s  f r o m  reprisal.
2. F i n a n c i a l  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
W h e n  assessing the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting, it is i m p orta nt to consider the c o m p a n y ' s  current 
a n d  future financial characteristics. S u c h  a  r e v i e w  e n c o m p a s s e s  the c o m p a n y ' s  profitability, liquidity, a n d  
capital a d e q u a c y .  Fr a u d u l e n t  financial reporting h a s  traditionally b e e n  associated w i t h  c o m p a n i e s  experi­
e n c i n g  financial difficulties. W h i l e  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  studies revealed that m o s t  instances o f  fraudulent 
financial reporting are detected w h e n  the c o m p a n y  is e x p e rie ncin g financial difficulties, there is s o m e  
e v i d e n c e  that the fraudulent activity s o m e t i m e s  starts d u r i n g  g o o d  e c o n o m i c  conditions. T h e  fraudulent acts 
m a y  b e  d i s c o v e r e d  m o r e  often d u r ing financial difficulties b e c a u s e  o f  the increased scrutiny a c o m p a n y  
receives at these times. S o  wh i l e  the f o l l o w i n g  discussion focuses o n  financial difficulties, profitable 
c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  consider these characteristics w h e n  assessing their e x p o s u r e  to fraudulent financial 
reporting. E x a m p l e s  o f  specific factors for consideration include:
• T h e  c o m p a n y ' s  liquidity. T h i s  analysis considers s u c h  matters as the a d e q u a c y  o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  w o r k i n g  
capital a n d  the trend in c a s h  flow. Significant differences b e t w e e n  net earnings a n d  c a s h  f l o w  m a y  
indicate the u s e  o f  i m p r o p e r  r e v e n u e  or e x p e n s e  recognition policies. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  in a d e q u a t e  c a s h  flow 
m a y  result in curtailment o f  supplies, less-generous credit terms, or b a n k r u p t c y  p r o c e e d i n g s  forced o n  
a n  oth e r w i s e  profitable c o m p a n y — all incentives for fraudulent financial reporting.
• T h e  relative profitability o f  the c o m p a n y .  T h i s  analysis considers s u c h  matters as:
—  T h e  trend in sales a n d  profits. A  decr e a s e  in the quality o f  sales— w h i c h  m a y  indicate the potential 
for l o w e r  sales a n d  profits in future periods— m a y  b e  e v i d e n c e d  b y  a liberalization o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  
credit policies, the introduction o f  u n u s u a l  discount a n d  p a y m e n t  p r o g r a m s ,  or other c h a n g e s  in 
business practices. T h i s  analysis also m a y  involve r e v i e w i n g  the c o m p a n y ' s  sales backlog. A  
significant d ecrease in the sales b a c k l o g  m a y  predict financial difficulties in future years.
—  W h e t h e r  the c o m p a n y ' s  sales a n d  profits forecasts c a n  b e  achieved.
—  H o w  the c o m p a n y ' s  sales a n d  profits c o m p a r e  to others in the industry.
—  T h e  a d e q u a c y  o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  reserves, e.g., provision for b a d  debts or loan losses.
• T h e  n e e d  a n d  the ability o f  the c o m p a n y  to obtain additional b o r r o w i n g .  A n a l y s i s  o f  the n e e d  for 
additional b o r r o w i n g  includes consideration o f  s u c h  factors as the n e e d  for f u n d s  for research a n d  
d e v e l o p m e n t ,  a n  inability to p a y  current bills, a n d  the n e e d  to e x p a n d  pro duct ive capacities. Anal y s i s  
o f  the ability to obtain additional b o r r o w i n g  considers s u c h  matters as the c o m p a n y ' s  credit ratings, 
current debt-to-equity ratio, the a m o u n t  o f  unrestricted collateral, the marketability o f  existing collateral, 
a n d  existing d eb t restrictions.
• T h e  c o m p a n y ' s  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  restrictive d eb t covenants. A  projection o f  a  n a r r o w  m a r g i n  o f  c o m ­
pliance w i t h  a particular c o v e n a n t  m a y  b e  o f  as m u c h  c o n c e r n  as situations w h e r e  the restrictive c o v e n a n t  
already h a s  b e e n  violated.
• T h e  quality o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  a c c o u n t s  receivable. Significant increases in the a g i n g  o f  the receivables, 
or s l o w d o w n s  in a v e r a g e  daily receipts, m a y  p o r t e n d  significant e c o n o m i c  difficulties for the c o m p a n y .
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3. O p e r a t i o n s
T o  assess the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting effectively, it is imp o r t a n t  to cons i d e r  the c o m p a n y ' s  
current a n d  future operating characteristics. M a n y  different operating characteristics influence the risk of 
fraudulent financial reporting. E x a m p l e s  o f  specific factors for consideration include:
• A n y  recent or p l a n n e d  c h a n g e s  in the c o m p a n y ' s  operations, s u c h  as:
—  Introduction o f  n e w  pr o d u c t i o n  techniques, w h i c h  m i g h t  increase available inventories, e n c o u r a g i n g  
m a n a g e m e n t  to increase sales fraudulently b y  s hipping wi t h o u t  c u s t o m e r  authorization. T h i s  factor 
also c a n  increase sales costs, pro v i d i n g  a n  incentive to m a n i p u l a t e  other portions o f  the financial 
statements so earnings are not adversely affected.
—  N e w  types o f  m a r k e t i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  especially those involving sales incentive p r o g r a m s ,  w h i c h  
m i g h t  p r o v i d e  sales p er sonn el w i t h  a n  incentive to increase sales fraudulently.
—  Installation o f  n e w  c o m p u t e r  h a r d w a r e  or software, w h i c h  m i g h t  give e m p l o y e e s  or m a n a g e m e n t  
opportunities to a u t o m a t e  fraudulent activities.
—  R e a l i g n m e n t  o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  operating divisions (e.g., a l i g n m e n t  b y  p r o d u c t  instead o f  b y  
g e o g r a p h y ) ,  w h i c h  m i g h t  help co n c e a l  a fraudulent m a n i p u l a t i o n  o f  financial records. T h i s  c h a n g e  
also c o u l d  r e d u c e  the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting b y  e nsuring rotation o f  e m p l o y e e s .
—  Introduction o f  a  n e w  c o m p e n s a t i o n  s y s t e m  for c o m p a n y  e m p l o y e e s ,  w h i c h  m i g h t  e n c o u r a g e  
m a n i p u l a t i o n  o f  financial p e r f o r m a n c e  to e n s u r e  receipt o f  p e r f o r m a n c e  bonu s e s .
• A n y  plan n e d ,  p e n d i n g ,  or p r o b a b l e  m e r g e r s  or acquisitions. S u c h  events m a y  e n c o u r a g e  fraudulent 
financial reporting to increase the c o m p a n y ' s  stock price.
• T h e  c o m p a n y ' s  relationship w i t h  its custo m e r s .  T h e  level o f  c u s t o m e r  c o m p l a i n t s  and/or returns m a y  
indicate a  p r o b l e m  in the quality o f  r e v e n u e  a n d  signal the existence o f  a n  incentive for fraudulent 
financial reporting. A m o n g  other things, this r e v i e w  looks at the r e a s o n  for a n y  significant c h a n g e s  in 
the pattern o f  c u s t o m e r  c o m p l a i n t s  and/or returns.
• T h e  c o m p a n y ' s  relationship w i t h  related parties. T h e  existence o f  related-party transactions that are 
material, individually or  in the aggregate, gives m a n a g e m e n t  a n  opportunity to m a n i p u l a t e  the financial 
statements fraudulently. O f  special c o n c e r n  are significant transactions that d o  not a p p e a r  to h a v e  b e e n  
negotiated at arms-length.
• W h e t h e r  the c o m p a n y  maintains significant business relationships w i t h  a  limited n u m b e r  o f  c u s t o m e r s  
or suppliers. S u c h  relationships a l l o w  these c u s t o m e r s  or suppliers to i m p o s e  additional external o v e r ­
sight in the n o r m a l  c o u r s e  o f  protecting their o w n  self-interests, thus potentially r e d u c i n g  the risk of 
fraudulent financial reporting. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  a c o m p a n y  m a y  try to m a i n t a i n  a n d  project a  positive 
corporate ethical climate to further close relationships w i t h  a  k e y  supplier or c u s t o m e r .  O n  the other h a n d ,  
the loss o f  a  k e y  supplier o r  c u s t o m e r  c a n  create a n  incentive for fraudulent financial reporting.
4. I n d i v i d u a l  M a n a g e m e n t  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
T h e  personal characteristics o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  m a n a g e m e n t  play a n  imp o r t a n t  role in the c o m p a n y ' s  internal 
e n v i r o n m e n t .  If a n  individual in a sensitive area o f  the c o m p a n y  h a s  w e a k  ethics, the potential for fraudulent 
financial reporting is significantly increased. A c c o r d i n g l y ,  to assess the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting 
effectively it is imp o r t a n t  to consider w h e t h e r  there are m a n a g e r s  w i t h  characteristics s u c h  as:
• A  record o f  criminal convictions, S E C  civil proceedings, or participation in other inappropriate activities 
(e.g., prev i o u s  violations o f  c o m p a n y  policies).
• Significant personal financial difficulties arising f r o m  s u c h  factors as h i g h  personal debts, i na dequ ate 
i n c o m e ,  extensive stock m a r k e t  speculation, g a m b l i n g ,  or h e a v y  u s e  of  d r u g s  or alcohol.
• A  significant level o f  instability in personal life.
• A  feeling o f  b e i n g  treated unfairly or inadequately b y  the organization.
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• A n  e x t r e m e  n e e d  to s u c c e e d  or  b e  a c c e p t e d  within the organization arising f r o m  s u c h  c o m p l e x  factors 
as c o m m u n i t y  or social expectation, p e e r  g r o u p  pressure f r o m  within the c o m p a n y ,  o r  s i m p l e  factors s u c h  
as personal greed.
5. A c c o u n t i n g  Policies a n d  P r o c e d u r e s
A  c o m p a n y ' s  a c c o u n t i n g  policies a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  are the specific m e t h o d s  u s e d  to a p p l y  G e n e r a l l y  A c c e p t e d  
A c c o u n t i n g  Principles ( G A A P ) .  T h e s e  m e t h o d s  tire influenced b y  the c o m p a n y ' s  size, the nature o f  its 
operations, a n d  the industry in w h i c h  it c o n d u c t s  its business. M a n y  opportunities to c o m m i t  or co n c e a l  
fraudulent activities involve the c o m p a n y ' s  a c c o u n t i n g  policies a n d  procedures. S o  the quality o f  the 
c o m p a n y ' s  a c c o u n t i n g  policies a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  h a s  a significant i m p a c t  o n  the risk that fraudulent financial 
reporting m a y  occur.
E x a m p l e s  o f  specific matters c o n c e r n i n g  a  c o m p a n y ' s  a c c o u n t i n g  policies a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  include:
• T h e  existence o f  transactions involving contentious, difficult, or e v o l v i n g  a c c o u n t i n g  issues.
• T h e  existence o f  significant inventory balances, or other assets, w it h special valuation p r o b l e m s .
• T h e  o c c u r r e n c e  o f  a n y  v e r y  large transactions or u n u s u a l  adj u s t m e n t s  at or n e a r  y e a r - e n d  or quarter-end.
• W h e t h e r  the c o m p a n y ' s  p r o c e d u r e s  for identifying a n d  rec ording related-party transactions are a d e q u a t e  
in the circumstances.
• T h e  overall quality of  the c o m p a n y ' s  a c c o u n t i n g  records. T h i s  analysis considers s u c h  matters as w h e t h e r  
the records are well d e s i g n e d  a n d  well organized, the a c c o u n t i n g  p r o c e d u r e s  are p e r f o r m e d  in a  c o n ­
scientious fashion, a n  up-to-date a c c o u n t i n g  policies a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  m a n u a l  is m aintained, routine 
transactions are p r o c e s s e d  in a  systematic m a n n e r ,  a n d  r ea sona ble p r o c e d u r e s  are u s e d  w h e n  c o m p u t i n g  
significant estimates a n d  j u d g m e n t s .
• T h e  quality o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  a c c o u n t i n g  principles. T h i s  analysis m i g h t  consider w h e t h e r  the c o m p a n y  
e m p l o y s  exceptionally aggressive, controversial, unusual, o r  liberal interpretations o f  G A A P —  e s p e ­
cially w i t h  regard to r e v e n u e  recognition— a n d  w h e t h e r  disputes b e t w e e n  the c o m p a n y  a n d  its i n d e p e n ­
d en t public accountants c o n c e r n i n g  the c o m p a n y ' s  application o f  G A A P  are frequent.
• T h e  quality of  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal financial reporting system. T h i s  analysis m i g h t  consider s u c h  
matters as w h e t h e r  m a n a g e m e n t  uses these reports in controlling the operations o f  the c o m p a n y ,  a n d  
w h e t h e r  financial statements are s u b m i t t e d  at regular intervals to the b o a r d  o f  directors.
• T h e  existence o f  financial statement e l e m e n t s  that d e p e n d  heavily o n  the exercise of  subjective j u d g m e n t  
or  u n u s u a l l y  difficult or  c o m p l e x  calculations.
B .  T h e  E x t e r n a l  E n v i r o n m e n t
T h e  external e n v i r o n m e n t  is m a d e  u p  o f  the conditions, cir cumstances, a n d  influences that affect operations 
b e y o n d  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  direct control. External e n v i r o n m e n t a l  conditions include matters affecting (1) the 
c o m p a n y ' s  industry, (2) the business e n v i r o n m e n t ,  a n d  (3) regulatory a n d  legal considerations.
1. I n d u s t r y  C o n d i t i o n s
A n a l y s i s  o f  the industry establishes a n  overall perspective f r o m  w h i c h  to assess the c o m p a n y ' s  operations. 
E v e n t s  affecting the industry usually affect the individual c o m p a n i e s  within the industry. K n o w i n g  h o w  the 
c o m p a n y  c o m p a r e s  to the industry as a w h o l e  c a n  point out u n u s u a l  situations. F o r  e x a m p l e ,  w h e n  the overall 
industry's sales h a v e  d e c r e a s e d  b y  2 0  percent, a n  increase in c o m p a n y  sales o f  1 0  percent points to a situation 
that w arrants further investigation.
T h e  analysis concentrates o n  the matters currently influencing the c o m p a n y ' s  industry. H o w e v e r ,  matters 
that h a v e  influenced the industry in the past, a n d  those likely to influence it in the future, are also considered. 
Industry conditions include s u c h  matters as:
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• W h e t h e r  specific trends are prevalent in the industry. T h i s  analysis considers s u c h  matters as the overall 
d e m a n d  for the industry's p roducts (e.g., w h e t h e r  the industry's prod u c t s  are b e c o m i n g  out o f  fashion 
or technologically obsolete a n d  h o w  d e m a n d  is influenced b y  price changes), w h e t h e r  a n y  favorable or 
ad v e r s e  e c o n o m i c  events are affecting the industry, a n d  w h e t h e r  the industry is e x p a n d i n g  or declining.
• T h e  i m p a c t  o f  a n y  n e w  a c c o u n t i n g  p r o n o u n c e m e n t s  affecting the industry.
• W h e t h e r  the industry is subject to cyclical or seasonal fluctuations. If so, the analysis considers w h a t  
stage o f  the cycle the industry is currently experiencing. T h e  strategies c o m m o n l y  u s e d  to m i n i m i z e  the 
vulnerability to the fluctuations also are assessed.
• T h e  industry's capital needs. B o t h  initial start-up costs a n d  con tinuing capital n e e d s  are assessed. A s  a n  
e x a m p l e  o f  the latter, in m a n y  h i g h - t e c h n o l o g y  or capital-intensive industries, it is n e c e s s a r y  regularly 
to s p e n d  large a m o u n t s  o f  m o n e y  o n  research a n d  d e v e l o p m e n t  or o n  facilities a n d  e q u i p m e n t  to r e m a i n  
competitive.
• W h e t h e r  the industry is currently in a state o f  transition. W h e n  the industry is in a  state o f  rapid evolution, 
m a n a g e m e n t  m a y  find it is n o  longer able to control the c o m p a n y ' s  operations in the s a m e  fashion as 
before. C o n t r o l  s y s t e m s  m a y  not e v o l v e  to k e e p  p a c e  w i t h  rapid c h a n g e s  in, for e x a m p l e ,  products, 
services, lines o f  business, a n d  m e t h o d s  o f  operating. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the c o m p a n y ' s  profits m a y  shrink 
dramatically. S u c h  situations c a n  place inordinate pressure o n  the c o m p a n y ,  its m a n a g e m e n t ,  a n d  its 
financial statements at a t i m e  w h e n  the c o m p a n y ' s  control s y s t e m s  are vulnerable.
2. B u s i n e s s  E n v i r o n m e n t
In addition to industry matters it is im p o r t a n t  to cons i d e r  the c o m p a n y ' s  business e n v i r o n m e n t — external 
matters that relate to the e c o n o m y  as a w h o l e .  A m o n g  these are:
• T h e  current credit e n v i r o n m e n t .  T h i s  analysis considers the general availability o f  f u n d s  for additional 
b o r r o w i n g  a n d  the prevailing interest rates.
• T h e  current equity ma r k e t .  T h i s  analysis considers the general level a n d  direction o f  m a r k e t  activity as 
well as a n y  u n u s u a l  activity or price fluctuations in the c o m p a n y ' s  shares. T h i s  analysis also considers 
h o w  the price o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  stock relates to the c o m p a n y ' s  current condition a n d  prospects for future 
p e r f o r m a n c e ,  particularly in relation to others in the c o m p a n y ' s  industry.
• C ontests for o w n e r s h i p  o f  the c o m p a n y .  T h i s  analysis considers w h e t h e r  the c o m p a n y  is u n d e r g o i n g  a n  
internal contest for control or is the target o f  a hostile takeover. It also considers m a n a g e m e n t ' s  
perception o f  w h e t h e r  the c o m p a n y  is vulnerable to a hostile takeover. S u c h  a per ception c a n  lead to 
pressure to increase the c o m p a n y ' s  stock price, a n d  raises the incentive for fraudulent financial reporting.
• T h e  sensitivity o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  operations a n d  profits to s u c h  e c o n o m i c  a n d  political factors as inflation, 
interest rates, u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  foreign e x c h a n g e  rates, a n d  restrictions o n  the repatriation o f  profits a n d  
c a s h  f r o m  foreign operations or subsidiaries.
• T h e  c o n t i n u e d  viability o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  p roducts in the marketplace. C o n s i d e r a t i o n  generally is g i v e n  
to s u c h  matters as the potential for technological o b s o l e s c e n c e  resulting f r o m  innovations in c o m p e t i n g  
products, a n d  the price o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  p roducts in relation to those o f  competitors.
3. L e g a l  a n d  R e g u l a t o r y  C o n s i d e r a t i o n s
Increasing g o v e r n m e n t  i n v o l v e m e n t  in business operations w o r l d w i d e  h a s  resulted in significant regulatory 
legislation, particularly in e m p l o y e e  protection, e n v i r o n m e n t a l  protection, a n d  c o n s u m e r  protection. F u r ­
t h e rmor e, g o v e r n m e n t s  cont i n u e  to regulate m a n y  aspects o f  their capital a n d  credit markets.
T h e s e  increases in regulation h a v e  h a d  a significant i m p a c t  o n  m a n y  c o m p a n i e s '  operations a n d  c a n  b e  a 
significant factor in d e t e r m i n i n g  the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting. E x a m p l e s  o f  matters for c o n s i d ­
eration include: .
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• T h e  status o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  business licenses or  a g r e e m e n t s .  T h i s  analysis gives particular attention to 
situations w h e r e  it ap p e a r s  the c o m p a n y ' s  licenses or a g r e e m e n t s  m a y  b e  s u s p e n d e d  or revo k e d .  Th i s  
potential is h e i g h t e n e d  w h e n  the c o m p a n y ' s  record o f  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  regulatory re q u i r e m e n t s  is poor.
• T h e  potential i m p a c t  o f  n e w  tax l a w s  or interpretations.
• T h e  c o m p a n y ' s  relationships w i t h  regulatory bodies. T h i s  analysis considers the general history o f  the 
c o m p a n y ' s  relationship, the results o f  a n y  recent investigations b y  g o v e r n m e n t  agencies, a n d  the i m p a c t  
o f  rulings o n  matters currently u n d e r  investigation. R u l i n g s  or findings that adversely affect the 
c o m p a n y ' s  operations m a y  increase the incentives for fraudulent financial reporting. O n  the other h a n d ,  
continual r e v i e w  b y  regulators m a y  r e d u c e  the c o m p a n y ' s  opportunities to c o m m i t  fraudulent financial 
reporting.
• T h e  extent o f  g o v e r n m e n t  control o v e r  operations, prices c harged, the quality o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  products, 
a n d  so forth. T h i s  analysis is c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  h o w  these regulations h a v e  affected past d e v e l o p m e n t  of  
the industry a n d  h o w  they will affect future d e v e l o p m e n t .  T h e s e  considerations are particularly important 
w h e n  a d r a m a t i c  c h a n g e  h a s  o c c u r r e d  or is likely to o c c u r  in the extent o f  g o v e r n m e n t  regulation.
I V .  C o n c l u s i o n
B y  illustrating the types o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  conditions that c a n  p r o d u c e  incentives a n d  opportunities for 
fraudulent financial reporting, these guidelines s h o u l d  heig h t e n  the sensitivity o f  the participants in the 
financial reporting process to the w i d e  r a n g e  o f  factors that c a n  influence the risk o f  fraudulent financial 
reporting.
Incentives a n d  opportunities c a n n o t  b e  v i e w e d  in isolation or s i m p l y  b e  a d d e d  together. It is the c o m p l e x ,  
d y n a m i c  interaction o f  these conditions that m a y  p r o d u c e  the c o m b u s t i b l e  m i x t u r e  leading to fraudulent 
financial reporting. Identifying risk factors d o e s  not necessarily m e a n  that fraudulent financial reporting will 
occur, but s i m p l y  indicates that the potential for s u c h  fraud, o f  w h i c h  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  others s h o u l d  b e  
a w a r e ,  m a y  b e  greater.
T h e s e  guidelines d o  not represent a " c o o k b o o k "  a p p r o a c h ,  m e a n t  to b e  applied m e chanically. Effectively 
assessing the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting requires j u d g m e n t ,  experience, a n d  creativity to properly 
identify a n d  w e i g h  the various incentives a n d  opportunities in a c o m p a n y ' s  u n i q u e  e n v i r o n m e n t .
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100 I N D E P E N D E N C E
I N T E R N A L  A U D I T O R S  S H O U L D  B E  I N D E P E N D E N T  O F  T H E  A C T I V I T I E S  T H E Y  A U D I T .
.01 Internal auditors are i n d e p e n d e n t  w h e n  they c a n  carry out their w o r k  freely a n d  objectively. 
I n d e p e n d e n c e  permits internal auditors to ren d e r  the impartial a n d  u n b i a s e d  j u d g m e n t s  essential to 
the p r o p e r  c o n d u c t  o f  audits. It is a c h i e v e d  t h r o u g h  organizational status a n d  objectivity.
1 1 0  O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  S t a t u s
T h e  organizational status o f  the internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  sufficient to p e r m i t  the a c ­
c o m p l i s h m e n t  o f  its audit responsibilities.
.01 Internal auditors s h o u l d  h a v e  the support o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  o f  the b o a r d  o f  directors so that they 
c a n  gain the c o o pera tion of  auditees a n d  p e r f o r m  their w o r k  free f r o m  interference.
.1 T h e  director o f  the internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  responsible to a n  individual in the 
organization w i t h  sufficient authority to p r o m o t e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  to e n s u r e  b r o a d  audit 
cov e r a g e ,  a d e q u a t e  consideration o f  audit reports, a n d  appropriate action o n  audit r e c o m m e n ­
dations.
.2 T h e  director s h o u l d  h a v e  direct c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w i t h  the board. R e g u l a r  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w i t h  
the b o a r d  helps assure i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  prov i d e s  a m e a n s  for the b o a r d  a n d  the director to k e e p  
e a c h  other i n f o r m e d  o n  matters o f  m u t u a l  interest.
.3 I n d e p e n d e n c e  is e n h a n c e d  w h e n  the b o a r d  c o n c u r s  in the a p p o i n t m e n t  or r e m o v a l  o f  the director 
o f  the internal auditing d e p artm ent.
.4 T h e  p u r p o s e ,  authority, a n d  responsibility o f  the internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  defined 
in a f o r m a l  written d o c u m e n t  (charter). T h e  director s h o u l d  s e e k  a p p r o v a l  o f  the charter b y  
m a n a g e m e n t  as well as a c c e p t a n c e  b y  the board. T h e  charter s h o u l d  (a) establish the 
d e p a r t m e n t ' s  position within the organization; (b) authorize access to records, personnel, a n d  
physical properties relevant to the p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  audits; a n d  (c) define the s c o p e  o f  internal 
auditing activities.
.5 T h e  director o f  internal auditing s h o u l d  s u b m i t  annually to m a n a g e m e n t  for a p p r o v a l  a n d  to the 
b o a r d  for its i nformation a s u m m a r y  o f  the d e p a r t m e n t ' s  audit w o r k  schedule, staffing plan, a n d  
financial budget. T h e  director s h o u l d  also s u b m i t  all significant interim c h a n g e s  for appr o v a l  
a n d  information. A u d i t  w o r k  schedules, staffing plans, a n d  financial b u d g e t s  s h o u l d  i n f o r m  
m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the b o a r d  o f  the s c o p e  o f  internal auditing w o r k  a n d  o f  a n y  limitations p l a ced 
o n  that scope.
.6 T h e  director o f  internal auditing s h o u l d  s u b m i t  activity reports to m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  to the b o a r d  
annu a l l y  or m o r e  frequently as necessary. Activity reports s h o u l d  highlight significant audit 
findings a n d  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a n d  s h o u l d  i n f o r m  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the b o a r d  o f  a n y  significant 
deviations f r o m  a p p r o v e d  audit w o r k  schedules, staffing plans, a n d  financial budgets, a n d  the 
reasons for t h e m .
120 O b j e c t i v i t y
Internal auditors s h o u l d  b e  objective in p e r f o r m i n g  audits.
.01 Objectivity is a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  m e n t a l  attitude w h i c h  internal auditors s h o u l d  m a i n t a i n  in p e r f o r m i n g  
audits. Internal auditors are not to subordinate their j u d g m e n t  o n  audit matters to that o f  others.
.02 Objectivity requires internal auditors to p e r f o r m  audits in s u c h  a m a n n e r  that they h a v e  a n  h o n est 
belief in their w o r k  p r o d u c t  a n d  that n o  significant quality c o m p r o m i s e s  are m a d e .  Internal auditors 
are not to b e  p l a c e d  in situations in w h i c h  th e y  feel u n a b l e  to m a k e  objective professional 
j u d g m e n t s .
N o t e :  T h e  five g e neral s ta nd ar d s  are e x p r e s s e d  in italicized st a t e m e n t s  in u p p e r  case. F o l l o w i n g  e a c h  o f  these ge n e r a l  s ta nd ar d s  are 
specific s ta nd ar d s  e x p r e s s e d  in italicized st a t e m e n t s  in l o w e r  case. A c c o m p a n y i n g  e a c h  specific s t a n d a r d  are guidelines d e ­
scribing suitable m e a n s  o f  m e e t i n g  that standard.
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.1 Staff a s s i g n m e n t s  s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  so  that potential a n d  actual conflicts o f  interest a n d  bias are 
avoided. T h e  director s h o u l d  periodically obtain f r o m  the audit staff info r m a t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  
potential conflicts o f  interest a n d  bias. 
.2 Internal auditors s h o u l d  report to the director a n y  situations in w h i c h  a  conflict o f  interest or 
bias is present or m a y  re a s o n a b l y  b e  inferred. T h e  director s h o u l d  th e n  reassign s u c h  auditors. 
.3 Staff a s s i g n m e n t s  o f  internal auditors s h o u l d  b e  rotated periodically w h e n e v e r  it is practicable 
to d o  so.
.4 Internal auditors s h o u l d  not a s s u m e  operating responsibilities. B u t  if o n  o c c a s i o n  m a n a g e m e n t  
directs internal auditors to p e r f o r m  n o n a u d i t  w o r k ,  it s h o u l d  b e  u n d e r s t o o d  that they are not 
functioning as internal auditors. M o r e o v e r ,  objectivity is p r e s u m e d  to b e  i m p a i r e d  w h e n  
internal auditors audit a n y  activity for w h i c h  they h a d  authority or responsibility. T h i s  i m p a i r ­
m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  consi d e r e d  w h e n  reporting audit results. 
.5 P e r s o n s  transferred to or tem porarily e n g a g e d  b y  the internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t  s h o u l d  not 
b e  a s s igne d to audit those activities they previously p e r f o r m e d  until a reaso n a b l e  period o f  ti m e  
h a s  elapsed. S u c h  a s s i g n m e n t s  are p r e s u m e d  to i m p a i r  objectivity a n d  s h o u l d  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  
w h e n  supervising the audit w o r k  a n d  reporting audit results. 
.6 T h e  results o f  internal auditing w o r k  s h o u l d  b e  r e v i e w e d  before the related audit report is 
released to p r o v i d e  reasonable a s s uran ce that the w o r k  w a s  p e r f o r m e d  objectively.
.03 T h e  internal auditor's objectivity is not adversely affected w h e n  the auditor r e c o m m e n d s  standards 
o f  control for s y s t e m s  or r e v i e w  p r o c e d u r e s  before they are i m p l e m e n t e d .  D e s i g n i n g ,  installing, 
a n d  operating s y s t e m s  are not audit functions. A ls o, the drafting o f  p r o c e d u r e s  for s y s t e m s  is not 
a n  audit function. P e r f o r m i n g  s u c h  activities is p r e s u m e d  to i m p a i r  audit objectivity.
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2 0 0  P R O F E S S I O N A L  P R O F I C I E N C Y
I N T E R N A L  A U D I T S  S H O U L D  B E  P E R F O R M E D  W I T H  P R O F I C I E N C Y  A N D  D U E  P R O F E S ­
S I O N A L  C A R E .
.01 Professional proficiency is the responsibility o f  the internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t  a n d  e a c h  internal 
auditor. T h e  d e p a r t m e n t  s h o u l d  assign to e a c h  unit those p e r s o n s  w h o  collectively possess the 
n ec essa ry k n o w l e d g e ,  skills, a n d  disciplines to c o n d u c t  the audit properly.
T h e  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t i n g  D e p a r t m e n t
2 1 0  Staffing
T h e  internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t  s h o u l d  p r o v i d e  a s s u r a n c e  that the technical proficiency a n d  e d u c a ­
tional b a c k g r o u n d  o f  internal auditors a r e  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  the audits to b e  p e r f o r m e d .
.01 T h e  director o f  internal auditing s h o u l d  establish suitable criteria o f  e d u c a t i o n  a n d  e x p e r i e n c e  for 
filling internal auditing positions, giving d u e  consideration to s c o p e  o f  w o r k  a n d  level o f  r e s p o n ­
sibility.
.02 R e a s o n a b l e  assurance s h o u l d  b e  obta i n e d  as to e a c h  prospective auditor's qualifications a n d  
proficiency.
2 2 0  K n o w l e d g e ,  Skills, a n d  Dis c i p l i n e s
T h e  internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t  s h o u l d  p o s s e s s  o r  s h o u l d  obtain the k n o w l e d g e  , skills, a n d  disciplines 
n e e d e d  to c a r r y  o u t  its audit responsibilities.
.01 T h e  internal auditing staff s h o u l d  collectively possess the k n o w l e d g e  a n d  skills essential to the 
practice o f  the profession within the organization. T h e s e  attributes include proficiency in appl y i n g  
internal auditing standards, pro cedures, a n d  techniques.
.02 T h e  internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t  s h o u l d  h a v e  e m p l o y e e s  or u s e  consultants w h o  are qualified in 
s u c h  disciplines as accounting, e c o n o m i c s ,  finance, statistics, electronic data processing, e n g i ­
neering, taxation, a n d  l a w  as n e e d e d  to m e e t  audit responsibilities. E a c h  m e m b e r  o f  the depart­
m e n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  n e e d  not b e  qualified in all o f  these disciplines.
2 3 0  S u p e r v i s i o n
T h e  internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t  s h o u l d  p r o v i d e  a s s u r a n c e  that internal audits a r e  p r o p e r l y  s u p e r ­
vised.
.01 T h e  director o f  internal auditing is responsible for p r o vidi ng appropriate audit supervision. S u ­
pervision is a  continuing process, b e g i n n i n g  w i t h  p l a n n i n g  a n d  e n d i n g  w i t h  the c o n c l u s i o n  o f  the 
audit a ssignment.
.02 S u p e r v i s i o n  includes:
.1 P r o v i d i n g  suitable instructions to subordinates at the outset o f  the audit a n d  a p p r o v i n g  the audit 
p r o g r a m .
.2 S e e i n g  that the a p p r o v e d  audit p r o g r a m  is carried out unless deviations are b o t h  justified a n d  
authorized.
.3 D e t e r m i n i n g  that audit w o r k i n g  p a p e r s  ad e q u a t e l y  support the audit findings, conclusions, a n d  
reports.
.4 M a k i n g  sure that audit reports are accurate, objective, clear, concise, constructive, a n d  timely.
.5 D e t e r m i n i n g  that audit objectives are b e i n g  me t .
.03 A p p r o p r i a t e  e v i d e n c e  o f  supervision s h o u l d  b e  d o c u m e n t e d  a n d  retained.
.04 T h e  extent o f  supervision required will d e p e n d  o n  the proficiency o f  the internal auditors a n d  the 
difficulty o f  the audit a ssignment.
.05 All internal auditing ass ignm ents , w h e t h e r  p e r f o r m e d  b y  or for the internal auditing dep a r t m e n t ,  
r e m a i n  the responsibility o f  its director.
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T h e  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t o r
2 4 0  C o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  S t a n d a r d s  o f  C o n d u c t
Internal auditors s h o u l d  c o m p l y  with professional s t a n d a r d s  o f  conduct.
.01 T h e  C o d e  o f  Ethics o f  T h e  Institute o f  Internal A u d i t o r s  sets forth standards o f  c o n d u c t  a n d  provides 
a basis for e n f o r c e m e n t  a m o n g  its m e m b e r s .  T h e  C o d e  calls for h i g h  standards o f  honesty, 
objectivity, diligence, a n d  loyalty to w h i c h  internal auditors s h o u l d  c o n f o r m .
2 5 0  K n o w l e d g e ,  Skills, a n d  Dis c i p l i n e s
Internal auditors s h o u l d  p o s s e s s  the k n o w l e d g e ,  skills, a n d  disciplines essential to the p e r f o r m a n c e  o f
internal audits.
.01 E a c h  internal auditor s h o u l d  possess certain k n o w l e d g e  a n d  skills as follows:
.1 Proficiency in a p p l y i n g  internal auditing standards, pro cedures, a n d  techniques is required in 
p e r f o r m i n g  internal audits. Proficiency m e a n s  the ability to a p p l y  k n o w l e d g e  to situations likely 
to b e  e n c o u n t e r e d  a n d  to deal w i t h  t h e m  w i t h o u t  extensive recourse to technical research a n d  
assistance.
.2 Proficiency in a c c o u n t i n g  principles a n d  tec hniques is required o f  auditors w h o  w o r k  e x t e n ­
sively w i t h  financial records a n d  reports. 
.3 A n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  principles is required to r e c o g n i z e  a n d  evaluate the m a t eri­
ality a n d  significance o f  deviations f r o m  g o o d  business practice. A n  un d e r s t a n d i n g  m e a n s  the 
ability to a p p l y  b r o a d  k n o w l e d g e  to situations likely to b e  en c o u n t e r e d ,  to r e c o g n i z e  significant 
deviations, a n d  to b e  able to carry out the research ne c e s s a r y  to arrive at r ea sona ble solutions. 
.4 A n  appreciation is required o f  the f u n d a m e n t a l s  o f  s u c h  subjects as acc ounting, e c o n o m i c s ,  
c o m m e r c i a l  law, taxation, finance, quantitative m e t h o d s ,  a n d  c o m p u t e r i z e d  i nformation sys­
tems. A n  appreciation m e a n s  the ability to rec o g n i z e  the existence o f  p r o b l e m s  or potential 
p r o b l e m s  a n d  to d e t e r m i n e  the further research to b e  u n d e r t a k e n  or the assistance to b e  obtained.
2 6 0  H u m a n  R e l a t i o n s  a n d  C o m m u n i c a t i o n s
Internal auditors s h o u l d  b e  skilled in dealing with p e o p l e  a n d  in c o m m u n i c a t i n g  effectively.
.01 Internal auditors s h o u l d  u n d e r s t a n d  h u m a n  relations a n d  m a i n t a i n  satisfactory relationships w i t h  
auditees.
.02 Internal auditors s h o u l d  b e  skilled in oral a n d  written c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  so that they c a n  clearly a n d  
effectively c o n v e y  s u c h  matters as audit objectives, evaluations, conclusions, a n d  r e c o m m e n d a ­
tions.
2 7 0  C o n t i n u i n g  E d u c a t i o n
Internal auditors s h o u l d  m a i n t a i n  their technical c o m p e t e n c e  t h r o u g h  continuing education.
.01 Internal auditors are responsible for c on tinu ing their ed u c a t i o n  in ord er to m a i n t a i n  their profi­
ciency. T h e y  s h o u l d  k e e p  i n f o r m e d  a b o u t  i m p r o v e m e n t s  a n d  current d e v e l o p m e n t s  in internal 
auditing standards, pro cedures, a n d  techniques. C o n t i n u i n g  ed u c a t i o n  m a y  b e  obta i n e d  t h r o u g h  
m e m b e r s h i p  a n d  participation in professional societies; attendance at conferences, seminars, col­
lege courses, a n d  in-house training p r o g r a m s ;  a n d  participation in research projects.
2 8 0  D u e  P r o f e s s i o n a l  C a r e
Internal auditors s h o u l d  exercise d u e  professional c a r e  in p e r f o r m i n g  internal audits.
.01 D u e  professional care calls for the application o f  the care a n d  skill e x p e c t e d  o f  a  r e a s o n a b l y  p r u d e n t  
a n d  c o m p e t e n t  internal auditor in the s a m e  or similar circumstances. Professional care should, 
therefore, b e  appropriate to the complexities of  the audit b e i n g  p e r f o r m e d .  In exercising d u e  
professional care, internal auditors s h o u l d  b e  alert to the possibility o f  intentional w r o n g d o i n g ,  
errors a n d  omissions, inefficiency, waste, ineffectiveness, a n d  conflicts o f  interest. T h e y  s h o u l d  
also b e  alert to those conditions a n d  activities w h e r e  irregularities are m o s t  likely to occur. In 
addition, they s h o u l d  identify i n a d e q u a t e  controls a n d  r e c o m m e n d  i m p r o v e m e n t s  to p r o m o t e  
c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  acceptable p r o c e d u r e s  a n d  practices.
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.02 D u e  care implies rea sonable care a n d  c o m p e t e n c e ,  not infallibility or extraordinary p e r f o r m a n c e .  
D u e  care requires the auditor to c o n d u c t  e x a m i n a t i o n s  a n d  verifications to a r ea sona ble extent, but 
d o e s  not require detailed audits o f  all transactions. A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the internal auditor c a n n o t  give 
absolute a ss uran ce that n o n c o m p l i a n c e  or  irregularities d o  not exist. Nevertheless, the possibility 
o f  material irregularities or n o n c o m p l i a n c e  s h o u l d  b e  co n s i d e r e d  w h e n e v e r  the internal auditor 
u n d e r t a k e s  a n  internal auditing a s s ignm ent.
.03 W h e n  a n  internal auditor suspects w r o n g d o i n g ,  the appropriate authorities within the organization 
s h o u l d  b e  i n f o r m e d .  T h e  internal auditor m a y  r e c o m m e n d  w h a t e v e r  investigation is c o n s i d e r e d  
n e c essa ry in the circumstances. Thereafter, the auditor s h o u l d  f o l low u p  to see that the internal 
auditing d e p a r t m e n t ' s  responsibilities h a v e  b e e n  met.
.04 Exercising d u e  professional care m e a n s  usi ng reasonable audit skill a n d  j u d g m e n t  in p e r f o r m i n g  
the audit. T o  this end, the internal auditor s h o u l d  consider: 
.1 T h e  extent o f  audit w o r k  n e e d e d  to a c h i e v e  audit objectives.
.2 T h e  relative materiality or significance o f  matters to w h i c h  audit p r o c e d u r e s  are applied. 
.3 T h e  a d e q u a c y  a n d  effectiveness of  internal controls. 
.4 T h e  cost o f  auditing in relation to potential benefits.
.05 D u e  professional care includes evaluating established operating standards a n d  d e t e r m i n i n g  w h e t h e r  
those standards are acceptable a n d  are b e i n g  me t .  W h e n  s u c h  standards are v a g u e ,  authoritative 
interpretations s h o u l d  b e  sought. If internal auditors are required to interpret or select operating 
standards, they s h o u l d  s e e k  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  auditees as to the standards n e e d e d  to m e a s u r e  
operating p e r f o r m a n c e .
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S C O P E  O F  W O R K3 0 0
T H E  S C O P E  O F  T H E  I N T E R N A L  A U D I T  S H O U L D  E N C O M P A S S  T H E  E X A M I N A T I O N  A N D  
E V A L U A T I O N  O F  T H E  A D E Q U A C Y  A N D  E F F E C T I V E N E S S  O F  T H E  O R G A N I Z A T I O N ' S  
S Y S T E M  O F  I N T E R N A L  C O N T R O L  A N D  T H E  Q U A L I T Y  O F  P E R F O R M A N C E  I N  C A R R Y I N G  
O U T  A S S I G N E D  R E S P O N S I B I L I T I E S .
.01 T h e  s c o p e  o f  internal auditing w o r k ,  as specified in this standard, e n c o m p a s s e s  w h a t  audit w o r k  
s h o u l d  b e  p e r f o r m e d .  It is r ecognized, h o w e v e r ,  that m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the b o a r d  of  directors 
p r o v i d e  general direction as to the s c o p e  o f  w o r k  a n d  the activities to b e  audited.
.02 T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  the r e v i e w  for a d e q u a c y  o f  the s y s t e m  o f  internal control is to ascertain w h e t h e r  
the s y s t e m  established p rovides rea sona ble a s s uran ce that the organization's objectives a n d  goals 
will b e  m e t  efficiently a n d  e c o n o m i c a l l y .
.03 T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  the r e v i e w  for effectiveness o f  the s y s t e m  o f  internal control is to ascertain w h e t h e r  
the s y s t e m  is functioning as intended.
.04 T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  the r e v i e w  for quality o f  p e r f o r m a n c e  is to ascertain w h e t h e r  the organization's 
objectives a n d  goals h a v e  b e e n  achieved.
.05 T h e  p r i m a r y  objectives of  internal control are to ensure: 
.1 T h e  reliability a n d  integrity o f  information.
.2 C o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  policies, plans, procedures, laws, a n d  regulations.
.3 T h e  safeguarding o f  assets.
.4 T h e  e c o n o m i c a l  a n d  efficient u s e  o f  resources.
.5 T h e  a c c o m p l i s h m e n t  of  established objectives a n d  goals for operations or p r o g r a m s .
3 1 0  Reliability a n d  I n t e g r i t y  o f  I n f o r m a t i o n
Internal auditors s h o u l d  r e v i e w  the reliability a n d  integrity o f  financial a n d  o p e r a t i n g  i nformation a n d  
the m e a n s  u s e d  to identify, m e a s u r e ,  classify, a n d  report s u c h  information.
.01 I n f o r m a t i o n  s y s t e m s  p r o v i d e  data for decision m a k i n g ,  control, a n d  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  external 
requirements. Therefore, internal auditors s h o u l d  e x a m i n e  i n f orma tion s y s t e m s  and, as appropri­
ate, ascertain whether:
.1 Financial a n d  operating records a n d  reports contain accurate, reliable, timely, c o m p l e t e ,  a n d
useful information. 
.2 C ontrols o v e r  r e c o r d k e e p i n g  a n d  reporting are a d e q u a t e  a n d  effective.
3 2 0  C o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  Policies, P l a n s ,  P r o c e d u r e s ,  L a w s ,  a n d  R e g u l a t i o n s
Internal auditors s h o u l d  r e v i e w  the s y s t e m s  established to e n s u r e  c o m p l i a n c e  with those policies, plans, 
p r o c e d u r e s ,  laws, a n d  regulations w h i c h  c o u l d  h a v e  a  significant i m p a c t  o n  ope rati ons a n d  reports, 
a n d  s h o u l d  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  the organization is in c o m p l i a n c e .
.01 M a n a g e m e n t  is responsible for establishing the s y s t e m s  d e s i g n e d  to e n s u r e  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  s u c h  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  as policies, plans, procedures, a n d  applicable l a w s  a n d  regulations. Internal auditors 
are responsible for d e t e r m i n i n g  w h e t h e r  the s y s t e m s  are a d e q u a t e  a n d  effective a n d  w h e t h e r  the 
activities audited are c o m p l y i n g  w i t h  the appropriate requirements.
3 3 0  S a f e g u a r d i n g  o f  A s s e t s
Internal auditors s h o u l d  r e v i e w  the m e a n s  o f  s a f e g u a r d i n g  assets an d ,  a s  appropriate, verify the 
existence o f  s u c h  assets.
.01 Internal auditors s h o u l d  r e v i e w  the m e a n s  u s e d  to s a f egua rd assets f r o m  various types o f  losses 
s u c h  as those resulting f r o m  theft, fire, i m p r o p e r  or illegal activities, a n d  e x p o s u r e  to the elements.
.02 Internal auditors, w h e n  verifying the existence o f  assets, s h o u l d  u s e  appropriate audit procedures.
3 4 0  E c o n o m i c a l  a n d  Efficient U s e  o f  R e s o u r c e s
Internal auditors s h o u l d  a p p r a i s e  the e c o n o m y  a n d  efficiency with w h i c h  res o u r c e s  a r e  e m p l o y e d .
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.01 M a n a g e m e n t  is responsible for setting operating standards to m e a s u r e  a n  activity's e c o n o m i c a l  a n d  
efficient u s e  o f  resources. Internal auditors are responsible for d e t e r m i n i n g  w hether: 
.1 O p e r a t i n g  standards h a v e  b e e n  established for m e a s u r i n g  e c o n o m y  a n d  efficiency. 
.2 Established operating standards are u n d e r s t o o d  a n d  are b e i n g  me t .
.3 De v i a t i o n s  f r o m  operating standards are identified, analyzed, a n d  c o m m u n i c a t e d  to those
responsible for corrective action. 
.4 Corrective action h a s  b e e n  taken. 
.02 A u d i t s  related to the e c o n o m i c a l  a n d  efficient u s e  o f  resources s h o u l d  identify s u c h  conditions as: 
.1 Underutilized facilities. 
.2 N o n p r o d u c t i v e  w o r k .  
.3 P r o c e d u r e s  w h i c h  are not cost justified. 
.4 Overstaffing or understaffing.
3 5 0  A c c o m p l i s h m e n t  o f  E s t a b l i s h e d  O b j e c t i v e s  a n d  G o a l s  f o r  O p e r a t i o n s  o r  P r o g r a m s
Internal auditors s h o u l d  r e v i e w  operations o r  p r o g r a m s  to ascertain w h e t h e r  results a r e  consistent with 
established objectives a n d  g o a l s  a n d  w h e t h e r  the opera t i o n s  o r  p r o g r a m s  a r e  b e i n g  c a r ried o u t  a s  
p l a n n e d .
.01 M a n a g e m e n t  is responsible for establishing operating or p r o g r a m  objectives a n d  goals, d e v e l o p i n g  
a n d  i m p l e m e n t i n g  control pro cedures, a n d  a c c o m p l i s h i n g  desired operating or p r o g r a m  results. 
Internal auditors s h o u l d  ascertain w h e t h e r  s u c h  objectives a n d  goals c o n f o r m  w i t h  those o f  the 
organization a n d  w h e t h e r  they are b e i n g  met.
.02 Internal auditors c a n  p r o v i d e  assistance to m a n a g e r s  w h o  are d e v e l o p i n g  objectives, goals, a n d  
s y s t e m s  b y  d e t e r m i n i n g  w h e t h e r  the u n d e r l y i n g  a s s u m p t i o n s  are appropriate; w h e t h e r  accurate, 
current, a n d  relevant i nformation is b e i n g  used; a n d  w h e t h e r  suitable controls h a v e  b e e n  incor­
p or ated into the operations or p r o g r a m s .
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P E R F O R M A N C E  O F  A U D I T  W O R K4 0 0
A U D I T  W O R K  S H O U L D  I N C L U D E  P L A N N I N G  T H E  A U D I T ,  E X A M I N I N G  A N D  E V A L U A T ­
I N G  I N F O R M A T I O N ,  C O M M U N I C A T I N G  R E S U L T S ,  A N D  F O L L O W I N G  U P .
.01 T h e  internal auditor is responsible for p l a n n i n g  a n d  c o n d u c t i n g  the audit a s s i g n m e n t ,  subject to 
supervisory r e v i e w  a n d  approval.
4 1 0  P l a n n i n g  t h e  A u d i t
Internal auditors s h o u l d  p l a n  e a c h  audit.
.01 P l a n n i n g  s h o u l d  b e  d o c u m e n t e d  a n d  s h o u l d  include: 
.1 Establishing audit objectives a n d  s c o p e  o f  w o r k .  
.2 O b t a i n i n g  b a c k g r o u n d  i nformation a b o u t  the activities to b e  audited. 
.3 D e t e r m i n i n g  the resources n ec essa ry to p e r f o r m  the audit. 
.4 C o m m u n i c a t i n g  w i t h  all w h o  n e e d  to k n o w  a b o u t  the audit.
.5 P e r f o r m i n g ,  as appropriate, a n  on-site s u r v e y  to b e c o m e  familiar w i t h  the activities a n d  controls 
to b e  audited, to identify areas for audit e m p h a s i s ,  a n d  to invite auditee c o m m e n t s  a n d  
suggestions. 
.6 W r i t i n g  the audit p r o g r a m .
.7 D e t e r m i n i n g  h o w ,  w h e n ,  a n d  to w h o m  audit results will b e  c o m m u n i c a t e d .  
.8 O b t a i n i n g  appr o v a l  o f  the audit w o r k  plan.
4 2 0  E x a m i n i n g  a n d  E v a l u a t i n g  I n f o r m a t i o n
Internal auditors s h o u l d  collect, analyze, interpret, a n d  d o c u m e n t  information to s u p p o r t  audit results.
.01 T h e  process of  e x a m i n i n g  a n d  evaluating information is as follows:
.1 Inf o r m a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  collected o n  all matters related to the audit objectives a n d  s c o p e  o f  w o r k .
.2 I n f o r m a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  sufficient, c o m p e t e n t ,  relevant, a n d  useful to p r o v i d e  a s o u n d  basis for 
audit findings a n d  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
Sufficient i nformation is factual, adequate, a n d  c o n v i n c i n g  so that a prudent, i n f o r m e d  p e r s o n  
w o u l d  rea ch the s a m e  c onclusions as the auditor.
C o m p e t e n t  i nformation is reliable a n d  the best attainable t h r o u g h  the u s e  o f  appropriate audit 
techniques.
R e l e v a n t  i nformation supports audit findings a n d  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a n d  is consistent w i t h  the 
objectives for the audit.
Useful inf orma tion helps the organization m e e t  its goals. 
.3 A u d i t  procedures, including the testing a n d  s a m p l i n g  techniques e m p l o y e d ,  s h o u l d  b e  selected
in a d v a n c e ,  w h e r e  practicable, a n d  e x p a n d e d  or altered if c i r c u m s t a n c e s  warrant. 
.4 T h e  process o f  collecting, analyzing, interpreting, a n d  d o c u m e n t i n g  i n f orma tion s h o u l d  b e  
supervised to p r o v i d e  reasonable a s s uran ce that the auditor's objectivity is m a i n t a i n e d  a n d  that 
audit goals are met.
.5 W o r k i n g  pap e r s  that d o c u m e n t  the audit s h o u l d  b e  p r e p a r e d  b y  the auditor a n d  r e v i e w e d  b y  
m a n a g e m e n t  o f  the internal auditing dep a r t m e n t .  T h e s e  p a p ers s h o u l d  record the information 
obta i n e d  a n d  the analyses m a d e  a n d  s h o u l d  support the ba s e s  for the findings a n d  r e c o m m e n ­
dations to b e  reported.
4 3 0  C o m m u n i c a t i n g  R e s u l t s
Internal auditors s h o u l d  report the results o f  their audit w o r k .
.01 A  signed, written report s h o u l d  b e  issued after the audit e x a m i n a t i o n  is c o m p l e t e d .  Interim reports 
m a y  b e  written or oral a n d  m a y  b e  transmitted formally or informally.
.02 T h e  internal auditor s h o u l d  discuss c onclusions a n d  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  at appropriate levels of  
m a n a g e m e n t  before issuing final written reports.
.03 R e p o r t s  s h o u l d  b e  objective, clear, concise, constructive, a n d  timely.
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.04 R e p o r t s  s h o u l d  present the purpose, scope, a n d  results o f  the audit; and, w h e r e  appropriate, reports 
s h o u l d  contain a n  exp ression o f  the auditor's opinion.
.05 R e p o r t s  m a y  include r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for potential i m p r o v e m e n t s  a n d  a c k n o w l e d g e  satisfactory 
p e r f o r m a n c e  a n d  corrective action.
.06 T h e  auditee's v i e w s  a b o u t  audit c onclusions or r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  m a y  b e  i ncluded in the audit 
report.
.07 T h e  director of  internal auditing or d e s i g n e e  s h o u l d  r e v i e w  a n d  a p p r o v e  the final audit report before 
issuance a n d  s h o u l d  dec i d e  to w h o m  the report will b e  distributed.
4 4 0  F o l l o w i n g  U p
Internal auditors s h o u l d  f o l l o w  u p  to ascertain that a p p r o p r i a t e  action is tak en o n  r e p o r t e d  audit
findings.
.01 Internal auditing s h o u l d  d e t e r m i n e  that corrective action w a s  tak en a n d  is a c h ievi ng the desired 
results, or that m a n a g e m e n t  or the b o a r d  h a s  a s s u m e d  the risk o f  not taking corrective action o n  
reported findings.
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5 0 0  M A N A G E M E N T  O F  T H E  I N T E R N A L  A U D I T I N G  D E P A R T M E N T
T H E  D I R E C T O R  O F  I N T E R N A L  A U D I T I N G  S H O U L D  P R O P E R L Y  M A N A G E  T H E  I N T E R N A L  
A U D I T I N G  D E P A R T M E N T .
.01 T h e  director o f  internal auditing is responsible for properly m a n a g i n g  the d e p a r t m e n t  so that:
.1 A u d i t  w o r k  fulfills the general p u r p o s e s  a n d  responsibilities a p p r o v e d  b y  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  
a c c e p t e d  b y  the board.
.2 R e s o u r c e s  o f  the internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t  are efficiently a n d  effectively e m p l o y e d .  
.3 A u d i t  w o r k  c o n f o r m s  to the S t a n d a r d s  f o r  the Professional P ractice o f  Internal Auditing.
5 1 0  P u r p o s e ,  A u t h o r i t y ,  a n d  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y
T h e  director o f  internal auditing s h o u l d  h a v e  a  s t a teme nt o f  p u r p o s e ,  authority, a n d  responsibility f o r  
the internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t .
.01 T h e  director o f  internal auditing is responsible for se e k i n g  the a p p r o v a l  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the 
a c c e p t a n c e  b y  the b o a r d  o f  a  f o r m a l  written d o c u m e n t  (charter) for the internal auditing depart­
m e n t .
5 2 0  P l a n n i n g
T h e  director o f  internal auditing s h o u l d  establish p l a n s  to c a r r y  out the responsibilities o f  the internal 
auditing d e p a r t m e n t .
.01 T h e s e  plans s h o u l d  b e  consistent w i t h  the internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t ' s  charter a n d  w i t h  the goals 
o f  the organization.
.02 T h e  p l a n n i n g  process involves establishing: 
.1 Goals.
.2 A u d i t  w o r k  schedules.
.3 Staffing plans a n d  financial budgets.
.4 Activity reports.
.03 T h e  g o a l s  o f  the internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  c a p a b l e  o f  b e i n g  a c c o m p l i s h e d  within 
specified operating plans a n d  b u d g e t s  and, to the extent possible, s h o u l d  b e  m e a s u r a b l e .  T h e y  
s h o u l d  b e  a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  m e a s u r e m e n t  criteria a n d  targeted dates of  a c c o m p l i s h m e n t .
.04 A u d i t  w o r k  s c h e d u l e s  s h o u l d  include (a) w h a t  activities are to b e  audited; (b) w h e n  they will b e  
audited; a n d  (c) the estimated t i m e  required, taking into a c c o u n t  the s c o p e  o f  the audit w o r k  
p l a n n e d  a n d  the nature a n d  extent o f  audit w o r k  p e r f o r m e d  b y  others. M a t t e r s  to b e  c o n s i d e r e d  in 
establishing audit w o r k  s c h e d u l e  priorities s h o u l d  include (a) the date a n d  results o f  the last audit; 
(b) financial exposure; (c) potential loss a n d  risk; (d) requests b y  m a n a g e m e n t ;  (e) m a j o r  c h a n g e s  
in operations, p r o g r a m s ,  s ystems, a n d  controls; (f) opportunities to ac h i e v e  operating benefits; a n d  
(g) c h a n g e s  to a n d  capabilities o f  the audit staff. T h e  w o r k  sch e d u l e s  s h o u l d  b e  sufficiently flexible 
to c o v e r  unanticipated d e m a n d s  o n  the internal auditing dep a r t m e n t .
.05 Staffing p l a n s  a n d  financial budgets, including the n u m b e r  o f  auditors a n d  the k n o w l e d g e ,  skills, 
a n d  disciplines required to p e r f o r m  their w o r k ,  s h o u l d  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  f r o m  audit w o r k  schedules, 
administrative activities, edu c a t i o n  a n d  training requirements, a n d  audit research a n d  d e v e l o p m e n t  
efforts.
.06 Activity reports s h o u l d  b e  s u b m i t t e d  periodically to m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  to the board. T h e s e  reports 
s h o u l d  c o m p a r e  (a) p e r f o r m a n c e  w i t h  the d e p a r t m e n t ' s  goals a n d  audit w o r k  schedules a n d  
(b) expenditures w i t h  financial budgets. T h e y  s h o u l d  explain the r e a s o n  for m a j o r  variances a n d  
indicate a n y  action t a k e n  or n e e d e d .
5 3 0  Policies a n d  P r o c e d u r e s
T h e  director o f  internal auditing s h o u l d  p r o v i d e  written policies a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  to g u i d e  the audit staff.
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.01 T h e  f o r m  a n d  content o f  written policies a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  s h o u l d  b e  appropriate to the size a n d  
structure o f  the internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t  a n d  the c o m p l e x i t y  of  its w o r k .  F o r m a l  administrative 
a n d  technical audit m a n u a l s  m a y  not b e  n e e d e d  b y  all internal auditing d ep artm ents . A  small 
internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t  m a y  b e  m a n a g e d  informally. Its audit staff m a y  b e  directed a n d  
controlled t h r o u g h  daily, close supervision a n d  written m e m o r a n d a .  In a  large internal auditing 
d e p a r t m e n t ,  m o r e  f o r m a l  a n d  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  policies a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  are essential to g u i d e  the 
audit staff in the consistent c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  the d e p a r t m e n t ' s  standards o f  p e r f o r m a n c e .
5 4 0  P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t
T h e  director o f  internal auditing s h o u l d  establish a  p r o g r a m  f o r  selecting a n d  d e v e l o p i n g  the h u m a n  
res o u r c e s  o f  the internal auditing de p a r t m e n t .
.01 T h e  p r o g r a m  s h o u l d  p r o v i d e  for:
.1 D e v e l o p i n g  written j o b  descriptions for e a c h  level o f  the audit staff. 
.2 Selecting qualified a n d  c o m p e t e n t  individuals.
.3 T r a inin g a n d  pro v i d i n g  continuing educational opportunities for e a c h  internal auditor. 
.4 A p p r a i s i n g  e a c h  internal auditor's p e r f o r m a n c e  at least annually.
.5 P r o v i d i n g  c o u n s e l  to internal auditors o n  their p e r f o r m a n c e  a n d  professional d e v e l o p m e n t .
5 5 0  E x t e r n a l  A u d i t o r s
T h e  director o f  internal auditing s h o u l d  co o r d i n a t e  internal a n d  external audit efforts.
.01 T h e  internal a n d  external audit w o r k  s h o u l d  b e  c o o rdin ated to ens u r e  a d e q u a t e  audit c o v e r a g e  a n d  
to m i n i m i z e  duplicate efforts.
.02 C o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  audit efforts involves:
.1 Periodic m e e t i n g s  to discuss matters o f  m u t u a l  interest.
.2 A c c e s s  to e a c h  other's audit p r o g r a m s  a n d  w o r k i n g  papers.
.3 E x c h a n g e  o f  audit reports a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  letters.
.4 C o m m o n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  audit techniques, m e t h o d s ,  a n d  terminology.
5 6 0  Q u a l i t y  A s s u r a n c e
T h e  director o f  internal auditing s h o u l d  establish a n d  m a i n t a i n  a  quality a s s u r a n c e  p r o g r a m  to evaluate 
the operations o f  the internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t .
.01 T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  this p r o g r a m  is to p r o v i d e  rea sona ble a ss uran ce that audit w o r k  c o n f o r m s  w i t h  these 
Sta ndar ds, the internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t ' s  charter, a n d  other applicable standards. A  quality 
a ss uran ce p r o g r a m  s h o u l d  include the f ol lowi ng elements: 
.1 Supervision. 
.2 Internal reviews. 
.3 External reviews.
.02 Sup e r v i s i o n  o f  the w o r k  o f  the internal auditors s h o u l d  b e  carried out continually to assure 
c o n f o r m a n c e  w i t h  internal auditing standards, d e p a r t m e n t a l  policies, a n d  audit p r o g r a m s .
.03 Internal r e v i e w s  s h o u l d  b e  p e r f o r m e d  periodically b y  m e m b e r s  o f  the internal auditing staff to 
appraise the quality of  the audit w o r k  p e r f o r m e d .  T h e s e  r e v i e w s  s h o u l d  b e  p e r f o r m e d  in the s a m e  
m a n n e r  as a n y  other internal audit.
.04 E x t e r n a l  r e v i e w s  o f  the internal auditing d e p a r t m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  p e r f o r m e d  to appraise the quality 
o f  the d e p a r t m e n t ' s  operations. T h e s e  r e v i e w s  s h o u l d  b e  p e r f o r m e d  b y  qualified p e r s o n s  w h o  are 
i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  the organization a n d  w h o  d o  not h a v e  either a real or a n  a p p a r e n t  conflict o f  interest. 
S u c h  r e v i e w s  s h o u l d  b e  c o n d u c t e d  at least o n c e  e v e r y  three years. O n  c o m p l e t i o n  o f  the review, 
a formal, written report s h o u l d  b e  issued. T h e  report s h o u l d  express a n  o p i n i o n  as to the 
d e p a r t m e n t ' s  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  the S t a n d a r d s  f o r  the Professional P ractice o f  Internal A u d i t i n g  a n d , 
as appropriate, s h o u l d  include r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for i m p r o v e m e n t .
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A p p e n d i x  H
N E W  Y O R K  S T O C K  E X C H A N G E  L I S T E D  
C O M P A N Y  M A N U A L ,  S E C T I O N  3, 
C O R P O R A T E  R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y -  
A U D I T  C O M M I T T E E
3 0 3 . 0 0  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e
E x c h a n g e  P o l i c y
E a c h  d o m e s t i c  c o m p a n y  w i t h  c o m m o n  stock listed o n  the E x c h a n g e ,  as a  condition o f  listing a n d  c o n t i n u e d  
listing o f  its securities o n  the E x c h a n g e ,  shall establish n o  later t ha n J u n e  30, 1 9 7 8  a n d  m a i n t a i n  thereafter 
a n  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  c o m p r i s e d  solely o f  directors i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  free f r o m  a n y  relation­
ship that, in the o p i n i o n  o f  its B o a r d  of  Directors, w o u l d  interfere w i t h  the exercise o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  j u d g m e n t  
as a c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r .  Directors w h o  are affiliates o f  the c o m p a n y  or officers or e m p l o y e e s  o f  the c o m p a n y  
or its subsidiaries w o u l d  not b e  qualified for A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s h i p .
A  director w h o  w a s  f o r m e r l y  a n  officer o f  the c o m p a n y  or a n y  o f  its subsidiaries m a y  qualify for m e m b e r s h i p  
e v e n  t h o u g h  h e  m a y  b e  receiving p e n s i o n  or deferred c o m p e n s a t i o n  p a y m e n t s  f r o m  the c o m p a n y  if, in the 
o p i n i o n  o f  the B o a r d  o f  Directors, s u c h  p e r s o n  will exercise i n d e p e n d e n t  j u d g m e n t  a n d  will materially assist 
the function o f  the c o m m i t t e e .  H o w e v e r ,  a  majority o f  the A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  shall b e  directors w h o  w e r e  not 
f o r m e r l y  officers o f  the c o m p a n y  or a n y  o f  its subsidiaries.
S u p p l e m e n t a r y  M a t e r i a l
In order to deal w i t h  c o m p l e x  relationships that m a y  arise, the fol l o w i n g  guidelines are p r o v i d e d  to assist 
the B o a r d  o f  Directors to o b s e r v e  the spirit o f  the policy in selecting m e m b e r s  o f  the A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e .
A  director w h o  h a s  b e e n  or is a  partner, officer or director of  a n  organization that h a s  c u s t o m a r y  c o m m e r c i a l ,  
industrial, b a n k i n g  or u n d e rwr itin g relationships w i t h  the c o m p a n y  w h i c h  are carried o n  in the ordinary 
c o u r s e  o f  business o n  a n  a r m s - l e n g t h  basis m a y  qualify for m e m b e r s h i p  unless, in the o p i n i o n  o f  the B o a r d  
o f  Directors, s u c h  director is not i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  or the relationship w o u l d  interfere w i t h  the 
exercise o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  j u d g m e n t  as a c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r .
A  director w h o ,  in addition to fulfilling the c u s t o m a r y  director's role, also prov i d e s  additional services 
directly for the B o a r d  o f  Directors a n d  is separately c o m p e n s a t e d  therefor, w o u l d  nonetheless qualify for 
m e m b e r s h i p  o n  the A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e .  H o w e v e r ,  a director w h o ,  in addition to his director's role, also acts 
o n  a  regular basis as a n  individual or representative o f  a n  organization serving as a professional advisor, legal 
c o u n s e l  or  consultant to m a n a g e m e n t ,  w o u l d  not qualify if, in the o p i n i o n  o f  the B o a r d  o f  Directors, s u c h  
relationship is material to the c o m p a n y ,  the organization represented or the director.
A  director w h o  represents or  is a close relative o f  a p e r s o n  w h o  w o u l d  not qualify as a m e m b e r  o f  the A u d i t  
C o m m i t t e e  in the light o f  the policy w o u l d  likewise not qualify for the c o m m i t t e e .  H o w e v e r ,  if the director 
is a  close relative o f  a n  e m p l o y e e  w h o  is not a n  executive officer or if there are valid countervailing reasons, 
the B o a r d  o f  Directors' decision as to eligibility shall govern.
W h i l e  rule 4 0 5  u n d e r  the Securities A c t  o f  1 9 3 3  m a y  b e  helpful to the B o a r d  o f  Directors in d e t e r m i n i n g  
w h e t h e r  a  particular director is a n  affiliate or  a close relative for p u r p o s e s  o f  this policy, it is not intended 
to b e  so technically applied as to g o  b e y o n d  the spirit o f  this policy.
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A p p e n d i x  I
G O O D  P R A C T I C E  G U I D E L I N E S  
F O R  T H E  A U D I T  C O M M I T T E E
I n t r o d u c t i o n
P r i m a r y  responsibility for the c o m p a n y ' s  financial reporting lies w i t h  top m a n a g e m e n t ,  o v e r s e e n  b y  the 
b o a r d  o f  directors. T o  help b o a r d s  o f  directors carry out this oversight responsibility, the C o m m i s s i o n  
r e c o m m e n d s  that all public c o m p a n i e s  establish audit c o m m i t t e e s  consisting o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  directors. 
E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  s u c h  c o m m i t t e e s ,  o f  course, d o e s  not relieve the other directors o f  their responsibility w it h 
respect to the financial reporting process. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  therefore reinforces its general r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  
w i t h  m o r e  specific r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for audit c o m m i t t e e  duties a n d  responsibilities.
First, specific r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  directed to audit c o m m i t t e e s  highlight the n e e d  for the audit c o m m i t t e e  (1) 
to b e  i n f o r m e d  a n d  vigilant, (2) to h a v e  its duties a n d  responsibilities set forth in a written charter, a n d  (3) 
to b e  g i v e n  resources a n d  authority a d e q u a t e  to dis charge its responsibilities. A m o n g  other things, the audit 
c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  r e v i e w  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  evaluation o f  factors related to the i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  
public accountant, help preserve that i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  r e v i e w  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  plans for e n g a g i n g  the 
c o m p a n y ' s  i n d e p e n d e n t  public a c c o u n t a n t  to p e r f o r m  m a n a g e m e n t  advisory services d u r i n g  the c o m i n g  year, 
considering the types o f  services that m a y  b e  r e n d e r e d  a n d  the a m o u n t  b u d g e t e d  for s u c h  services.
In addition, the C o m m i s s i o n  highlights other i m p o r t a n t  audit c o m m i t t e e  functions t h r o u g h o u t  C h a p t e r  T w o .  
T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  r e v i e w  the c o m p a n y ' s  process o f  assessing the risk o f  fraudulent financial 
reporting a n d  the p r o g r a m  that m a n a g e m e n t  establishes to m o n i t o r  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  the c o d e  o f  corporate 
conduct. T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  h a v e  o p e n  lines o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w i t h  the chief a c c o u n t i n g  officer 
a n d  the chief internal auditor. In fact, the chief internal auditor's direct a n d  unrestricted access to the audit 
c o m m i t t e e  is vital to his objectivity. M a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  advise the audit c o m m i t t e e  w h e n  it seeks a  s e c o n d  
o p i n i o n  o n  a  significant a c c o u n t i n g  issue. A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  o v e r s e e  the quarterly reporting process. 
Finally, the c h a i r m a n  o f  the audit c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  write a letter describing the c o m m i t t e e ' s  activities a n d  
responsibilities for inclusion in the a n n u a l  report to stockholders.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  d e v e l o p e d  this set o f  r e c o m m e n d e d  audit c o m m i t t e e  duties a n d  responsibilities f r o m  a 
r e v i e w  a n d  consideration o f  the practices m a n y  w e l l - m a n a g e d  c o m p a n i e s  fol l o w  today, o f  the extensive 
g u i d a n c e  the public a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  legal professions h a v e  pub l i s h e d  o n  the subject, a n d  o f  practices 
s u g g e s t e d  b y  the results o f  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  research projects, a n d  b y  presentations m a d e  to the C o m ­
mission.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  believes that m o r e  detailed delineation a n d  description o f  responsibilities is best left to the 
discretion o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the b o a r d  o f  directors to tailor to the n e e d s  a n d  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  o f  e a c h  
c o m p a n y .  In the c o u r s e  o f  its research a n d  deliberations, h o w e v e r ,  the C o m m i s s i o n  h a s  identified additional, 
m o r e  specific practices a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  that c a n  h el p audit c o m m i t t e e s  p e r f o r m  their oversight role effec­
tively. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  is not prescribing these additional m e a s u r e s ,  a n d  therefore h a s  not incl u d e d  t h e m  
as r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  but offers this g u i d a n c e  in the f o r m  o f  the f o l lowi ng G o o d  Practice Guidelines, w h i c h  
c o m p a n i e s  c a n  consider within the exercise o f  their j u d g m e n t .  T o  c o m p a n i e s  that already h a v e  audit 
c o m m i t t e e s ,  the guidelines will serve as a standard for r e v i e w  a n d  ass essment. O t h e r  c o m p a n i e s  —  those 
just establishing audit c o m m i t t e e s  or those s e e king to i m p r o v e  their c o m m i t t e e s '  effectiveness —  m a y  find 
t h e m  to b e  helpful in suggesting practical w a y s  for audit c o m m i t t e e s  to dis charge their responsibilities.
G e n e r a l  G u i d e l i n e s
• Size a n d  T e r m  o f  A p p o i n t m e n t .  A n  audit c o m m i t t e e  n o r m a l l y  s h o u l d  consist o f  not f e w e r  t ha n three 
i n d e p e n d e n t  directors. T h e  m a x i m u m  size m a y  vary, but the c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  b e  small e n o u g h  so that 
e a c h  m e m b e r  is a n  active participant. T h e  t e r m  o f  a p p o i n t m e n t  is at the discretion o f  the b o a r d  of
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directors, b u t  it is desirable to h a v e  t e r m s  a r r a n g e d  to m a i n t a i n  continuity w h i l e  bringing fresh p e r s p e c ­
tives to the w o r k  o f  the c o m m i t t e e .
• M e e t i n g s .  T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  m e e t  o n  a  regular basis a n d  special m e e t i n g s  s h o u l d  b e  called as 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  require. T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  m e e t  privately w i t h  the internal auditor a n d  the i n d e p e n ­
d en t public accountant.
• R e p o r t i n g  to the B o a r d  o f  Directors. T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  report its activities to the full b o a r d  o n  a 
regular basis, s u c h  as after e a c h  m e e t i n g ,  so that the b o a r d  is k e p t  i n f o r m e d  o f  its activities o n  a current 
basis.
• E x p a n d  K n o w l e d g e  o f  C o m p a n y  Oper a t i o n s .  A  systematic a n d  continuing learning p r o cess for audit 
c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  will increase their effectiveness. O n e  w a y  is to r e v i e w  various financial aspects of  
the c o m p a n y  o n  a p l a n n e d  basis.
• C o m p a n y  C o u n s e l .  T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  m e e t  regularly w i t h  the c o m p a n y ' s  general counsel, a n d  
outside c o u n s e l  w h e n  appropriate, to discuss legal matters that m a y  h a v e  a  significant i m p a c t  o n  the 
c o m p a n y ' s  financial statements. In a  n u m b e r  o f  c o m p a n i e s  the general c o u n s e l  and/or outside co u n s e l  
attend meetings.
• A u d i t  Pla n s .  T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  r e v i e w  w i t h  the chief internal auditor a n d  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
a c c o u n t a n t  their a n n u a l  audit plans, including the d e g r e e  o f  coordination o f  the respective plans. T h e  
c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  inquire as to the extent to w h i c h  the p l a n n e d  audit s c o p e  c a n  b e  relied u p o n  to detect 
fraud or w e a k n e s s e s  in internal controls.
• Electronic D a t a  Proc e s s i n g .  T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  discuss w i t h  the internal auditor a n d  the i n d e p e n ­
d en t public a c c o u n t a n t  w h a t  steps are p l a n n e d  for a r e v i e w  o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  electronic data pro cessing 
p r o c e d u r e s  a n d  controls, a n d  inquire as to the specific security p r o g r a m s  to protect against c o m p u t e r  fraud 
or m i s u s e  f r o m  b o t h  within a n d  outside the c o m p a n y .
• O t h e r  Auditors. T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  inquire as to the extent to w h i c h  i n d e p e n d e n t  public acc ountants 
other t ha n the principal auditor are to b e  u s e d  a n d  u n d e r s t a n d  the rationale for u s i n g  t h e m .  T h e  c o m m i t t e e  
s h o u l d  request that their w o r k  b e  c o o rdin ated a n d  that a n  appropriate r e v i e w  o f  their w o r k  b e  p e r f o r m e d  
b y  the principal auditor.
• Officer E x p e n s e s  a n d  Perquisites. T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  r e v i e w  in- hous e policies a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  for 
regular r e v i e w  o f  officers' e x p e n s e s  a n d  perquisites, including a n y  u s e  o f  corporate assets, inquire as to 
the results o f  the re v i e w ,  and, if appropriate, r e v i e w  a  s u m m a r i z a t i o n  o f  the e x p e n s e s  a n d  perquisites of  
the period u n d e r  review.
• A r e a s  R e q u i r i n g  S pe cial Attention. T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  instruct the i n d e p e n d e n t  public a c c o u n t a n t  
a n d  the internal auditor that the c o m m i t t e e  e x p ects to b e  a d v i s e d  if there are a n y  areas that require its 
special attention.
S e l e c t i o n  o f  a n  I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t
A  p r i m a r y  responsibility o f  the audit c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  b e  the selection o f  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac c o u n t a n t  
for the c o m p a n y .  T h e  actual selection generally is p r o p o s e d  b y  m a n a g e m e n t ,  w i t h  the audit c o m m i t t e e  
c o n f i r m i n g  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  selection, a n d  is ratified b y  the stockholders. S u g g e s t e d  b e l o w  are a  n u m b e r  of  
considerations that m a y  enter into the decision. T h e r e  will b e  variations, o f  course, including those that 
d e p e n d  u p o n  w h e t h e r  the c o m m i t t e e  is con sidering m a n a g e m e n t ' s  prop o s a l  to retain the present i n d e p e n d e n t  
public a ccountants or m a n a g e m e n t ' s  p roposal to a pp oint a n e w  public a c c o u n t i n g  firm.
Issues related to this audit:
• O p i n i o n s  o n  the p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  the public a c c o u n t i n g  firm b y  appropriate m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the chief 
internal auditor
• T h e  p r o p o s e d  audit fee a n d  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant's e n g a g e m e n t  letter; explanations for fee 
c h a n g e s
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• T h e  e x p e c t e d  level o f  participation b y  the partner a n d  other m a n a g e m e n t  p e r s o n n e l  in the audit e x a m i n a ­
tion, the m i x  o f  skills a n d  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  the staff, a n d  staff rotation policy
• If a n e w  public a c c o u n t i n g  firm is b e i n g  considered, the steps p l a n n e d  to e n s u r e  a s m o o t h  a n d  effective 
transition.
Issues related to the firm generally:
• T h e  report o f  the public a c c o u n t i n g  firm's latest p e e r  r e v i e w  c o n d u c t e d  p u r s u a n t  to a professional quality 
control p r o g r a m
• A n y  significant litigation p r o b l e m s  or disciplinary actions b y  the S E C  or others
• T h e  public a c c o u n t i n g  firm's credentials, capabilities, a n d  reputation a n d  a  list o f  clients in the s a m e  
industry a n d  g e o g rap hica l area.
P o s t - A u d i t  R e v i e w
• T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  obtain f r o m  m a n a g e m e n t  explanations for all significant variances in the financial 
statements b e t w e e n  years. (This r e v i e w  m a y  b e  p e r f o r m e d  at a  m e e t i n g  o f  the entire board.) T h e  
c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  consider w h e t h e r  the data are consistent w i t h  the M a n a g e m e n t ' s  D i s c u s s i o n  a n d  
A n a l y s i s  ( M D & A )  section of  the a n n u a l  report.
• T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  request a n  explanation f r o m  financial m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
a c c o u n t a n t  o f  c h a n g e s  in a c c o u n t i n g  standards or rules p r o m u l g a t e d  b y  the Financial A c c o u n t i n g  S t a n ­
dar ds B o a r d ,  Securities a n d  E x c h a n g e  C o m m i s s i o n  or other regulatory bodies, that h a v e  a n  effect o n  the 
financial statements.
• T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  inquire a b o u t  the existence a n d  s ub stan ce o f  a n y  significant a c c o u n t i n g  accruals, 
reserves, or estimates m a d e  b y  m a n a g e m e n t  that h a d  a  material i m p a c t  o n  the financial statements.
• T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  inquire o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public a c c o u n t a n t  if there w e r e  a n y  
significant financial reporting issues discussed d u r i n g  the a c c o u n t i n g  period a n d  if s o  h o w  they w e r e  
resolved.
• T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  m e e t  privately w i t h  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant, to request his o p i n i o n  o n  
various matters including the quality o f  financial a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  per s o n n e l  a n d  the internal audit staff.
• T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  a s k  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public a c c o u n t a n t  w h a t  his greatest c o n c e r n s  w e r e  a n d  if h e  
believes a n y t h i n g  else s h o u l d  b e  discussed w i t h  the c o m m i t t e e  that h a s  not b e e n  raised o r  c o v e r e d  
els ewhere.
• T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  r e v i e w  the letter o f  m a n a g e m e n t  representations g i v e n  to the i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
a c c o u n t a n t  a n d  inquire w h e t h e r  h e  e n c o u n t e r e d  a n y  difficulties in obtaining the letter or a n y  specific 
representations therein.
• T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  discuss w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public a c c o u n t a n t  the s ub stan ce o f  
a n y  significant issues raised b y  i n-house a n d  outside c o u n s e l  c o n c e r n i n g  litigation, contingencies, cla i m s  
or assessments. T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  u n d e r s t a n d  h o w  s u c h  matters are reflected in the c o m p a n y ' s  
financial statements.
• T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  d e t e r m i n e  the o p e n  years o n  federal i n c o m e  tax returns a n d  w h e t h e r  there are a n y  
significant ite ms that h a v e  b e e n  or m i g h t  b e  disputed b y  the I R S ,  a n d  inquire as to the status o f  the related 
tax reserves.
• T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  r e v i e w  w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t  the M D & A  section o f  the a n n u a l  report a n d  a s k  the 
extent to w h i c h  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public a c c o u n t a n t  r e v i e w e d  the M D & A  section. T h e  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  
inquire o f  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public a c c o u n t a n t  if the other sections o f  the a n n u a l  report to stockholders are 
consistent w i t h  the i n f orma tion reflected in the financial statements.
• T h e  c o m m i t t e e  a n d  the b o a r d  o f  directors s h o u l d  c onsider w h e t h e r  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public ac c o u n t a n t  
s h o u l d  m e e t  w i t h  the full b o a r d  to discuss a n y  matters relative to the financial statements a n d  to a n s w e r  
a n y  questions that other directors m a y  have.
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G O O D  P R A C T I C E  G U I D E L I N E S  F O R  
M A N A G E M E N T ' S  R E P O R T
H o w  m a n a g e m e n t  carries out its financial reporting responsibilities is o f  interest to the investing public. 
W i d e s p r e a d  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  reports, tailored to fit individual c o m p a n y  circumstances, will 
i m p r o v e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w i t h  financial sta tement users a b o u t  the nature o f  financial i n f orma tion a n d  the 
processes a n d  responsibilities that s u r r o u n d  its preparation a n d  presentation.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  h a s  r e c o m m e n d e d  that all a n n u a l  reports to stockholders b e  required b y  S E C  rule to include 
a m a n a g e m e n t  report, sig n e d  b y  the c o m p a n y ' s  chief executive officer a n d  the chief financial officer and/or 
the chief a c c o u n t i n g  officer. T h e  controller m a y  serve as the chief a c c o u n t i n g  officer, or the chief financial 
officer also m a y  p e r f o r m  the functions o f  a chief a c c o u n t i n g  officer. T h i s  report s h o u l d  a c k n o w l e d g e  
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  responsibilities for the financial statements a n d  internal controls, discuss h o w  these r e s p o n ­
sibilities w e r e  fulfilled, a n d  p r o v i d e  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  the effectiveness o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal 
controls.
C o n t e n t  o f  t h e  M a n a g e m e n t  R e p o r t
A n  inf ormative m a n a g e m e n t  report s h o u l d  discuss the fo l l o w i n g  matters, as applicable:
• M a n a g e m e n t ' s  responsibilities for the financial statements. T h i s  part o f  the m a n a g e m e n t  report s h o u l d  
specifically a c k n o w l e d g e  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  responsibilities for:
—  P r e p a r i n g  the financial statements so that they are fairly presented in a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  generally 
a c c e p t e d  a c c o u n t i n g  principles appropriate in the c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a n d  not misstated d u e  to material 
fraud or error
—  P r e p a r i n g  the other i nformation in the a n n u a l  report to stockholders a n d  ensu r i n g  that s u c h  infor­
m a t i o n  is correct a n d  consistent w i t h  the financial statements
—  D e t e r m i n i n g  the estimates a n d  j u d g m e n t s  u s e d  in pre paring the financial statements.
• M a n a g e m e n t ' s  responsibility for establishing a n d  m a i n t a i n i n g  a s y s t e m  of  internal control d e s i g n e d  to 
p r o v i d e  r ea sona ble a s s uran ce as to the integrity a n d  reliability o f  the financial statements, the protection 
o f  assets, a n d  the pre vent ion a n d  detection o f  fraudulent financial reporting. M a n a g e m e n t ' s  discussion 
o f  internal control also s h o u l d  include:
—  M a n a g e m e n t ' s  o p i n i o n  as to the effectiveness o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal controls as o f  the e n d  of  
the c o m p a n y ' s  fiscal year, or at s o m e  other point in t i m e  d u r i n g  the fiscal ye a r
—  A  description o f  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  basis for its o p i n i o n  o n  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal controls
—  M a n a g e m e n t ' s  statement that it h a s  appropriately r e s p o n d e d  to the internal auditor's a n d  i n d e p e n ­
d en t public accountant's r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal control system.
O t h e r  D i s c l o s u r e s  in t h e  M a n a g e m e n t  R e p o r t
T h e  exact contents o f  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  report c a n n o t  b e  prescribed; to attempt to d o  so w o u l d  e n c o u r a g e  
boilerplate reports o f  little value. In addition to the matters specifically n o t e d  a b o v e ,  other topics that 
m a n a g e m e n t  m a y  w i s h  to discuss include:
• T h e  financial records a n d  d o c u m e n t s ,  a n d  m i n u t e s  o f  i m p o r t a n t  mee t i n g s ,  that w e r e  m a d e  available to 
the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountants a n d  the validity a n d  a c c u r a c y  o f  the representations that w e r e  m a d e  
to the i n d e p e n d e n t  public acc ountants
• A  c h a n g e  in i n d e p e n d e n t  public a ccountants d u r i n g  the y ea r
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• T h e  reporting relationships within the c o m p a n y  o f  individuals w i t h  significant roles in the financial 
reporting process
• T h e  w o r k  o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal auditors
• T h e  inherent limitations o f  internal control
• T h e  existence o f  a c o d e  o f  c o n d u c t  w h i c h  is m o n i t o r e d  a n d  enforced; this discussion also c o u l d  include 
a n  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  the c o d e
• Uncertainties w h o s e  resolution c o u l d  h a v e  a material i m p a c t  o n  the financial statements.
E x a m p l e  o f  M a n a g e m e n t  R e p o r t
T h e  fol l o w i n g  is a n  illustration o f  a m a n a g e m e n t  report. A c t u a l  m a n a g e m e n t  reports s h o u l d  b e  tailored to
the facts a n d  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  o f  e a c h  c o m p a n y .
M A N A G E M E N T  R E P O R T  O N  R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y  
F O R  F I N A N C I A L  R E P O R T I N G
T h e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  A B C  C o r p o r a t i o n  a n d  its subsidiaries h a s  the responsibility for pre paring 
the a c c o m p a n y i n g  financial statements a n d  for their integrity a n d  objectivity. T h e  statements 
w e r e  p r e p a r e d  in a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  generally a c c e p t e d  a c c o u n t i n g  principles applied o n  a  c o n ­
sistent basis a n d  are not misstated d u e  to material fraud or error. T h e  financial statements include 
a m o u n t s  that are b a s e d  o n  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  best estimates a n d  j u d g m e n t s .  M a n a g e m e n t  also 
p r e p a r e d  the other i nformation in the a n n u a l  report a n d  is responsible for its a c c u r a c y  a n d  
con sistency w i t h  the financial statements.
T h e  corporation's financial statements h a v e  b e e n  audited b y  X Y Z  C o . ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  certified 
public accountants, elected b y  the shareholders. M a n a g e m e n t  h a s  m a d e  available to X Y Z  C o .  
all the corporation's financial records a n d  related data, as well as the m i n u t e s  o f  stockholders' 
a n d  directors' meetings. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  m a n a g e m e n t  believes that all representations m a d e  to 
X Y Z  C o .  d u r i n g  its audit w e r e  valid a n d  appropriate.
M a n a g e m e n t  o f  the corporation has established a n d  m a i ntai ns a s y s t e m  o f  internal control that 
prov i d e s  reasonable a s s uran ce as to the integrity a n d  reliability o f  the financial statements, the 
protection o f  assets f r o m  u n a u t h o r i z e d  u s e  or  disposition, a n d  the p re vent ion a n d  detection o f  
fraudulent financial reporting. T h e  s y s t e m  o f  internal control p rovides for appropriate division 
o f  responsibility a n d  is d o c u m e n t e d  b y  written policies a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  that are c o m m u n i c a t e d  
to e m p l o y e e s  w i t h  significant roles in the financial reporting process a n d  u p d a t e d  as necessary. 
M a n a g e m e n t  continually m o n i t o r s  the s y s t e m  o f  internal control for c o m p l i a n c e .  T h e  c o r p o r a ­
tion mai n t a i n s  a  strong internal auditing p r o g r a m  that i n d e p e n d e n t l y  assesses the effectiveness 
o f  the internal controls a n d  r e c o m m e n d s  possible i m p r o v e m e n t s  thereto. In addition, as part o f  
its audit o f  the corporation's financial statements, X Y Z  C o .  c o m p l e t e d  a stu dy a n d  evaluation 
o f  selected internal a c c o u n t i n g  controls to establish a  basis for reliance thereon in d e t e r m i n i n g  
the nature, timing, a n d  extent of  audit tests to b e  applied. M a n a g e m e n t  h a s  c o n s i d e r e d  the 
internal auditor's a n d  X Y Z  C o . ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  the corporation's s y s t e m  o f  
internal control a n d  h a s  ta k e n  actions that w e  believe are cost-effective in the c i r c u m s t a n c e s  to 
r e s p o n d  appropriately to these r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  M a n a g e m e n t  believes that, as o f  [date], the 
corporation's s y s t e m  o f  internal control is a d e q u a t e  to a c c o m p l i s h  the objectives dis cussed 
herein.
M a n a g e m e n t  also recognizes its responsibility for fostering a strong ethical climate so that the 
corporation's affairs are c o n d u c t e d  a c c o r d i n g  to the highest standards o f  personal a n d  corporate 
conduct. T h i s  responsibility is characterized a n d  reflected in the corporation's c o d e  o f  corporate 
c onduct, w h i c h  is publicized t h r o u g h o u t  the corporation. T h e  c o d e  o f  c o n d u c t  addresses, a m o n g  
other things, the necessity o f  ens urin g o p e n  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  within the corporation; potential
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conflicts o f  interests; c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  all d o m e s t i c  a n d  foreign laws, including those relating to 
financial disclosure; a n d  the confidentiality o f  proprietary information. T h e  corporation m a i n ­
tains a  systematic p r o g r a m  to assess c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  these policies.
J o e  D o e  
C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e  Officer 
J a n e  S m i t h  
C h i e f  Financial Officer 
(and/or) 
J a n e  B r o w n  
Controller
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G O O D  P R A C T I C E  G U I D E L I N E S  F O R  A U D I T  
C O M M I T T E E  C H A I R M A N ' S  L E T T E R
A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  play a n  i m p o r t a n t  role in o v e r s e e i n g  the financial reporting p ro cess a n d  the establishment 
a n d  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  strong internal controls. T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  that the Securities a n d  E x c h a n g e  
C o m m i s s i o n  require all a n n u a l  reports to stockholders to include a letter f r o m  the c h a i r m a n  o f  the audit 
c o m m i t t e e  describing the c o m m i t t e e ' s  responsibilities a n d  activities.
A m o n g  other subjects, the audit c o m m i t t e e  c h a i r m a n ' s  letter c o u l d  discuss:
• T h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  the audit c o m m i t t e e
• T h e  identity o f  e a c h  audit c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r ,  unless disclosed e l s e w h e r e
• T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e ' s  purp o s e ,  objectives, a n d  responsibilities
• T h e  activities o f  the audit c o m m i t t e e  dur i n g  the past ye a r  including matters s u c h  as the n u m b e r  o f  
m e e t i n g s  he l d  a n d  the significant topics discussed w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t ,  internal auditors, a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  
public accountants.
T h e  fo l l o w i n g  is a n  e x a m p l e  o f  a letter b y  the c h a i r m a n  o f  a n  audit c o m m i t t e e .  T h i s  illustrative letter d o e s  
not contain the precise w o r d i n g  that the audit c o m m i t t e e  c h a i r m a n  s h o u l d  u s e  o r  in a n y  w a y  limit the 
selection o f  topics the c h a i r m a n  m a y  w i s h  to discuss.
A U D I T  C O M M I T T E E  C H A I R M A N ' S  L E T T E R
T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e  o f  the b o a r d  o f  directors is c o m p o s e d  o f _ _  i n d e p e n d e n t  directors. T h e
m e m b e r s  o f  the audit c o m m i t t e e  are: J o h n  D o e ,  C h a i r m a n ,  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  , a n d
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . T h e  c o m m i t t e e  held _ _  m e e t i n g s  d u r i n g  fiscal y e a r _ _ _ .
T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e  o versees the c o m p a n y ' s  financial reporting p ro cess o n  beh a l f  o f  the b o a r d  
o f  directors. In fulfilling its responsibility, the c o m m i t t e e  r e c o m m e n d e d  to the b o a r d  o f  directors, 
subject to shareholder approval, the selection o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant. 
T h e  audit c o m m i t t e e  dis cussed w i t h  the internal auditor a n d  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public accou n t a n t  
the overall s c o p e  a n d  specific plans for their respective audits. T h e  c o m m i t t e e  also discussed the 
c o m p a n y ' s  consolidated financial statements a n d  the a d e q u a c y  o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal c o n ­
trols. T h e  c o m m i t t e e  m e t  regularly w i t h  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal auditor a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  public 
accountant, w i t h o u t  m a n a g e m e n t  present, to discuss the results o f  their e x a m i n a t i o n s ,  their 
evaluations o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  internal controls, a n d  the overall quality o f  the c o m p a n y ' s  financial 
reporting. T h e  m e e t i n g s  also w e r e  d e s i g n e d  to facilitate a n y  private c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w i t h  the 
c o m m i t t e e  desired b y  the internal auditor or i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant.
J o h n  D o e ,  C h a i r m a n  
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e
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